CourtListener 10714234•In re A.M. CA2/8
Full text
Filed 10/29/25 In re A.M. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re A.M. et al., Persons Coming B340692
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP00416A–C)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent
v.
F.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant F.M.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant V.A.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
The juvenile court found siblings A.M., An.M., and V.M.
came within its jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (d) due to their father’s
sexual abuse of an unrelated child. The parents appeal,
contending the jurisdictional findings and removal order were not
supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother V.A., Father F.M., and their three daughters, A.M.,
An.M., and V.M., lived together in a home with an unrelated
child, R.G., for whom V.A. was caring on a long-term basis while
R.G.’s father was incarcerated. R.G. referred to V.A. as her
mother, F.M. as her father, and the other children as her sisters.
In December 2023, R.G., age 12, disclosed she had been
sexually abused by M.H., a man she considered to be her
grandfather.2 The disclosure was prompted by V.A., who had
learned that M.H. had abused a cousin of R.G.’s and asked R.G. if
M.H. had done anything to her. At first, R.G. denied the abuse
because she was scared that no one would believe her, but after
crying at school, she told a teacher that M.H. had abused her.
The allegation was reported to the police, who began
investigating. R.G. underwent a forensic interview on December
13, 2023, concerning the abuse by M.H.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
2 M.H. was actually the spouse of a person who took care of
R.G. while V.A. attended school.
2
In January 2024, R.G. sent an e-mail to two of her teachers
stating she had been abused by both M.H. and F.M. R.G.
confirmed the allegations to a school counselor.
R.G.’s disclosure of abuse by F.M. was reported to the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on January
11, 2024.) It was reported to DCFS that R.G. said F.M. sexually
touched her on multiple occasions. R.G. stated that since she was
a first grader, F.M. had been going into her bedroom while she
was there with her sister and touching her (R.G.)
inappropriately. The abuse happened when V.A. was at work.
R.G. said the abuse temporarily stopped when she was in the
second grade because V.A. did not work that year, but resumed
when she was in the third, fourth, and fifth grades. According to
R.G., F.M. had touched her five times in her bedroom during the
previous year. R.G. said she was scared and did not know what
to do. She was afraid to tell V.A. about the abuse because F.M.
got mad at small things and took his anger out on the sisters.
A DCFS social worker interviewed R.G., V.A., and F.M. on
January 11, 2024. R.G. reported that when she was in the first
grade, F.M. touched her while she was laying on the couch
watching a movie. R.G. said F.M. touched her breast under her
clothes, but she would not elaborate about the incident. R.G. also
reported that when she was in fourth and fifth grades, F.M.
“touched [her] breast under the clothes and the lower area, front
and back, under clothes.” No one else was present at the time.
She did not remember how frequently the abuse occurred, and
she did not elaborate further about what had taken place. R.G.
did not tell Mother about F.M. touching her inappropriately, as
she was scared to say anything. R.G. had not seen F.M. touch his
daughters inappropriately. R.G. told the social worker she was
3
not afraid of V.A. or F.M. and felt safe at home with them. The
social worker described R.G.’s demeanor as “tranquil and
respectful.”
V.A. said she believed R.G. and would protect R.G. and her
children, but she also disputed R.G.’s account. V.A. said, “I don’t
discredit [R.G.], but I will not say something that is not true. I’m
dedicated to the family. I go out with all the kids. I talk to them
about not allowing anyone touching them inappropriately. I’m
very open in regards to sexual abuse.” V.A. said she never went
out and was always home, and she had been home since she was
pregnant with her oldest child. She said she had worked during
the year R.G. was in the first grade. V.A. said, “I will cut all ties
with anyone who would hurt my children, and although [F.M.]
has never given me no reason to believe he has done something
wrong, my children come first. I did not see signs, and I didn’t
see that happening. I was molested as a kid myself, and I am
very vigilant and paranoid, because I have girls, and I don't want
them to go through any of that harassment and/or abuse.” V.A.
said her daughters had not disclosed any inappropriate touching
by F.M.
F.M. told DCFS he had never touched R.G. or his daughters
inappropriately or sexually. He agreed to leave the home until
the investigation was completed. V.A. and F.M.’s daughters, ages
four, three, and one, were too young to make meaningful
statements regarding the allegations.
On January 12, 2024, V.A. sent a text message to DCFS
stating R.G. had recanted her allegation against F.M. According
to V.A., R.G. “woke up this morning crying saying she made it up,
she lied[,] that [F.M.] never touched her. She wanted my
attention and the attention she got from us when she told us
4
about [M.H.] . We did more alone time with her without the
younger kids and she liked that and wanted that.” A police
officer confirmed to DCFS that R.G. had admitted making up the
allegations against F.M. and that he had not touched her breast
or vagina. R.G. told the police she did not feel uncomfortable
around F.M., she trusted him, and she had never seen him touch
her siblings inappropriately.
On January 23, 2024, R.G. underwent a forensic interview
concerning the allegations involving F.M. When asked why she
was being interviewed that day, she responded, “Today, it’s kind
of about my dad but what my dad did I probably was confused
with my grandpa because what I experienced with my grandpa
was kind of my whole life, so what he did I probably got confused
with my dad.” R.G. told the interviewer what M.H. had done, but
said she did not want to go into “full detail” because she would
“probably break down or get really uncomfortable.”
After exploring the abuse by M.H., the interviewer asked
R.G. what had happened with F.M. “Nothing happened with my
dad,” said R.G. “It’s probably because I got confused [because]
me and my dad we hang out a lot and I know my dad would never
do anything like that to me.” She acknowledged that she had
said F.M. had sexually touched her, and when asked to describe
that, she said, “Probably what my grandpa did, like rub on me.”
“[W]hat would he have used to rub on you?” the interviewer
asked.
“Like his arms, his hands,” responded R.G. The
interviewer asked where that would happen, and R.G. said,
“What I would think would happen, because my grandpa always
came over so I would get confused with him and my dad but it
would be in my bedroom.”
5
When asked how the “stuff about dad” came up, R.G.
answered, “I don’t exactly remember. It was a long time ago,
probably like in fifth grade and both my parents were home and
my grandpa. And I never really knew [because] my dad would
come in my room all the time to help me clean my room [because]
my room was always the messy one. But I think that’s when I
got confused.”
R.G. told the interviewer that she had reported the abuse
by F.M. to two of her teachers by e-mail. When asked what she
told them, R.G. said, “Probably that I was just sexually touched.”
She then told a school counselor “mainly about my grandpa and
how I probably, and about my dad too.”
The interviewer asked R.G. what had happened since she
disclosed abuse by F.M. R.G. said that since then she had barely
seen F.M., and only on weekends when V.A. was present. This
made her feel “[p]retty sad” because she and F.M. had a good
relationship. The interviewer asked how R.G. felt when the
interviewer asked about F.M., and R.G. answered, “My feelings
around Dad are pretty sad because after everything about my
dad we haven’t talked as much you know and me not talking with
my dad is sad because me and my dad talk a lot.” She feared
F.M. would be mad at her for saying anything if it ruined their
relationship.
The forensic interviewer wrote that R.G. “provided
consistent statements about sexual abuse by [F.M.], which
included being ‘rubbed’ on her body (i.e. arms, back, back lower
part/buttocks) while in her bedroom. [R.G.] minimized [F.M.’s]
actions, stating that he entered her bedroom when he would help
her clean up. She also attempt[ed] to justify his actions, stating
that her ‘dad would never do that.’ It should be noted that
6
this evaluator remains concerned for sexual abuse by
[F.M.]. [R.G.] expressed feelings of responsibility for the shift in
the family dynamics and in her relationship with [F.M.]. She
also expressed feelings of sadness since these shifts occurred.
[R.G.’s] recantation and minimization are unsurprising given
that her initial disclosure was elicited and not spontaneous—as
in, she did not make an independent decision that she was ready
to disclose and seek help.” The interviewer observed that “the
mental and emotional distress caused by the abuse is excessive,
as evidenced by [R.G.’s] feelings of fear, the thought that she
would not be believed if she disclosed the abuse, her feelings and
statements of sadness, her feelings of guilt and responsibility for
the abuse and the changes in her relationship with [F.M.], and
her depressive feelings (i.e. sadness, sleeping often, self-
isolating).” The forensic interviewer believed R.G. “most likely
recanted when confronted about the situation as she feels
that her life changed when she mentioned her father
sexually touched her, which was why she was trying to
defend him with statements of feeling as if she was
confusing the situation with grandfather and her father.”
After the forensic interview, R.G. underwent a forensic
medical examination, but the extent of the examination was
limited by R.G.’s refusal to undergo a genitourinary examination
or to change into an examination gown.
DCFS filed a dependency petition concerning R.G. That
petition is not at issue in this appeal. The relevant petition for
this appeal is the petition filed on February 6, 2024, alleging
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect)
and (d) (sexual abuse) that F.M. sexually abused R.G. by fondling
her breasts and lower body, and that the sexual abuse of R.G. by
7
F.M. endangered the physical health and safety of A.M., An.M.,
and V.M., created a detrimental home environment, and placed
A.M., An.M., and V.M. at risk of serious physical harm, damage,
danger and sexual abuse. No allegations were made against V.A.
in the petition.
On February 11, 2024, V.A. told DCFS that R.G. recanted
the day after she made her accusations and said “she was missing
the attention she got when she was with [M.H]. I have three
smaller kids who unfortunately are more active and require more
attention. Sometimes [R.G] gets pushed to the back a little. She
also missed her mom.” V.A. did not believe F.M. had abused
R.G., stating, “I don’t get any of that vibes from him.” V.A.
thought R.G.’s claim of sexual abuse “was a cry for attention.”
On February 26, 2024, F.M. denied abusing R.G. The social
worker asked F.M. why he thought R.G. made her allegation
against him. F.M. replied, “I’m not sure. Not sure if it’s
confusion with the grandpa’s case. Not sure if someone talked to
her.”
On August 12, 2024, the juvenile court found true the
allegations of the dependency petition. The court stated it
believed F.M. had abused R.G. The court acknowledged R.G. had
recanted but stated its belief that “recantation is part of trauma
that children who are victims of sexual abuse display. It’s very
noteworthy to this child recanting and saying she was afraid
[F.M.] would be mad at her because she disclosed, lends
credibility to her initial reports. She does not want to disappoint
him. She doesn’t want to anger him for fear that these actions
will happen again.”
8
The court noted R.G.’s account of F.M.’s abuse was less
descriptive than her description of M.H.’s abuse, but opined that
this was because R.G. was “interviewed again and again.” The
court observed that F.M.’s daughters were the same age as R.G.
was while she was being abused by F.M., and said, “This court
believes that the abuse happened and these children are at risk
of imminent harm.”
A.M., An.M., and V.M. were declared dependents of the
juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d).
The court removed them from F.M.’s custody, released them to
V.A., granted F.M. monitored visitation, and ordered him to
participate in various programs and services. The court ordered
family maintenance services and a sexual abuse awareness
program for V.A.
F.M. and V.A. appealed. While the appeal was pending,
the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction over the
children.3
DISCUSSION
I. Mootness
Respondent asserted in their briefing that the appeal from
the order removing the children from F.M.’s custody was moot
because the trial court returned the children to him and
terminated dependency court jurisdiction. We asked the parties4
3 We grant Respondent’s request for judicial notice of the
juvenile court’s May 12, 2025 minute orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
459, subd. (a); In re M.B. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 617, 627.)
4 Although V.A. was non-offending, she has appealed from
the judgment. Her briefing on appeal consists solely of joinders
in F.M.’s arguments. “Appellate counsel for the party purporting
9
to advise this court whether the entire appeal should be
dismissed as moot in light of the termination of dependency court
jurisdiction over the children. We have read and considered the
parties’ submissions.
We conclude this appeal has been mooted by the
termination of dependency jurisdiction. A case becomes moot
when events render it impossible for a court, if it should decide
the case in favor of the appellant, to grant any effective relief. (In
re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) For relief to be
effective, the appellant must complain of an ongoing harm that is
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome appellant
seeks. (Ibid.) Here, because the court terminated jurisdiction
over the children and released them to their parents, the
jurisdictional finding has not formed the basis for any order that
is now adversely affecting or curtailing F.M.’s rights. (See id. at
pp. 277–278 [case not moot where jurisdictional finding affects
to join some or all of the claims raised by another are obligated to
thoughtfully assess whether such joinder is proper as to the
specific claims and, if necessary, to provide particularized
argument in support of his or her client’s ability to seek relief on
that ground. If a party’s briefs do not provide legal argument and
citation to authority on each point raised, ‘ “the court may treat it
as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]” ’
[Citation.] ‘Joinder may be broadly permitted [citation], but each
appellant has the burden of demonstrating error and prejudice.’ ”
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363–
364.) As V.A. makes no independent claims, does not
demonstrate error or prejudice as to her, and provides no
particularized argument in support of her ability to seek relief on
the grounds raised by F.M., we need not discuss her appeal
further.
10
custody rights, curtails contact with child, or has resulted in
dispositional orders that continue to adversely affect a parent].)
Even if F.M. is successful on appeal in his challenge to the
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, there is no
effective relief we can provide to him.
F.M. concedes his appeal of the dispositional order has been
mooted by the termination of jurisdiction but contends his
challenge to the jurisdictional findings is not moot. He claims he
“continues to suffer ongoing harm, as the jurisdictional findings
are prejudicial to him, and this harm is capable of being rectified
by the outcome that [he] seeks.” As this conclusory assertion is
not supported by any discussion or explanation of what ongoing
harm or prejudice he is suffering as a result of the jurisdictional
findings, F.M. has failed to identify “a tangible legal or practical
consequence of the jurisdictional finding that would be remedied
by a favorable decision on appeal.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 278.)
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) F.M. asks this court to exercise our
inherent discretion to rule on the appeal’s merits even if it is
moot, arguing the findings were egregious and could impact any
future dependency referrals or proceedings. He claims both
parents promptly complied with their case plans, resulting in
jurisdiction terminating, and argues their diligence should not
result in the dismissal of the appeal. While F.M.’s argument is
conclusory, vague, and largely speculative, in an abundance of
caution we exercise our discretion to review his appeal on the
merits.
11
II. Jurisdictional Findings
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633
(R.T.).) Under this standard of review, we examine the record in
the light most favorable to the findings and conclusions of the
juvenile court and defer to the juvenile court on issues of
credibility of the evidence and witnesses. (Ibid.) We “ ‘ “do not
reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but
merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766, 773.) If there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile
court’s order, we must uphold the order even if other evidence
supports a contrary conclusion. (In re Megan S. (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251.)
The evidence is sufficient to support the court’s findings.
R.G. disclosed that on multiple occasions over several years,
when V.A. was at work, F.M. sexually abused her. The abuse
began when R.G. was in the first grade, when F.M. touched her
breast under her clothes as she lay on the couch watching a
movie. As she got older, F.M. began touching her genital area
under her clothes. R.G. recanted her statement, telling the
forensic interviewer she must have been confused between M.H.
and F.M., but the juvenile court found R.G.’s initial reports more
credible than her awkward recantation. We defer to the juvenile
court’s determination of the credibility of both the evidence and
the witnesses. (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) As for risk to
F.M.’s daughters, there was evidence R.G. was abused in the
presence of one of the daughters, and at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing, F.M.’s oldest daughter was five years old,
an age similar to R.G.’s age when the abuse began.
12
Section 355, subdivision (b) provides that hearsay evidence
contained in an agency’s social study “is admissible and
constitutes competent evidence upon which a finding of
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 300 may be based, to the extent
allowed by subdivisions (c) and (d).” Section 355, subdivision
(c)(1) makes such hearsay evidence insufficient “by itself” to
support a jurisdictional finding “[i]f a party to the jurisdictional
hearing raises a timely objection” and the agency fails to show an
exception listed in the statute applies. Here, F.M. did not object
to the admission of R.G.’s statements at the jurisdictional
hearing; accordingly, pursuant to section 355, they are sufficient
by themselves to support the jurisdictional finding.
F.M. argues R.G.’s out-of-court statements were insufficient
to support the jurisdictional findings because they were
uncorroborated hearsay statements that were later recanted, and
they lacked the necessary indicia of reliability. F.M.’s argument
relies on In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869 (I.C.) and In re Lucero L.
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227 (Lucero L.), in which the California
Supreme Court imposed requirements beyond those imposed by
section 355 on hearsay statements of abuse made by truth-
incompetent children—i.e., those who are too young to testify due
to their inability to distinguish truth from falsehood. (I.C., at
p. 875; Lucero L., at pp. 1244–1248 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.);
Lucero L., at pp. 1250–1251 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) While “a
child’s out-of-court reports of parental abuse are admissible in
evidence [at a jurisdictional hearing] regardless of whether the
child is competent to testify in court,” pursuant to section 355,
subdivision (b) (I.C., at p. 875), the Supreme Court held a
jurisdictional finding may not be based solely on such a truth-
incompetent child’s hearsay statements without violating due
13
process, unless “ ‘ “the time, content and circumstances of the
statement” ’ ” bear sufficient indicia of reliability. (Id. at pp. 887,
890; Lucero L., at pp. 1231, 1244–1248 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.);
Lucero L., at pp. 1250–1251 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
Here, R.G. was 12 years old when she reported F.M.
sexually abused her. F.M. does not argue she was truth-
incompetent. The juvenile court did not find, nor is there any
evidence, that R.G. was unable to distinguish truth from
falsehood. Given that F.M. did not call R.G. to testify at the
jurisdictional hearing, much less question her competence to
differentiate truth from falsehood, the record does not support his
claim that her out-of-court statements were subject to additional
scrutiny under I.C. and Lucero L.
F.M. argues the evidence did not support two statements
made by the court while explaining the basis for its finding that
he had sexually abused R.G., but on appeal we review the
juvenile court’s ruling, not its reasoning. (In re A.A. (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313.) F.M.’s arguments, moreover, are
basically a claim that the juvenile court should have weighed the
evidence differently. First, he contends the record does not show
that R.G. had been interviewed “again and again,” which the
court cited as a reason that her allegations against F.M. were less
detailed than those she had made against M.H. However, the
evidence showed R.G. had been interviewed twice about her
allegations against F.M. in addition to discussing them with her
school counselor, and these conversations took place within
weeks of two interviews concerning her allegations against M.F.
Second, F.M. claims the court’s conclusion that R.G.
recanted because she did not want to anger F.M. for fear that his
actions would happen again was not supported by the evidence,
14
and he points to evidence in the record that R.G. and F.M. had a
good relationship and she felt safe with him. There was evidence
in the record that F.M. and R.G. had a positive relationship, but
R.G. also told DCFS she was afraid to disclose the abuse because
F.M. became angered by small things and took it out on the
sisters, and during the forensic interview she mentioned her fear
that F.M. would be mad at her for saying something. The court
reasonably concluded R.G.’s fear of F.M.’s anger for making
disclosing the abuse “len[t] credibility to her initial reports,” and
that this fear and her desire not to disappoint him signaled that
her recantation was “part of trauma that children who are
victims of sexual abuse display.” “ ‘In evaluating the evidence,
we accept reasonable inferences in support of the judgment and
do not consider whether contrary inferences may be made from
the evidence.’ ” (Patricia A. Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply
Internat., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258, 270.) “ ‘ “We do not
consider the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” ’ ”
(In re Gilberto G. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 52, 62.)
F.M.’s next claim is also a request that we reweigh the
evidence: he argues there was no substantial evidence to support
the findings because there were no other witnesses to F.M.’s
sexual abuse of R.G., and V.A. was a vigilant parent who had not
seen any problematic conduct by F.M. “Weighing evidence,
assessing credibility, and resolving conflicts in evidence and in
the inferences to be drawn from evidence are the domain of the
trial court, not the reviewing court. Evidence from a single
witness, even a party, can be sufficient to support the trial court’s
findings.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 (Alexis
E.).) We decline F.M.’s invitation to reweigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court.
15
Finally, in an argument specific to the court’s finding under
section 300, subdivision (d) that the children were placed at risk
of sexual abuse by F.M.’s abuse of R.G., F.M. points out that his
three-year-old daughter said she felt safe at home and that no
one was hurting her, disclosed no abuse or neglect, and was
described by her mother as a happy and healthy child. He
asserts R.G.’s initial statement to the social worker lacked detail
and was immediately recanted, V.A. was a protective parent who
would cut ties with anyone who hurt her children, F.M. positively
described R.G., DCFS described both F.M. and V.A. as caring for
their children a great deal, and there was no evidence in the
record of anyone pressuring R.G. to recant. At best, this
argument demonstrates the juvenile court could have resolved
the evidentiary and credibility conflicts differently, but it does
not show there was no substantial evidence to support the
findings. Moreover, “[w]hen a dependency petition alleges
multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the
dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the
juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of
the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the
petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the
reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other
alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the
evidence.” (Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.)
16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
RUBIN, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
17
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