CourtListener 10711781•Beauchemin v. Persons Plastic Surgery CA1/4
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Filed 10/27/25 Beauchemin v. Persons Plastic Surgery CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
ERIN BEAUCHEMIN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A170578
v. (Contra Costa County
PERSONS PLASTIC SURGERY et Super. Ct. No. C2102629)
al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
In this medical malpractice case, plaintiffs Erin Beauchemin and
Ethan Locks (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal after the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants Dr. Barbara Persons and her
practice, Persons Plastic Surgery (collectively, defendants). Plaintiffs
contend Dr. Persons negligently performed a breast augmentation procedure
on Ms. Beauchemin, specifically by placing the implants improperly, causing
Ms. Beauchemin to suffer severe pain. Mr. Locks, who is Ms. Beauchemin’s
husband, asserts a cause of action for loss of consortium (a claim that the
parties agree “rises and falls” with Ms. Beauchemin’s professional negligence
claim).
In granting summary judgment, the trial court determined first that an
expert declaration submitted by defendants met their initial burden of
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production as to the breach and causation elements of plaintiffs’ medical
negligence claim, thus shifting to plaintiffs the burden to produce evidence
creating triable issues of fact as to those elements. Plaintiffs did not submit
an expert declaration in response, relying instead on their own declarations,
in which they recounted out-of-court statements by a later treating physician.
The trial court sustained hearsay objections to those portions of plaintiffs’
declarations and concluded plaintiffs did not show triable issues of fact
existed as to the breach and causation elements of the medical negligence
claim.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend defendants did not meet their initial
burden of production, because the declaration of the defense medical expert
contained unsupported opinions that should have been excluded. Plaintiffs
further argue that, even if defendants met their initial burden, summary
judgment was improper because the out-of-court statements on which
plaintiffs rely are admissible and establish the existence of triable issues of
fact.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Ms. Beauchemin’s Medical Treatment
On September 21, 2020, Ms. Beauchemin had a breast augmentation
procedure, which Dr. Persons performed. Dr. Persons placed “650cc silicone
filled smooth round high profile Sientra implants.” As summarized by the
1 In their opening appellate brief, plaintiffs also asserted that,
regardless of whether triable issues of fact exist as to the breach and
causation elements of their medical negligence claim, summary judgment
was improper because there are triable issues pertaining to plaintiffs’ theory
that Dr. Persons was negligent in failing to obtain Ms. Beauchemin’s
informed consent for the breast augmentation procedure. In their reply brief,
plaintiffs state they are withdrawing that argument from this court’s
consideration on appeal.
2
trial court, the placement of the implants was “subglandular and subfascial—
under the glands and above the muscle and under the fascia to allow the
nipple to be elevated slightly.” In an “operative report” describing the
procedure, Dr. Persons stated the implants were “confirmed to be
symmetrical and in proper position.” There were no complications.
Liposuction was also performed on Ms. Beauchemin’s “anterior axillary
creases (bra rolls).”
At follow-up appointments in late September and early October, Ms.
Beauchemin reported she was experiencing “continuous” pain and asked for
more pain medication. Later, in her deposition, Ms. Beauchemin described
the pain as “excruciating.” The pain was concentrated in Ms. Beauchemin’s
left breast. In her visit notes, Dr. Persons stated Ms. Beauchemin’s pain was
out of proportion to the physical findings. Bruising was mostly resolved; the
incision was clean, dry, and intact; and there was some swelling. At an
appointment on October 5, 2020, Dr. Persons prescribed more pain
medication but explained it would be the last prescription due to Ms.
Beauchemin’s controlled substance prescriptions on her CURES2 history.
On October 8, 2020, Dr. Persons performed an exploration of Ms.
Beauchemin’s left anterior axillary crease (an area where liposuction was
performed during the previous procedure, and the area where Ms.
Beauchemin reported pain). Dr. Persons’ notes state “[n]o significant
abnormality” was found. Dr. Persons removed a small area of firm fat.
On January 16, 2021, Ms. Beauchemin returned for another
appointment at which she complained of continued left breast pain in the
upper lateral quadrant. Dr. Persons suggested that Ms. Beauchemin get an
ultrasound and mammogram of the area, but Ms. Beauchemin was reluctant
2 Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System.
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to do so. Although no abnormalities were noted, Dr. Persons offered to
explore the implant pocket and left upper quadrant to evaluate for neuroma.
Dr. Persons stated in her notes that Ms. Beauchemin was exhibiting drug-
seeking behavior, and that she would not prescribe further medications. Ms.
Beauchemin was also interested in minor leg liposuction.
On January 21, 2021, Ms. Beauchemin had another procedure with Dr.
Persons for liposuction of her thighs and knees and exploration of the left
breast. Dr. Persons’ notes state the implant was in the correct position. On
January 26, 2021, Ms. Beauchemin had a follow-up appointment at which it
was noted that her incisions were doing well and that any narcotics would be
prescribed by a pain doctor.
On August 11, 2021, Ms. Beauchemin returned to Dr. Persons with
complaints of left breast upper quadrant pain. The assessment was to send
Ms. Beauchemin for a mammogram and ultrasound as previously
recommended. Ms. Beauchemin did not want to pay out of pocket, so
Dr. Persons offered a referral for the imaging. On August 24, 2021, Dr.
Persons offered and recommended that she remove the implants to see if that
would relieve the pain, and then if so, she would perform a mastopexy. Dr.
Persons told Ms. Beauchemin that she would not, however, replace the
implants, because then it would not be known if they were the cause of the
pain. According to Dr. Persons, Ms. Beauchemin did not want the implants
removed. Ms. Beauchemin did not return for any further visits with Dr.
Persons.
On September 29, 2021, Ms. Beauchemin had cosmetic surgery
performed by Dr. Chris Gold at Kaiser. Ms. Beauchemin was offered MRI
imaging preoperatively to help find the source of the pain. She declined and
wished to move forward with surgery. According to Dr. Gold’s notes, the
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indication for the surgery was “undesired cosmetic appearance,” and the
planned procedures were breast implant exchange, breast capsulectomy,
breast lift, mastopexy (all bilateral) and chest excision of a possible soft tissue
mass (left). Dr. Gold believed Ms. Beauchemin’s breast implants were placed
under the muscle because that is what she had told him, and no outside
records were available for his review. Additional diagnoses from the past
medical history included acute stress disorder and anxiety disorder.
Dr. Gold stated in his notes that he removed the implants, which were
intact. At the time of removal, the implants “were reversed with the backside
facing the anterior aspect of the patient with incorrect polarity.” Other
findings included “[s]ubglandular implants with no violation of the pectoralis
major muscle,” “[e]xpanded breast pocket [with] inferior and lateral
malposition noted,” and “[l]owered inframammary fold on the left side of
approximately 1.5 cm lower than the right.”
Dr. Gold did not replace the implants at that time. He recommended
delaying any submuscular placement of new implants for a minimum of three
months to allow the area of the subglandular plane to close. Dr. Gold
testified that submuscular implant placement is the type he is comfortable
doing, and he did not replace the implants subglandularly. No masses were
found or removed during Dr. Gold’s surgery.
Dr. Gold stated in his notes that, during the procedure on
September 29, 2021: “I spoke with the husband [Mr. Locks] at 1310
(approximately) to explain to him that the patient’s implants were noted to be
in the subglandular plane, and that they were reversed. After extensive
discussion with the husband regarding risk of implant pocket malposition
recurrence, with conversion to subpectoral implants at this time, we
proceeded with Wise pattern mastopexy alone. My recommendation was to
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delay subpectoral (dual plane 1) augmentation until minimum 3 months to
allow area subglandular plane to completely as attempt at sutures/mesh may
not yield desired long term result.”
In December 2021, Ms. Beauchemin returned to Dr. Gold and had
490 cc implants placed. Several months later, her left-sided breast pain in
the upper quadrant returned. Ms. Beauchemin then opted to have the
implants removed and another mastopexy performed in February 2023.
B. Procedural Background
In their complaint, filed in December 2021, plaintiffs alleged Dr.
Persons breached the standard of care by improperly placing the breast
implants and placing them backwards, causing pain to Ms. Beauchemin.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending there were no
triable issues as to the elements of breach of duty and causation. Defendants
supported their motion with an expert declaration from Dr. Cynthia
Goodman, who opined that Dr. Persons complied with the standard of care
and did not cause Ms. Beauchemin’s claimed injuries.
In their opposition, plaintiffs argued that Dr. Goodman’s opinions
should be excluded because they were based on factual assumptions that
lacked foundation, so defendants failed to meet their initial burden of
production in moving for summary judgment. Plaintiffs claimed alternatively
that out-of-court statements by Dr. Gold, as described in plaintiffs’
declarations, created triable issues as to breach and causation.
After a hearing, the court granted defendants’ motion. The court
overruled plaintiffs’ objections to Dr. Goodman’s declaration, explaining that
Dr. Goodman had provided “substantial testimony setting forth an
understanding of the facts, and the reasons for her opinions.” The court
noted plaintiffs had not come forward with conflicting expert evidence. The
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court sustained hearsay objections to the portions of plaintiffs’ declarations
referring to out-of-court statements by Dr. Gold.
The court entered judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is warranted if “all the papers submitted show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“ ‘We independently review the parties’ papers supporting and opposing the
motion, using the same method of analysis as the trial court. Essentially, we
assume the role of the trial court and apply the same rules and standards.’ ”
(Apex Solutions, Inc. v. Falls Lake National Ins. Co. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1249, 1256.) A defendant moving for summary judgment may meet its initial
burden of production by showing “one or more elements of the cause of action
. . . cannot be established”; the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a
triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) We consider all
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Id. at p. 843.)
“ ‘The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice are: (1) a
duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the
profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) a
proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury;
and (4) resulting loss or damage.’ ” (Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)
Expert testimony on these points is essential, including at summary
judgment. “Where, as here, the material issues framed by the complaint are
whether the conduct of a medical professional fell below the standard of care
and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, expert testimony is required to
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establish the reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession under similar
circumstances [citation], as well as whether the defendant’s conduct
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries within a reasonable medical
probability [citation].” (Zaragoza v. Adam (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 113, 118–
119; accord, Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 607 [“ ‘ “When a
defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert
declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he
is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with
conflicting expert evidence.” ’ ”].)
B. Defendants Met Their Initial Burden of Production
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in overruling their objections to
Dr. Goodman’s opinions that Dr. Persons complied with the standard of care
and did not cause injury to Ms. Beauchemin. Plaintiffs argue that, without
Dr. Goodman’s opinions, defendants did not meet their initial burden to
negate the elements of breach and causation. We find no error.
The parties agree the abuse of discretion standard of review applies to
the trial court’s ruling admitting Dr. Goodman’s opinions. (See Strobel v.
Johnson & Johnson (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 796, 816 [noting that “most
appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings . . . in the context of a summary judgment motion,”
but concluding the particular evidentiary issue presented was appropriately
reviewed de novo].) The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr.
Goodman’s declaration, which satisfied defendants’ initial burden on
summary judgment to negate the breach and causation elements of plaintiffs’
medical negligence claim.
Plaintiffs assert Dr. Goodman’s opinions are invalid because they are
based on an unwarranted factual assumption, specifically the assumption
8
that Dr. Persons correctly placed Ms. Beauchemin’s implants.3 We disagree,
and we conclude the trial court correctly found Dr. Goodman’s opinions were
well supported and admissible.
Dr. Goodman has been licensed to practice medicine in California since
2000, specializes in plastic surgery, and is certified by the American Board of
Plastic Surgery. She has served as the chief of plastic surgery at Marin
General Hospital and Novato Community Hospital and has authored
numerous articles in major plastic surgery journals on such topics as breast
implants, breast augmentation, reduction, and reconstructive surgery. She is
a member of the American Society of Plastic Surgeons, the American Society
for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, Inc., the American Board of Plastic Surgery,
and the California Society of Plastic Surgeons. She states in her declaration
that she is familiar with the standard of care for physicians performing
aesthetic plastic surgery procedures in 2020 through 2022, including the
performance of breast augmentation and liposuction.
In preparing her declaration, Dr. Goodman reviewed “the following
records pertaining to patient Erin Beauchemin: Persons Plastic Surgery
chart, including pre and post procedure photographs, Kaiser outpatient and
inpatient records, which include pain management and records of care by
Chris Gold, M.D., pre and post photographs contained in the Kaiser records,
3 In their opening appellate brief, plaintiffs claimed Dr. Goodman made
a second improper assumption—that Dr. Persons obtained Ms. Beauchemin’s
informed consent for the implant procedure. But as noted, in their reply
brief, plaintiffs withdrew their argument that triable issues of fact exist as to
their theory that Dr. Persons was negligent for failing to obtain informed
consent. And in the portion of their reply brief addressing the admissibility
of Dr. Goodman’s declaration, plaintiffs do not press the argument that the
declaration was inadmissible for failing to consider the viability of plaintiffs’
now-abandoned informed consent theory.
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and the deposition testimony of Erin Beauchemin, Ethan Locks, Barbara
Persons, M.D., and Chris Gold, M.D.”
After reviewing this information, Dr. Goodman concluded “to a
reasonable degree of medical probability that Dr. Persons, and her practice,
Persons Plastic Surgery, at all times complied with the standard of care in
providing care and treatment to patient Erin Beauchemin. It is well within
the standard of care to attempt to achieve the look of a breast lift with
implants placed subglandularly and above the muscle, especially in
circumstances where a patient is not desirous of a breast mastopexy.”
Dr. Goodman further opined that, “to a reasonable degree of medical
probability . . . no act or omission of Dr. Persons, or her practice, Persons
Plastic Surgery, was a substantial cause of Ms. Beauchemin’s claimed
injuries.” Dr. Goodman noted that Ms. Beauchemin’s reports of pain were
not typical of the type of procedure she had. In addition, given Ms.
Beauchemin’s lengthy preoperative history of pain and use of opioid
medications, as well as “the lack of any found cause of pain,” Ms. Beauchemin
may be more susceptible to the perception of pain, but no breach of the
standard of care caused that pain.
Dr. Goodman also addressed the contention by plaintiffs that the
implants were placed “ ‘upside down and backwards.’ ” Dr. Goodman stated
“there is no polarity, thus no ‘upside down.’ ” Although “there is a slightly
flatter backside where a logo is placed,” Dr. Goodman reviewed Dr. Persons’
notes from the initial implant procedure in September 2020 where she
described placing the implants properly with the logo facing the back or chest
wall. In addition, Dr. Goodman noted that, when Dr. Persons performed the
follow-up procedure in January 2021, she opened the “left pocket” and
confirmed the implant was still in the correct location.
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When Ms. Beauchemin underwent surgery several months later at
Kaiser in September 2021, Dr. Gold found the implants were logo side up.
But Dr. Goodman averred that (as noted by Dr. Gold in his deposition)
implants can flip, especially when the pocket where the implants are placed
has stretched. Dr. Goodman stated such stretching and shifting had occurred
in this case, and that “[w]hen Ms. Beauchemin underwent surgery with Dr.
Gold, she again developed recurring stretching of her breast tissue. Thus, to
a reasonable degree of medical probability, given the quality of the patient’s
tissue and the size of the implants placed, the implants flipped in the absence
of negligence. To a reasonable degree of medical probability such flipping
would not cause physical harm.”
In overruling plaintiffs’ objections to Dr. Goodman’s declaration, the
trial court explained: “Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. Goodman is an
expert in plastic surgery and do not present any opposing declaration from an
expert on the standard of care. Dr. Goodman’s declaration and opinions are
based on her extensive professional knowledge as well as a review of all the
medical records related to Ms. Beauchemin’s care. She provides substantial
testimony setting forth an understanding of the facts, and the reasons for her
opinions. There is no evidence that her opinion was based on anything other
than what was contained within these admissible pieces of evidence nor that
she ignored key pieces of evidence.” We agree.
As plaintiffs note, an expert opinion may be excluded from evidence
when it is “based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support
[citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors [citation], . . . .” (Jennings
v. Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108,
1117.) “Similarly, when an expert’s opinion is purely conclusory because
unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation connecting the factual predicates
11
to the ultimate conclusion, that opinion has no evidentiary value because an
‘expert opinion is worth no more than the reasons upon which it rests.’ ”
(Ibid.) But as outlined above and as the trial court noted, Dr. Goodman’s
declaration is far from conclusory. Dr. Goodman describes in detail her
understanding of the facts and explains the reasons for her conclusions that
Dr. Persons complied with the standard of care and that no act or omission of
Dr. Persons caused Ms. Beauchemin’s claimed injuries.
Plaintiffs contend Dr. Goodman did not sufficiently explain the basis of
what they characterize as her assumption that Dr. Persons properly placed
the implants. We disagree. As we have discussed above, Dr. Goodman
explained she had reviewed the medical records, in which Dr. Persons
described placing the implants with the logo facing the back or chest wall
during the initial procedure in September 2020, and when Dr. Persons
opened the left pocket in January 2021, the implant was still in the correct
position. In reaching her conclusion that the implants were properly placed
but then flipped without negligence, Dr. Goodman also took into account “the
quality of the patient’s tissue and the size of the implants placed,” noting that
by the time of Ms. Beauchemin’s surgery with Dr. Gold, her breasts had
developed more ptosis (drooping) and the implants had shifted laterally in
the pocket. Dr. Goodman reviewed the testimony of Dr. Persons and Dr.
Gold, both of whom concurred implants can flip.
It is thus clear from Dr. Goodman’s declaration that, in arriving at her
opinion the implants were correctly placed, she relied on the medical records,
deposition testimony, and specific characteristics of Ms. Beauchemin’s tissue
and the implants that were placed. We reject plaintiffs’ suggestion that Dr.
Goodman’s opinion should have been excluded or rejected because the
materials she relied on did not include different items, such as statistical
12
information or case studies. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, or
otherwise err, by admitting Dr. Goodman’s opinions into evidence and finding
defendants met their initial burden of production on summary judgment as to
the elements of breach and causation.
C. Plaintiffs Did Not Present Evidence Raising a Triable Issue of
Fact
Plaintiffs contend that, even if Dr. Goodman’s opinions were properly
admitted and defendants met their initial burden of production, plaintiffs
raised triable issues of fact as to breach and causation by providing their own
declarations describing out-of-court statements by Dr. Gold. We disagree.
In his declaration in opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Locks states
that Dr. Gold called him during the September 29, 2021 procedure when he
removed the breast implants that had been placed in Ms. Beauchemin by Dr.
Persons. Mr. Locks’ declaration states that, “Dr. Gold told me that he had
left the operating room to call me and that Ms. Beauchemin’s breast implants
had been incorrectly placed by Dr. Persons.” According to Mr. Locks, Dr.
Gold stated “that Dr. Persons had placed the implants backwards,” and Dr.
Gold “explained . . . that this meant that the labels on the implants were not
facing the proper direction.” Mr. Locks states in his declaration that, “Dr.
Gold did not ever mention, suggest, or state, during our call on September 29,
2021, that [Ms. Beauchemin’s] implants had flipped over after placement by
Dr. Persons. Dr. Gold was very specific, in his statements to me, that the
implants had been placed incorrectly by Dr. Persons.”
In her declaration, Ms. Beauchemin states that, after the
September 29, 2021 procedure, “[Dr. Gold] told me that my breast implants
had been placed incorrectly in me, upside down and backwards, and that they
had malposition. He also told me that there was no way I could have caused
the implants to flip over and that the implants were placed incorrectly
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initially during the surgery by Dr. Persons.” Ms. Beauchemin continues by
stating, “[Dr. Gold] told me that my pain was caused by the implants being
placed incorrectly by Dr. Persons and caused by the implant rubbing on my
muscle.” Finally, Ms. Beauchemin states, “[Dr. Gold] told me I should file
legal action against Dr. Persons for placing the implants incorrectly and
causing me months of continuous pain.”
As noted, the trial court sustained hearsay objections to the portions of
plaintiffs’ declarations attributing these statements to Dr. Gold. Plaintiffs
contend (1) the court’s hearsay ruling was error, and (2) the statements at
issue (once admitted into evidence) raise triable issues of material fact as to
the breach and causation elements of plaintiffs’ medical negligence claim.
We conclude that, even if the statements are considered, plaintiffs did not
show there are triable issues of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subds. (c), (p)(2).)4
Plaintiffs acknowledge that the opinions of Dr. Gold that they describe
in their declarations “could reasonably be characterized as conclusory . . . .”
And as we have discussed in part II.B, ante, an expert’s conclusory opinion
that is unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation has no evidentiary value.
(Property California SCJLW One Corp. v. Leamy (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1155,
1163.) “ ‘An expert who gives only a conclusory opinion does not assist the
jury to determine what occurred, but instead supplants the jury by declaring
4 Because we conclude the statements that plaintiffs attribute to Dr.
Gold do not raise triable issues of material fact, we need not address the
parties’ arguments as to whether the statements were properly excluded as
hearsay or instead should have been admitted under the hearsay exception
for prior inconsistent statements (Evid. Code, § 1235) because they differed
from Dr. Gold’s deposition testimony. We also need not address defendants’
contention that the statements could have been excluded as improper expert
testimony.
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what occurred.’ ” (Ibid.) “These rules apply to expert witness declarations
submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment.” (Ibid.) For
example, in Property California, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s
decision to exclude an expert declaration submitted in opposition to a
summary judgment motion where the trial court found the expert’s opinions
“lacked adequate foundation and adequate analysis.” (Ibid.; see id. at
pp. 1163–1164.)
As plaintiffs note, courts have stated that, because evidence offered in
opposition to summary judgment is to be liberally construed, “a reasoned
explanation required in an expert declaration filed in opposition to a
summary judgment motion need not be as detailed or extensive as that
required in expert testimony presented in support of a summary judgment
motion or at trial.” (Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 173, 189.) But even applying a somewhat more relaxed standard
here in evaluating the evidence submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to
summary judgment, the opinions they proffer (i.e., the brief statements of Dr.
Gold as related by plaintiffs in their declarations) are not accompanied by
any reasoned explanation.5
5 In addition to citing the Garrett court’s statement that less detail is
required in an expert declaration filed in opposition to summary judgment
(Garrett, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 189), plaintiffs cite Jennifer C. v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1332, where the
court stated more broadly that “[t]he requisite of a detailed, reasoned
explanation for expert opinions applies to ‘expert declarations in support of
summary judgment,’ not to expert declarations in opposition to summary
judgment.” But we reject any suggestion by plaintiffs that this language
should be read to mean an expert declaration offered in opposition to
summary judgment need not contain any explanation of the expert’s opinions.
Indeed, in Jennifer C. itself, the declaration at issue included an explanation
of the expert’s reasoning and the materials on which he relied (id. at
pp. 1330–1331), and the appellate court concluded the expert’s opinions “were
15
Dr. Gold’s statements (as reported by plaintiffs) that Dr. Persons
“placed” the implants “incorrectly” or “backwards” and that “there was no
way [Ms. Beauchemin] could have caused the implants to flip over” are not
supported by an explanation for the conclusion that the implants must have
been placed backwards and could not have flipped. Set against Dr.
Goodman’s declaration explaining her conclusion the implants were properly
placed and flipped without negligence (including her opinion that flipping
was made more likely by specific characteristics of Ms. Beauchemin’s tissue
and the implants used), these brief statements assuming incorrect placement
do not raise a triable issue of material fact.
As to causation, Ms. Beauchemin states in her declaration that, “[Dr.
Gold] told me that my pain was caused by the implants being placed
incorrectly by Dr. Persons and caused by the implant rubbing on my muscle.”
In our view, this brief statement similarly does not raise a triable issue of
fact. As noted, Dr. Goodman, in her declaration in support of summary
judgment, explained the bases for her opinion that no act or omission of Dr.
Persons was a substantial cause of Ms. Beauchemin’s claimed injuries.
Ms. Beauchemin’s reports of pain were not typical of the type of procedure
she had. Ms. Beauchemin had a preoperative history of pain and use of
opioid medications, and there was a “lack of any found cause of pain,”
suggesting Ms. Beauchemin may be more susceptible to the perception of
pain. Dr. Goodman also noted that Ms. Beauchemin’s pain did not resolve
upon removal of the implants. In contrast, the one-sentence opinion
pertaining to causation that Ms. Beauchemin attributes to Dr. Gold does not
address or consider these factors and is not accompanied by any explanation
adequately supported by a reasoned explanation and were not ‘conclusory’ ”
(id. at p. 1333).
16
as to how the alleged cause of Ms. Beauchemin’s pain was identified. We
conclude plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue of material fact.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on
appeal.
STREETER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
CLAY, J.*
* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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