Singh v. Patel CA2/2

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Filed 10/29/25 Singh v. Patel CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ROHIT SINGH, B342605

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV10334)
v.

DAHYABHAI M. PATEL et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Steve Cochran, Judge. Affirmed.

Bhakta Law Firm and Ankit H. Bhakta for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Thakur Law Firm and Pamela Tahim Thakur for
Defendants and Respondents.
____________________
Plaintiff Rohit Singh appeals the trial court’s judgment in
his malicious prosecution action against Defendants
Dahyabhai M. Patel, Kanta Patel, and Shivani Patel.1 We
conclude the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.162 special motion to strike. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 2, 2023, Dahyabhai and Kanta filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. It alleged Singh, Bharat Patel, and Jai
Prabhu, LLC withheld their mail, entered their residence without
permission while they were on vacation, and damaged their
property. (See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 18 U.S.C. § 1961.) Bharat Patel
is Dahyabhai’s and Kanta’s son and is the father of Shivani. He
leases a motel in El Monte from Dahyabhai; Singh is the property
management consultant for the motel.
On March 7, 2023, Shivani filed a request for a civil
harassment restraining order in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles, seeking to protect Kanta, Dahyabhai, herself, and her
boyfriend from Singh.3 (See § 527.6, subd. (a)(1).) She said Singh
made a sexually suggestive comment to her, “made unwanted

1 We use defendants’ first names when we refer to them
individually.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3 Defendants provided a copy of the temporary restraining
order to the trial court. We granted Singh’s request to take
judicial notice of other documents associated with the order,
including Shivani’s request for a restraining order and the court’s
May 17, 2023, order denying the request.

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sexual advances” on several occasions, threatened to shoot her
boyfriend, “forcefully put his hand between [her] legs” when they
were in a car together, and “broke into [her] house while [her]
grandparents were away.” The court granted a temporary
restraining order (TRO). After a hearing on May 17, 2023, the
court denied Shivani’s request for an order of protection and
dissolved the TRO.
Several months later, in December 2023, the court
dismissed the complaint in the federal action with leave to
amend. Later that month, Dahyabhai and Kanta voluntarily
dismissed the federal action without prejudice.
In April 2024, Singh filed the present action for “wrongful
use of civil proceedings.” Even though Dahyabhai and Kanta had
filed the federal action and Shivani had filed the restraining
order request, Singh alleged the trio were all actively involved in
bringing both actions. He further alleged both actions terminated
in his favor, defendants had no reasonable grounds for either,
and defendants filed them maliciously.
Defendants moved to strike both of Singh’s causes of action
pursuant to section 425.16—widely known as an “anti-SLAPP
motion.” (See Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055
(Rusheen).) They argued Singh’s claims arose from their
protected activity in filing civil litigation and lacked minimal
merit. Singh opposed, arguing defendants’ filings were not
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because they were based on
“false allegations of criminal conduct,” and even if they were
protected, his malicious prosecution claims had sufficient merit to
proceed. He submitted a declaration in support of his opposition
stating: (1) Shivani’s restraining order request “was false and
malicious” and contained “contrived and fabricated” statements;

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and (2) the federal action had “no basis in fact,” “was filed to
harass and intimidate [Singh],” and was “driven by greed and
hostility towards [Bharat Patel] related to their family business.”
After a hearing, the trial court granted defendants’ motion.
First, the court explained the filing of the federal action and the
restraining order request were protected activity under section
425.16, and there was no evidence conclusively establishing
either action was illegal. Second, the court concluded Singh could
not show “defendants acted without probable cause and with
malice” in bringing those actions, as required for his malicious
prosecution causes of action.
Judgment was entered on October 17, 2024. Singh timely
appealed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).)
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Anti-
SLAPP Motion
California’s anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for
weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from
protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384
(Baral); see also § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) A court’s analysis of an
anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps. (Baral, at p. 384.)
“First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim
arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Ibid.) If the
defendant succeeds, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability
of success.” (Ibid.; see also Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer
Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.) At that step, the court
undertakes “a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure’ ” in which
“[i]ts inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a
legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing

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sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Baral, at pp. 384–
385.) The plaintiff’s evidence is accepted as true. (Id. at p. 385;
see Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811,
820.) “However, speculative inferences not supported by the
evidence proffered need not be considered.” (Monster Energy Co.
v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 795.)
As a threshold matter, Singh’s briefing is pervaded by his
assumption a court must necessarily accept everything in his
declaration as true. But that is not the law. Rather, an anti-
SLAPP plaintiff’s “ ‘proof must be made upon competent
admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v.
Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater); see
also id. at p. 947.) “[D]eclarations that lack foundation or
personal knowledge, or that are argumentative, speculative,
impermissible opinion, hearsay, or conclusory are to be
disregarded.” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 26.)
Singh also argues the standard the trial court used for its
ruling was unclear. We do not agree. While the court’s minute
order was succinct, the court plainly determined defendants’
“[a]ctivity is protected” and Singh failed to make an adequate
showing of the merits of his causes of action. “We . . . presume
the court knew and properly applied the law absent evidence to
the contrary,” (McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1110), and here, the transcript of the
hearing makes abundantly clear the trial court knew and duly
applied the governing anti-SLAPP standards.
A. Standard of Review
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)

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B. Defendants Showed Singh’s Claims Arose from
Their Protected Activity
It is the defendant’s burden to make “a threshold showing
that the challenged cause of action arises from protected
activity.” (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056; see also
Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 (Navellier).) The
appropriate focus of that inquiry is on “the defendant’s activity
that gives rise to his . . . asserted liability.” (Navellier, at p. 92.)
Singh does not dispute his claims against defendants arise
from their filing of the federal action and the restraining order
request against him. The Supreme Court has already held that
“ ‘ “ ‘the basic act of filing litigation’ ” ’ ” is a protected activity for
purposes of the anti-SLAPP law. (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 90; see Kenne v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 966
[“[t]here is no question that the filing of a civil harassment
petition constitutes protected activity”].) “This action therefore
falls squarely within the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute’s
‘arising from’ prong.” (Navellier, at p. 90.)
Singh does not seriously challenge that conclusion, but he
instead argues the federal action and the restraining order
request are not protected by the anti-SLAPP law because they
were “illegal as a matter of law.” It is true that the anti-SLAPP
law does not apply “where either the defendant concedes the
illegality of [his] conduct or the illegality is conclusively shown by
the evidence.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 316.) But
that narrow exception does not apply here because defendants
have never conceded they engaged in any illegal activity, and
Singh has presented no conclusive evidence otherwise.
As to the federal action, Singh argues it “involve[s] serious
and blatantly false allegations of sexual harassment, assault, and

6
abuse—which is criminal conduct in California.” However, the
federal complaint contains no allegations of sexual harassment,
assault, or abuse. Because Singh’s brief does not adequately
support his argument that the filing of the federal action was
illegal, we do not consider that issue further. (See WFG National
Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
881, 894–895 [“we may disregard conclusory arguments”
unsupported by accurate record citations].)
As to the restraining order request, Singh argues Shivani
made false statements in that document and thereby violated
Penal Code sections 118, 134, and 148.5. Singh points to his own
declaration’s conclusory assertions Shivani’s statements were
“false,” “malicious,” “contrived,” and “fabricated.” Even assuming
Singh’s characterizations amounted to competent evidence
Shivani’s statements were false, Singh does not explain how his
declaration “conclusively” establishes Shivani violated those
Penal Code provisions as a matter of law. In fact, he makes no
effort even to identify the elements of those crimes, let alone
point to facts showing Shivani acted with the requisite state of
mind when she filed the restraining order request.
Thus, the trial court correctly determined Singh’s claims
arose from defendants’ protected activity.
C. Singh Failed to Sufficiently Show Defendants’
Prior Actions Were Brought Without Probable
Cause
Singh’s claims are for malicious prosecution. A malicious
prosecution cause of action has three required elements: “the
prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the
defendant and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to
the plaintiff; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was

7
initiated with malice.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 292 (Soukup).) To defeat defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motion, Singh had to show his claims were “ ‘ “ ‘supported
by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.’ ” ’ ” (Drummond v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
439, 449.) That is, he had to make a sufficient prima facie
showing of each required element. (See Billauer v. Escobar-Eck
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 964–965 [“the absence of a necessary
element” causes the plaintiff’s claim to fail as a matter of law].)
In a malicious prosecution cause of action, “the probable
cause element calls on the trial court to make an objective
determination of the ‘reasonableness’ of defendant’s conduct, i.e.,
to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to the
defendant, the institution of the prior action was legally tenable.”
(Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 878
(Sheldon).) That objective determination is distinct from malice,
which “is directly concerned with the subjective mental state of
the defendant in instituting the prior action.” (Ibid.) “ ‘A litigant
will lack probable cause for his action either if he relies upon
facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true, or if
he seeks recovery upon a legal theory which is untenable under
the facts known to him.’ ” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.)
Singh essentially argues he showed defendants lacked
probable cause to file the federal action against him and to
request the restraining order because his declaration states
defendants’ allegations were false. We disagree that is sufficient
to satisfy his burden. Because we conclude Singh failed to make a
prima facie showing that either the federal action or the
restraining order request was filed without probable cause, the

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trial court correctly granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.4
(See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384–385.)
1. The Restraining Order Request
With regard to the restraining order request, Singh
declared Shivani’s petition contained “false . . . allegations” of
abuse and the restraining order was ultimately denied. Neither
of those amounts to a prima facie showing Shivani filed the
request without probable cause.
First, the ultimate denial of Shivani’s request for a
restraining order, without more, does not mean the request “was
not arguably meritorious when it was [brought],” nor that it “was
brought without probable cause.” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v.
LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 743.)
Second, nothing in Singh’s conclusory declaration
demonstrates Shivani’s request was legally untenable based upon
the facts then known to her or that she had no reasonable cause
to believe those facts to be true. Indeed, Singh’s declaration is
entirely silent regarding what facts Shivani knew when she filed
the request and whether she reasonably believed them to be true.
(See Sheldon, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 879 [relevant belief is “the
defendant’s belief in, or knowledge of, a given state of facts”]; see
also id. at p. 881 [“ ‘[t]he want of probable cause . . . is measured
by the state of the defendant’s knowledge, not by his intent’ ”].)
For example, Singh’s declaration does not state Shivani had no
reasonable cause to believe he made sexually suggestive
comments to her, threatened her, touched her, or broke into her
house. Singh’s declaration amounts to little more than “merely

4 Because we conclude Singh failed to make an adequate
showing of probable cause, we need not and do not address the
other elements of malicious prosecution.

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call[ing] [Shivani] a liar . . . , without evidence,” which does not
show she lacked probable cause. (Citizens of Humanity, LLC v.
Hass (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 589, 600–601 [contrasting with a case
where a malicious prosecution plaintiff “proffered significant
evidence to support the reasonable inference” the defendant had
been a shill plaintiff in underlying lawsuit].)
Moreover, we granted Singh’s request to take judicial
notice of Shivani’s request for the restraining order. Shivani
signed that document under penalty of perjury, and it is therefore
properly considered in the anti-SLAPP analysis. (See Sweetwater,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 941 [plea forms signed under penalty of
perjury can be considered in anti-SLAPP analysis].) Even though
it is Singh’s burden to demonstrate the minimal merit of his
claims at this stage, we note Shivani’s sworn statements are
some evidence her request for a restraining order was legally
tenable under the facts Shivani knew at the time. (See Sheldon,
supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 881 [pertinent question is whether the
court thinks the facts known to the defendant constituted
probable cause]; cf. Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292 [“ ‘[i]n a
situation of complete absence of supporting evidence, it cannot be
adjudged reasonable to prosecute a claim’ ”].)
2. The Federal Action
As to the federal action, Singh argues statements in his
sworn declaration that “the allegations against him in . . . the
Federal Action . . . were completely false” demonstrate
defendants “relied on allegations they knew were false,” and they
therefore lacked probable cause. We disagree. Even if Singh’s
conclusory assertions of falsity were entitled to some credence,
nothing in Singh’s declaration tends to show Dahyabhai or Kanta
“ ‘relie[d] upon facts which [they had] no reasonable cause to

10
believe to be true’ ” or they sought “ ‘recovery upon a legal theory
which [was] untenable under the facts known to [them].’ ”
(Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.) That is, Singh’s declaration
falls short for the same reason it did with respect to Shivani’s
restraining order request: it is silent regarding whether
Dahyabhai and Kanta had reasonable cause to believe Singh and
Bharat Patel defied their command not to enter their residence
while they were in India in 2022, destroyed their belongings, and
refused to deliver their mail. And Singh does not argue the legal
theories underlying the federal action were untenable on those
facts.
Singh’s inability to make an adequate showing defendants
lacked probable cause when they brought the underlying actions
against him fatally undermines his malicious prosecution causes
of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs
on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)–(2).)

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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