People v. Pech CA4/3

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Filed 10/20/25 P. v. Pech CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063340

v. (Super. Ct. No. 21NF1803)

MANUEL JESUS PECH, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Elizabeth G. Macias, Judge. Affirmed.
Boyce & Schaefer and Benjamin Kington, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Kristin Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Manuel Jesus Pech was convicted of various sex crimes against
young women and underage girls. He asserts there was insufficient evidence
of duress to support his conviction for sexual penetration by duress. He also
contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making several comments
during his rebuttal argument that appealed to the jury’s passion and
prejudice. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Pech worked as a tattoo artist. He did not require his clients to
provide identification, so many of them were under the age of 18. Between
2017 and 2021, Pech sexually assaulted a number of young female clients
while giving them tattoos. At the time, he was in his late 30s or early 40s and
weighed about 250 pounds.
Pech was charged with various sex crimes against multiple girls
and women. For example, count 3 alleged that he committed sexual
penetration of a child over the age of 14 years by duress, force, or fear.
The victim in count 3 testified that when she was 16 years old,
she contacted Pech through Instagram and arranged to have him give her a
tattoo on her right thigh. She and a friend went to Pech’s apartment for the
tattoo, and Pech had her lie down on a massage table with her right leg bent
outward. The victim was wearing loose-fitting gym shorts at the time.
About 30 minutes into the session, Pech tried to force the victim’s
legs open. She tried to close her legs, but he forced them open again. Pech
then inserted his fingers into her vagina and left them there for five to ten
minutes while completing the tattoo with his other hand. The victim “froze,”
“got cold,” and felt “scared” and “shocked.” She did not feel like she could stop
him and did not say anything; he had the tattoo needle in his other hand and
was still tattooing her.

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At the beginning of his closing argument, the prosecutor thanked
the jury for their service. He added that “[t]his is a very important case to the
victims” and that “the reason you are here [is] for the five victims of the
defendant. . . . They put their trust in the defendant, and the defendant
violated their trust and sexually assaulted them during the tattoo.” The
prosecutor then discussed the allegations concerning each victim and the
elements of the charges at length.
During his rebuttal the following day, the prosecutor made
several related comments that elicited objections from defense counsel. For
example, the prosecutor noted that when the jurors received their summons,
they likely asked themselves, “Why should I care?,” and then added, “Well,
the victims in this case, that’s why you should care.” Defense counsel objected
to the statement as appealing to the jury’s passion and prejudice, and the
trial court cautioned the prosecutor to be cautious going forward. The
prosecutor then reminded the jury about the seriousness of the case and that
each juror demonstrated a commitment to justice.
Next, the prosecutor observed that getting a tattoo when
underage may not be “a good idea,” “[b]ut it was these victims’ imperfections
that made them vulnerable,” “the defendant knew that,” and the purpose of
the law is to protect those that are the most vulnerable. Defense counsel
again objected to these statements but was overruled.
The jury found Pech guilty of five sex offenses against four
women; it also found the victims were particularly vulnerable and that Pech
violated a position of trust or confidence, among other findings. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3) & (11) [circumstances in aggravation include
that victim was particularly vulnerable and defendant took advantage of
position of trust or confidence to commit offense].)

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DISCUSSION
I.
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PECH SEXUALLY PENETRATED HIS VICTIM BY DURESS
Pech first contends there is insufficient evidence he committed
sexual penetration of a child over the age of 14 years by duress (count 3).1
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and consider whether any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Perez-Robles (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 222, 226.) A single witness’s
uncorroborated testimony may be sufficient. (Ibid.)
Pech contends there was insufficient evidence of duress to
support count 3 because he was not a family member of or authority figure to
the victim; the victim’s friend was present; the victim had her cell phone with
her; and Pech did not do anything to induce fear or impliedly threaten the
victim. We are not persuaded.
Duress, by its nature, involves psychological coercion of the
victim, and the defendant’s position of authority is a relevant factor. (People
v. Townes (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 603, 612 (Townes).) The jury here was
instructed to “consider all the circumstances [relevant to duress], including
the age of the other person and her relationship to the defendant.”
(CALCRIM No. 1045.) Other relevant circumstances include the victim’s age,

1 Count 3 alleged sexual penetration of a minor who is 14 or older

by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear. (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(C).)
As there was no evidence of force, the prosecutor argued the act was
accomplished by duress.

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whether the defendant physically controlled the victim when she attempted
to resist, and the relative physical vulnerability of the child. (People v.
Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1072.) The fact the defendant did not
use force or threats does not preclude a finding of duress. (Ibid.)
Considering all relevant circumstances here, we find ample
evidence of duress. The 16-year-old victim was lying on her back in the
defendant’s apartment while being illegally tattooed by a 250-pound man
more than twice her age, who was holding a tattoo needle to her upper thigh
and actively tattooing her leg while he forced her legs open and digitally
penetrated her with his other hand. She testified she was “scared” and
“shocked” when it happened and did not feel like she could stop him. A
reasonable jury could find she submitted to the penetration because she
reasonably feared what would happen if she resisted, and Pech thus
accomplished the penetration by means of fear or duress. (Cf. Townes, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th at p. 613 [defendant used duress against his 16-year-old
daughter by directly and impliedly threatening retribution from God if she
disobeyed his requests to engage in sexual intercourse with him].)
II.
THE PROSECUTOR’S COMMENTS DURING REBUTTAL
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Pech next contends the trial court prejudicially erred by
permitting the prosecutor to argue the jury should “‘protect the most
vulnerable’” (boldface omitted), thereby appealing to the jury’s passions and
depriving Pech of due process. Again, we disagree.
A prosecutor may make vigorous arguments as warranted by the
evidence, as long as those arguments are not inflammatory or principally
aimed at arousing the jury’s passion or prejudice. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7

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Cal.5th 306, 337 (Rivera).) It is improper for the prosecutor to make
arguments suggesting that emotion may reign over reason, or to use
inflammatory rhetoric inviting an irrational, purely subjective response.
(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 894 (Covarrubias).)
“‘[P]rosecutors may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to
protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking.
The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be
convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence.’”
(United States v. Sanchez (9th Cir. 2011) 659 F.3d 1252, 1256.)
In evaluating the propriety of a prosecutor’s comments, “[w]e
consider the assertedly improper remarks in the context of the argument as a
whole.” (Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 894.) Viewing the challenged
comments in context, we find no misconduct here.
The prosecutor’s comments about why the jurors should care
about the case simply reminded them about the importance of their civic
duty. (See Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 337 [“The prosecutor’s statement
merely reminded the jurors about the importance of the civic duty in which
they were engaged. It did not ask the jury to act on the basis of fear or to
decide the case in a particular way in light of that duty.”].)
Similarly, we see no problem with the prosecutor’s comments
that the victims were underage and vulnerable and that the law is meant to
protect the most vulnerable. These comments came at the end of rebuttal,
following a lengthy discussion about the elements required to prove guilt and
the evidence particular to each victim. Viewing the argument in its entirety,
the statements were permissible argument on whether Pech violated any
laws. “There was nothing in the prosecution’s remarks that urged the jurors

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to act on their passions or prejudice.” (Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p.
895.)
Assuming arguendo the prosecutor’s remarks were improper,
they were not prejudicial. The jury was instructed that counsel’s statements
are not evidence and it is the jury’s duty to determine the facts based on the
evidence; they are presumed to have followed those instructions. (People v.
Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1005.) Moreover, the evidence against Pech
was overwhelming; six women testified to being sexually assaulted by Pech
over the course of four years as he was giving them tattoos. On this record, “it
is not reasonably probable that the verdict would have been more favorable to
defendant without the [alleged] misconduct.” (People v. Martinez (2010) 47
Cal.4th 911, 957 [alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument
was harmless because comments were “relatively brief” and evidence against
defendant “was very strong and generally uncontradicted”].)
Pech asserts the improper comments were particularly
prejudicial because they came at the end of the rebuttal, citing Crotts v.
Smith (9th Cir. 1996) 73 F.3d 861, 867 [presentation of prejudicial evidence
at end of trial “only magnified the prejudicial effect”]. We disagree. Taken in
context, the statements at issue were only a small part of a lengthy
discussion about the required elements and burdens, and they kept with the
theme that the jurors were selected because they are committed to justice.
There is no reasonable probability any juror misunderstood the comments as
urging them to act on their passions.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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