CourtListener 10711765•People v. Nelson CA2/7
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Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Nelson CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B338956
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA084564)
v.
KURT WAYNE NELSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph A. Brandolino, Judge. Affirmed.
Kurt Wayne Nelson, in pro. per., Marilee Marshall, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Kurt Wayne Nelson appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.75.1 We appointed counsel to represent Nelson on
appeal. After reviewing the record on appeal, counsel for Nelson
filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 that did not identify any arguable issues. After
independently reviewing the record and the contentions in
Nelson’s supplemental brief, we have not identified any either.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The June 8, 2016 and February 7, 2017 Incidents2
On June 8, 2016 Nelson impersonated a police officer to
gain entry into the home of Jose Chavez and his daughter
Catherine. Nelson pointed a gun at them while a second man
went into the bedroom area. Nelson directed Jose and Catherine
to lie face down on the kitchen floor while Nelson angrily asked
for someone named “Gordo” and “[w]here’s the dope?” Jose and
Catherine told Nelson they did not know someone by that name
and they thought Nelson had the wrong house. Jose and
Catherine believed Nelson was going to kill them.
During the incident, Nelson aggressively pointed a gun at
Jose and then Catherine, kicked Catherine, threatened to kill
them, and shocked each of them with a taser multiple times.
After Nelson and the second man left, Catherine discovered she
was missing property from her bedroom, including a credit card,
diamond jewelry, and other items.
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We described the factual background of this case in
Nelson’s direct appeal. (See People v. Nelson (May 24, 2021,
B296142) [nonpub. opn.].)
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On February 7, 2017 another man came to the house on
behalf of Nelson and tried to persuade Jose and Catherine not to
press charges and not to testify at the preliminary hearing.
B. The Jury Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found Nelson guilty of two counts of first degree
residential robbery (§ 211; counts 3 and 4); two counts of making
criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 5 and 6); two counts of
false imprisonment by violence (§ 236; counts 11 and 12); two
counts of first degree residential burglary (§ 459; counts 13 and
16); two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2);
counts 14 and 15); two counts of attempted witness dissuasion
(§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); counts 19 and 20); and two counts of assault
with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 21 and
22).3
The jury also found true with respect to counts 3 through 6,
11 through 16, 21, and 22 that Nelson committed the crimes
while impersonating a police officer (§ 538d). With respect to
counts 3 and 4 the jury found true that Nelson personally used a
firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b),
and as to counts 5, 6, and 11 through 15 that Nelson personally
used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). In a bifurcated trial, Nelson waived his right to a
jury trial on the allegations Nelson had served three prior prison
3 The jury acquitted Nelson on charges of kidnapping to
commit another crime, torture of Jose, and two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon.
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terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)), and the trial court found the
allegations true as to two of the three alleged prison priors.
The trial court sentenced Nelson to an aggregate state
prison sentence of 40 years, including two years for the two prior
prison term enhancements.
On appeal, we reversed Nelson’s convictions of assault with
a firearm (counts 14 and 15) and one count of first degree
residential burglary (count 16). We also modified the sentences
on counts 19 and 20 for attempted witness dissuasion, imposing
the full middle term on each count. In addition, we struck the
two one-year prior prison term enhancements on the basis that
Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1,
2020 (Senate Bill 136), had amended section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), to provide a one-year prior prison term
enhancement limited to sexually violent offenses. Because
Nelson’s prison priors were not for sexually violent offenses, and
Nelson’s sentence was not final at the time the new law became
effective, the prior prison term enhancements were no longer
valid. In all other respects, we affirmed. We directed the
superior court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
reflecting a modified aggregate state prison term of 40 years
eight months. (People v. Nelson (May 24, 2021, B296142)
[nonpub. opn.].)
C. The Trial Court Denies Nelson’s Petitions To Recall and
Resentence
On October 3, 2022 Nelson, representing himself, filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, Nelson argued
he was “sentenced to two [section] 667.5(b) prison priors
enhancements [and] under Senate Bill 483 my prison priors are
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void and have to come off.” Nelson also argued he was entitled to
appointment of an attorney and resentencing “under all other
enhancement laws.”
On November 21, 2022 the trial court indicated on the
record, without counsel present, that it was “in receipt of a
document listing [Nelson] as eligible for resentencing pursuant to
newly enacted provisions of Penal Code section 1171(a)/1171.1(a).
Those sections invalidate certain enhancements and allow for
resentencing of defendants whose sentences include those
enhancements.” (Capitalization omitted.) The court appointed
counsel and deemed Nelson’s habeas petition a request for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 (formerly
section 1171.1).
On January 2, 2024 Nelson, represented by counsel, filed a
petition to recall and resentence him pursuant to section 1172.75
(before the trial court ruled on his first petition). Nelson asserted
his sentence was legally invalid because a “one-year prison prior
enhancement was imposed” under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b). Nelson argued the court must strike the
enhancement and conduct a “full resentencing hearing.” Further,
he argued, the court must consider postconviction factors in
resentencing (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)), including ameliorative
changes in the law under sections 654, 1170, 1385, 12022.5 and
12022.53.
On May 29, 2024 the trial court denied Nelson’s two
petitions for resentencing, explaining, “The court did impose
initially at his sentencing two penal code section 667.5(b) priors
which added two years to his sentence. . . . On direct appeal, the
court of appeal struck those two priors and reduced the sentence
by two years based on [Senate Bill] 163, which was effective
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January 1st, 2020. And the court of appeal decision doing that
was filed May 24th, 2021 and it became . . . final when a
remittitur was issued 60 days after that; so that would be in July
of 2021. [¶] That statute – that S.B. 136 statute was amended, I
believe, by S.B. 483, which authorized retrospective application
and resentencing, and that was not effective until January 1st,
2022. At that time the defendant’s sentence was already final
with no one-year priors imposed or included in the sentence. [¶]
So based on that, I believe the defendant is not eligible for
resentencing under the current statute.”
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Nelson in this appeal.
After reviewing the record, counsel did not identify any arguable
issues and advised Nelson on or about June 24, 2025 that she
was filing a brief stating she was unable to find any arguable
issues and that Nelson “could file a supplemental brief in this
case raising any issues which he chooses to call to the court’s
attention.” Counsel also sent Nelson a copy of the opening brief.
On June 24 this court sent a letter to Nelson and his appointed
counsel directing appointed counsel “to send the record of this
appeal” to Nelson.
On August 19, 2025 we received from Nelson a 12-page
supplemental brief, which attached as an exhibit the 2019
abstract of judgment reflecting the two one-year prior prison
term enhancements the trial court imposed at the initial
sentencing. Nelson’s supplemental brief did not address the trial
court’s May 29, 2024 finding that he was ineligible for relief
under section 1172.75 because the two prior prison term
enhancements had been struck on appeal. Instead, Nelson
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argued “[t]his court must conduct a full resentencing” that
considers “all ameliorative changes in the sentencing law(s).”
(Boldface omitted.) Further, he asserted, at a resentencing the
court must consider Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.),
which limits a trial court’s discretion to impose upper-term
sentences pursuant to amended section 1170, subdivision (b);
Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended
sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 to grant discretion to trial courts
to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements in the interests of
justice; and Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which
amended sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1385, subdivision (b),
effective January 1, 2019, to give courts discretion to strike or
dismiss a five-year sentence enhancement imposed under section
667, subdivision (a)(1), for a prior serious felony conviction.
Nelson also relied on section 1385, subdivision (a), which
authorizes courts to strike an enhancement “in the furtherance of
justice.”
“Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b)
required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement
for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a
separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years. [Citation.] Effective January 1, 2020,
Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590) . . . amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison
term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent
offenses. [Citations.] Enhancements based on prior prison terms
served for other offenses became legally invalid.” (People v.
Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 379-380; accord, People v.
Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 854.) The Legislature later
enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (Sen. Bill 483), effective January 1,
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2022, to make the changes implemented by Senate Bill 136
retroactive by adding former section 1171.1 (now section 1172.75)
to the Penal Code. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 [“it is the intent
of the Legislature to retroactively apply . . . Senate Bill 136 . . . to
all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or
prison for these repealed sentence enhancements”]; Garcia, at
pp. 854-855.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides that “[a]ny
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” Section 1172.75, subdivision (b),
directs the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
to “identify those persons in their custody currently serving a
term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a)” and to provide the inmate’s name and other
identifying information to the sentencing court on a specified
schedule. Section 1172.75, subdivision (c), in turn, provides that
“[u]pon receiving the information described in subdivision (b), the
court shall review the judgment and verify that the current
judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in
subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current
judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a),
the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
Although CDCR identified Nelson as an individual who was
eligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, he was not.
The 2019 abstract of judgment Nelson attached to his petition
showed the trial court initially imposed a sentence that included
two prior prison term enhancements. But, as discussed, in
2021—before Senate Bill 483 was enacted—we struck the two
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prior prison term enhancements and directed the trial court to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment. The August 10, 2021
amended abstract of judgment reflects that the amended
judgment imposing an aggregate sentence of 40 years eight
months did not include the two prior prison term enhancements.
Accordingly, under section 1172.75, subdivision (c), Nelson was
not eligible for recall and resentencing because as of the date of
his resentencing petitions filed in 2022, “the current judgment”
did not include “an enhancement described in subdivision (a).”
(See People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1005-1006
(Tang) [defendant was ineligible for resentencing under § 1172.75
where initial sentence included one prior prison term
enhancement, but on appeal the judgment was modified to strike
the enhancement, because “a stricken enhancement is not an
imposed enhancement within the meaning of section 1172.75,
subdivision (a)”].)
The Court of Appeal in Tang distinguished prior cases that
concluded the defendant was eligible for relief under
section 1172.75 where a prior prison term enhancement was
imposed, but the punishment was stayed or struck. (People v.
Tang, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1007-1008.) The Tang court
explained with respect to People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
188, 194, review granted, Oct. 23, 2024, S286987, “Nor does
Espino . . . necessitate a conclusion that a stricken enhancement
entitles an inmate to section 1172.75 resentencing. Espino
addressed a scenario involving a sentencing enhancement that
was imposed where the punishment was stricken. . . . In other
words, striking an enhancement is different from striking the
punishment for the enhancement.” (Tang, at p. 1010; see People
v. Cota (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1133, review granted Oct. 1,
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2025, S292637 [defendant was “entitled to resentencing because
now-invalid prison priors were imposed and included in the
judgment against him,” although the punishment was struck].)
Neither Nelson nor his appellate counsel has identified a
cognizable legal issue. Our independent review has not identified
one either. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 231-232; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-
119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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