People v. Reid CA1/2

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Filed 10/23/25 P. v. Reid CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170013
v.
LARRY REID, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 012200751)
Defendant and Appellant.

Following a revocation of probation, Appellant Larry Reid was
sentenced to State Prison. Reid appeals, asserting five arguments, the first
of which is that the trial court erred in not obtaining a probation report
before sentencing him. The Attorney General concedes that the court erred
and that the error was prejudicial. We agree and we reverse.
BACKGROUND
The facts of Reid’s crimes, facts we learn from the preliminary
examination, are not germane to the disposition of this appeal and need not
be set forth in detail. Suffice to say that on May 28, 2022, Madisyn Zingg was
working as a store clerk at a smoke shop in Walnut Creek. While Zingg’s
back was turned, Reid reached behind the counter and took a display of
cigarette lighters. Zingg said, “ ‘No, no, no,’ ” and grabbed Reid’s wrist or
hand. Reid dropped the first display, took a second one, and “wrenched away

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from [Zingg] and left the store” without paying. Zingg suffered an abrasion
on her knuckles
Walnut Creek Police Officer Connor Davis responded to the store in full
uniform. After watching a video of the incident, Favis found Reid some two
blocks away. When Reid refused to comply with Davis’s demands, he “pulled
[Reid] to the ground” because he was trying to pull away. Reid scratched at
Davis, leaving abrasions and scratches on the officer’s hand, elbow, and
forehead. Reid said, “Dude, I’m going to flip on you and fuck you up”; he also
spit on Davis. A bystander helped Davis subdue Reid. Meanwhile, other
officers arrived to assist, one of whom Reid tried to kick. Reid continued to
threaten to “fuck. . . up” the officers, and told another officer to “Get off my
fucking ankles, you cunt.”
Davis read Reid his Miranda1 rights, and he said “that he entered the
store, he took the items, he struggled with the store clerk, and left the store.
He didn’t have any intention to pay for the items.” He also said, “I don’t give
a fuck about the sales girl. I don’t fucking care. She shouldn’t be fucking
touching me. She has no right to fucking touch me. I go in a store and take
something, she can touch me? Bullshit. That’s fucking wrong. I don’t give a
fuck.”
By information filed on November 8, 2022, Reid was charged with
second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, count one)2; resisting an officer by
force or violence (§ 69, count two); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd.
(a)(1), count three); and misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a

1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
2 Any further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.

2
peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count 4). Count three also alleged an out-on-
bail enhancement pursuant to section 12022.1.
On December 8, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the district
attorney orally amended the information to allege misdemeanor criminal
threats (§ 422). The court granted the district attorney’s motion to dismiss
the remaining charges (§ 1385), and that same day placed Reid on probation
for two years. No probation report was prepared. The proceedings were
before the Honorable Patricia Scanlon.
Over the next year, the probation department filed seven petitions to
revoke probation. Five of the first six (all but the fourth) were sustained, and
probation reinstated. The seventh petition to revoke probation was filed on
December 13, 2023, alleging that Reid trespassed, was a public nuisance, and
exhibited disorderly conduct while under the influence of drugs. On January
25, 2024, Judge Scanlon held a court trial, and found that Reid had
trespassed and was under the influence of drugs.
On February 8, Reid requested that a pre-sentence report be prepared
by the probation department. Judge Jon Rolefeson, a retired Judge who had
become involved in Judge Scanlon’s absence, granted Reid’s request. But at
the sentencing hearing, Judge Scanlon disagreed with Judge Rolefeson.
The sentencing hearing took place on February 15. Reid requested that
Judge Scanlon reinstate his probation or sentence him to the low term of two
years in prison for the robbery. The prosecution requested that the court
sentence him to three years in prison for robbery with a consecutive one year
for the misdemeanors.
At sentencing, Judge Scanlon imposed the midterm of three years for
robbery with no additional time for his misdemeanor convictions. Doing so,
she characterized as “appalling” Reid’s “ ‘letter to the Court about . . . what a

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victim he is in this whole process.’ ” Then, after summarizing the facts of the
offenses and Reid’s “abysmal failure on probation”, Judge Scanlon stated her
reasoning for selecting the midterm, going on for some three pages.
Following Judge Scanlon’s remarks, defense counsel asked, “Your
Honor, can I say two things before we finish?” She responded, “No.”
Reid appealed.
On January 21, 2025, the court filed an “Agreed Statement of Appeal”
in response to this Court’s November 26, 2024 order. On January 30, the
court filed a “Settled Statement of Appeal” (January 30th Settled Statement)
in response to our order on January 28.
DISCUSSION
Reid makes five arguments on appeal, the first of which is that the trial
court did not obtain a probation report before sentencing him to prison.3 Reid
is correct.
As the Attorney General states the law: “Statutory authority and the
California Rules of Court specify the circumstances under which the court
must prepare a probation report. Section 1203, subdivision (b)(1), states that
when a person is convicted of a felony and is eligible for probation, the court
‘shall immediately refer the matter to a probation officer to investigate and
report to the court, at a specified time, upon the circumstances surrounding
the crime and the prior history and record of the person, which may be
considered either in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment.”

3 The other arguments, all of which can be determined on remand, are

that the court: (1) considered improper factors in choosing the base
term; (2) erred in concluding there were no mitigating factors; (3)
abused its discretion in finding three aggravating factors; and (4)
denied Reid due process.

4
The purpose of a probation report is to advise the court of the
circumstances surrounding the crime and to provide information about the
defendant’s history and record. (People v. Llamas (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 35,
40.) And to protect this right, section 1203, subdivision (b)(4), provides that:
“The preparation of the report of the consideration of the report by the court
may be waived only by a written stipulation of the prosecuting and defense
attorneys that is filed with the court or an oral stipulation in open court that
is made and entered upon the minutes of the court, except that a waiver shall
not be allowed unless the court consents thereto.” (§ 1203, subd. (b)(4).)
Given the setting here, the Attorney General concludes―and
concedes―that “the superior court erred by failing to obtain a probation
report before sentencing” (boldface omitted), adding this: “Section 1203.2
subdivision (b)(1), required the superior court to obtain a report from the
probation department before sentencing appellant to prison. Because the
superior court did not do so, appellant has shown error.”
The Attorney General also acknowledges that Reid has shown the
required prejudice under the Watson harmless error standard. (See People v.
Dobbins (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 176, 182, applying People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836–837 (Watson).) Again, the Attorney General’s brief is apt:
“The record reflects a reasonable probability of a more favorable result
in the absence of the challenged error. When discussing circumstances
pertaining to the defendant under [California Rules of Court] rule 4.423 (b),
the superior court acknowledged, ‘I honestly don’t know enough about his
prior record.’ The superior court also concluded that appellant had not
presented sufficient evidence that his mental illness ‘significantly reduced
[his] culpability for the crime.’ (Rule 4.423(b)(2).) But appellant had
presented evidence of serious mental illness and asserted that it had been 30

5
years since his last criminal offenses, suggesting that the probation
department might have found these circumstances in mitigation to be
present. The probation department could have also reasonably taken a
different view on the circumstances in aggravation ultimately relied on by
the superior court. The underlying facts of the robbery were not particularly
aggravated. Thus, the record reflects a reasonable probability of a more
favorable result in the presence of a probation report. Accordingly, appellant
has shown prejudice under Watson, and remand for resentencing is required.”
Finally, we note that Reid has requested he be resentenced by a
different Judge. As the Attorney General points out, Judge Scanlon’s last
day on the bench was January 31, 2025 (January 30th Settled Statement).
Thus, Judge Scanlon will not preside over Reid’s resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P. J.

DESAUTELS, J.

(A170013N)

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