Gonzalez v. Aten Technology CA4/3

CourtListener 10708122CalctappOct 21, 2025

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Filed 10/21/25 Gonzalez v. Aten Technology CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JORGE GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064777

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01369268)
ATEN TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Craig L. Griffin, Judge. Affirmed.
Foundation Law Group and Eric S. Beane for Defendant and
Appellant.
Grochow Law, Lauren E. Grochow, Daniel M. Kalinowski and
Lauren Celine Torres for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Aten Technology, Inc. (Aten) appeals the trial court’s
order denying its motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff Jorge Gonzalez’s
complaint for retaliation and wrongful termination. The trial court denied the
motion on the ground the parties’ arbitration agreement was unconscionable.
Among other things, the court found the parties’ Dispute Resolution
Agreement (Arbitration Agreement) lacked mutuality because a separate
Employee Confidentiality and Proprietary Rights Agreement (Confidentiality
Agreement) signed by the parties on the same day permitted Aten to sue
plaintiff in court for any claims arising from the Confidentiality Agreement,
while the Arbitration Agreement required all claims that would typically be
brought by plaintiff against Aten to be arbitrated.
On appeal, Aten contends the trial court lacked authority to
decide the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement because the parties
delegated that threshold issue to the arbitrator by providing any arbitration
would be conducted pursuant to the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules
and Procedures (JAMS Rules) that were in effect when the claim was filed.
The current version of the JAMS Rules provides that disputes over “the
formation, existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the [arbitration]
agreement . . . shall be submitted to and ruled on by the Arbitrator” and “the
Arbitrator has the authority to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues
as a preliminary matter.” Aten also contends that, even if the court had
authority to decide the issue of unconscionability, plaintiff should have been
compelled to arbitrate.
We find no error and affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff began working for Aten as its operations manager on
April 5, 2023. On March 21, 2023, Aten provided plaintiff a four-page written

2
offer of employment, which plaintiff signed on March 24 (Offer Letter). It
contained a provision requiring arbitration of “any dispute or claim” arising
out of the employment relationship “pursuant to the rules for arbitration of
employment disputes by the American Arbitration Association provided you
choose to do so, as Execution of the Arbitration Agreement is voluntary.”
Plaintiff initialed the statement, below the arbitration provision, that said
“Employee Voluntarily Agrees to Arbitration outlined above.” (Underscoring
omitted.)
But then, on plaintiff’s first day of employment, Aten presented
plaintiff the Arbitration Agreement as part of multiple documents it gave
plaintiff as part of his onboarding package. The Arbitration Agreement
contained provisions that were, in many respects, different from the
arbitration provision set forth in the Offer Letter. The documents in the
onboarding package (including the Arbitration Agreement) were not provided
to plaintiff in advance of his first day of work; they were not given to him to
review as part of his Offer Letter. Also on his first day, Plaintiff was provided
a Confidentiality Agreement governing, among other things, the handling of
certain potential disputes between the parties. A human resources employee
(a payroll specialist) presented plaintiff with the onboarding package
containing both agreements and waited in the room with plaintiff while
plaintiff signed them. The human resources employee then countersigned
both agreements on behalf of Aten.
I.
THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The Arbitration Agreement is a two-page, pre-printed, single-
spaced document. It includes a blank line in the first paragraph where the
plaintiff’s name was handwritten in and signature blocks for Aten and

3
“Employee.” It includes five separately numbered paragraphs, titled “1.
Alternative Resolution,” “2. Class Action,” “3. Jury Trial,” “4. Payment of
Costs,” and “5. Severability.” (Boldface omitted.) The “Alternative Resolution”
(boldface omitted) section states: “The Parties agree that any controversy
arising out of or relating to [plaintiff’s] employment with [Aten], whether
brought by [plaintiff] or [Aten] . . . shall be submitted to arbitration in
Orange County, California, before a sole arbitrator selected from JAMS, and
shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of California Code of
Civil Procedure §§ 1280 et seq. and the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules
in effect at the time the claim is filed (‘JAMS Rules’).”
There is no evidence in the record plaintiff was provided a copy of
the JAMS Rules when he was given the agreements to sign. Nor is there
evidence he accessed and reviewed them on the JAMS website, or was given
the opportunity and means to do so before he was asked to sign the
onboarding documents on his first day of employment. The Arbitration
Agreement simply stated, “[c]opies of the JAMS Rules and forms can be
located at www.jamsadr.com, or by calling [telephone number].”
The JAMS Rules in effect at the time of plaintiff’s employment
and the commencement of his lawsuit comprise 34 rules, many of which
contain multiple subparts. The JAMS Rules are 12 pages long, and each page
has two columns of single-spaced text. Rule 1(b) states “[t]he Parties shall be
deemed to have made these Rules a part of their Arbitration
Agreement . . . whenever they have provided for Arbitration by JAMS under
its Employment Rules . . . .” Rule 11(b) provides “[j]urisdictional and
arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the formation, existence,
validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which Arbitration is
sought, and who are proper Parties to the Arbitration, shall be submitted to

4
and ruled on by the Arbitrator. Unless the relevant law requires otherwise,
the Arbitrator has the authority to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability
issues as a preliminary matter.”
The “Class Action” (boldface omitted) section of the Arbitration
Agreement is a class action waiver, in which the parties agreed they could
not assert a class action in any arbitration or any other forum. It further
states: “I and the Company further expressly intend and agree that any claim
that all or part of this class action waiver is unenforceable, unconscionable,
void, or voidable may be determined only by a court of competent jurisdiction
and not by an arbitrator.”
The next section of the Arbitration Agreement, titled “Jury
Trial,” states in boldface print: “Both [plaintiff] and [Aten] acknowledge and
agree that both are hereby waiving any rights to trial by jury in any action,
proceeding, or counterclaim brought by either [plaintiff] or [Aten] against the
other in connection with any matter whatsoever arising out of or in any way
connected with [plaintiff’s] employment.” (Boldface omitted.)
Finally, the “Severability” (boldface omitted) section provides: “If
any portion of this Agreement is determined to be invalid, illegal, or
unenforceable under any applicable law, the validity, legality, and
enforcement of the remaining provisions shall not in any way be affected or
impaired. If a provision of this Agreement is determined to be invalid, illegal,
or unenforceable in any respect under any applicable law, such provision
shall be renegotiated by the parties. The objective of the renegotiation shall

5
be to place each party in a position as nearly equal to that had such provision
not been determined to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable.”
II.
THE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
Plaintiff signed the Confidentiality Agreement as part of his
onboarding package on April 5, 2023—the same day he signed the Arbitration
Agreement. The Confidentiality Agreement is a seven-page, single-spaced
agreement that, among other things, addresses how plaintiff must treat
Aten’s confidential information, inventions, and security. The Confidentiality
Agreement provides that “[a]ny action or proceeding by either Party to
enforce this Agreement shall be brought only in any state or federal court
located in the state of California, county of Orange” and “[t]he Parties
irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of such courts and waive the
defense of inconvenient forum to the maintenance of any such action or
proceeding in such venue.”
The Confidentiality Agreement includes the following integration
clause: “Entire Agreement. Unless specifically provided herein, this
Agreement contains all of the understandings and representations between
the Employee and ATEN pertaining to the subject matter hereof and
supersedes all prior and contemporaneous understandings, agreements,
representations and warranties, both written and oral, with respect to such
subject matter.” (Boldface omitted.)
Finally, the Confidentiality Agreement contains a severability
provision stating, “[s]hould any provision of this Agreement be held by a
court of competent jurisdiction to be enforceable only if modified, or if any
portion of this Agreement shall be held as unenforceable and thus stricken,

6
such holding shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this
Agreement . . . .”
III.
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Aten terminated plaintiff’s employment in August 2023,
approximately four months after his employment began. Plaintiff sued Aten
and other defendants in Orange County Superior Court for retaliation,
wrongful termination, and violation of Business and Professions Code section
17200, et seq.1 The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that Aten fired him in
retaliation for reporting illegal conduct by the company.
IV.
THE MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Aten moved to compel arbitration of the action pursuant to the
Arbitration Agreement. It contended all of plaintiff’s claims were
encompassed within the broad scope of the Arbitration Agreement and any
dispute over arbitrability, including enforceability, had been delegated to the
arbitrator because of the Arbitration Agreement’s incorporation by reference
of the JAMS Rules. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing Aten failed to show
the parties had clearly and unmistakably agreed to delegate arbitrability to
the arbitrator and the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable due to

1
Plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed all defendants other than
Aten.

7
unconscionability. Plaintiff introduced a copy of the Confidentiality
Agreement in opposition to the motion.
V.
THE COURT’S RULING ON THE MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
The trial court denied Aten’s motion. It found the parties had not
delegated to the arbitrator the issue of the Arbitration Agreement’s
enforceability: “The Agreement here does not provide the ‘clear and
unmistakable evidence’ required. It does not say anything at all about who
shall determine arbitrability. It does not contain a specific delegation clause
saying something along the lines of the arbitrator shall have the exclusive
authority to resolve any dispute regarding the arbitrability of claims or
defenses. [¶] Although there is no delegation language in the Arbitration
Agreement, Aten argues that the incorporation of the JAMS rules into . . . it
provides the required ‘clear and unmistakable evidence.’ On facts similar to
this case, the court in Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
771, held that the provider rules did not show the required ‘clear and
unmistakable intent.’ The Court finds Ajamian persuasive and reaches the
same conclusion here.”
The court then concluded the Arbitration Agreement was
unconscionable—and therefore unenforceable—due to lack of mutuality:
“Here, the Confidentiality Agreement contains a host of promises by the
employee to the company to keep information confidential; but the company
makes virtually no promises to the employee. Accordingly, the party most
likely to bring an action under the Confidentiality Agreement would be the
employer, which the employer may bring in court. But most other actions
relating to the employment relationship—such as discrimination,
harassment, and wrongful termination—would be brought by the employee,

8
who must arbitrate. [¶] Accordingly, the Court here concludes the Arbitration
Agreement, considered with the Confidentiality Agreement, lack mutuality
and are therefore substantively unconscionable. Because they are both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, they are unenforceable.”
Aten timely appealed the denial of its motion.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Aten contends as follows: (1) The trial court should
not have decided the threshold issue of unconscionability because the parties
delegated that issue to the arbitrator by incorporating JAMS rule 11(b);
(2) Even if the court could properly decide the issue, it erred in finding the
Arbitration Agreement unconscionable; and (3) Even assuming the court
correctly concluded the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable, the
unconscionable terms should have been severed. We reject each of Aten’s
contentions.
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
IS UNENFORCEABLE DUE TO LACK OF MUTUALITY
A. Standard of Review
“‘There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order is
based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.
[Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of
law, then a de novo standard of review is employed. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]
Interpreting a written document to determine whether it is an enforceable
arbitration agreement is a question of law subject to de novo review when the
parties do not offer conflicting extrinsic evidence regarding the document's

9
meaning.” (Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 50, 60.) “‘We do not review the trial court’s reasoning, but rather
its ruling. A trial court’s order is affirmed if correct on any theory, even if the
trial court’s reasoning was not correct.’” (J.R. v. Electronic Arts Inc. (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 1107, 1114–1115.) The decision to sever rests in the trial court’s
discretion and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 121–127 (Armendariz),
abrogated in part on another ground in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
(2011) 563 U.S. 333, 340.)
B. Interplay Between California Law and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
Aten contends the FAA applies to the Arbitration Agreement. We
need not decide this issue because the outcome of the appeal would be the
same under both California and federal law, both of which “favor[]
enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th
at p. 97.) “As with the FAA (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.), California law establishes ‘a
presumption in favor of arbitrability.’ [Citation.] An agreement to submit
disputes to arbitration ‘is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.’” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.) “‘“[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such
as . . . unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening” the FAA’ or California law.” (Ibid.)
“‘When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a
certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally . . . should apply
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.’”
(Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 890.) Therefore, “our
inquiry into the enforceability of the arbitration agreement at issue in this
case entails the same inquiry under [California law] as the FAA: Are there

10
reasons, based on general contract law principles, for refusing to enforce the
present arbitration agreement?” including “whether and to what extent the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th
at p. 99.)
C. The Parties Did Not Clearly and Unmistakably Agree to Delegate
Arbitrability to the Arbitrator
We begin with Aten’s contention the parties agreed to arbitrate
threshold issues, including the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement.
We disagree and conclude the trial court properly decided plaintiff’s challenge
to the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement.
In all cases, there is an initial presumption that a court—not an
arbitrator—has the authority to decide threshold issues of arbitrability,
including any challenge to an arbitration agreement’s enforceability. (Nelson
v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 643, 654.)
Indeed, “the federal policy in favor of arbitration does not extend to deciding
questions of arbitrability.” (Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G. (9th
Cir. 2013) 724 F.3d 1069, 1072.) The parties may agree to delegate authority
to the arbitrator to decide threshold issues, but given the contrary
presumption, evidence that the parties intended such a delegation must be
“‘clear and unmistakable’” before a court will enforce a delegation provision.
(Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 781 (Ajamian);
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S. 63, 69.) “This
is a ‘heightened standard,’ higher than the evidentiary standard applicable to
other matters of interpreting an arbitration agreement.” (Ajamian, at p. 790.)
The “‘clear and unmistakable’” test is justified because the
question who will decide issues of arbitrability “is not one that the parties
would likely focus upon in contracting, and the default expectancy is that the

11
court would decide the matter.” (Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.)
Accordingly, an arbitration agreement’s “silence or ambiguity about the
arbitrator’s power [to decide the question of arbitrability] cannot satisfy the
clear and unmistakable evidence standard.” (Ibid.)
Here, as in Ajamian, “[n]owhere in the [Arbitration] Agreement
is there any express grant of authority to the arbitrator to decide threshold
issues such as the unconscionability of the arbitration provision. The
[Arbitration] Agreement does not state that the [arbitrator], rather than the
court, will determine if the arbitration provision is unconscionable or
otherwise unenforceable. Indeed, there is no language indicating that the
parties ever contemplated who would decide such issues.” (Ajamian, supra,
203 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.)
Aten does not contend otherwise. Rather, Aten argues the
general incorporation of JAMS Rules—or, more accurately, the incorporation
of whatever version of the JAMS Rules would be in effect when a claim is
filed—meets the heightened standard of clear and unmistakable evidence the
parties intended to delegate threshold issues to the arbitrator.2 Aten relies on
decisions from both federal and California courts holding that, at least in
some contexts, the incorporation of arbitration rules constitutes clear and

2
We assume for purposes of our analysis—and plaintiff does not
dispute—the language in the Arbitration Agreement that the arbitration
shall be “conducted in accordance with” JAMS Rules was sufficient to
incorporate some version of the JAMS Rules by reference into the agreement.

12
unmistakable evidence of an agreement to delegate arbitrability decisions to
the arbitrator.3
We share the concern expressed in Ajamian (and in decisions by
other courts) whether simply incorporating a set of arbitration rules by
reference in an employment contract can fairly be said to constitute “‘clear
and unmistakable’” evidence the parties knowingly manifested their intent
about who will decide issues of enforceability, validity, and arbitrability.4 We
also share the concern expressed by other courts that doing so is particularly
problematic in the employment context or when one of the parties to the
arbitration agreement is unsophisticated. (See Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 306 [holding in the employment context, and
under the facts there, incorporation by reference of arbitration rules does not
meet the clear and unmistakable test because there was “no such evidence
[the employee] had any idea what the AAA rules might have meant, much
less that he focused on this issue or knowingly agreed to delegate such
disputes to an arbitrator”; “Concluding that [the employee] actually
considered and consciously agreed to delegate the issue of arbitrability would

3
Among other things, Aten cites Brennan v. Opus Bank (9th Cir.
2015) 796 F.3d 1125 (incorporation of AAA rules into an employment
agreement between a bank and an executive was a clear and unmistakable
delegation to the arbitrator to decide whether the agreement was
unconscionable), PGE Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 2017) 862 F.3d
981, and Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G., supra, 724 F.3d 1069.
We are not, of course, bound to follow decisions from lower federal courts.
(Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592, 610 (Mondragon).)

4 See, e.g., Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th

292, 306; Eiess v. USAA Federal Sav. Bank (N.D.Cal. 2019) 404 F.Supp.3d
1240, 1252–1254; Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1035;
Jack v. Ring LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1201.

13
be a complete fiction”]; Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc.
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 643, 657 [questioning but not deciding whether
incorporation of arbitration rules binds an unsophisticated party];
Mondragon, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 607, fn. 7 [“[I]t is hard to see how
an unsophisticated party would understand the provision as a clear and
unmistakable delegation of exclusive authority to the arbitrator to decide
arbitrability issues”]; Oracle America, Inc. v. Myriad Group A.G., supra, 724
F.3d at p. 1075 [limiting decision to agreements between sophisticated
parties and declining to decide the effect of incorporating rules into consumer
contracts]; Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc. supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052
[reference to AAA rules insufficient to prove the consumer, an
unsophisticated party, considered and consciously agreed to delegate the
issue]; cf Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p.
557 [holding incorporation of rules is clear and unmistakable evidence of
parties’ intent to delegate where agreement was between sophisticated
parties of relatively equal bargaining power].) As one federal district court
observed: “Although incorporation [of AAA’s arbitration rules] by reference
may fairly be deemed a clear and unmistakable delegation where there are
sophisticated parties, a different result may obtain where one party is
unsophisticated. For an unsophisticated plaintiff to discover she had agreed
to delegate gateway questions of arbitrability, she would need to locate the
arbitration rules at issue, find and read the relevant rules governing
delegation, and then understand the importance of a specific rule granting
the arbitrator jurisdiction over questions of validity—a question the Supreme

14
Court itself has deemed ‘“rather arcane.”’” (Eiess v. USAA Federal Sav. Bank,
supra, 404 F.Supp.3d at p. 1253.)
We need not reach either of those broader issues, however,
because there are a number of other, independent, reasons for concluding the
particular reference to arbitration rules Aten included in the Arbitration
Agreement does not satisfy the heightened “clear and unmistakable” test.
First, Aten’s argument turns on what rule 11(b) of the JAMS
Rules currently provides. But the Arbitration Agreement did not incorporate
by reference the JAMS rules as they currently exist—or even in the form in
which they existed on the date the parties signed the Arbitration Agreement.
It provided that, if a dispute should arise between the parties at some point
in the future, the dispute would be resolved in an arbitration that would be
conducted under whatever JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules were “in
effect at the time the claim [was] filed.” (Italics added.) Thus, at the time
plaintiff was asked to sign the Arbitration Agreement, neither he nor Aten
had any way of knowing what the rules might say in the future and,
therefore, no way of knowing what specific rules would actually govern any
future dispute. We cannot find that referencing or incorporating some future,
unknown version of the JAMS rules constitutes a “clear and unmistakable”
manifestation of intent to delegate arbitrability issues solely and conclusively
to the arbitrator.
Second, even if we were to ignore the contractual provision
incorporating an unknown future set of rules and focus only on the JAMS
rules as they currently exist (and as they existed when plaintiff signed the
Arbitration Agreement), there is still no “clear and unmistakable”

15
manifestation that the parties intended the arbitrator to be the exclusive
decision-maker on issues of arbitrability and enforceability.
In its current form, rule 11(b) of the JAMS Rules does not give
the arbitrator the exclusive authority to decide whether the Arbitration
Agreement is enforceable.5 Nor does it provide that the arbitrator’s decision
on threshold issues (such as enforceability) is final. The Agreement states
only that an “award or relief granted by the Arbitrator” is final and binding
and “may be enforced by any court of competent jurisdiction.” Particularly in
light of the presumption in favor of judicial determination of threshold issues,
we cannot say that, even if the parties had specifically incorporated this
particular version of the JAMS Rules, they manifested a clear and
unmistakable intent that the arbitrator—and only the arbitrator—would
conclusively decide threshold issues of arbitrability and enforceability.6
Third, even assuming for the sake of argument that simply
stating the arbitration will be conducted under some future version of the

5 Rule 11(b) provides “disputes over the formation, existence,

validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement . . . shall be submitted to
and ruled on by the Arbitrator” and “the Arbitrator has the authority to
determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues as a preliminary matter.”

6
We recognize some California courts have found incorporation of
arbitration rules to constitute a clear and unmistakable manifestation of
intent. (See, e.g., Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc., supra, 136
Cal.App.4th at p. 1123 [AAA construction arbitration rules specified
arbitrator decided arbitrability]; Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater,
supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 557 [AAA commercial arbitration rules specified
arbitrator decided arbitrability]; Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 1413, 1442–1443 [JAMS rule 11 authorized arbitrator to make
the final decision as to what issues were arbitrable].) Given the particular
facts here, including the specific terms of this particular Arbitration
Agreement, we do not find those decisions dispositive.

16
JAMS Rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence the parties
intended and agreed to delegate the issue of enforceability exclusively to the
arbitrator, there is another reason there is no “clear and unmistakable”
delegation here. At the same time plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement,
he was asked to (and did) sign the Confidentiality Agreement, which also
governed the subject of potential claims that may arise from the parties’
employment relationship. This was after plaintiff had been given (and had
initialed) the Offer Letter, which included yet another arbitration provision,
which provided “any dispute or claim relating to or arising out of our
employment relationship” would be resolved by binding arbitration
“conducted . . . pursuant to the rules of arbitration of employment disputes by
the American Arbitration Association . . . .”
In considering the Arbitration Agreement, we must consider and
read it together with the documents plaintiff executed as part of his hire,
including the Confidentiality Agreement and the Offer Letter. (Civ. Code
§ 1642 [“[s]everal contracts relating to the same matters, between the same
parties, and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken
together”]; Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 490
[holding an arbitration agreement and confidentiality agreement executed on
the same day as part of plaintiff’s hire, both of which governed how to resolve
disputes arising from the plaintiff’s employment, “should be read together”].)
Taken together, the three agreements are hardly a model of
clarity, much less “clear and unmistakable” evidence as to who the parties
intended would decide threshold challenges to the Arbitration Agreement,
and even what arbitration rules would apply. On his first day on the job,
plaintiff was given two agreements to sign (along with multiple other
documents) as part of his onboarding package. This was after he had already

17
been given, and was asked to sign, a letter offering him the job and spelling
out the terms of his employment. He literally was given (and dutifully signed)
three different agreements governing the resolution of disputes between the
parties.
The first agreement (the Offer Letter) said “any dispute or claim”
relating to his employment would be resolved by arbitration conducted under
the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
The second agreement (the Arbitration Agreement) said “any
controversy arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment with the
Company, whether brought by the Employee or the Company” would be
resolved in arbitration under whatever JAMS Rules would be in effect at the
time the claim was filed and that any “class action, collective action,
representative action, multiple plaintiff, or any similar procedures . . . shall
not be asserted, nor will they apply, in any arbitration pursuant to this
Agreement.” (In neither instance were the rules provided, described, or
explained to plaintiff.) The Arbitration Agreement did not include an
integration clause and said nothing about how it related to the conflicting
arbitration terms in the Offer Letter.
The third agreement (the Confidentiality Agreement) provided
that “[a]ny action or proceeding by either Party to enforce this Agreement
shall be brought only in any state or federal court located in the state of
California, county of Orange.” The Confidentiality Agreement, which called
for a court to resolve disputes, also said it “contains all the understandings
and representations between the Employee and ATEN pertaining to the
subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous
understandings, agreements, representations and warranties, both written
and oral, with respect to such subject matter.” And the severability clause in

18
that agreement says a court will decide whether any provision in it is
unenforceable.
Viewed together, it is clear Aten’s goal was to impose on plaintiff
the obligation to arbitrate all claims he may have against the company and
waive all class claims and, at the same time, allow Aten to sue plaintiff in
court for claims it may bring against plaintiff for violating the terms of the
Confidentiality Agreement. Nothing in these three documents “clearly and
unmistakably” establishes the parties intended the arbitrator to have
exclusive and final authority to decide the threshold issue of enforceability.
(Mondragon, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th a p. 608 [“‘“As a general matter, where
one contractual provision indicates that the enforceability of an arbitration
provision is to be decided by the arbitrator, but another provision indicates
that [a] court might also find provisions in the contract unenforceable, there
is no clear and unmistakable delegation of authority to the arbitrator”’”].)
To someone with legal training and experience, perhaps the
interpretation Aten now offers of the interplay of the terms of the agreements
might be reasonable. Which is to say, perhaps someone with legal knowledge
would be able to analyze the three documents and manage to discern the
scope and import of the various arbitration, court resolution, integration, and
severability provisions in them and also discern the court’s authority would
be limited to deciding whether the class action waiver is enforceable and
deciding disputes over the Confidentiality Agreement. Perhaps they might
even be able to determine, to the extent claims were to be arbitrated, whether
some version of the JAMS Rules or the American Arbitration Rules would
govern. But as the court in Mondragon explained, the question is not whether
Aten’s interpretation is reasonable: “The question is whether the delegation

19
is clear and unmistakable. [Citations.] And it isn’t.” (Mondragon, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 610, italics added.)
We reach the same conclusion here. As the party that drafted
these employment-related agreements, Aten was in the position to ensure the
agreements it provided to plaintiff included clear and unmistakable language
specifying that any disagreement over the validity or enforceability of the
arbitration provisions would be decided exclusively and finally by an
arbitrator, not by a court. It would not be difficult to write such a provision.
But Aten did not do so.
We conclude the Arbitration Agreement does not furnish clear
and unmistakable proof the parties agreed to delegate exclusively to the
arbitrator the determination of the enforceability of the Arbitration
Agreement. The trial court did not err in so finding.
D. The Arbitration Agreement Is Materially One-Sided and Therefore
Unconscionable
Turning to whether the trial court erred in finding the
Arbitration Agreement unconscionable, we conclude it did not.
“The general principles of unconscionability are well established.
A contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice
in deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other party. [Citation.] Under this standard,
the unconscionability doctrine ‘“has both a procedural and a substantive
element.”’ [Citation.] ‘The procedural element addresses the circumstances of
contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to
unequal bargaining power. [Citations.] Substantive unconscionability
pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of

20
whether they are overly harsh or one-sided.’” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8
Cal.5th at p. 125.)
Although both procedural and substantive unconscionability are
required to deny enforcement of a contract as unconscionable, “they need not
be present in the same degree. . . . [T]he more substantively oppressive the
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to
come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”
(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.) We discuss each in turn.
1. Procedural Unconscionability
“A procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry
into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ [Citation.] An adhesive contract
is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with
superior bargaining power ‘on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ [Citations.]
Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically
adhesive [citations] . . . .” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 126.)
Once a contract is found to be adhesive, “[t]he pertinent question,
then, is whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such
oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required.
[Citations.] ‘“‘Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation
and meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision
is hidden within a prolix printed form.’”’” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8
Cal.5th at p. 126.)
“[E]conomic pressure can also be substantial when employees are
required to accept an arbitration agreement in order to keep their job.
Employees who have worked in a job for a substantial length of time have
likely come to rely on the benefits of employment. For many, the sudden loss
of a job may create major disruptions, including abrupt income reduction and

21
an unplanned reentry into the job market. In both the prehiring and
posthiring settings, courts must be ‘particularly attuned’ to the danger of
oppression and overreaching.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p.
127.)
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion the Arbitration
Agreement possessed only a modest amount of procedural unconscionability
based on its adhesive nature and, therefore, a high degree of substantive
unconscionability must exist to find the Arbitration Agreement unenforceable
based on principles of unconscionability. There can be no reasonable dispute
the Arbitration Agreement is a contract of adhesion. Aten presented the form
agreement to plaintiff on his first day of employment as part of its
onboarding package, and Aten clearly possessed superior bargaining power.
Aten contends the Offer Letter defeats plaintiff’s argument of
surprise because plaintiff had already agreed to arbitration before he showed
up for work on the first day and was asked to (and did) sign the Arbitration
Agreement. We find the argument unavailing. The agreements he was given
to sign on his first day were markedly different from the arbitration terms set
forth in the Offer Letter. The Offer Letter stated all disputes arising from his
employment would be resolved by arbitration; as it turned out, however,
based on the two agreements he was given on day one, only those claims
plaintiff would be likely file against Aten would be arbitrated, while claims
most likely to be asserted by Aten (i.e., for breach of the Confidentiality
Agreement) could only be litigated in court. Plaintiff was not given a copy of
the Arbitration Agreement and Confidentiality Agreement to review in
advance of his start date, but was handed both agreements, along with a
stack of other documents (all drafted by Aten), and expected to sign them
while a human resources representative waited in the room with him. On

22
these facts, as plaintiff points out, the agreements presented to him on his
first day of work, including the Arbitration Agreement, were not in any
meaningful sense “voluntary,” as stated in the Offer Letter.
We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that some measure
of procedural unconscionability was shown.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
While procedural unconscionability focuses on how the agreement
was obtained and executed, “[s]ubstantive unconscionability examines the
fairness of a contract’s terms. This analysis ‘ensures that contracts,
particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been
variously described as “‘“overly harsh”’” [citation], “‘unduly oppressive’”
[citation], “‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience”’” [citation], or “unfairly
one-sided” [citation]. All of these formulations point to the central idea that
the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with “a simple old-fashioned
bad bargain” [citation], but with terms that are “unreasonably favorable to
the more powerful party.”’” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 129–
130.)
We have no difficulty concluding plaintiff’s obligation to arbitrate
his claims is unfairly one-sided and the Arbitration Agreement therefore has
a high degree of substantive unconscionability. Aten based its motion to
compel arbitration on the Arbitration Agreement, which was only one of
multiple documents presented to plaintiff for his signature on his first day of
employment. But on his first day, plaintiff and Aten also signed the
Confidentiality Agreement, which also governed the subject matter of

23
potential claims that may arise between the parties as a result of the
employment relationship.
As discussed above, the Arbitration Agreement and
Confidentiality Agreement must be read together. (Civ. Code, § 1642
[“[s]everal contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties,
and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken
together”]; Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 491.)
When we do that, it is clear the Arbitration Agreement lacks mutuality. The
Confidentiality Agreement is heavily (if not entirely) one-sided in favor of
Aten.7 It imposes obligations only on plaintiff and allows Aten to sue plaintiff
in court for breach of those obligations. The Arbitration Agreement, however,
governs all other claims arising from the employment relationship—
including all the claims that typically would be brought by an employee such
as plaintiff—and it requires those claims to be brought in arbitration. As
noted by the trial court, “[a]n agreement may be unfairly one-sided if it
compels arbitration of the claims more likely to be brought by the weaker

7
Among other things, the Confidentiality Agreement required
plaintiff to agree to treat all of Aten’s business information as confidential,
not to disclose such information to others, and not to access, use, copy, or
remove such information. At oral argument, Aten’s counsel suggested the
seven-page document was not truly one-sided because in a single sentence it
acknowledges that any idea or invention will not be considered an “Employer
Invention” if it “qualifies fully under the provisions of California Labor Code
Section 2870 . . . including any idea or invention which is developed entirely
on the Employee’s own time without using the Employer’s equipment,
supplies, facilities or trade secret information, and which is not related to the
Employer’s business (either actual or demonstrably anticipated), and which
does not result from work performed for the Employer.” This sentence does
not impose any obligations on Aten, and it certainly does not obviate the
otherwise completely one-sided character of the Confidentiality Agreement
and its judicial resolution provisions.

24
party but exempts from arbitration the types of claims that are more likely to
be brought by the stronger party.” (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
702, 724.) That is precisely the case here. The trial court correctly found the
Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable.
E. The Arbitration Agreement Cannot be Saved by Severance
Aten contends that rather than denying arbitration, the trial
court was required by the severability provision in the Arbitration Agreement
to simply sever the unconscionable provisions and allow arbitration to
proceed on the rest.8 We disagree. The so-called “Severability” (boldface
omitted) provision in the Arbitration Agreement provides, “[i]f any portion of
this Agreement is determined to be . . . unenforceable . . . the remaining
provisions shall not in any way be affected or impaired. If a provision of this
Agreement is determined to be . . . unenforceable in any respect . . . such
provision shall be renegotiated by the parties.”

8
Aten argues that, contrary to plaintiff’s assumption, it does not
contend the trial court abused its discretion by not severing the offending
provisions pursuant to Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a), which
provides if a court finds a contract or term thereof unconscionable “the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” (Ibid.)
Rather, Aten argues the court was required to sever pursuant to the
severability provision contained in the Arbitration Agreement. Aten argues
the standard of review is, therefore, de novo on that issue because the trial
court lacked discretion in enforcing the parties’ severability clause. As
discussed below, we conclude severability is not a remedy here as a matter of
law because the purported “severability” provision simply requires a
renegotiation (and resulting attempt to agree upon a modification) of the
agreement, and there is no particular provision or provisions to sever given
that the lack of mutuality goes to the entire scope of arbitration.

25
Here, the unconscionability arises from the lack of mutuality of
plaintiff’s agreement to arbitrate and is not tied to one discrete provision that
can be easily excised from the agreement. The unconscionability here goes to
the entirety of the scope of the arbitration. Indeed, even Aten fails to identify
precisely what provision(s) can and should be severed, referring to
unidentified provisions in the Confidentiality Agreement that could be
severed, or “even the entire Confidentiality Agreement.”
In short, the lack of mutuality permeates the parties’ agreement.
As explained by the California Supreme Court, “such permeation is indicated
by the fact that there is no single provision a court can strike or restrict in
order to remove the unconscionable taint from the agreement. Rather, the
court would have to, in effect, reform the contract, not through severance or
restriction, but by augmenting it with additional terms” and “[b]ecause a
court is unable to cure this unconscionability through severance or
restriction, and is not permitted to cure it through reformation and
augmentation, it must void the entire agreement.” (Armendariz, supra, 24
Cal.4th at pp. 124–125.)9
Further, despite its “Severability” (boldface omitted) title, the
provision relied upon by Aten is no such thing. It does not provide for

9
This case is distinguishable from the California case relied upon
by Aten, Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257, because
that case involved a specific provision in the arbitration agreement that the
court concluded could be severed—a provision expressly exempting from
arbitration “‘any claim based on or related to the . . . Inventions &
Confidentiality Agreement between you and [the company].’” (Id. at pp. 1270,
1274–1275.) It also involved Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a), and
did not involve a severability clause like the one here, which mandates a
renegotiation of the terms deemed unenforceable. (Farrar v. Direct
Commerce, Inc., at p. 1273.)

26
severance of terms found to be invalid or unenforceable. To the contrary, it
provides the invalid or unenforceable terms must be “renegotiated by the
parties,” with the added proviso that the “objective” of the renegotiation is to
put the parties in a position as close as possible to the position they would
have been in had the offending provision not been found to be unenforceable.
Such a “renegotiation,” if successful, would necessarily require the
Arbitration Agreement to be modified or reformed. “[W]hether an employer is
willing, now that the employment relationship has ended, to allow the
arbitration provision to be mutually applicable, or to encompass the full
range of remedies, does not change the fact that the arbitration agreement as
written is unconscionable and contrary to public policy. Such a willingness
‘can be seen, at most, as an offer to modify the contract; an offer that was
never accepted. No existing rule of contract law permits a party to resuscitate
a legally defective contract merely by offering to change it.’” (Armendariz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 125.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

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