People v. Begley CA1/1

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Filed 10/20/25 P. v. Begley CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170305
v.
JOSHUA RHEA BEGLEY, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR-578339-1)
Defendant and Appellant.

In 2010, a jury convicted defendant Joshua Begley of five counts,
including one count of first degree murder with the special circumstances
that the murder was committed in the commission of a robbery and a
burglary. He was sentenced to six years in prison plus life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP), including two one-year enhancements for prior
prison terms under Penal Code former section 667.5, subdivision (b)
(section 667.5(b)).1 He appealed, and this division affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Begley (Feb. 28, 2013, A130178) [nonpub. opn.].)
About a decade later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 483). The bill invalidated certain
section 667.5(b) enhancements imposed before 2020 and entitles a defendant

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise noted.
whose judgment contained such an enhancement to a full resentencing.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 2; § 1172.75, subds. (a), (c); People v. Monroe (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.) Begley sought resentencing under the new law.
The trial court then struck the section 667.5(b) enhancements, agreed with
Begley that he should receive the midterm for the three counts on which he
originally received the upper term, and resentenced him to a total term of
three years plus LWOP.
Begley now appeals, raising one claim the Attorney General opposes
and two claims the Attorney General concedes. We reject the opposed claim,
which is that Begley’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
seeking to strike several one-year enhancements based on section 1385, as
amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 81).
Begley also claims, and the Attorney General concedes, that (1) the
abstract of judgment must be amended to strike a $10,000 restitution fine
and accompanying parole revocation restitution fine the trial court did not
impose or, alternatively, the fines must be vacated under Assembly Bill
No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1186), which invalidates
uncollected restitution fines imposed more than 10 years ago (§ 1465.9,
subd. (d)); and (2) remand is required for the court to calculate Begley’s
actual custody credits as of resentencing. We accept the Attorney General’s
concessions. Thus, we order the resentencing minute order corrected to
conform to the court’s oral pronouncement and the fines—as well as two
other fees that were not imposed—stricken from both the determinate and
indeterminate abstracts of judgment. We also remand the matter for
Begley’s actual custody credits to be updated. Otherwise, we affirm.

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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are set forth in our opinion in Begley’s direct
appeal. Briefly, in February 2010, Begley entered a guitar shop in Rohnert
Park, stabbed the owner, Taku Sakashita, to death, and stole Sakashita’s
property. A few days later, when the police attempted to arrest Begley, he
led them on a high-speed chase before he was apprehended.
Several months later, the jury convicted Begley of first degree murder,
second degree robbery, second degree burglary, recklessly evading an officer,
and resisting an officer.2 The jury found true the special circumstances that
the murder occurred during a robbery and a burglary. It also found true that
Begley personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon during the murder
and the robbery and personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) during the
robbery and the burglary.3
In October 2010, after finding that Begley served two prior prison
terms under former section 667.5(b), the trial court sentenced him to six
years in prison plus LWOP. The determinate sentence was composed of three
years for evading an officer, a consecutive term of one year for the weapon
enhancement accompanying the murder, and two consecutive one-year terms
for the section 667.5(b) enhancements. A nine-year term for the robbery and
its enhancements, a seven-year term for the burglary and its enhancements,

2 Begley was convicted under sections 187, subdivision (a) (murder),

211 (robbery), 459 (burglary), and 148, subdivision (a)(1) (resisting officer),
and Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a) (evading officer).
3 The special circumstances were found true under section 190.2,

subdivision (a)(17), the weapon allegations were found true under
section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), and the GBI allegations were found true
under section 12022.7, subdivision (a).

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and a one-year term for resisting an officer were imposed and stayed. The
court also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine and other fees, ordered direct
restitution payable to the Victim Compensation Board (Board) and
Sakashita’s wife, and awarded 250 days of actual custody credits.4
In spring 2023, the trial court appointed counsel for Begley after he
was referred for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483. Begley filed a
motion for resentencing in which he claimed the court had to strike the
section 667.5(b) enhancements and reduce his sentence by two years. He also
argued that his sentence should be further reduced based on his positive
performance in prison.
In addition, Begley claimed the trial court was required to conduct a
full resentencing under which he was entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567). Specifically, he argued
that section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill No. 567, precluded the court
from reimposing the upper term for the three counts (robbery, burglary, and
evading an officer) on which he originally received that term because no
aggravating factors were stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt. He argued that childhood trauma, including his parents’ drug use and
domestic violence, justified the lower term for each of these counts.
The prosecution conceded that the section 667.5(b) enhancements had
to be stricken but opposed Begley’s request to be resentenced to the midterm
or lower term for robbery, burglary, and evading an officer. The prosecution
argued that aggravating factors related to Begley’s criminal history justified

4 In 2014, the trial court increased the restitution payable to the Board

and Sakashita’s wife. Begley appealed, and we modified the restitution order
to correct a calculation error. As modified, the order required him to pay
approximately $75,000 to the Board and $24,000 to Sakashita’s wife.
(People v. Begley (Nov. 10, 2015, A144367) [nonpub. opn.].)

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imposing the upper term and that any childhood trauma he may have
experienced did not justify, much less require, the lower term.
On March 6, 2024, the trial court recalled the sentence and resentenced
Begley. It struck the two section 667.5(b) enhancements. It also concluded
that lower-term sentences were not justified under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), but it agreed with Begley that midterm sentences were
appropriate.
Accordingly, the trial court resentenced Begley to a total term of three
years in prison plus LWOP. The determinate sentence was composed of the
midterm of two years for evading an officer and a consecutive term of one
year for the weapon enhancement attached to the murder. The court
imposed and stayed a seven-year term for the robbery and its enhancements,
a six-year term for the burglary and its enhancements, and a one-year term
for resisting an officer. At the prosecution’s request, the court ordered “all
victim restitution to the victim’s family and the Victim Compensation Board
. . . as previously ordered.” The court also awarded 250 days of actual
custody credits, the original amount awarded in 2010, after Begley’s counsel
incorrectly indicated it was not the court’s duty to update them.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Begley’s Counsel Did Not Render Ineffective Assistance by Failing
to Seek the Dismissal of Enhancements Under Section 1385.
Begley claims that his counsel below provided ineffective assistance by
not asking the trial court to strike any of the weapon or GBI enhancements
under section 1385, as amended by Senate Bill No. 81. We are not
persuaded.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must demonstrate “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” such that

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“counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ [constitutionally] guaranteed,”
and “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th
659, 674.) Thus, a defendant must show both that (1) “counsel’s performance
. . . fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms” and (2) there is “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).)
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “defer[]
to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel
acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Mai,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed
for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
(2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Ibid.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 amended section 1385 to
add subdivision (c), which provides that a trial court “shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal
of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1); People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92.) The statute lists
several mitigating circumstances that, if established, “weigh[] greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) One
such circumstance is that “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single
case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall
be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).)

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Begley claims that since the multiple-enhancement mitigating
circumstance clearly existed in this case, “there could be no conceivable
strategic or tactical reason” for his counsel not to ask the trial court to “strike
four of the five deadly weapon and [GBI] enhancements” under section 1385.
He argues that there is a reasonable probability the court would have done
so, because dismissing the enhancements would not endanger public safety
given that he is sentenced to LWOP and has “no prospect of ever being
released.” The Attorney General responds that counsel could have
reasonably decided to focus on her ultimately successful strategy of reducing
the three upper-term sentences.
We agree with the Attorney General that Begley’s counsel could have
had a rational tactical purpose for not seeking to dismiss any enhancements
under amended section 1385. (See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) Even
if we accept Begley’s position that dismissal of all but one enhancement
would not endanger public safety, the trial court was not thereby required to
determine that dismissal was in the interest of justice. As our state Supreme
Court has explained, even “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety, a [trial] court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements” if it “finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing
factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the
mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’ ” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029.)
Here, section 1172.75 precluded the court from resentencing Begley to a
determinate term any higher than the original six years—which he already
served. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d) [cannot impose longer sentence at
resentencing]; People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085
[determinate term served before indeterminate term].) Under these

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circumstances, counsel could have reasonably believed that the court was
unlikely to strike enhancements “in the furtherance of justice” where they
could have no practical effect on Begley’s sentence. In short, Begley fails to
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient under prevailing
professional norms, and we therefore reject his claim.
B. The Restitution Fine and Other Charges Not Imposed at
Resentencing Must Be Stricken from the Abstracts of Judgment.
In his opening brief, Begley claims that the $10,000 restitution fine
under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) (section 1202.4(b)), and accompanying
suspended $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45
reflected on the abstracts of judgment and resentencing minute order must
be stricken, because the trial court did not reimpose these fines. The
Attorney General responds that the court reordered all restitution previously
imposed.
In a supplemental brief, Begley also argues that the restitution fine
imposed at the original sentencing must be vacated under section 1465.9,
subdivision (d) (section 1465.9(d)), enacted by Assembly Bill No. 1186, which
provides that any portion of a restitution fine under section 1202.4 that is not
paid within 10 years of being imposed must be vacated. The Attorney
General agrees the fine must be vacated under this law.
We conclude that the restitution fine and parole revocation restitution
fine were not reimposed at the resentencing. Furthermore, although Begley
does not raise the issue, both the determinate and indeterminate abstracts of
judgment reflect two other fees the trial court also did not impose. We
therefore order the resentencing minute order corrected to reflect the court’s
oral pronouncement and the unimposed fines and fees stricken from both
abstracts.

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Absent “compelling and extraordinary reasons” for not doing so, a
sentencing court must impose a restitution fine between $300 and $10,000 in
every case where a defendant is convicted of a felony. (§ 1202.4, subds. (b),
(c).) Where, as here, the defendant’s “sentence includes a period of parole,”
the court must also “assess an additional parole revocation restitution fine in
the same amount as that imposed” under section 1202.4(b). (§ 1202.45,
subd. (a); see People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 484 [parole revocation
restitution fine appropriate in any case where determinate term imposed,
even if defendant also sentenced to death].)
Effective January 1, 2025, about 10 months after Begley was
resentenced, Assembly Bill No. 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1) amended
section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d) of the statute. Section 1465.9(d)
provides, “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a
restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any
collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a
judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”
As noted above, in resentencing Begley the trial court ordered “all
victim restitution to the victim’s family and [the Board] . . . as previously
ordered.” The accompanying minute order states, “All previous fines, fees[,]
and restitution orders remain in effect.” We disagree with the Attorney
General that the court thus imposed a restitution fine under
section 1202.4(b). The restitution ordered to Sakashita’s wife and the Board
was direct restitution under section 1202.4, subdivision (f), not a restitution
fine. And although the minute order states that all fines and restitution
orders remained in effect, the court did not say that at the hearing.
Thus, no restitution fine or parole revocation restitution fine was
imposed at resentencing, and both must be stricken from the determinate

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and indeterminate abstracts of judgment.5 (People v. Clark (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 248, 260–261.) Although Begley does not raise the issue, for
the same reason both abstracts of judgment must also be corrected to remove
a $30 court security fee under section 1465.8 and a $30 criminal conviction
assessment under Government Code section 70373 that the court did not
impose. Finally, we order the resentencing minute order corrected to reflect
that only the orders of direct restitution remain in effect.
C. A Remand Is Required to Update Begley’s Actual Custody Credits.
Finally, Begley claims, and the Attorney General concedes, that the
trial court was required to award actual custody credits as of the
resentencing date. We agree with the parties that a remand is required to
address this issue.
Under section 2900.1, “[w]here a defendant has served any portion of
[the] sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment
is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of
imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence [the
defendant] may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or
acts.” This provision requires a sentencing court to “recalculate and credit
against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already
served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since [the defendant]
was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.”6 (People v.

5 Even if the trial court had imposed the restitution fine and parole

revocation restitution fine at resentencing, the practical result would be the
same. The restitution fine was originally imposed well over 10 years ago,
meaning it would have to be vacated under section 1465.9(d). In turn, the
parole revocation restitution fine would also have to be vacated, as it can only
be imposed with a restitution fine of the same amount. (§ 1202.45, subd. (a).)
6 The calculation of post-sentence conduct credits remains the

responsibility of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (People v.

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Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29, 37.) Thus, a remand is required for the
trial court to recalculate Begley’s actual custody credits.
III.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to recalculate actual custody
credits to include the credits Begley accrued after his original sentencing.
The court shall also (1) amend the March 6, 2024 minute order to state that
“All previous orders for direct restitution remain in effect”; (2) amend the
determinate and indeterminate abstracts of judgment to omit the $10,000
fines under Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 and the $30 fees under
Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code 70373; and (3) send
certified copies of the amended abstracts to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397.) Begley is not eligible for conduct
credits due to his murder conviction. (See § 2933.2.)

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_________________________
Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

People v. Begley A170305

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