People v. Gonzalez CA4/3

CourtListener 10711768CalctappOct 27, 2025

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Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063896

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22NF0842)

LUIS ARTURO GONZALEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant Luis Arturo Gonzalez was convicted of multiple sex
offenses. On appeal, he contends the trial court gave two unconstitutional
jury instructions and miscalculated his presentence credits. As respondent
concedes, Gonzalez’s credits claim has merit. We will therefore modify his
presentence credit award. In all other respects, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A detailed recitation of facts is unnecessary to resolve Gonzalez’s
claims. The prosecution presented evidence Gonzalez raped J.P. when she
was 17 years old, sexually assaulted and raped C.I., and lewdly touched his
girlfriend’s 13-year-old daughter, S.A. Gonzalez testified he did not have
sexual intercourse with J.P., his sexual conduct with C.I. was consensual,
and he never touched S.A. in a sexually inappropriate manner.
The jury convicted Gonzalez of three counts of forcible rape (Pen.
Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)), two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the
age of 14 (id., § 288, subd. (a)), and one count of forcible sexual penetration
with a foreign object (id., § 289, subd. (a)(1)). It also found true allegations
J.P. was a minor aged 14 years or older (id., § 264, subd. (c)(2)), and Gonzalez
committed sexual offenses against multiple victims (id., 667.61, subds. (b),
(e)(4)). The trial court sentenced him to prison for 45 years to life, plus six
years.

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DISCUSSION
I.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Gonzalez contends his convictions were tainted by two standard
jury instructions, CALCRIM No. 1191B and CALCRIM No. 226. We
disagree.1
A. CALCRIM No. 1191B
Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1191B, the trial court instructed the
jury it could consider the evidence of any charged offense that was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt as proof Gonzalez had a propensity to commit sex
crimes and was thus likely to have committed the other charged offenses.2
Gonzalez contends this instruction violated his right to due process by
lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof. As Gonzalez concedes, however,
the California Supreme Court rejected this argument in People v. Villatoro
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152. Although Gonzalez claims Villatoro was wrongly

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Although Gonzalez did not object to these instructions in the
trial court, raising the prospect of forfeiture, we will entertain his arguments
because, as respondent acknowledges, the instructions arguably infringed his
substantial rights. (Pen. Code, § 1259.)

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The instruction provided: “The People presented evidence that
the defendant committed the crimes charged in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. [¶]
If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not required to,
conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to
commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the
defendant was likely to commit [and did commit] the other sex offenses
charged in this case. [¶] If you find that the defendant committed one or more
of these crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all
the other evidence in the case. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the
defendant is guilty of another crime. The People must prove each charge [and
allegation] beyond a reasonable doubt.” (See CALCRIM No. 1191B.)

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decided and should be reconsidered, we are bound by that decision. (Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; People v.
Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 68 [Villatoro was dispositive of defendant’s
due process challenge to CALCRIM No. 1191B].) Accordingly, we reject his
challenge to CALCRIM No. 1191B.
B. CALCRIM No. 226
CALCRIM No. 226 informed the jury how to assess the credibility
of witnesses and listed several factors bearing on that issue, including
whether the witness had “a personal interest in how the case is decided.”3
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued Gonzalez had such an
interest, and thus was not a credible witness, because “[h]e’s the man on trial
here.”
Gonzalez contends the “personal interest” factor in CALCRIM
No. 226 undermines the presumption of innocence when the defendant takes
the stand because it allows the jury to use the fact he has been charged with

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The instruction informed the jurors, “In evaluating a witness’s
testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or
disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony. Among the factors that you
may consider are: [¶] How well could the witness see, hear, or otherwise
perceive the things about which the witness testified? [¶] How well was the
witness able to remember and describe what happened? [¶] What was the
witness’s behavior while testifying? [¶] Did the witness understand the
questions and answer them directly? [¶] Was the witness’s testimony
influenced by a factor such as a bias or prejudice, a personal relationship
with someone involved in the case, or a personal interest in how the case is
decided? [¶] What was the witness’s attitude about the case or about
testifying? [¶] Did the witness make a statement in the past that is consistent
or inconsistent with his or her testimony? [¶] How reasonable is the
testimony when you consider all the other evidence in the case? [¶] Did other
evidence prove or disprove any fact about which the witness testified? [¶] Did
the witness admit to being untruthful? [¶] Has the [witness] engaged in other
conduct that reflects on his or her believability?” (See CALCRIM No. 226.)

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a crime as proof he is not telling the truth. Gonzalez contends the problem
was compounded here because the prosecutor expressly relied on the personal
interest factor in attacking his credibility during closing argument.
When the defendant testifies on his own behalf, however, the jury
is free to consider anything in reason that may affect the truthfulness of his
testimony, including his interest to avoid conviction. (People v. Bunyard
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1223, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Diaz
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.) That interest, which would be obvious to
anyone even without instructions or argument, is fair game for comment
because it logically bears on the defendant’s willingness to tell the truth.
(Bunyard, at p. 1223.)
Moreover, Gonzalez’s jury “was not instructed by the court that
there was any presumption of interest and bias; to the contrary, the
instruction upon which the prosecutor . . . based [his] argument relating to
credibility clearly left the jurors a choice as to whether to find any existence
of motive or interest on the part of any witness, including defendant. Nor
does the record show any argument from the prosecutor that the jury should
presume guilt as the result of his status as the defendant or his interest in
acquittal.” (People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1223–1224.) Rather,
consistent with CALCRIM No. 226, the prosecutor simply listed Gonzalez’s
interest in the case as one of many factors bearing on his credibility. Under
these circumstances, there was no violation of Gonzalez’s due process rights.
(Bunyard, at p. 1223.)
II.
PRESENTENCE CREDITS
At sentencing, the trial court awarded Gonzalez 817 days of
presentence credit, based on 711 days of actual custody, plus 106 days of

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conduct credit under Penal Code section 2933.1, which limits such credits to
15 percent of the actual custody days when, as here, the defendant is
convicted of a violent felony. But, as the parties recognize, Gonzalez actually
spent 712 days in custody before he was sentenced. Therefore, although his
conduct credits remain unchanged, Gonzalez is entitled to one additional day
of actual custody credit and one additional day of total presentence credit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to award Gonzalez 712 days of actual
presentence custody credit and 818 total days of presentence credit. The trial
court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect this
modification and send a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

GOODING, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:

SCOTT, J.

BANCROFT, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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