People v. Smith CA4/2

CourtListener 10711762CalctappOct 27, 2025

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Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Smith CA4/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
See concurring opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E081229 & E082184

v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1600624)

WILLIE ROY SMITH III, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Affirmed.

Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
In 2018, Defendant Willie Roy Smith pled guilty to attempted premeditated

murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), admitting a gun discharge enhancement

(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and other offenses, with a stipulation regarding the factual basis

being taken from the preliminary hearing transcript. He was thereafter sentenced to an

aggregate term of 32 years to life in prison. In 2022, Defendant filed a petition for

resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6, in which he asserted he could not presently be

convicted of the crime, but his petition was denied. He appealed from that denial, and in

a split decision we reversed the denial because the trial court considered the preliminary

hearing transcript in determining if a prima facie showing had been made.

The People petitioned for review, which was granted, and the California Supreme

Court retransferred the case to us with directions to vacate our decision and to reconsider

it in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton II). We have complied with

that direction and requested supplemental briefing from the parties. We now affirm the

trial court’s denial of the resentencing petitions.

BACKGROUND

In 2016, the People charged Defendant with the attempted murder of Jane Doe,

and numerous other offenses arising from the incident in which Defendant, who was

driving Doe, the mother of his child, fired a gun at Doe as she sat in the back seat next to

her infant child.

1 Except as otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
At the preliminary hearing, Doe testified that on May 7, 2016, she was walking to

the grocery store with her then two-month old baby (whose father is Defendant), when

Defendant pulled up alongside her and offered her a ride. Although reluctant at first, Doe

accepted and got into the back seat with the baby.

While driving back from the store, instead of taking Doe home, Defendant drove

past where she lived at the time with her grandmother, heading towards a location where

he and she had gone in the past to have sex. Defendant demanded that Doe have sex with

him, but when she refused and pled with him to take her home, Defendant called her

names, stopped the car, pulled out a gun, turned, and shot her.

Doe estimated he shot her two or three times. The bullets struck her in the head,

neck, and hands. While Doe drifted in and out of consciousness, bleeding in the back

seat, Defendant drove to a liquor store, purchased liquor, and returned to the car with the

alcohol, and continued to drive, telling Doe, “We going to die. I’m sorry. I have to do it.

We going to die.”

Doe passed out while Defendant was driving, regaining consciousness to find law

enforcement were present, and she was being placed into an ambulance. Defendant had

pulled onto the center divider of eastbound Interstate 10, where a highway patrol officer

made a traffic stop after multiple calls regarding his reckless driving. Defendant

spontaneously said he had “f----ed up” and told the officer to “just shoot me.” During the

traffic stop, the highway patrol officer noticed Doe, bleeding, lying on the floorboard in

the rear right passenger area of the car.

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During the pendency of the action, Defendant wrote multiple letters to Doe asking

her to help him out, not to testify, or to “switch the story,” indicating he had told the

police that at the store where they had been shopping that some guy approached the car

and shot a gun at the window. Defendant warned Doe that if she did not tell the police

the same thing, they would take her baby. He apologized to her in the letters, stating that

he had “f----ed up” and asked her to come to court and help him out.

On November 4, 2016, Defendant was charged in a 13-count information, with

attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), count 1), corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5,

subd. (a), count 2), child endangerment (§ 273a, count 3), dissuading a witness (§ 136.1,

subd. (a), counts 4-7), violation of a protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a), counts 8-11,

misdemeanors), and driving while intoxicated with a prior conviction for driving while

intoxicated. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a) & (b), counts 12 & 13.) As to count 1, the

information also alleged that the Defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great

bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personal infliction of great bodily injury.

(§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) As to count 2, the information alleged that Defendant personally

used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury.

(§ 12022.7, subd. (e).)

In March 2018, Defendant pled guilty to one count of deliberate and premeditated

attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), count 1), one count of dissuading a witness

(§ 136.1, subd. (a)), and one misdemeanor count of driving under the influence

(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). He also admitted that he personally and intentionally

discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury within the meaning of section

4
12022.53, subdivision (d) during the commission of the attempted murder. The parties

stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for the plea and

that Defendant agreed to a sentence of 32 years to life plus a consecutive determinate

term of two years in state prison.

On December 11, 2018, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his

plea of guilty, made on the ground he thought he was only agreeing to the sentence that

would be imposed if he were convicted at trial, but that there would be a trial where he

would tell his story. He denied reading the guilty plea forms or being advised that he was

waiving his right to a trial. On July 31, 2020, Defendant was sentenced in accordance

with the stipulated sentence bargain.

On March 13, 2022, Defendant filed his first petition for resentencing pursuant to

section 1172.6. Defendant’s petition alleged that (1) an information had been filed

against him that allowed the prosecution to try him for attempted murder under the

natural and probable consequences doctrine, (2) he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial

at which he could have been convicted of attempted murder, and (3) he could not

presently be convicted of attempted murder because of changes to accomplice liability for

murder made by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). In an attachment to the

petition, Defendant argued that he did not shoot Doe; rather, an unknown person came up

to the car and shot Doe through the window.

At the prima facie hearing on the petition, the People argued that Defendant was

ineligible for relief because he was convicted under a still-valid theory of murder.

Relying on the former appellate decision in People v. Patton (2023) 89 Ca1.App.5th 649

5
(Patton I), review granted June 28, 2023, S279670, the People argued that the

preliminary hearing transcript, to which the parties had stipulated as the factual basis for

the plea, contained uncontroverted evidence that Defendant was the direct perpetrator of

the attempted murder. The trial court denied the petition, stating that it was “satisfied

with [Doe’s] eyewitness testimony that [D]efendant was the person who shot her.”

On April 14, 2023, Defendant filed a second section 1172.6 petition on the same

grounds, although no attachments to this petition are in the record. The court held the

prima facie hearing for that petition on September 23, where the People reiterated their

argument from the first hearing but informed the court that the California Supreme Court

had granted review in Patton I, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted. In response,

the court asked the parties if there was anything in the preliminary hearing transcript “that

would suggest any other theory” of liability, and Defendant’s appointed counsel replied,

“Nothing at all.” The trial court again denied the petition.

Defendant filed notices of appeal as to both orders denying his petitions, which

were consolidated. (People v. Smith (July 24, 2024, E081229, E082184) [nonpub. opn.]

[2024 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 4611, at *4] (Smith).)

In our original opinion, the majority concluded that it was error to deny

Defendant’s petitions at the prima facie stage, because he sufficiently alleged a prima

facie case for relief and the record of conviction does not contain facts refuting the

allegations of his petitions. (Smith, supra, E081229, E082184 [2024 Cal.App. Unpub.

LEXIS 4611, at *9, 12–13, 15–16.) In his dissent, Presiding Justice Ramirez disagreed

with the absolute approach used by the majority to preclude consideration of a

6
preliminary hearing transcript, in light of the holding in People v. Lewis (2021) 11

Ca1.5th 952, which permits the trial court to consider the preliminary hearing transcript

as part of the record of conviction to determine if the allegations of the resentencing

petition have been refuted. (Smith, supra, E081229, E082184 [2024 Cal.App. Unpub.

LEXIS 4611 at *21] (dis. opn., of Ramirez, P. J).)

After our opinion was filed (Smith, supra, E081229, E082184 [2024 Cal.App.

Unpub. LEXIS 4611]), the People petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court issued a

grant and hold pending its decision in Patton I, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649 as the lead

case. Upon the filing of its opinion in Patton II, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549, the Supreme

Court retransferred this case to us with directions to vacate our opinion and reconsider it

in light of Patton II. We have now done so.

DISCUSSION

Following the Supreme Court’s remand of this case in light of Patton II,

Defendant submitted a supplemental brief arguing that notwithstanding the new

precedent, the denial of Defendant’s section 1172.6 must be reversed and remanded to the

superior court with directions to issue an order to show cause followed by an evidentiary

hearing. The People argue to the contrary, that the Supreme Court holding in Patton II,

supra, 17 Cal.5th 549 approved of the trial court’s reference to the preliminary hearing

transcript, seeking affirmance of the denial of the resentencing petition. The People have

the better argument.

We begin by acknowledging that a person convicted of attempted murder under

the natural and probable consequences doctrine is entitled to petition for relief under

7
section 1172.6. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The petition must be accompanied by a declaration

by the petitioner that the petitioner is eligible for relief under this section, based on all the

requirements of subdivision (a). (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A).)

Pertinent to cases involving convictions of attempted murder, section 1172.6 sets

requirements for the contents of a resentencing petition, including an averment as to all of

the following: (1) that the accusatory pleading allowed the prosecution to proceed on the

theory of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, (2)

that the petitioner was convicted of attempted murder after accepting a plea offer in lieu

of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted

murder, and (3) that the petitioner could not presently be convicted of attempted murder

because of changes to sections 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6,

subd. (a)(1)–(3).)

Accordingly, a defendant previously convicted of a qualifying offense may file a

petition pursuant to section 1172.6. Upon receipt of a facially sufficient petition, the

superior court appoints counsel if requested by the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).)

“A petition that includes ‘[a] declaration by petitioner that the petitioner is eligible for

relief . . . , based on all the requirements of subdivision (a),’ the case number and year of

the petitioner’s conviction, and whether the petitioner seeks counsel is facially sufficient

and entitles the petitioner to counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b).)” (Patton II, supra, 17 Cal.5th

at pp. 558–559, citing People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis.) The

prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, and a reply may be filed by the

8
petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Patton II, at p. 559.) The court shall then “hold a hearing

to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.)

After a facially sufficient petition has survived the initial stage, and counsel has

been appointed to submit briefing, the superior court proceeds to determine if a prima

facie showing has been made, “‘“tak[ing] petitioner’s factual allegations as true and

mak[ing] a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to

relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.””’ (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at

p. 971.) In conducting this inquiry, “a court should not reject the petitioner’s factual

allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.”

(People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 978, citing In re Serrano (1995) 10

Cal.4th 447, 456.)

At the prima facie stage, the trial court can rely on the record of conviction to

determine whether it refutes the petitioner’s claim of eligibility. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th

at pp. 970–972.) The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage only if the

record of conviction conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a

matter of law. (Id. at p. 971.) A court may not engage in factfinding or weighing of

evidence in making this determination at the prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 972.)

‘“However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, ‘‘contain[s] facts refuting

the allegations made in the petition,’’ then ‘‘the court is justified in making a credibility

determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Id. at p. 971.)

Thus, “[a]lthough the court must generally take the petitioner’s factual allegations

as true, it is not required to accept factual allegations that are conclusively refuted by the

9
record of conviction, including the court’s own documents.” (People v. Gaillard (2024)

99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211 (italics added), citing Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)

Herein lies the difficulty with Defendant’s petition. On the form petitions for

resentencing, Defendant duly checked the box stating he had been prosecuted for

attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences theory and that he could

not presently be convicted of that crime under current law. Yet the declarations he

attached to each petition conclusively refuted the checked boxes by setting out a scenario

in which he was just as much a victim as Doe insofar as a strange person approached the

vehicle and fired into the car, striking Doe. Additionally, the accusatory pleadings and

the preliminary hearing transcript establish that Defendant was not prosecuted under the

natural and probable consequences theory; he was prosecuted as the sole shooter.

Further, we note that the Defendant’s rendition of facts as set forth in the

declaration attached to his first resentencing petition was the basis for the witness

intimidation (or tampering) counts for which he pled guilty to one count of violating

section 136.1, subdivision (a)(1). In other words, the “some other dude did it” defense

was the defense he sought to establish by threatening Doe to “switch up” her testimony.

The preliminary hearing transcript directly refuted Defendant’s declaration in support of

the resentencing petition, and was part of the record of conviction, considering both the

preliminary hearing transcript and the guilty plea to the witness intimidation counts.

But there’s more. The prosecution’s theory was at all times that Defendant was the

sole shooter. The evidence it presented in the preliminary hearing included the victim’s

testimony that Defendant was the shooter and that he acted alone. This testimony formed

10
the factual basis for Defendant’s plea by stipulation. At the prima facie stage, the record

of conviction includes the preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea. (Patton

II, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 568, citing People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223.) The

record of conviction thus refutes the statements on the face of the petition that Defendant

could not be convicted of attempted murder following the statutory amendments.

We are aware that in Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pages 124–125, the Supreme

Court forbade courts from conducting “its own independent review of record evidence to

determine what conduct ‘realistically’ led to the defendant’s conviction.” (Id. at p. 124;

see Patton II, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 568.) However the trial court’s reliance on the

preliminary hearing transcript here did not violate that prohibition.

In Gallardo, the defendant alleged a Sixth Amendment violation where there were

allegations under both section 667, subdivision (a), as well as under the Three Strikes law

(§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)), relating to a prior conviction of assault by means of force likely to

produce great bodily injury, where convictions under former section 245, subdivision

(a)(1), were not expressly listed in the statute defining serious felonies. (§ 1192.7, subd.

(c)(31).) There, the lower court had examined the record of the prior conviction to

determine if it qualified as a serious felony for both the “nickel prior” conviction [five-

year enhancement] as well as a strike, thereby going “outside the record” to determine if

the prior felony conviction qualified as a serious felony. The Supreme Court in Gallardo

reasoned, “While a sentencing court is permitted to identify those facts that were already

necessarily found by a prior jury in rendering a guilty verdict or admitted by the

defendant in entering a guilty plea, the court may not rely on its own independent review

11
of record evidence to determine what conduct ‘realistically’ led to the defendant's

conviction. (Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 124.)

In Patton II the Supreme Court held that Gallardo did not preclude consideration

of the preliminary hearing transcript in the context of resentencing petitions stating,

“Rather than resolving a contested factual dispute, statements within Patton’s preliminary

hearing transcript contributed specific factual assertions about his conviction—namely,

that it was premised on him being the sole shooter. Patton’s conclusory checkbox

allegations alone could not create a factual dispute about whether he played a

meaningfully different role in the attempted murder.” (Patton II, supra, 17 Cal.5th at

p. 569.) Additionally, the Supreme Court disapproved of appellate decisions in which the

use of preliminary hearing transcripts at the prima facie stage was conditioned on

whether a defendant, when pleading guilty, stipulated to the transcript or its contents.

(Ibid.)

Here, Defendant did stipulate to the preliminary hearing transcript as providing the

factual basis for his guilty plea. The trial court was authorized to consider it in

determining if it refuted the allegations of his resentencing petition in which he alleged he

was convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The transcript,

along with the accusatory pleading, established that Defendant was not convicted of

attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine because he was

the actual shooter. Instead, he was prosecuted as the sole shooter and pled guilty as the

sole shooter. The record of conviction, including the preliminary hearing, conclusively

refuted the allegations in the resentencing petition, as provided in Lewis and Patton. The

12
trial court properly considered the preliminary hearing transcript, which, by Defendant’s

stipulation, established the factual basis for his guilty plea, to determine if Defendant

made a prima facie showing on his resentencing petitions.

The resentencing petitions were properly denied at the prima facie stage.

DISPOSITION

The orders denying the resentencing petitions are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ
P. J.

I concur:

CODRINGTON
J.

13
[People v. Smith, E081229/E082184]

MENETREZ, J., Concurring.

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton) held that if a petition under Penal

Code section 1172.6 is supported only by “conclusory, checkbox allegations” and the

preliminary hearing transcript contains “unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts,” the

petition may be denied on that basis at the prima facie stage. (Patton, at p. 564.)

(Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) In such circumstances, the

petitioner bears “the burden of coming forward with nonconclusory allegations” that

create a material factual dispute. (Id. at p. 567.)

The present case is distinguishable from Patton because defendant Willie Roy

Smith did not rely exclusively on conclusory, checkbox allegations. Rather, in a

declaration under penalty of perjury, he gave a detailed description of his version of the

facts, according to which the victim was shot by an unidentified stranger.

Smith’s declaration does not, however, create a material factual dispute, for at least

two reasons. First, the declaration directly contradicts his prior admission that he

personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury within

the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d), during the commission of the

attempted murder. Second, Smith has not described a factual scenario under which he

could have been convicted of attempted murder under prior law but can no longer be

convicted under current law. Instead, under Smith’s version of events, he would be

innocent even under prior law. Smith’s guilty plea forecloses reliance on any such

version of events. The petitioner “cannot use a section 1172.6 resentencing hearing to

1
relitigate facts already determined, whether by plea, admission, or verdict.” (People v.

Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 458.)

For the foregoing reasons, Smith’s petitions were correctly denied at the prima

facie stage. I therefore concur in the judgment.

MENETREZ
J.

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