CourtListener 10707346•People v. Rodas CA4/1
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Filed 10/20/25 P. v. Rodas CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083671
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN423108)
BARTOLO LUCAS RODAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael D. Washington, Judge. Affirmed.
Mario P. Tafur and Joshua J. Schroeder for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski, and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Bartolo Lucas Rodas appeals the judgment of conviction after a jury
found him guilty of multiple counts of rape and attempting to dissuade
witnesses. He asserts claims regarding his right to testify, judicial bias,
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, insufficient
evidence, and sentencing error. We find no merit to his contentions and
affirm.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Evidence
I.R. is Rodas’s eldest daughter. She was born in Guatemala on
November 4, 1997. When I.R. was one year seven months old, Rodas and
I.R.’s mother moved to the United States, leaving I.R. in the care of her
maternal grandmother. For much of her childhood, I.R. believed her
grandmother was her mother. Rodas visited I.R. in Guatemala around five
times. I.R.’s mother never visited her.
In October 2012, one month before I.R. turned 16 years old, Rodas
picked her up in Guatemala and moved her to the United States. After she
moved to the United States, her parents limited her communication with her
grandmother in Guatemala.
I.R. attended high school fulltime in Fallbrook. In addition to her
schoolwork, she was expected to prepare Rodas’s lunches, load his truck for
work, prepare the family’s dinners, clean the home, and do the laundry.
When her parents were unhappy with the way I.R. performed these tasks,
they would beat her. Her mother also beat I.R. when she did her schoolwork
instead of the housework. In addition to the housework, I.R. cared for her
younger sisters and went to work with Rodas on the weekends.
Rodas maintained tight control over I.R. and her activities. When she
started working, Rodas demanded half of her paycheck. He also often
checked her cell phone. If she refused to give him the phone, he would beat
her. Rodas forbade I.R. from dating.
2
When I.R. was 16 years old, Rodas began sexually abusing her. One
evening after he had been drinking and the other family members were
asleep, he entered the bedroom I.R. shared with her sister, lay down next to
her, and began touching her vagina and breasts under her clothes. I.R.
confronted Rodas about the incident the next day. He asked her if she liked
it and told her not to tell her mother or there would be problems. She did not
tell anyone about what happened because she was afraid of being beaten and
blamed. After this first incident, Rodas sexually abused I.R. every Friday
after her mother went to bed.
Shortly before I.R. turned 17 years old, Rodas escalated the abuse and
began touching her vagina with his penis. At that time, he would put his
penis “in between and all around” the outer lips of her vagina. After she
turned 17, he began inserting his penis further into her vagina and then
would ejaculate on her. When she would tell him to stop, he would beat her.
I.R. met her boyfriend when she was 20 or 21 years old. She went to
live with him in September 2020. Rodas demanded that I.R. continue to visit
him regularly, and, if she did not, he would threaten her with physical
violence and with telling her boyfriend she was seeing another man. During
these visits, Rodas continued to sexually abuse her when her mother was not
home. The sexual abuse occurred even when her boyfriend was in another
room of the house, although Rodas never touched her with his penis on these
occasions. During one visit, Rodas punched I.R. in the face in front of her
boyfriend. On some occasions, Rodas took I.R. to a motel, where he raped
her.
Early in April 2021, I.R. met Rodas the final time. He told her to meet
him at a motel so they could talk about him leaving her alone. He told her to
“do it one more time” or else he would not leave her alone. Then he raped
3
her. On April 12, Rodas told I.R. she had to see him, and, if she did not, he
would tell her boyfriend she had another man. She told him to leave her
alone, and she did not go see him. The conversation made her cry and want
to kill herself because she had “had enough” of Rodas’s threats.
After this final conversation with Rodas, I.R. told her boyfriend about
the abuse. Her boyfriend called Rodas, and Rodas made threats of physical
violence against I.R. and her boyfriend. Rodas told I.R. that if she reported
him to law enforcement, he would kill her. Despite these threats, on April 17,
2021, I.R. reported the abuse to law enforcement.
Rodas raped I.R. more than once every year from the time she was 17
years old until she was 23 years old. She did not report the abuse because
Rodas would threaten her and cause her fear.
The forensic interviewer who interviewed I.R. after she reported the
abuse testified that children who are sexually abused often delay the
disclosure of the abuse and that there are a number of reasons for this
delayed disclosure.
B. Defense Evidence
I.R.’s mother, sister, half-brother, aunt, and uncle testified in Rodas’s
defense. The family members testified Rodas did not have a reputation for
violence, and they did not witness him physically or sexually abuse I.R.
C. Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found Rodas guilty of three counts of rape by force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of a minor 14 years of age or older (Pen. Code,1
§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (c)(2)); 12 counts of rape by force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); and two counts of attempting to
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4
dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). The jury
also found true allegations that Rodas took advantage of a position of trust or
confidence to commit the crime; I.R. was particularly vulnerable; and the
offenses involved great violence, great bodily harm, the threat of bodily harm,
or other facts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and/or
callousness. Before Rodas’s sentencing hearing, I.R. stated she thought an
appropriate sentence for Rodas would be “probation up to a year in jail . . . .”2
The trial court sentenced Rodas to 99 years in state prison.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Potential Claims of Trial Court Error Are Forfeited
First, Rodas presents issues he “preserved for appeal.” He lists 15
instances in which he challenged the admission of evidence or testimony in
the trial court. He also highlights the trial court’s denial of his motion for
acquittal as to the two counts of attempting to dissuade a witness, and his
motion for pinpoint instructions regarding allegations as to the victim’s
vulnerability. As to some of these issues, Rodas states the trial court erred in
its rulings, but, as to others, he argues the trial court correctly sustained
defense objections. He also explains these issues are “intertwined with” his
claims for relief, and thus, should be considered “in the contexts of each of
[his] claims.”
2 Rodas requests judicial notice of a declaration from I.R., which requests
leniency and Rodas’s release from custody. He also seeks judicial notice of an
excerpt from Daniel Kahneman’s book Thinking, Fast and Thinking Slow,
which defines rational thinking. We deny these requests. (Vons Companies,
Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“Reviewing courts
generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial
court.”].)
5
To the extent Rodas intended to raise these issues as individual claims
of trial court error, he has forfeited them by failing to clearly identify them by
headings or supporting them with cogent analysis or authority. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2
(Freeman) [“To the extent defendant perfunctorily asserts other claims,
without development and, indeed, without a clear indication that they are
intended to be discrete contentions, they are not properly made, and are
rejected on that basis.”]; Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc.
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 538, 547 [“ ‘Failure to provide proper headings forfeits
issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a
heading.’ ”].)
However, to the extent these issues are relevant to Rodas’s other
claims, we address them post.3
B. Rodas’s Contention Regarding His Right to Testify Is Forfeited and Lacks
Merit
Rodas argues the trial court denied him his right to testify in his own
defense. He contends neither defense counsel nor the court conferred with
him about his right to testify, and he did not have an opportunity to assert
3 Throughout this section, and his opening brief generally, Rodas makes
unsupported assertions of structural error. We do not consider these
arguments that are void of authority or argument. (Freeman, supra, 8
Cal.4th at p. 482, fn. 2 [declining to consider arguments that are not
sufficiently developed]; People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1412,
fn. 5 (Carroll) [court need not consider constitutional argument void of
analysis or authority].)
6
his right.4 Yet, he seems uncertain if this contention is accurate because he
also states, “Unless I am mistaken and it is in the record at some point I did
not catch, this is a fundamental violation . . . .”
But the record clearly shows Rodas’s defense counsel advised him of his
right to testify, and he waived that right. An appellant must provide
supporting citations to the factual record, and, if he fails to cite accurately to
the record, he forfeits the issue or argument on appeal that is presented
without the record reference. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C);
City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239.) Rodas’s
misleading argument on this issue has rendered this claim forfeited.
Notwithstanding forfeiture, this claim also lacks merit. Neither the
state nor the federal Constitution place upon trial courts the duty to sua
sponte inform a defendant of his right to testify, or to obtain an express
waiver of that right. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1052–1053.)
And Rodas conferred with his defense counsel about his right to testify. We
are not persuaded by Rodas’s argument in his reply brief that his counsel
advised him of his right only after the defense rested. Although counsel did
not discuss the matter on the record until after the defense rested, in doing so
4 Confusingly, Rodas presents this claim within the section of his
opening brief addressing judicial bias but does not appear to contend the
alleged violation of his right to testify resulted from judicial bias. To the
extent Rodas intended to present this argument in support of his judicial bias
claim, it does no more to establish bias than the other examples discussed
post.
7
he made clear that his discussion with Rodas about his right to testify
occurred the previous day.5
C. Rodas’s Judicial Bias Claim Is Forfeited and Lacks Merit
Rodas contends the trial judge was biased because of the crimes
charged against him and his status as an immigrant. He does not contend
the judge was deliberately biased, but instead, he suggests the judge acted
out of implicit biases resulting from the #MeToo movement and national anti-
immigrant sentiment.
1. Rodas Has Forfeited His Judicial Bias Claim
Rodas forfeited this judicial bias claim by failing to object on this
ground at trial. Although Rodas objected to many perceived errors at trial,
including the alleged errors he relies on here in an attempt to prove judicial
bias, he did not object at any time to any perceived error on the ground of
bias. (People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 592 [defendant forfeited claim
of judicial bias because he did not object to alleged errors in the trial court on
the ground of bias and did not move to disqualify the judge].) Nevertheless,
5 Rodas also argues in his reply brief that, even if counsel’s discussion
with Rodas about his right to counsel was sufficient, Rodas “did not
understand the right he had or that he waived his right because he is not a
native Spanish speaker–his first language is a Native Central American
language that is difficult to find an adequate translator for, which is part and
parcel of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims made in the AOB.” Yet,
Rodas was assisted by a Spanish language interpreter throughout trial with
no objection, and he did not raise a language issue in his opening brief. We
do not expressly address this argument raised for the first time in a reply
brief on appeal. (Nordstrom Com. Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 583 [“A
party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal [citation], and points
raised for the first time in a reply brief on appeal will not be considered,
absent good cause for failure to present them earlier.”].) However, we note
Rodas’s argument is misleading. The record indicates he could read and
write in Spanish; he wrote text messages to I.R. in Spanish; and he
specifically requested a Spanish interpreter at trial.
8
despite Rodas’s forfeiture, we also reach the merits of his judicial bias claim
in light of his assertion that it would have been futile to object.
2. Rodas Has Failed to Establish Judicial Bias
Rodas has not shown the trial court committed any error, let alone
error that resulted from judicial bias. He contends the trial court’s bias was
evidenced in five ways: (1) the court did not understand I.R. had a motive to
fabricate her testimony because she sought to avoid criminal prosecution for
incest; (2) it allowed the prosecutor to vouch for I.R.; (3) it failed to
acknowledge its ability to show mercy by sentencing Rodas to probation or
concurrent sentences; (4) it erroneously admitted expert testimony regarding
delayed disclosure; and (5) it erroneously admitted evidence of text messages
exchanged between Rodas and I.R. We address each of these claims in turn.
a. Legal Standard
A criminal defendant has a state and federal constitutional right to an
impartial trial judge and to a trial conducted without the appearance of bias.
(People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111, overruled on another ground
in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151; Peters v. Kiff (1972) 407 U.S.
493, 502.)
The party claiming bias bears the burden of presenting facts that
clearly establish judicial bias. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344,
363.) The appearance of bias is judged by the reasonable person test. (See
Evans v. Superior Court (1930) 107 Cal.App. 372, 382.) The test is not
whether the defendant “has proved harm, but whether the court’s comments
would cause a reasonable person to doubt the impartiality of the [court] or
would cause us to lack confidence in the fairness of the proceedings such as
would necessitate reversal.” (Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
452, 461.) A “ ‘party’s unilateral perception of an appearance of bias. . .’ ” is
9
insufficient, “ ‘unless we are ready to tolerate a system in which disgruntled
or dilatory litigants can wreak havoc with the orderly administration of
dispute-resolving tribunals.’ ” (Haas v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1017, 1034.) In addition, “ ‘[a] trial court’s numerous rulings against
a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias,
especially when they are subject to review. [Citations.] [¶] On appeal, we
assess whether any judicial misconduct or bias was so prejudicial that it
deprived defendant of ‘ “ ‘a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 447.)
b. I.R.’s Motive to Fabricate the Allegations of Sexual Abuse
As to Rodas’s first proposed illustration of the trial court’s bias, he
appears to allude to the trial court’s comments in support of imposing an
aggravated sentence. Specifically, the trial court imposed an aggravated
term in reliance on the factual findings made by the jury, and, in doing so,
explained, “I have reason to believe [I.R.] because I can’t think of any
advantage that she would have in coming to court and making false
allegations against her father.” That the trial court concluded I.R. lacked a
sufficient motive to make false allegations against Rodas does not prove the
trial court failed to appreciate that I.R. could have fabricated the allegations
to avoid being charged with incest. Rather, it means the trial court found
I.R.’s allegations of abuse credible, and thus, necessarily found she did not
engage in unlawful incest. That the trial court may not have considered a
motivation for fabrication that did not exist does not suggest the court was
biased.
c. Vouching for I.R.
Rodas’s second proposed example of the trial court’s bias–that it
allegedly allowed the prosecutor to vouch for I.R.’s credibility–is not
10
supported by the record. As explained post with respect to Rodas’s claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, he has not shown the prosecutor engaged in any
improper vouching. Because there was no vouching, the trial court could not
have allowed vouching due to bias.
d. Sentencing Discretion
As to Rodas’s suggestion that the trial court acted out of bias in failing
to sentence Rodas to probation or concurrent sentences, he has shown no
error, let alone error that resulted from judicial bias. As explained post,
Rodas was statutorily ineligible for probation, and the trial court properly
imposed consecutive sentences for separate offenses. Rodas has not provided
any basis on which we could find the trial court imposed this proper sentence
as the result of bias.
e. Evidence of Delayed Disclosure
To the extent Rodas argues the trial court exhibited bias by erroneously
admitting expert testimony regarding delayed disclosure, again he fails to
establish any error, let alone error resulting from judicial bias.
At trial, the defense cross-examined I.R. about her failure to disclose
the sexual abuse to counselors who questioned her about her accusations of
physical abuse in the home. Following her testimony, the prosecutor sought
the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony from licensed
clinical social worker Christina Shultz on the issue of delayed disclosure of
child sex abuse victims. The court ruled Shultz could “testify broadly to the
issue of delayed reporting by . . . child victims of sexual abuse,” and that any
additional testimony would have to be admissible rebuttal.
Schulz testified as to the characteristics of child sexual abuse and
related delayed disclosure, as well as the protocol for interviewing a potential
child victim of sexual abuse. Schulz explained “the vast majority of
11
individual children who have been abused do not tell right away,” a
phenomenon that has been substantiated by research and Schulz’s own
practice. She offered reasons as to why victims might delay disclosure.
Schulz further testified that the perpetrator of child sexual abuse is typically
known to the victim, and, when the perpetrator is a stranger, the victim is
more likely to immediately disclose the abuse. She explained that many child
victims of sexual abuse reported abuse occurring while another family
member was in the home. Throughout Shulz’s testimony, the trial court
sustained numerous defense objections and cautioned the prosecutor to
remain within the scope of the court’s ruling on the admissibility of the
testimony.
The trial court properly admitted this evidence. (People v. McAlpin
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1301; see also People v. Page (Sept. 30, 2025,
D084545) ___Cal.App.5th ___ [2025 WL 2787609, at *6].) Thus, Rodas cannot
show the court exhibited bias by erroneously admitting Schulz’s testimony.
This is particularly true where the court repeatedly sustained defense
objections to improper questions and cautioned the prosecutor about
exceeding the scope of admissibility.
f. Text Messages
Lastly, Rodas has not shown judicial bias resulted in any error with
respect to the admission of evidence of text messages exchanged between
Rodas and I.R.
Before trial, the defense moved in limine to exclude evidence of text
messages sent between Rodas and I.R. for a lack of foundation and on
hearsay grounds. The trial court held a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code
section 402 to determine the existence of the proper foundation for admitting
the text messages. At the hearing, the District Attorney investigator who
12
reviewed the logs of the extraction of the text messages from I.R.’s cell phone
testified. After the hearing, the court found the messages generally
admissible, subject to individual objections.
Thereafter, I.R. testified regarding the text messages. In the messages
I.R. sent to Rodas, I.R. asked Rodas for forgiveness for failing him and
making mistakes, admitted having lied about unspecified things, and insisted
she had not fabricated her allegations of sexual abuse. In the messages
Rodas sent to I.R., he insulted her, used profanity against her, and admitted
having threatened her. In other messages, Rodas asked for I.R.’s forgiveness
and stated “a spell. . . made [him] do it.”
At the beginning of I.R.’s testimony about the messages, Rodas lodged
general foundation, hearsay, and speculation objections, which the court
overruled. Thereafter, Rodas lodged a handful of objections to the admission
of the content of the messages, one successfully objecting to the prosecutor
simply reading a message, three unsuccessfully objecting to the prosecutor
reading portions of the messages as part of a question, and one objecting
when the prosecutor misquoted a message.
Here, Rodas appears to argue that the trial court should have excluded
the text messages based on foundation, hearsay, and speculation objections,
and that this failure to do so demonstrates judicial bias. He does not identify
any individual messages that were allegedly inadmissible on these grounds,
and thus, appears to argue the messages were inadmissible as a whole.
However, the only objection Rodas proposes that we can consider with respect
to the text messages generally, rather than as applied to individual
messages, is the foundation objection. But the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the appropriate foundation for the text messages
because it admitted them after the investigator who reviewed the extraction
13
log laid a proper foundation, and after I.R. identified the text messages.
(People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal. 4th 258, 266, 267 [admissibility of
evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion; foundational requirement met if
“sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that the writing is what it
purports to be, i.e., that it is genuine for the purpose offered”].)6 Rodas
cannot establish judicial bias based on the erroneous admission of the text
messages where the trial court properly admitted the evidence.
Ultimately, none of the five examples of judicial bias Rodas has
presented establish trial court error, and thus, Rodas has failed to show
judicial bias based on these alleged errors. Even if Rodas had established the
trial court erred in some way, he has not shown that any error was the result
of bias. Error alone is insufficient to establish judicial bias in the absence of
any showing that the error resulted from the bias alleged. (People v. Pearson,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 447.) In fact, “[Rodas]’s willingness to let the entire
trial pass without articulating an appropriate objection ‘strongly suggests’ his
claim [of judicial bias] is without merit.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 592.)
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Next, Rodas asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
properly oppose certain evidence and testimony, and for failing to counter the
prosecution’s mischaracterization of evidence.
6 Rodas also suggests the prosecution engaged in a nefarious plan to give
I.R. a cell phone through which she could collect unflattering or incriminating
text messages from Rodas. I.R. testified that, when she was 18 years old, she
had a cell phone that she got for free from the government. But I.R. did not
report the sexual abuse until April 17, 2021, when she was 23 years old. The
prosecution team could not have provided I.R. with any phone she possessed
at the age of 18.
14
1. Standard of Review
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684–685.) “It is defendant’s burden to
demonstrate the inadequacy of trial counsel.” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12
Cal.4th 415, 436.) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “the
defendant must first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) An insufficient showing on either one of these
components is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Strickland,
at p. 687.) “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result
of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be
followed.” (Id. at p. 697.)
“It is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more
appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
15
2. Failure to Object to Testimony and Evidence
First, Rodas argues his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to, or oppose, evidence of Rodas’s control over I.R., evidence regarding
I.R.’s credibility, and a statement by I.R.’s mother. We reject these
arguments.
a. Evidence of Rodas’s Dominance and Control Over I.R.
Rodas contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
introduction of evidence that he alleges the prosecution improperly used to
suggest Rodas exercised dominance and control over I.R.. First, he argues
counsel should have sought to exclude evidence that Rodas facilitated I.R.’s
lawful immigration to the United States because this was merely evidence of
Rodas exercising his ordinary custodial rights over his child. Relatedly, he
argues his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence that
Rodas expected I.R. to do household chores and submit to his rules regarding
her phone use and dating. Rodas further contends his counsel should have
objected to evidence that I.R.’s mother beat her.
The prosecution did not merely present innocuous evidence of ordinary
parental supervision. Through evidence showing Rodas required I.R. to do
chores and submit to his rules, the prosecution painted a picture of a teenage
girl who was brought to a new country against her wishes to live with
parents she barely knew, made to perform the household chores to her
parents’ standards or risk physical beatings, and given almost no autonomy
over herself. This evidence was highly relevant to the prosecution’s theory
that Rodas committed the charged rapes by means of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear. (See § 261, subd. (b)(1) [“ ‘[d]uress’ means a direct or implied
threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a
16
reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which
otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one
otherwise would not have submitted,” and “ ‘[m]enace’ means any threat,
declaration, or act that shows an intention to inflict an injury upon
another”].) In addition, the prosecution presented evidence that Rodas’s
control over I.R. continued even after she became an adult, and thus, cannot
be deemed mere acts of ordinary parental authority.
Rodas cannot establish ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure
to lodge a meritless objection to this relevant and admissible evidence.
(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616 [“Because there was no sound legal
basis for objection, counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the evidence
cannot establish ineffective assistance.”].)
b. Evidence Related to I.R.’s Credibility and Character
Rodas further challenges his counsel’s failure to object to I.R.’s
inconsistent testimony as being nonresponsive and contradictory. In
addition, he argues his counsel should have objected to, and moved to strike,
inflammatory statements that presented I.R. in a sympathetic or morally
superior light, such as her text messages admitting to lying, being stupid,
loving her father, and being a sinner. Relatedly, Rodas argues his defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to many of the questions eliciting
this contradictory testimony from I.R. on the ground they were already asked
and answered.7
7 Rodas also makes a passing reference to questions the prosecutor posed
to I.R.’s boyfriend that had been asked and answered, but he does not
accompany the reference with any context or argument. We do not
separately address this undeveloped argument. (Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th
at p. 482, fn. 2 [declining to consider arguments that are not sufficiently
developed].)
17
Regardless of whether Rodas’s counsel might have had legitimate bases
on which to object to the evidence, he used the evidence to the benefit of the
defense by arguing I.R. was not credible and fabricated the allegations
against Rodas. Counsel could have made a reasonable tactical decision not to
object to the evidence so he could use it to impeach I.R.’s credibility. In fact,
even here, Rodas uses I.R.’s contradictory statements and testimony to argue
the evidence was insufficient to support Rodas’s convictions. Because the
record does not affirmatively demonstrate Rodas’s counsel lacked a rational
tactical purpose for declining to object to the evidence in question, we cannot
find he was ineffective. (People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 872–
873.)
c. Statement by I.R.’s Mother
Next, Rodas challenges his counsel’s failure to object to testimony about
a statement I.R.’s mother made. I.R.’s boyfriend testified that, after I.R.
disclosed the abuse to him, he called I.R.’s mother and informed her. I.R.’s
sister, L.R., then testified that, after I.R.’s boyfriend called her mother, her
mother told Rodas she “didn’t think [he] would do something like that to
[I.R.].” L.R. further testified that, in response to her mother’s statement,
Rodas said nothing, put the palm of his hand on his forehead, and looked
down.
Rodas faults his counsel for failing to object to this statement as
“unclear,” or vague, because it could have been referring to “beatings, incest,
holding onto [I.R.]’s green card, precluding [I.R.] from dating [her boyfriend]
or moving out, breaking [I.R.]’s phone, telling [I.R.] that her car is actually
his, giving [I.R.] money and then demanding it back, refusing to allow [I.R.]
to move out and treating her like property that can be sold to [her boyfriend]
for marriage, and any number of things discussed at trial here.” But the
18
record leaves no ambiguity that the subject of the statement at issue was
Rodas’s sexual abuse of I.R., as I.R.’s boyfriend disclosed the abuse to her
mother immediately before she made the statement at issue. Because
neither the question nor the answer was vague, Rodas’s counsel had no
meritorious basis upon which to object. Counsel was not ineffective for
failing to lodge a meritless objection. (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at
p. 616.)
3. Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s Mischaracterization of Evidence
Lastly, Rodas argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to counter
the prosecution’s misrepresentation of the threats Rodas made that formed
the basis for the charges of attempting to dissuade a witness. His claim is
premised on testimony from I.R. and her boyfriend that Rodas threatened
them both with physical harm and/or death if they disclosed the abuse.
Rather than showing the prosecutor misrepresented the nature of the threats
Rodas made against I.R. and her boyfriend, Rodas’s true complaint seems to
be that I.R. gave conflicting testimony about the threats. Again, however,
Rodas’s counsel attempted to use I.R.’s contradictory testimony to Rodas’s
advantage by arguing I.R. was an unreliable witness who fabricated the
allegations against Rodas. In the absence of an affirmative demonstration in
the record that Rodas’s counsel lacked a rational tactical purpose for
declining to object to the evidence in question, we cannot find he was
ineffective. (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 734.)8
8 In passing, Rodas appears to suggest the trial court erred by denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1 based on the
allegedly contradictory evidence. Again, we do not address Rodas’s vague
and unsupported argument. (Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 482, fn. 2.)
19
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Rodas’s next claim of error is that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by making comments during her opening statement, which Rodas
characterizes as relying on inadmissible hearsay, invoking defenses Rodas
did not have to raise, and relying on evidence the prosecutor was unable to
produce at trial. He also contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for
evidence and witnesses, presented inflammatory and prejudicial evidence,
directing the jury, and “[e]quivocated” between the cultures of the United
States and Guatemala.
1. Standard of Review
“A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make
the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not
render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct
under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods to persuade either the trial court or the jury.” (People v. Morales
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) Under the federal standard, prosecutorial
misconduct requires reversal of a judgment unless the misconduct was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Castillo (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 364, 386–387, fn. 9 (Castillo); People v. Bordelon (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 1311, 1323–1324.) Under the state standard, prosecutorial
misconduct requires reversal where it is reasonably probable the defendant
would have obtained a more favorable verdict absent the misconduct. (People
v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839; Castillo, at p. 386.)
2. Forfeiture
20
Except for an issue regarding the scope of expert testimony, Rodas did
not object in the trial court to any of the alleged acts of prosecutorial
misconduct, and a sustained objection and/or admonition would have cured
any potential prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s alleged improper
comments during her opening statement, vouching for witnesses,
presentation of inflammatory or prejudicial evidence, and directing the jury.
Because he did not object to alleged errors that could have been cured by the
trial court, Rodas forfeited all of his assertions of prosecutorial misconduct,
except for that related to the scope of the expert testimony. (People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674.)
However, in light of Rodas’s argument that it had been “impossible” or
futile to object, as explained post, we also find he has not established
prosecutorial misconduct.
3. Opening Statement
Rodas first cites a multitude of allegedly improper comments by the
prosecutor during her opening statement, which Rodas characterizes as
relying on inadmissible hearsay, invoking defenses Rodas did not have to
raise, and relying on evidence the prosecutor was unable to produce at trial.
As identified by Rodas, the prosecutor referred to the following
evidence: (1) Rodas’s statements suggesting I.R. consented to the sexual
relationship; (2) Rodas’s threats to I.R. and her boyfriend; (3) Rodas’s
statement that she had become a woman and “c[ould] handle this”; (4)
Rodas’s disparaging comments to I.R.; (5) I.R.’s disclosure of the abuse to her
boyfriend; (6) statements I.R.’s boyfriend made to Rodas after learning of the
abuse; (7) Rodas’s statement that he had been “wrong all these years”;
(8) I.R.’s admission that she had sinned; and (9) thoughts the prosecutor
attributed to I.R. and her boyfriend. The first eight categories involve
21
evidence that fell within exceptions to the hearsay rule or was admissible for
nonhearsay purposes. (Evid. Code, §§ 1220 [admission by a party opponent],
1221 [adoptive admission], 1236 [witness’s prior consistent statement], 1238
[witness’s prior identification], 1250 [declarant’s state of mind]; People v.
Castro (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 191, 200, fn. 6 [“The testimony. . . concerning
various threats . . . was not admitted for the truth of the matter stated, but
only to show that threats had been made. The testimony was not hearsay.”];
People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 723 [victim’s statements indicating
fear of defendants were relevant to prove lack of consent].) As to the final
category, this was not a reference to actual statements made, but rather, was
the prosecutor hypothesizing what I.R. and her boyfriend might have been
thinking, which amounted to making reasonable inferences from the
evidence. (People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 126 [prosecutor may
argue reasonable inferences from the record].)
Second, we reject Rodas’s argument that the prosecutor improperly
referenced the issue of consent and, thereby, invoked Rodas’s defenses.
Rodas’s argument seems to be focused on the prosecutor’s reference to text
messages related to the issue of I.R.’s consent to the sexual relationship. But
Rodas does not argue that the prosecutor mischaracterized this evidence or
that it was so inflammatory as to have prejudiced the jury. He merely argues
the statements were hearsay and placed the defense in a difficult strategic
position. However, as stated, the prosecutor did not erroneously refer to
inadmissible hearsay evidence, so Rodas cannot show she committed
misconduct by knowingly referring to patently inadmissible evidence. (See
People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 762 [“ ‘[R]emarks made in an opening
statement cannot be charged as misconduct unless the evidence referred to by
the prosecutor “was ‘so patently inadmissible as to charge the prosecutor with
22
knowledge that it could never be admitted.’ ” ’ ”].) And the fact that the
substantial incriminating evidence against Rodas made it difficult to craft a
defense is not proof of prosecutorial misconduct.
Third, Rodas argues the prosecutor referred to statements that differed
from the evidence ultimately admitted at trial, or that the prosecutor could
not prove at trial. However, in light of the trial court’s instruction to the jury
that the lawyers’ statements were not evidence, “any minor variance in the
evidence actually presented could not be so prejudicial or egregious as to
warrant reversal.” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 519.)
4. Vouching
Next, Rodas contends the prosecutor engaged in improper vouching by:
(1) suggesting I.R. could not remember the exact number of times she was
raped because of the overall frequency of acts; (2) arguing I.R.’s household
responsibilities created a coercive environment; (3) presenting the text
messages between I.R. and Rodas; (4) admitting I.R.’s mother’s statement
that she did not think Rodas would do something like this to I.R.; and (5)
suggesting I.R. wanted a healthy relationship with her boyfriend and a
normal relationship with Rodas, when she did not.
“A prosecutor may make ‘assurances regarding the apparent honesty or
reliability of’ a witness ‘based on the “facts of [the] record and the inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom.” ’ [Citation.] But a ‘prosecutor is prohibited
from vouching for the credibility of witnesses or otherwise bolstering the
veracity of their testimony by referring to evidence outside the record.’ ”
(People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 432–433.) “ ‘Improper vouching
occurs when the prosecutor either (1) suggests that evidence not available to
the jury supports the argument, or (2) invokes his or her personal prestige or
23
depth of experience, or the prestige or reputation of the office, in support of
the argument.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 474, 480.)
Rodas does not explain how any of the prosecutor’s statements or
arguments amounted to improper vouching. Specifically, Rodas does not
point to any instance in which the prosecutor attempted to bolster the
credibility of a witness or evidence by referring to evidence outside the record,
or by invoking the prosecutor’s prestige or experience. Rather, Rodas takes
issue with the prosecutor’s proper argument regarding logical inferences
flowing from the evidence presented at trial. (Turner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
432–433 [prosecutor may make assurances regarding honesty based on
reasonable inferences from the record but may not bolster credibility based
on evidence outside record].)
5. Inflammatory and Prejudicial Evidence
Next, Rodas argues the prosecutor admitted inflammatory and
prejudicial evidence and argument regarding: (1) Rodas’s specific placement
of his penis in relation to I.R.’s vagina; (2) Rodas’s threats against I.R.; (3) the
text messages between I.R. and Rodas, and whether Rodas “in fact” made the
statements reflected in the texts; (4) I.R.’s immigration to the United States;
(5) Rodas’s disparaging comments about I.R.; (6) I.R.’s household obligations;
(7) Rodas’s lack of consent to I.R.’s relationship with her boyfriend; and (8)
I.R.’s consent to sexual acts with Rodas. He also faults the prosecutor for
“[e]quivocat[ing]” between the cultures of the United States and Guatemala
by referring to the defense characterization of I.R.’s decision to move in with
her boyfriend “as some kind of romantic elopement.”
Prosecutors are not required to discuss crimes “dispassionately or with
philosophic detachment,” but may not present “ ‘ “ ‘irrelevant information or
inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s attention from its proper role, or
24
invites an irrational, purely subjective response.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Leon (2015)
61 Cal.4th 569, 605–606.) It is not misconduct for a prosecutor to make
“vigorous” arguments that are “tied to specific evidence” and the prosecution’s
theory. (Ibid.) Each example Rodas cites was specifically tied to evidence
and relevant to prove the elements of the crimes charged, i.e. penetration and
force, fear, or duress for purposes of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), and
witness intimidation (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). Rodas has not shown that any of
the evidence or argument cited was so prejudicial or inflammatory as to
amount to misconduct.
6. Expert Testimony
Rodas also asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by suggesting
the expert on delayed disclosure was a neutral and objective witness, and by
eliciting testimony from the expert that was beyond the scope of what the
trial court ruled was admissible.
a. Expert’s Neutrality
In support of his assertion that the prosecutor improperly suggested
the expert was neutral and objective, Rodas cites to certain pages of the
reporter’s transcript as containing the prosecutor’s misconduct. Rodas’s
citations refer to the expert’s testimony that she did not work for law
enforcement, was a neutral party that conducted forensic interviews at the
request of an investigative agency, and the agencies pay a fee to her facility
for the interviews. However, these citations fall within the defense’s cross-
examination of the expert witness, and thus, any questioning and elicited
responses cannot be attributed to the prosecutor. Although Rodas cites to the
prosecution’s statement during closing argument that the expert was
“unbiased” because “[s]he is not a branch of law enforcement” and “doesn’t
have any say in whether charges are brought . . . ,” the prosecutor’s argument
25
made an entirely permissible inference from the testimony elicited by the
defense at trial. (People v. Turner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 432–433.)
b. Scope of Testimony
“Although it is misconduct for a prosecutor intentionally to elicit
inadmissible testimony [citation], merely eliciting evidence is not
misconduct.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1218.)
Here, after eliciting the expert’s testimony on delayed disclosure, the
prosecutor began to expand on the expert’s testimony by asking if the abuser
is typically someone known to the victim, and confirming it is common for
sexual abuse to occur in the victim’s home. When the prosecutor asked if it is
possible for abuse to occur in the home without the knowledge of other family
members, the defense objected to the question as being beyond the scope of
the trial court’s ruling on admissibility. The court sustained the objection.
The prosecutor then asked if victims of sex abuse typically show outward
signs of abuse, and the court again sustained a defense objection as being
beyond the scope. The court called a sidebar, at which the prosecutor
explained why she believed her questioning was permissible based on the
court’s ruling and the expert’s testimony to that point. The court reminded
the prosecutor of its limitation on the admissibility of the expert’s testimony,
stated the prosecutor could not expand the testimony, and cautioned it would
sustain any additional defense objections on this basis. The court noted that
it largely understood why the prosecutor had framed her questions the way
she had up to that point, but explained the prosecutor had then reached a
point where her questions sought testimony that was beyond the scope of the
court’s ruling on admissibility.
On this record, Rodas has not shown the prosecutor was intentionally
trying to elicit testimony she knew to be inadmissible rather than seeking to
26
expand the testimony in a way she believed to be permissible but was
ultimately foreclosed by the trial court. Regardless, to the extent the
prosecutor attempted to elicit testimony that was beyond the scope of the
trial court’s ruling on admissibility, the trial court kept tight boundaries on
the prosecutor’s questioning. Thus, the record demonstrates the trial court
took appropriate action to prevent any prejudice, and there is no reasonable
probability that any misconduct could have affected the verdict. (See People
v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 980 [no risk of prejudice from prosecutor’s
allegedly improper question where trial court sustained objection and witness
did not answer]; People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 764.)
7. Directing Jury
Rodas finally contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by
directing the jury it was required to make findings, even though the jury was
permitted to decline to reach a verdict. Specifically, Rodas faults the
prosecutor’s explanation to the jury it could find Rodas accomplished the rape
by fear but, to do so, it “ha[d] to find that [I.R.] was actually and reasonably
afraid of her father.” He also contends it was improper for the prosecutor to
inform the jury it “ha[d] to make a finding” as to the first three counts of
forcible rape, and, “[o]nce [the jury] f[ou]nd the defendant guilty of forcible
rape, [it] ha[d] to make a finding about whether it was committed when [I.R.]
was under 18 and over 14.”
The prosecutor’s comments accurately informed the jury of the findings
required for each offense, pursuant to the trial court’s jury instructions.
Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that, to find Rodas guilty of
rape by fear, it had to find “the woman is actually and reasonably afraid . . . .”
In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that, if it found Rodas guilty of
rape as charged in counts one through three, it “must then decide whether
27
the People have proved the additional allegation that those crimes were
committed upon” a victim between the ages of 14 and 18 years old. It is not
misconduct to accurately define the elements of the crimes charged (People v.
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 223–224), or to urge jurors to reach a verdict
(People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 696). And, although “ ‘the trial
court has a duty to avoid coercing the jury to reach a verdict” (People v.
Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 782), Rodas has not shown that such coercion
took place here, either by the court or the prosecutor.
But even if the prosecutor’s argument suggested to the jury it had to
reach a verdict, the trial court cured any error through its instructions to the
jury. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that the statements of
the lawyers were not evidence; it was to disregard any statement by a lawyer
that contradicted the instructions issued by the court; it “should try to agree
on a verdict” if it could; and it could only convict Rodas on any count if it
found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Morales (2001) 25
Cal.4th 34, 47 [any mischaracterization of the law during closing argument
was cured by instructions to the jury].)
F. Insufficient Evidence
Rodas next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions.
In reviewing a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from
which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 455.) In conducting
such a review, a reviewing court does not “ ‘ask itself whether it believes that
28
the evidence at the trial established guilt,’ ” but rather, asks whether
“ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307,
318–319.) We presume the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could
deduce from the evidence (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053), and
“discard evidence that does not support the judgment as having been rejected
by the trier of fact for lack of sufficient verity” (People v. Moore (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 937, 940). “[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its
deductions for those of the jury. It is of no consequence that the jury
believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have reached
a contrary conclusion.” (People v. Brown (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 968, 970.)
Rather than arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove any element
of any crime of which Rodas was charged, he simply argues prosecution
witnesses, and I.R. in particular, gave inconsistent testimony that lacked
credibility or was otherwise contradicted. Rodas merely invites us to reweigh
the evidence presented against him at trial and interpret it in his favor. This
we cannot do. (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079–1080
[“ ‘ “We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.”
[Citations.] “Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is
the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” ’ ”].)
To the extent Rodas offers any permissible challenge to the evidence
underlying any of his convictions, he appears to argue the evidence was
insufficient to prove count one, Rodas’s first rape of I.R., which allegedly
happened when she was 16 years old. Rodas seemingly points to the fact that
I.R. testified Rodas raped her for the first time when she was 17 years old. It
is true that, at times, I.R. testified the first rape occurred after she turned 17.
29
But she also testified that this act occurred when she was 16 and one half,
“around 17,” and just before her 17th birthday. It was up to the jury, not this
court on appellate review, to resolve this conflict. Because two reasonable
inferences could be deduced from I.R.’s testimony, i.e. that she was either 16
or 17 years old when Rodas first raped her, we cannot draw a conclusion
contrary to that which the jury drew. (People v. Brown, supra, 150
Cal.App.3d at p. 970.)
G. Sentencing
Finally, Rodas argues the trial court should have sentenced him to
probation or ordered his sentences to run concurrently. He relies heavily on
the fact that I.R. stated she would be satisfied if Rodas received a sentence of
probation or up to a year in jail.
As to a sentence of probation, Rodas was statutorily ineligible.
“[P]robation shall not be granted to” a defendant convicted of violating
section 261, subdivision (a)(2), as Rodas was here. (§ 1203.065, subd. (a).)
Contrary to Rodas’s argument, subdivision (b) of section 1203.065, which
contemplates a grant of probation “in unusual cases,” only applies to
defendants convicted of an offense enumerated in that provision, which does
not include a conviction under section 261, subdivision (a)(2). (Id. at subd.
(b)(1) [contemplating a sentence of probation in “unusual cases” where the
defendant was convicted under §§ 220, 261, subd. (a)(7), 286, subd. (k), 287,
subd. (k), 288a, or 289, subd. (g)].)
Rodas’s argument that he should have received concurrent sentences
under section 667, subdivision (c) is patently meritless. The evidence did not
show, as Rodas would have us find, that he committed “a long, continuous act
of rape” over the course of some six plus years. Rather, the evidence showed
Rodas sexually assaulted I.R. on numerous discreet occasions. In fact, I.R.’s
30
testimony, which the jury necessarily credited, established that Rodas
assaulted I.R. every Friday for an extended period.9
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
DO, J.
9 In a single conclusory sentence, Rodas also argues that his sentence
“was cruel and unusual especially taking into account [his] lack of a criminal
history.” We do not address this undeveloped argument. (Carroll, supra, 222
Cal.App.4th at p. 1412, fn. 5 [court need not consider constitutional argument
void of analysis or authority].)
31
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