CourtListener 10708159•People v. Zakrzewski CA4/3
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Filed 10/21/25 P. v. Zakrzewski CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063353
v. (Super. Ct. No. 19HF0674)
MATTHEW ANTONIO OPINION
ZAKRZEWSKI,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Christine M. Aros and Christine M. Aros, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
After being sentenced to more than 700 years to life in prison
based on sexual abuse of over a dozen male victims under the age of 14,
defendant Matthew Antonio Zakrzewski appeals. He contends there is
insufficient evidence to support his conviction on three counts. Having
reviewed the relevant evidence, much of which is under seal, we find no merit
in his contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Over the course of at least six years, Zakrzewski provided
babysitting services to many families. He advertised his services on various
internet websites, marketing himself as someone who was capable of
handling challenging and special needs kids, and who had a lot of experience
caring for boys.
In May 2019, a mother reported to law enforcement that her male
child, who Zakrzewski babysat off-and-on over the course of a few months,
had been sexually abused by him. An ensuing investigation uncovered
thousands of pictures and videos from Zakrzewski’s electronic devices and led
to his arrest.
A felony complaint charged Zakrzewski with four counts of child
sexual abuse crimes involving two male minor victims, as well as one count of
possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)).1 Within less
than a year, the number of counts alleged against him rose to 34 and the
number of male minor victims rose to 17, with the alleged crimes spanning
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
over at least a five-year period. The crimes charged included numerous
counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age (§ 288,
subd. (a)), one count of attempting such a lewd act (§§ 288, subd. (a), 664,
subd. (a)), two counts of oral copulation with a child 10 years old or younger
(§ 288.7, subd. (b)), one count of using a minor for sex acts (§ 311.4, subd. (c)),
and two counts of distributing pornography to a minor (§ 288.2, subd. (a)(2)).
There were also allegations Zakrzewski committed lewd acts against more
than one victim and more than one victim under 14 years old (§ 667.61,
subds. (b), (e), (e)(4), (j)(2)).
Victims, victims’ parents, and law enforcement officers testified
at trial. In addition, the jury saw photos and videos obtained from
Zakrzewski’s electronic devices, and it received evidence concerning past
internet searches found on Zakrzewski’s electronic devices, which included
the terms “child grooming” and “pedophilia.”
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all 34 counts and found true
all the multiple victim and multiple victim under 14 years of age allegations.
The trial court sentenced Zakrzewski to a total indeterminate prison term of
705 years to life, plus a total determinate prison term of two years and eight
months. Zakrzewski timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Zakrzewski challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction on three counts: two counts of lewd acts on a child under the
age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)), one involving John Doe #1 and the other involving
John Doe #4; and one count of distributing harmful material to John Doe #4
in violation of section 288.2, subdivision (a)(2). On the record before us, his
contentions are without merit.
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I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“It is settled that the test of sufficiency of the evidence is
whether, reviewing the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below, substantial evidence is disclosed such that a reasonable trier
of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is that evidence which is ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value.’ [Citation.] An appellate court must ‘presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.] It must not reweigh the evidence
[citation], reappraise the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve factual
conflicts, as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact [citation].
Furthermore, an appellate court can only reject evidence accepted by the trier
of fact when the evidence is inherently improbable and impossible of belief.”
(People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 884 (Pitts), superseded by statute
on another ground as stated in People v. Levesque (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 530,
536–537.)
II.
SECTION 288, SUBDIVISION (A)
“[S]ection 288 was enacted to provide children with ‘special
protection’ from sexual exploitation. [Citation.] The statute recognizes that
children are ‘uniquely susceptible’ to such abuse as a result of their
dependence upon adults, smaller size, and relative naiveté. [Citation.] The
statute also assumes that young victims suffer profound harm whenever they
are perceived and used as objects of sexual desire.” (People v. Martinez (1995)
11 Cal.4th 434, 443–444 (Martinez).) “Unlike rape, the wrong punished by the
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lewd acts statute is not the violation of a child’s sexual autonomy, but of its
sexual innocence.” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 243.)
Subdivision (a) of section 288 makes it a felony to “willfully and
lewdly commit[] any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body . . . of a
child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the
child.” Aside from the age of the child, there are two elements to the crime:
(1) a touching of the child; and (2) a concurrent specific intent by the
perpetrator to arouse the lust, passion, or sexual desire of the perpetrator or
the child. (See Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 444; People v Valenti (2016)
243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1160, superseded in part by statute on other grounds
as stated in People v. Villegas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 253, 281, fn. 9.)
Zakrzewski does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
establishing intent, but instead focuses on the “touching” element. Noting the
two disputed counts each involved a dog licking the unclothed genital area of
a child, Zakrzewski contends such an act cannot amount to a “touching”
under section 288, subdivision (a) because the statute requires the touching
be done by either the perpetrator or the minor. He separately argues there
was no evidence he “instructed or directed any touching done by the dogs.”
Regarding the first issue, which is a question of statutory
interpretation, case law makes clear the statute is not so narrow. As
explained by the Supreme Court, “courts have long indicated that section 288
prohibits all forms of sexually motivated contact with an underage child.”
(Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 444.) Beyond requiring some type of
touching, nothing in the broad language restricts the form or nature of the
contact, or the manner in which it may occur. (Ibid.) “Indeed, the ‘gist’ of the
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offense has always been the defendant’s intent to sexually exploit a child, not
the nature of the offending act.” (Ibid.)
To that end, courts agree constructive touching of a child, by
means of the child themselves, another person, or an object, may satisfy the
act required for a violation of section 288, subdivision (a). (See People v.
Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 343;
People v. Villagran (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 880, 890; People v. Meacham (1984)
152 Cal.App.3d 142, 153–154, abrogated on another ground in People v.
Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746.) The focus in such a situation is whether the
defendant convinced, orchestrated, instructed, suggested, caused, or
otherwise encouraged the touching to occur. (See, e.g., People v. Lopez (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1230 [defendant directed children to undress outside
of his presence]; Pitts, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 890 [defendant compelled
child to drink urine from a cup]; Meacham, at p. 154 [defendant had children
pose in such manner their hands were touching their own genitalia]; People v.
Austin (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114 [defendant coerced child into taking
off own clothes].) Although we have not located a published case involving
touching done by an animal, we find no reason offered by defendant or
otherwise as to why the constructive touching doctrine should not apply with
equal force in such a situation.
Having concluded the touching of a child by a dog may, under
certain circumstances, amount to a constructive touching which violates
section 288, subdivision (a), we turn to Zakrzewski’s sufficiency of the
evidence argument.
The first challenged count, count 14, was specifically alleged to
involve a dog licking John Doe #4’s genitals. Zakrzewski acknowledges the
prosecution introduced two photos of a dog licking the child’s genitals on two
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different occasions, but he claims there was no other evidence with respect to
the alleged lewd act. Thus, he argues there was no evidence he directed or
encouraged John Doe #4 or the dog to engage in the activity, meaning the
touching could not be imputed to him through the constructive touching
doctrine.
At the time of trial, John Doe #4 recalled having a dog of the type
in the pictures, but he could not remember if Zakrzewski talked to him about
dogs or if they played with his dog together. There also was no other
testimony specific to the dog incidents. However, there was a plethora of
other circumstantial evidence from which a jury could have concluded
Zakrzewski instigated, encouraged, and/or orchestrated the activity, making
him responsible for the constructive touching. Among that evidence was the
following: a description by John Doe #4 of two incidents in which Zakrzewski
initiated sexual related conduct with John Doe #4, one of which included
John Doe #4 expressly declining the activity; a video in which Zakrzewski
attempted to initiate sexual related conduct with John Doe #4 and John Doe
#4 rejected the attempt; and multiple photos and videos, including an
elaborate camera setup by Zakrzewski, depicting Zakrzewski engaging in
sexual related conduct with John Doe #4 which would be perceived by a child
as being a “fun” activity. Notably, all the videos and photos were obtained
from Zakrzewski’s electronic devices, and the incidents, including the ones
involving the dog, occurred over a roughly nine-month period.
The same is true with respect to an incident involving a dog
licking John Doe #1’s genitals, which potentially formed the basis of
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Zakrzewski’s conviction on count 1 or count 2.2 Two videos filmed by
Zakrzewski and played for the jury showed Zakrzewski initiating sexual
related touching of John Doe #1. In addition, evidence from a forensic
interview with John Doe #1 detailed other occasions of sexual related contact
between Zakrzewski and John Doe #1, with each initiated by Zakrzewski.
Combined with the video of the dog incident, which was filmed by Zakrzewski
on the same day as the other two videos, there was sufficient evidence from
which a jury could find Zakrzewski responsible for a constructive touching of
John Doe #1 stemming from the dog incident.
III.
SECTION 288.2
On count 12, which involved John Doe #4, the jury found
Zakrzewski guilty of distributing harmful material to a minor in violation of
section 288.2, subdivision (a)(2). Zakrzewski contends “there was no evidence
that the material exhibited to [John] Doe #4 fell within the definition of
harmful material under [section] 388.2 [sic].” We disagree.
Section 288.2, subdivision (a)(1) makes it a felony or
misdemeanor for a person, who knows or believes another person is a minor,
to “knowingly distribute[], send[], cause[] to be sent, exhibit[], or offer[] to
distribute or exhibit by any means . . . any harmful matter that depicts a
minor or minors engaging in sexual conduct, to the other person with the
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual
2 Counts 1 and 2 were the only charges involving John Doe #1.
Unlike count 14, counts 1 and 2 did not specify the particular alleged lewd
acts on which they were based. Based on evidentiary rulings by the trial
court, one of the three videos shown to the jury as supplying the basis for
counts 1 and 2 was a video of the dog incident.
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desires of that person or of the minor, and with the intent or for the purposes
of engaging in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or oral copulation with the other
person, or with the intent that either person touch an intimate body part of
the other.” Subdivision (a)(2) of the same section provides for a slightly
reduced felony penalty for situations in which “the matter used by the person
is harmful matter but does not include a depiction or depictions of a minor or
minors engaged in sexual conduct.” (§ 288.2, subd. (a)(2) [imprisonment for
16 months, or two or three years].) The purpose of the statute is to prevent
the use of certain material “‘to groom young victims for acts of molestation.’”
(People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1287.)
Qualifying harmful matter includes any “matter, taken as a
whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide
standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and is matter which, taken as a
whole, depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct and
which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.” (§ 313, subd. (a); see § 228.2, subd. (c) [“‘harmful matter’
has the same meaning as defined in [§] 313”].)
Zakrzewski bases his insufficiency of the evidence argument on a
portion of one of the necessary components for material to qualify as harmful
matter: that the material, taken as a whole, depicts or describes sexual
conduct. Relying on a definition of sexual conduct provided to the jury, he
asserts neither of the two videos allegedly shown to John Doe #4 contain
content which would qualify as sexual conduct. But in making that
argument, Zakrzewski overlooks a category of material which qualifies as
sexual conduct.
The trial court instructed the jury with a definition of sexual
conduct consistent with the one contained in section 311.4, a statute
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referenced in section 288.2, subdivision (a). Included in that definition was
“any lewd or lascivious sexual act as defined in [s]ection 288.”
John Doe #4 testified Zakrzewski showed him a video depicting
two young boys who appeared to be brothers—one older than the other.
Although he could not remember many details at the time of trial, which was
roughly seven years after being shown the video, the details he provided were
generally consistent with the content of a video submitted into evidence as
exhibit 63. Contrary to Zakrzewski’s assertion, that video does not simply
depict nudity. Its contents would be sufficient for a jury to find it depicted at
least one lewd or lascivious act. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence of
harmful matter to uphold the conviction on count 12.3
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
3 The parties dispute whether there is sufficient evidence that
Zakrzewski showed John Doe #4 a different video, namely one involving John
Doe #8, and whether the contents of such video could meet the definition of
sexual conduct. We need not address these disputes given our sufficiency of
the evidence conclusion based on exhibit 63.
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