CourtListener 10710542•People v. Valenzuela CA2/1
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Filed 10/24/25 P. v. Valenzuela CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B340254
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XSCMA036245)
v.
RICARDO VALENZUELA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Ricardo Valenzuela appeals from the denial of
his resentencing petition under Penal Code1 section 1172.6,
formerly section 1170.95. Defendant argues substantial evidence
does not support the trial court’s conclusion that he directly aided
and abetted murder and attempted murder. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Because defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, we summarize that evidence in the light most favorable
to the judgment. (See People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)
Defendant was a member of Trust No Bitch (TNB), a
criminal street gang. TNB was rivals with Young Boys Rifa
(YBR), another gang.
1. May 6, 2006 incident
On May 6, 2006, Oscar Flores was pulling out of a gas
station in a white Nissan Sentra. In the car with him were YBR
member Ezekiel Gonzalez and a person known as “Socko.” Flores
denied being a gang member himself.
Flores saw defendant driving alone in a white Ford
Festiva.2 Defendant said, “TNB,” and began shooting at Flores’s
car. Flores drove away. The shooting shattered three windows in
Flores’s car and left multiple bullet holes.
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 Persons in the record at times refer to the white Ford as
a “Fiesta” as opposed to a “Festiva.” Flores identified it as a
Festiva.
2
Flores testified he had never seen defendant before, but
Gonzalez told Flores defendant was from TNB and was called
“Snaps.”
2. July 10, 2006 incident
On July 10, 2006, Flores was driving in the Nissan Sentra
with Gonzalez and a man he called “Smokes.” Flores saw the
Ford Festiva from the May incident driving on the street. At
Gonzalez’s prompting, Flores followed the Festiva.
Defendant was driving the Festiva with Jose Barra as his
passenger. He saw the Nissan Sentra, which began following
him. Defendant used his cell phone to call fellow TNB member
Roger Martinez. Defendant told Martinez he was being chased,
and asked Martinez to “get a strap,” meaning a gun. He called
back later and told Martinez his location.
Sometime thereafter, as Flores was following defendant, a
car pulled up next to the driver’s side of the Sentra; the car was
driving on the wrong side of the road. The driver rolled down the
window and began firing at Flores’s car. Flores identified the
driver as Martinez.
As Martinez continued to fire, Gonzalez fired back at
Martinez. Flores looked to his right and saw the Festiva was now
on the passenger side of his car, with defendant driving. Flores
saw muzzle flashes coming from the Festiva. During the gun
battle, a bullet hit Flores’s left arm, and Gonzalez was killed.
The evidence suggested the bullet that killed Gonzalez came from
Martinez’s car.
Defendant testified at trial. He acknowledged he called
Martinez and told him defendant was being “chased” and
Martinez should “get a strap.” Defendant denied he told
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Martinez to shoot or kill anyone—his hope was that Martinez
“could help me get away from them or distract them . . . .”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Conviction and sentencing
For the May 6 incident, the People charged defendant with
three counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder. The People alleged as to each count that defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a handgun, and
personally used a handgun.
For the July 10 incident, the People charged defendant
with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of
Gonzalez, two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, and three counts of shooting at an
occupied vehicle. For the murder and attempted murder counts,
the People alleged a principal personally used a handgun,
personally and intentionally discharged a handgun, and
personally and intentionally discharged a handgun causing great
bodily injury and death. For the counts of shooting at an
occupied vehicle, the People alleged defendant personally used a
firearm.
As to all nine counts, the People alleged defendant
committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, and
in association with a criminal street gang.
Defendant was tried in 2010. The trial court instructed the
jury on direct aiding and abetting and, as to the July 10 murder
and attempted murder counts, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The jury found defendant not guilty of
first degree murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of
second degree murder. The jury otherwise found him guilty as
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charged with all allegations found true. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 230 years to life in state prison. The court imposed
15-year minimum parole eligibility terms on each of the four
attempted murder counts under section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(5).
On appeal, we modified the sentence to stay imposition of
the 15-year minimum parole eligibility terms on the two
attempted murders committed in July 2006, but otherwise
affirmed the judgment.3 (People v. Valenzuela (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1239 (Valenzuela).)
2. Resentencing petition
On February 19, 2019, defendant filed a petition under
former section 1170.95 seeking resentencing. The petition was
assigned to Judge Kathleen Blanchard, who had presided over
defendant’s trial and imposed his sentence.
The trial court appointed counsel for defendant. The
People conceded defendant had made a prima facie showing for
relief, and the court issued an order to show cause and set the
matter for an evidentiary hearing. In advance of the hearing,
defendant filed a brief limiting his request for resentencing to the
murder and two attempted murder counts arising from the July
10 incident and argued defendant was convicted of those counts
under the natural and probable consequences theory.
3 Defendant’s gang affiliation was used to impose both the
15-year minimum parole eligibility term and the firearm
enhancements on the July 2006 attempted murders. This was
impermissible under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(2).
(Valenzuela, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238.)
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At the hearing, the court took judicial notice of the court’s
file and record of conviction. The parties submitted no further
evidence.
The trial court denied the resentencing petition. The court
explained, “[E]ven under the light of the evidence as most
favorable to [defendant],” the evidence showed “that he called
[Martinez], told him to get a strap, told him he was being
followed, called him back with his location, and set in motion all
of the shooting, the car-to-car shooting, as a direct aider and
abettor. I understand the People . . . give the alternate theory . . .
that he could have been the actual perpetrator of the shooting,
but I think that there was overwhelming evidence that at the
very least he was guilty as a direct aider and abettor to the
attempt[ed] murder and the murder at issue.”
Defendant appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189 of
the Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ] natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and
abetting, and [to] limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173.)
Amended section 188 provides that except as stated in the
amended section 189 governing felony murder, “ ‘in order to be
convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (Lee, at p. 1173,
quoting § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
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The bill also added former section 1170.95, now numbered
section 1172.6, “which creates a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957.) Relief is potentially available for “[a] person convicted
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter . . . .” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).)
If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of relief under
section 1172.6, the trial court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v.
Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891.) At that hearing, the
People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner
remains guilty of murder or attempted murder under the
amended sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
“[A] trial court’s decision denying a petition under
section 1172.6 following an evidentiary hearing is predominantly
a question of fact” that is reviewed for “substantial evidence.”
(See People v. Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.)
“Under this standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most
favorable to the [order or] judgment below to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (See People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
988.) “ ‘If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no
consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or
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drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a
contrary conclusion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ortiz (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1363, italics omitted.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
Ruling
We note defendant’s briefing below and on appeal limits his
resentencing request to the murder and attempted murder counts
arising from the July 10 incident. He does not seek resentencing
of the attempted murder counts arising from the May 6 incident.
We further note although Flores’s testimony that he saw
muzzle flashes from defendant’s car arguably supports a direct
perpetrator theory, the trial court apparently eschewed such a
theory, instead concluding the evidence showed defendant was
guilty as an aider and abettor. Accordingly, our analysis
disregards the evidence that defendant fired at Flores’s vehicle
during the July 10 incident.
Substantial evidence would still support the trial court’s
findings. In May 2006, defendant attempted to kill the occupants
of Flores’s Nissan Sentra. Two months later, defendant saw that
same Sentra following him. He called Martinez and told
Martinez to get a “strap,” i.e., arm himself, then called again to
tell Martinez defendant’s (and, by extension, the Sentra’s)
location. Martinez caught up to them and opened fire. It is a
reasonable inference that defendant, who demonstrated lethal
intent towards the occupants of the Sentra in May, asked
Martinez to arm himself with the intention that Martinez shoot
at the Sentra’s occupants just as defendant had in May.
Defendant argues that even if the evidence establishes he
set the chain of events in motion that led to the shooting, “it still
does not mean that [defendant] intended to kill.” Defendant
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notes it was Flores and Gonzalez that instigated the encounter by
“chas[ing]” defendant. Defendant argues, “There was no evidence
that [defendant] said anything to Martinez about shooting to kill”
or “to fire directly at the car.” Thus, “it would be nothing but
speculation to conclude that [defendant] made the call to
Martinez with the specific intention of having Flores and the
other occupants in his car killed as opposed to just distracting
them long enough for him to get away, which was what he
testified was his intention.”
Defendant’s argument might be more compelling if not for
the May 2006 incident, in which, again, defendant demonstrated
lethal intent towards the Sentra’s occupants. Although this
does not in itself establish he harbored the same intent in
July 2006, it supports the other evidence establishing that intent,
namely his calling his fellow gang member and instructing him to
obtain a firearm. From this the trial court could infer defendant
intended Martinez to deal with the Sentra the way defendant had
before, with lethal force.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J. M. KIM, J.
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