CourtListener 10711676•Seiden v. CMS Construction CA2/1
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Filed 10/27/25 Seiden v. CMS Construction CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
LEWIS SEIDEN, B334424 consolidated with
B334642
Cross-complainant and
Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. 20STCV17928)
CMS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
et al.,
Cross-defendants and
Respondents.
APPEALS from a judgment and orders of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, William Fahey, Judge. Affirmed in
part and dismissed in part.
Kowal Law Group, Timothy M. Kowal, Teddy T. Davis, and
Ryan Merker for Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Wolfe & Wyman and Libby Wong for Cross-defendant and
Respondent CMS Construction, Inc.
Lewitt, Hackman, Shapiro, Marshall & Harlan, Jessica W.
Rosen and Nicholas S. Kanter for Cross-defendants and
Respondents KGM3 LLC, Craig Steven Den Besten, and Randi
Den Besten.
____________________________
INTRODUCTION
The trial court dismissed appellant Lewis Seiden’s second
amended cross-complaint with prejudice as a terminating
sanction for his repeated discovery misconduct. The court later
denied Seiden’s motion to vacate the dismissal under Code of
Civil Procedure1 section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)).
Seiden now appeals. We conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing terminating sanctions given the breadth of
Seiden’s misconduct. We also disagree with Seiden’s contention
that section 473(b) mandated the court vacate its dismissal
because Seiden’s attorney submitted a declaration accepting the
blame for the imposition of terminating sanctions. The fault for
the discovery misconduct that led to terminating sanctions
occurred when Seiden was representing himself and belonged to
him alone; it was not the fault of the attorney he retained at the
eleventh hour as the court considered the consequences of that
misconduct.
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Seiden’s Commercial Landlord Sues Him and Seiden
Cross-complains against KGM3
Seiden sells and leases cars. He leased office space from
Bogota Corporation (Bogota) to operate his business. In 2019, in
connection with its contemplated sale of the property to
respondent KGM3 LLC (KGM3), Bogota requested that Seiden
execute a tenant estoppel certificate.2 Seiden refused. Bogota
consummated the sale anyway, and in May 2020 it sued Seiden,
alleging among other things that Seiden had wrongfully refused
to execute the estoppel certificate unless Bogota compensated
him for meritless claims, which needlessly forced Bogota to place
money in escrow as security for those claims.
On October 26, 2020, Seiden, represented by counsel, filed
a cross-complaint against KGM3, which had consummated the
purchase from Bogota and assumed the lease to Seiden. Seiden
claimed KGM3 had breached the lease by, among other things,
failing to adequately maintain the property, prohibiting him from
using the common area water spigot, and failing to make
promised improvements. Seiden sought a rebate of rent and
compensation for an alleged decrease in his business income.
2 “Estoppel certificates inform prospective buyers and
lenders of the lessees’ understanding of a lease agreement. By
providing independent verification of the presence or absence of
any side deals, estoppel certificates prevent unwelcome post-
transaction surprises that might adversely affect the building’s
income stream . . . .” (Robert T. Miner, M.D., Inc. v. Tustin Ave.
Investors (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 264, 273.)
3
B. Seiden Begins Representing Himself and Adds CMS
and the Den Bestens as Cross-defendants
On September 10, 2021, Seiden’s counsel substituted out of
the case and Seiden began to represent himself.
On November 10, 2021, Seiden filed a first amended cross-
complaint; on August 17, 2022, he filed a second amended cross-
complaint. Seiden alleged that KGM3 interfered with his use of
the property by continuing Bogota’s breaches and breaching the
lease in new ways, including by barring Seiden from various
areas of the property. Seiden also asserted cross-claims against
respondent CMS Construction, Inc. (CMS), another tenant in the
building, and the principals of KGM3 and CMS, respondents
Craig Steven Den Besten and Randi Den Besten. He alleged he
suffered personal injury, and his business was harmed, after
CMS and Craig Steven Den Besten altered a sewer line access
causing noxious gas to enter Seiden’s office space.
After the trial court granted respondents’ demurrers in
part, Seiden proceeded on various cross-claims against
respondents to recover for alleged business losses and personal
injury.
C. KGM3’s and CMS’s Motions to Compel and Seiden’s
Supplemental Responses
On June 7, 2022, CMS moved to compel production of
documents in response to its first set of requests, asserting that
Seiden had failed to make a “code compliant” production of
documents. Seiden filed a written opposition that did not dispute
the inadequacy of his document production but argued the court
should deny the motion on procedural grounds.
On December 27, 2022, KGM3 moved to compel
supplemental responses to its first set of special interrogatories.
4
KGM3 contended that Seiden had interposed meritless objections
and improperly invoked section 2030.230 to refer to voluminous
documents instead of providing responsive information, while
also failing to specify where in the referenced documents
responsive information could be found.3 Seiden filed an
opposition, which did not contest the merits of KGM3’s
arguments and instead argued only that KGM3’s motion was
procedurally defective.
On February 7, 2023, the trial court granted CMS’s and
KGM3’s motions, ordering within 15 days that Seiden was to
produce all documents responsive to CMS’s requests and to
respond to KGM3’s special interrogatories; the court also granted
KGM3 $2,625 in sanctions. The court concluded that Seiden’s
objections to the interrogatories “[we]re meritless[ and]
improperly vague,” his responses improperly invoked section
2030.230 to refer to documents instead of providing responsive
facts, and in any event the responses failed to specify with
sufficient detail the documents Seiden claimed would provide
responsive information.
3 Under section 2030.230, “If the answer to an
interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of
a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the
documents of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed,
and if the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be
substantially the same for the party propounding the
interrogatory as for the responding party, it is a sufficient answer
to that interrogatory to refer to this section and to specify the
writings from which the answer may be derived or
ascertained. . . .”
5
On February 22, 2023, Seiden provided to CMS a
spreadsheet which purported to link documents he had
previously produced to specific document requests. On
February 23, 2023, CMS’s counsel responded that the
spreadsheet was “incomprehensible” and did not comply with the
court’s February 7, 2023 order; counsel later further indicated the
spreadsheet was not new but part of the prior inadequate
production, and linked documents were not responsive to CMS’s
requests. On February 28, 2023, after the 15-day deadline had
elapsed, Seiden served supplemental responses to CMS’s
document requests. In the supplemental responses, Seiden
stated that “[s]ome of the documents requested are reports which
were unable to be generated by the production date due [to] a
failure of [his] hard drive” and that he had “brought the
[computer] to a computer repair facility which was unable to
recover the data.”
On March 3, 2023, Seiden untimely served further
responses to KGM3’s special interrogatories. In response to
interrogatories seeking facts and documents supporting his claim
of reduced car sales, Seiden stated “[the i]nterrogatory cannot be
answered completely at this time because doing so requires
access to data that is unavailable at present,” and claimed that
he had lost data due to a “failed hard drive” and would have to
“manually rebuild the lost data files.” He stated that he would
“further supplement th[e] [r]esponse” “[a]s files are rebuilt.”
D. Respondents File Motions for Terminating Sanctions
On May 15, 2023, KGM3 and the Den Bestens filed a
motion under section 2023.030 for terminating sanctions, or
alternatively, evidentiary and issue sanctions, along with
monetary sanctions due to Seiden’s alleged misuse of the
6
discovery process.4 The discovery misuse alleged by KGM3 and
the Den Bestens went well beyond Seiden simply failing to
comply with the court’s February 7, 2023 order on the motions to
compel.
KGM3 and the Den Bestens primarily focused on Seiden’s
repeated failure to provide responsive information substantiating
his claim of lost business income. They asserted Seiden was
evasive at his September 19, 2022 deposition, for example stating
he “would have to check” whether he had sold more than two cars
in 2022, refusing to identify the business records where the
information could be found, and claiming to not know how much
revenue his business received in the years 2019 through 2022
including refusing to provide an estimate. Then, after KGM3
successfully moved to compel Seiden to provide further responses
to its first set of special interrogatories (many of which related to
his claim of lost business income), his further responses
continued to be evasive and reasserted objections the court had
already found lacked merit. In addition, Craig Steven Den
Besten propounded interrogatories on Seiden regarding the
number of cars Seiden had sold or leased during 2019-2022,
medical treatment he had received for the alleged exposure to
sewer gases, and the basis for his claims he had been damaged by
alleged breaches of the lease and the implied covenant of quiet
4 KGM3 had filed a sanctions motion on March 29, 2023,
but filed a new motion on the same grounds after the hearing
date on its original motion was changed several times and the
case was twice transferred to new judges.
7
enjoyment, but Seiden only interposed objections and failed to
provide any substantive responses.5
KGM3 and the Den Bestens also questioned the bona fides
of Seiden’s claims that he had lost responsive information due to
a computer problem and argued in the alternative that if Seiden
had in fact lost responsive information then he had “permitted
the spoliation of evidence.” They adduced evidence Seiden had
stated in response to a later interrogatory that to rebuild his lost
data files he “intend[ed] to aggregate writings on purchase orders
and other documents with any electronic data available” but
refused to respond to KGM3’s interrogatory asking him to
specifically identify those written documents, which suggested he
was withholding responsive information. KGM3 and the Den
Bestens lastly contended that terminating sanctions were
warranted because the court had already imposed monetary
sanctions on Seiden but his discovery abuse continued.
CMS filed its own motion for terminating sanctions on
May 16, 2023.6 CMS asserted that Seiden had failed to produce
the documents required by the trial court’s February 7, 2023
order, and instead provided an “incomprehensible” spreadsheet
that failed to tie any produced documents to specific document
requests and in any event omitted six of the document requests
entirely. CMS also contended that Seiden served supplemental
written responses which included “evasive and non-responsive
5 As noted below, Craig Steven Den Besten filed a motion to
compel responses to these interrogatories.
6 Similar to KGM3, CMS had filed a sanctions motion on
March 29, 2023, but filed a new motion on the same grounds after
the case was transferred.
8
objections.” CMS argued that terminating sanctions were
appropriate because neither monetary sanctions nor orders
compelling discovery had been effective. In addition, CMS
asserted that terminating sanctions were warranted because
Seiden had spoliated evidence by allowing digital information
related to his sales to be “ ‘lost.’ ”
E. Respondents Also File Additional Motions to Compel
In addition to the sanctions motion from KGM3 and the
Den Bestens, KGM3 moved to compel Seiden to respond to its
interrogatory seeking to identify the documents Seiden planned
to use to rebuild his data files and Craig Steven Den Besten
moved to compel Seiden to respond to Den Besten’s first set of
special interrogatories.
In addition to its sanctions motion, CMS separately moved
to compel Seiden to respond to its further discovery requests
regarding Seiden’s claim that he lost data due to a computer
problem. CMS contended that Seiden responded to the discovery
only with meritless objections, including objecting to the special
interrogatories and requests for admission on the sole ground
they were not supported by declarations attesting to the need for
more than 35 requests when in fact there were such declarations.
F. The Trial Court Grants the Motions for Terminating
Sanctions and Motions to Compel after Seiden Fails
to File Written Opposition
The hearing on respondents’ sanctions motions and the
motions to compel was scheduled for June 14, 2023, which made
Seiden’s oppositions due June 1, 2023. Seiden did not file any
opposition. On June 7, 2023, respondents served and filed notices
of Seiden’s failure to oppose the motions.
9
That same day, attorney Travis A. Corder substituted into
the case to represent Seiden. On June 13, 2023, Corder
attempted to file an ex parte application to continue the hearing
on the motions, but the application was rejected by the court
clerk because Corder missed the 10:00 a.m. filing deadline.7
Later on June 13, the trial court advanced the hearing date
and granted the sanctions motions and motions to compel
without holding a hearing. The court’s minute order stated that
the motions were “well-taken, unopposed and granted in their
entirety.” The court dismissed Seiden’s second amended cross-
complaint with prejudice.8
G. Seiden Files a Motion to Vacate which the Trial
Court Denies
On July 11, 2023, Seiden filed a motion under section
473(b) to vacate the trial court’s June 13 order on the sanctions
motions.9 As relevant here, Seiden contended he was entitled to
7 Seiden later adduced evidence that the filing was delayed
because the filing service Corder used unexpectedly did not
recognize his password, requiring him to expend time to change
his password.
8 The trial court also imposed monetary sanctions which we
affirmed in a separate appeal. (Bogota Corporation v. Seiden
(Nov. 22, 2024, B332296) [nonpub. opn.].)
9 “Section 473[(b)] provides two separate provisions for
relief from default or dismissal. [Citation.] ‘One affords
discretionary relief, and the other makes relief mandatory.’
[Citation.]” (Hernandez v. FCA US LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
329, 335.) Seiden contended in his motion to vacate that he was
entitled to both mandatory and discretionary relief under section
10
relief because his attorney, Corder, submitted a declaration
accepting blame for failing to file oppositions to the sanctions
motions or an ex parte application to continue the hearing. In his
declaration, Corder averred that Seiden retained him on May 24,
2023, and he advised Seiden at that time he “would likely not be
able to file oppositions to the [eight] [m]otions by [the June 1 due
date]” and intended to ask opposing counsel to stipulate to a
continuance and, if they did not agree, to seek a continuance from
the court. Corder further averred that opposing counsel did not
agree to a continuance and then detailed his failed effort to file
an ex parte application on June 13, 2023. Corder identified as his
“failures” not preparing and timely filing oppositions to the
sanctions motions, not filing the ex parte application before the
last day, not preparing oppositions by the day before the hearing
and seeking a continuance with the oppositions ready, and failing
in his attempt to file the ex parte application on June 13, 2023.
He took no responsibility for Seiden’s discovery misconduct or the
failure to remedy it by providing code compliant responses;
Corder implicitly acknowledged the responses to date were
deficient, stating he was working with Seiden “to further
supplement his discovery responses where appropriate” and “to
locate and produce any additional responsive documents.”
Corder averred that, other than his inability to file the ex parte
application on June 13, his failures were the result of his having
too much other work and suffering from a medical condition
473(b). However, Seiden does not pursue his claim for
discretionary relief on appeal and we therefore do not discuss it
further.
11
which impacted, among other things, his “cognition,”
“concentration” and “decision-making.”
Attached to Corder’s declaration was a copy of the ex parte
application to continue the June 14, 2023 hearing he had
attempted to file on June 13. The section 473(b) motion did not
include proposed oppositions to any of the pending motions,
proposed discovery responses, or any other proposed pleading
beyond the ex parte application to continue. (See § 473(b) [the
“[a]pplication for . . . relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the
. . . pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the
application shall not be granted”]; Rodriguez v. Brill (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 715, 729 [in the context of terminating sanctions,
§ 473(b) “require[s] the application for relief to be accompanied by
verified discovery responses”].)
In their joint opposition, respondents contended that
Seiden, not his attorney, was responsible for the sanctions
motions being granted because Seiden was the one who engaged
in discovery abuse. Respondents asserted that the trial court
granted the sanctions motions because it found them to have
merit, not because they were unopposed, and further asserted
that Seiden was to blame for the lack of opposition because he
delayed in retaining an attorney. In addition, relying on the
requirement that a party seeking relief under section 473(b) must
attach a copy of the pleading they propose to file, respondents
argued that Seiden’s motion failed because he had not attached
compliant discovery responses.
In his reply brief, Seiden contended that the court might
not have granted the sanctions motions if he had gotten a
continuance and could have prepared oppositions. In response to
respondents’ argument that he was required to submit discovery
12
responses with his motion to vacate, Seiden pointed out he had
already provided “facts and argument supportive of [his] defenses
[to the sanctions motions]” in a declaration by Corder and in the
motion to vacate, and suggested that tendering proposed
oppositions one to two weeks after the hearing “could . . .
constitute substantial compliance” with the requirement to
attach a proposed pleading.
The court held a hearing on the motion to vacate on
August 11, 2023 and took the matter under submission. The
court denied the motion on August 17, 2023. It concluded that
“Seiden [wa]s not entitled to mandatory relief as to the dismissal
of the [second amended cross-complaint]. The motions for
terminating sanctions were well-taken and Seiden failed to file
oppositions by the due date. Corder was not counsel of record
until a later date. In other words, nothing Corder did or did not
do caused the [m]otion for [t]erminating [s]anctions to be
granted.” The court further found, “[i]t was also Seiden’s fault,
and not Corder’s, that no oppositions were filed to the discovery
motions.” The court also stated, “Seiden concedes that the
[m]otion [to vacate] did not include proper discovery responses.
But this is followed by a strained and unpersuasive ‘substantial
compliance’ argument . . . .”
The court found that “Seiden ha[d] engaged in a long
pattern and practice of misconduct in this case. Seiden
improperly delayed years in filing his [first amended cross-
complaint] and then [his second amended cross-complaint]. He
provided evasive and incomplete answers in his deposition. He
failed to provide substantive responses to interrogatories and
failed to produce documents. After meet and confer efforts,
Seiden refused to supplement his answers, requiring cross-
13
defendants to file motions to compel.” The court stated, “In sum,
this is one of those rare cases where a party has demonstrated
that he is incapable of or unwilling to comply with the basic
requirements of civil litigation and discovery.”
After the court entered a judgment of dismissal, Seiden
timely appealed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying
his motion to vacate.10
DISCUSSION
Seiden contends the trial court erred in imposing
terminating sanctions because Seiden did not violate any court
10 Seiden also appealed an October 6, 2023 order granting
KGM3’s motion for contractual attorney’s fees. In that order, the
trial court found that KGM3 had incurred $121,884 in reasonable
attorney’s fees, but made a deduction to avoid “a double recovery
of attorney[’]s fees because the [c]ourt previously awarded fees as
discovery sanctions.” As KGM3 concedes, it is evident the court
intended to deduct the portion of the prior fee awards Seiden had
already paid ($2,625) but instead mistakenly deducted the
unpaid balance of those prior awards ($11,362) to arrive at its
final award of $110,522, an error that benefitted Seiden. The
court later included that amount ($110,522) in an amended
judgment which no party has appealed.
Seiden contended in his opening brief that the court’s
October 6, 2023 order was error because it left him “obligated to
pay” a portion of KGM3’s attorney’s fees “twice” under both the
October 6, 2023 order and the prior fee awards. Seiden
abandoned his appeal of the October 6, 2023 order in his reply
brief, based on respondents’ concession (with which we concur)
“that the trial court intended to incorporate the amount of unpaid
discovery sanctions in the judgment,” such that respondents can
no longer enforce collection of any attorney fee amount beyond
what is included in the amended judgment.
14
order nor engage in conduct that would justify terminating
sanctions, and because the court failed to consider less drastic
sanctions. Seiden also contends the court erred in denying his
motion to vacate because Corder’s declaration accepting blame for
the sanctions motions being granted entitled him to relief.
A. The Terminating Sanctions
1. Standard of Review
“ ‘We review the trial court’s order [imposing terminating
sanctions] under the abuse of discretion standard and resolve all
evidentiary conflicts most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
We will reverse only if the trial court’s order was arbitrary,
capricious, or whimsical. It is [the] appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error and where the evidence is in
conflict, we will affirm the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We
presume the trial court’s order was correct and indulge all
presumptions and intendments in its favor on matters as to
which it is silent.’ ” (Creed 21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 690, 702.)
2. Legal Principles Governing Discovery Sanctions
A court may impose sanctions, including a terminating
sanction ordering dismissal of the action, for “misuse of the
discovery process.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (d)(1).) “Misuses of the
discovery process include . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [f]ailing to respond or
to submit to an authorized method of discovery[,] [¶] . . .
[m]aking, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious
objection to discovery[,] [¶] . . . [m]aking an evasive response to
discovery[,] [¶] . . . [d]isobeying a court order to provide
discovery[, and] [¶] . . . opposing, unsuccessfully and without
15
substantial justification, a motion to compel . . . discovery.”
(§ 2023.010, subds. (d)-(h).)
In addition, the Civil Discovery Act authorizes sanctions,
including terminating sanctions, when parties fail to obey an
order compelling their responses to specific types of discovery.
(E.g., §§ 2030.300, subd. (e) [“[i]f a party . . . fails to obey an order
compelling further response to interrogatories, the court may
make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an
issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction”],
2031.320, subd. (c) [“if a party . . . fails to obey an order
compelling inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the court
may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of
an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating
sanction”].)
“The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to
discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending
with the ultimate sanction of termination. . . . [Citation.] If a
lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is
warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant
incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached
that will curb the abuse.” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) “The trial court has broad discretion
in selecting discovery sanctions, subject to reversal only for
abuse. [Citations.] The trial court should consider both the
conduct being sanctioned and its effect on the party seeking
discovery and, in choosing a sanction, should ‘ “attempt[] to tailor
the sanction to the harm caused by the withheld discovery.” ’
[Citation.] The trial court cannot impose sanctions for misuse of
the discovery process as a punishment.” (Ibid.)
16
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Imposing Terminating Sanctions
a. The trial court was statutorily empowered to
impose terminating sanctions based on Seiden’s
pattern of discovery abuse.
Seiden contends the trial court could only issue terminating
sanctions if he violated an order compelling discovery, and that
he did not violate any such court order. Both of these premises
are mistaken.
Certain code provisions do require the disobedience of an
order compelling discovery before imposition of a terminating
sanction pursuant to that provision. (E.g., §§ 2030.300, subd. (e),
2031.320, subd. (c); see generally New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1423-1424.) But not all.
Trial courts are authorized to impose sanctions, including
terminating sanctions, for a party’s pattern of misuse of the
discovery process untethered to any order on a motion to compel.
(§ 2023.030, subd. (d); City of Los Angeles v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 74-75.)
Section 2023.010 defines misuses of the discovery process,
including numerous examples of such misuse unrelated to
defying an order following a motion to compel. Section 2023.030
permits a court to impose sanctions, up to and including
dismissing an action, for misuses of the discovery process as set
forth in section 2023.010. (City of Los Angeles v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 67-72.)
However, “[a] court may invoke its independent authority to
impose sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 only
when confronted with an unusual form of discovery abuse, or a
pattern of abuse, not already addressed by a relevant sanctions
17
provision.” (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,
supra, at p. 74.)
The trial court found such an unusual pattern of abuse
here, concluding “this is one of those rare cases where a party has
demonstrated that he is incapable of or unwilling to comply with
the basic requirements of civil litigation and discovery.”
Substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that Seiden
had engaged in a pattern of discovery misuse sufficiently
egregious for terminating sanctions, including “[f]ailing to
respond” to discovery (§ 2023.010, subd. (d)), “[m]aking, without
substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery”
(id., subd. (e)), “[m]aking an evasive response to discovery” (id.,
subd. (f)), “[d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery” (id.,
subd. (g)), and “opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial
justification, a motion to compel . . . discovery” (id., subd. (h)).
Seiden failed to produce documents in response to CMS’s
document requests. When CMS moved to compel, Seiden’s
opposition did not dispute he had failed to respond nor claim he
had a legitimate excuse for not doing so, and instead asserted
only that CMS’s motion failed on procedural grounds which the
court later rejected. Seiden initially responded to KGM3’s first
set of special interrogatories by trying to hide the requested
needles inside a haystack of irrelevant information, improperly
invoking section 2030.230 to refer to documents instead of
providing responsive information and referring to voluminous
documents without specifying where responsive information
could be found. When KGM3 moved to compel, Seiden again
failed to provide any substantial justification for his actions and
relied instead on flawed procedural arguments. At his
deposition, Seiden refused to provide information and reasonable
18
estimates about his business’s revenue, refused to identify the
business records where the information could be found, and
interposed meritless objections.
Seiden’s evasive conduct continued after the trial court
granted KGM3’s and CMS’s initial motions to compel. Despite
being ordered to produce documents to CMS, Seiden failed to
produce any documents and instead provided CMS with a
spreadsheet purporting to identify responsive documents but
which the court could reasonably conclude was incomplete and
meant to confuse. Despite being ordered to respond to KGM3’s
first set of special interrogatories, Seiden served responses devoid
of responsive facts, and relied on an excuse—that he had lost
information through a “failed hard drive”—which the trial court
could reasonably conclude was not genuine. Seiden had initially
responded to the interrogatories by referring to documents
independent of any hard drive, and not mentioning any
responsive documents on a hard drive. Then, when pressed
about the lack of relevant information in the identified
documents, Seiden claimed for the first time the actual
responsive information was elsewhere, on a now-failed hard
drive. When questioned about that excuse, he adopted a third
story that he had yet other information (which he refused to
identify or produce) from which he could reconstruct what was
allegedly on the hard drive.
Seiden’s misuses of the discovery process were not limited
to his claim for business losses but also included his other claims
for damages from alleged toxic gas exposure, breaches of the
lease, and breaches of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
Seiden relied on objections which the trial court could conclude
19
were meritless to avoid responding to interrogatories propounded
by Craig Steven Den Besten regarding these other claims.
b. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that lesser sanctions would not
be effective.
Seiden also contends the trial court abused its discretion
because it did not consider whether a sanction less drastic than
dismissal of his action would have sufficed. “ ‘A decision to order
terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a
violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the
evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce
compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in
imposing the ultimate sanction.’ ” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors,
Inc., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992, fn. omitted; see Collisson
& Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1620 [“ ‘[T]he
question before this court is not whether the trial court should
have imposed a lesser sanction; rather, the question is whether
the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction it
chose’ ”].)
Although the court’s order did not expressly state that it
considered and rejected lesser sanctions, we presume the court
made an implied finding that less severe sanctions would not
curb Seiden’s discovery abuse if substantial evidence supports
such a finding. “ ‘[E]ven where there are no express findings, we
must review the trial court’s exercise of discretion based on
implied findings that are supported by substantial evidence.’ ”
(Agnone v. Agnone (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 758, 767 [review of
order imposing discovery sanctions].)
The trial court’s implied finding that lesser sanctions would
not be effective to compel Seiden’s compliance with his discovery
20
obligations is supported by substantial evidence. First, the
court’s February 7, 2023 order, compelling compliance and
imposing monetary sanctions, had failed to curb Seiden’s
discovery abuse. As discussed above, Seiden’s pattern of
discovery abuse continued after the court’s order in his further
responses to the discovery subject to the order as well as several
of respondents’ additional discovery requests.
Second, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that evidence or issue sanctions would not
adequately ameliorate the harm caused by Seiden’s failure to
provide information and identify documents to support his
claims. Evidentiary or issue sanctions are usually more
appropriate than terminating sanctions where it is “unlikely
[that] the responsive information [sought by the discovery] would
relate to at least some of the core issues at trial” such that lesser
sanctions can be crafted “to replace the information that would or
could be included” in the discovery not produced. (Lopez v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 566, 605-606; see also Caryl Richards, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 300, 305 [terminating
sanctions improper for the defendant’s failure to adequately
respond to a single interrogatory, which could have been
effectively ameliorated by an issue or evidence sanction regarding
the topic of the interrogatory].) Here, however, Seiden repeatedly
evaded discovery going to the very heart of his claims that his
business had suffered due to respondents’ conduct, that emissions
from the sewer outlet CMS had worked on had harmed his health
and business, and that he could recover damages under the lease
and the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. (See Miranda v.
21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 929 [rejecting
21
the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court should have imposed
an issue sanction instead of terminating sanctions in part
because the only possibly appropriate issue sanction would be
“equivalent to a dismissal of [the] plaintiff’s claim”].)
Seiden relies on Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society
of New York, Inc., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 566, but in that case
the lower court imposed the terminating sanction before
attempting to gain compliance with monetary sanctions and
there was “no basis in the record showing the [lower] court could
not have obtained [the defendant]’s compliance with lesser
sanctions.” (Id. at p. 605.) In contrast here, the orders
compelling Seiden to respond to discovery and monetary
sanctions failed to achieve his compliance. In addition, in Lopez
the defendant suggested specific monetary, evidentiary, and issue
sanctions the lower court could have imposed (id. at p. 605
[identifying alternatives such as a “monetary penalty for every
day [the offending party] did not search for the documents or for
each day the responsive documents were not produced” or
“evidentiary or issue sanctions to replace the information that
would or could be included within th[e requested] documents”]),
while in this case Seiden fails to identify any lesser sanctions
that would be effective.11 Lastly, in Lopez, there were “core
11 Indeed, Seiden fails to explain how evidentiary or issue
sanctions would have produced any different result here. The
“lesser” alternative sanction proposed by respondents was to
prohibit Seiden from introducing at trial any evidence of
damages. If Seiden’s discovery abuses were to preclude him from
presenting evidence that he suffered business losses, damage
from alleged toxic gas exposure, or damage from alleged breaches
of the lease and the covenant of quiet enjoyment, or if the court
22
issues . . . unaffected” by the contested discovery (id. at p. 606);
here, as noted, Seiden’s discovery abuses related to the key issues
underlying his claims of business loss and personal injury.
B. The Motion to Vacate
Seiden contends the trial court erred in denying his motion
to vacate the dismissal of his second amended cross-complaint
because he was entitled to relief based on the declaration of his
counsel, Corder, accepting blame for the dismissal.
1. Legal Principles Governing Motions to Vacate under
Section 473(b) and Standard of Review
Seiden’s appeal challenges only the denial of mandatory
relief under section 473(b). Under that provision, “the court
shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six
months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is
accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or
her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any
(1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client,
and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or
(2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or
her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was
not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect.” (§ 473(b).)
had imposed an issue sanction that Seiden could not show such
damage, the outcome of this case would be exactly the same
because such a sanction would be equivalent to dismissing
Seiden’s claims given the necessity to demonstrate damages.
(See Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at
p. 929.)
23
“ ‘When a default [or dismissal] is the attorney’s fault the
court must grant a timely noticed motion for relief. The only
limitation is when the court finds [that] the default [or dismissal]
was not in fact the attorney’s fault, for example when the
attorney is simply covering up for the client. . . .’ [Citation.]
Thus, ‘[t]he court must also find that the default [or dismissal]
was actually caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or neglect. . . .’ ” (Todd v. Thrifty Corp. (1995) 34
Cal.App.4th 986, 991.)
The phrase “ ‘in proper form’ ” as used in the mandatory
relief provision incorporates the requirement, as stated in the
discretionary relief provision, that the motion “ ‘shall be
accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed
to be filed.’ ” (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
393, 401.) Courts “interpret the requirement in section 473(b)
that an application for mandatory relief be ‘in proper form’ to
mean that, when relief is sought from a terminating sanction
imposed for failing to provide discovery responses, the application
must be accompanied by verified responses to the discovery in
question. . . . [This] avoid[s] further delays by compelling the
delinquent party to demonstrate a readiness to proceed on the
merits.” (Rodriguez v. Brill, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p.729,
citing Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 401-402.)
“ ‘[I]f the prerequisites for the application of the mandatory
provision of section 473[(b)] exist, the trial court does not have
discretion to refuse relief.’ ” (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 399.) We defer to the court’s factual findings,
so that “[w]hen . . . ‘the evidence gives rise to conflicting
reasonable inferences, one of which supports the findings of the
24
trial court, the trial court’s finding is conclusive on appeal.’ ”
(Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th
613, 623.)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Seiden’s
Motion to Vacate
The trial court denied Seiden’s motion under section
473(b)’s mandatory relief provision based on two factual grounds.
Both findings are supported by substantial evidence and
therefore are conclusive, and each independently supports the
court’s denial of relief.
First, the court concluded that nothing Corder did or failed
to do caused the sanctions motions to be granted. Seiden
contends that Corder was at fault because he was retained on
May 24, 2023, before the oppositions to the sanctions motions
were due, and he was the one responsible for filing the
oppositions. We question whether failure to oppose the motions
at issue here even qualifies for relief under section 473(b), as the
statute does not apply “to every ‘omission’ or ‘failure’ in the
course of an action that might be characterized as a ‘default’
under the more general meaning of the word” (English v. IKON
Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 143), but
instead only to a default entered when a defendant fails to
answer a complaint and to dismissals which are procedurally
equivalent to such a default. (E.g., Hossain v. Hossain (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 454 [§ 473(b) does not apply to failure to timely
oppose motion to enforce settlement]; English v. IKON Business
Solutions, Inc., supra, at p. 149 [§ 473(b) does not apply to failure
to oppose summary judgment motion].) The dismissal here was
not entered solely as a result of the failure to file an opposition to
the sanctions motions in the way a default is entered if no answer
25
is filed. It was entered because Seiden (and not his attorney) had
previously engaged in a repeated pattern of discovery abuse.
Even so, assuming section 473(b) encompassed the failure
to oppose the sanctions motions, the court reasonably inferred
that Corder was not at fault for failing to file the oppositions, and
that instead it was Seiden’s fault because he delayed in retaining
Corder until it was too late.12 In his declaration, Corder averred
that when Seiden retained him, he advised Seiden that he “would
likely not be able to file oppositions to the [eight m]otions by
June 1 and that [he] intended, rather, to first attempt to obtain
additional time by stipulation of the parties and, failing that, to
apply ex parte for a continuance of the [m]otions . . . .” Based on
this, the court could reasonably infer that Seiden retained Corder
with the understanding that Corder was not going to prepare
oppositions to the motions by June 1 because there was not
enough time for Corder to do so.13
12 Seiden asserts “the trial court placed undue importance
on the fact that . . . Corder had not formally entered an
appearance in the case until June 7[, 2023].” We disagree. The
court acknowledged in its order that Corder averred he was
retained on May 24, 2023, and expressly found, “[i]t was . . .
Seiden’s fault, and not Corder’s, that no oppositions were filed to
the discovery motions.”
13 In his reply brief, Seiden for the first time argues that
Corder was at fault for failing to “timely” request a continuance
of the hearing on the sanctions motions from opposing counsel
and for failing to file an ex parte application to continue the
hearing. Seiden has forfeited these claims by failing to include
them in his opening brief. (See Varjabedian v. City of Madera
(1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11 [“Obvious reasons of fairness
26
Second, the court found that the motion to vacate was not
accompanied by a proposed pleading, as required by section
473(b). Seiden contends he substantially complied with the
requirement to attach a pleading by presenting in his motion to
vacate arguments against the sanctions motions. In its order, the
court found that Seiden’s “ ‘substantial compliance’ ” claim lacked
merit.14 We agree.
“The purpose of the proposed pleading requirement of
section 473 is to compel the delinquent party to demonstrate his
or her good faith and readiness to proceed on the merits” and
because of this purpose “courts have held substantial compliance
to be sufficient.” (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at pp. 401, 402.) “A test for substantial compliance
is whether the moving party has demonstrated a willingness and
ability to comply with the procedural requirements that led to the
militate against consideration of an issue raised initially in the
reply brief of an appellant”].) Furthermore, even were we to
consider these claims and read section 473(b) to encompass them,
we would reject them because the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that opposing counsel would not have
stipulated to a continuance even if Corder had made the request
earlier and that the court would not have granted a continuance
had Corder applied for one ex parte. At the hearing on the
motion to vacate, the court noted that Seiden’s earlier (April
2023) ex parte application for a continuance of the hearing date
had been denied and “there was nothing [in the motion to vacate]
to show that a renewed ex parte [application] should have been
granted or would have been granted.”
14 Given this statement in the court’s order, we reject
Seiden’s contention that the trial court did not base its decision
on the lack of a proposed pleading.
27
dismissal.” (Rodriguez v. Brill, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 729
[“In the context of a terminating sanction for failing to provide
discovery, we conclude substantial compliance is demonstrated if,
at or before the hearing on the motion for relief, the moving party
has served a copy of verified discovery responses on opposing
counsel”].) Seiden did not provide discovery responses, nor did he
even commit to providing them by a given date. He instead
sought additional delay to prepare and file oppositions to the
motions, requesting the court continue the hearing for 45 to 60
days, “with [the] opposition deadlines to be keyed to that new
hearing date.” Although Seiden’s motion to vacate and
supporting documents discussed some reasons why he believed
the sanctions motions were flawed, they did so in a general and
conclusory fashion, failed to address most of respondents’
arguments, and failed to provide any supporting documentary
evidence to refute respondents’ claims of discovery abuse. Under
these circumstances, the court could reasonably conclude that
Seiden was seeking “just more delays” and had not
“demonstrated a willingness and ability to comply with the
procedural requirements that led to the dismissal” (id. at
p. 729).15
15 Seiden relies on Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School
District (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, where the court held that
the plaintiff, who sought to vacate a court order so that she could
file an opposition, substantially complied with the proposed
pleading requirement by setting forth “the same factual
contentions and legal arguments . . . in her various filings
requesting relief from the judgment” that she would have
included in the opposition. (Id. at p. 933.) Austin, which involved
discretionary relief under section 473(b), is inapposite. The
28
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal and order denying the motion to
vacate are affirmed. The appeal from the October 6, 2023 fee
order is dismissed as moot. Respondents are awarded their costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
policies behind the proposed pleading requirement, such as
“ ‘ “avoiding unnecessary and prejudicial delay,” ’ ” “apply with
even greater force when mandatory relief is being sought. Under
the discretionary provisions of section 473[(b)], a trial court may
consider whether attorneys or their clients are abusing the rules
or causing needless delay in deciding whether to grant relief.
Because relief under the mandatory provision must be granted
when the requisites of the statute are met, a trial court would
have little or no ability to curb abuses if a proposed [pleading]
were not required.” (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at pp. 401-402.)
29
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