In re F.W. CA2/3

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Filed 10/17/25 In re F.W. CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re F.W., a Person Coming Under the B340312
Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03924)
FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIELLE W.,

Defendant and Appellant;

JUSTIN S.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Linda Sun, Judge. Affirmed.
Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Senior Deputy County
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Respondent Justin S.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Danielle W. (mother) challenges orders of the juvenile court
sustaining a dependency petition as to her daughter, F.,
removing F. from mother’s custody, and placing F. with her
biological father, Justin S. (father). We find no error, and thus
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Detention and petition.
Mother and father are the parents of F., who was born in
June 2021. When this case began, mother and F. were living in a
shelter in Los Angeles, and father was living in San Diego.
In October 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
that mother was mentally ill and was neglecting F. A shelter
case manager told a DCFS social worker that mother “tend[ed] to
go off on paranoia tangents that someone is watching her or is
out to get her.” Mother said that she had moved to Los Angeles
four years earlier at the insistence of maternal grandfather and
another man, Jason, with the involvement of the CIA. Mother
acknowledged that the maternal grandfather was dead, but she

2
believed he was still working undercover for a government
agency. Mother had lived with her family in Utah before coming
to Los Angeles, but said she was not currently in contact with
them because everyone in her family had “undercover jobs she
doesn’t know about.” She claimed to see her deceased father and
siblings who lived out-of-state driving around Los Angeles.
Mother said that people she knew talked to her in her head.
She denied that the voices she heard ever told her to hurt F., but
she believed the voices told F. to hurt herself. Mother
acknowledged having a family history of schizophrenia, but said
schizophrenia was “ ‘a disease created by the government to fuck
with people,’ ” not a “ ‘real illness.’ ”
Mother said she had had therapy many times, most
recently four years earlier. She had never stayed in therapy long
enough to receive a formal diagnosis. Mother said “ ‘they’ ” were
trying to diagnose F. with autism, and other children in the
complex were teaching F. bad things because they gave F. hugs.
Several members of mother’s extended family said there
was a family history of schizophrenia, and mother had
experienced significant trauma, including childhood sexual
abuse. Mother’s siblings expressed concern about F.’s safety in
mother’s care.
Mother’s case manager said mother previously had been
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. The case
manager believed mother took good care of F., but that F. was
very isolated because mother believed the CIA would kidnap F. if
she were placed in childcare.
Mother’s former therapist said mother had had prolonged
periods of psychosis and suffered from schizophrenia or
schizoaffective disorder.

3
In November 2023, DCFS filed a petition alleging that
mother suffered from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and
delusional and irrational thought processes, for which mother
had not sought treatment and which rendered her unable to
safely care for F. DCFS recommended that F. remain in mother’s
care with family preservation services.
At a December 2023 detention hearing, mother for the first
time identified father as F.’s biological father. The court found a
prima facie case that F. was a child described by Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b), and it ordered F.
released to mother with family preservation services.
II. Jurisdiction.
In January 2024,2 mother reported having called the
suicide hotline once when she lived in Texas, but said she had
never tried to hurt herself. She said she would like to kill the
people who were trafficking her and F., and she identified those
people as the police, the government, the FBI, and St. Joseph’s
Medical Center. Mother said that at her last meeting at
St. Joseph’s Medical Center, she had been told she needed to get
a babysitter, which she took to mean the hospital wanted to
traffic F. She believed F. had been molested and that “someone”
was trying to sell her.
Mother acknowledged that hearing people talking to her in
her head sounded crazy, but said she “underst[ood] how this can
happen” after a friend “explained FBI technology.” Mother said

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2 All subsequent events occurred in 2024 unless otherwise
indicated.

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the voices sometimes said, “ ‘It’s time,’ ” which she understood to
mean that “ ‘it’s time for her to have sex with the person next to
her’ and that this is how she is being trafficked.” Mother said
that when she came to California from Texas, the songs on the
radio told her, “ ‘You belong in Hollywood. You are a super
assassin. We have a job for you.’ ” Mother also said she couldn’t
go anywhere because she was doing scenes for a movie, and that
“ ‘Whoever is harming F[.] must be doing it to other children and
must be stopped.”
Mother reported that her friend Jason had “sent her a
message through her head instructing her to have sexual
relations with [father],” and thus the sex had not been consensual
even though it appeared to be. Mother believed father worked
undercover for the government and had deliberately failed to
wear a condom so she would get pregnant. Mother also believed
that Jason and maternal grandmother were capturing her sex life
through her head and were trying to make a movie about her sex
life without her consent. She said her father was pretending to
be dead and had a fake funeral, but that she saw her father and
Jason “driving around checking up on her.”
Based on the foregoing, DCFS opined that although there
was no indication that mother’s auditory hallucinations had
instructed her to harm F., mother “admitted to engaging in
sexual activity against her wishes because the voices told her to,”
and thus “[t]he possibility of mother engaging in conduct that is
risky, harmful or detrimental to F[.] at the command of the voices
exists.” Further, mother’s “non-compliance with mental health
services and psychotropic medication coupled with her chronic
homelessness not only limit her ability to parent F[.] but also her
ability to provide a stable and nurturing home environment in

5
which F[.] could thrive.” DCFS thus recommended that the
petition be sustained and mother be provided with family
maintenance services.
Mother underwent a psychiatric evaluation in late
January. The evaluating psychiatrist said mother reported
hearing voices that told her to hurt F., but said she had never
done so. The psychiatrist believed that F. was at risk in mother’s
care, and he urged DCFS to step in until mother was on
medication and stable. The same day, the psychiatrist placed
mother on a psychiatric hold, and F. was detained and placed in
foster care.
The social worker obtained a contact number for father and
spoke to him in January. Father said he and mother met during
the summer of 2020 and had a few sexual encounters over several
days. A few weeks later, mother contacted him and said she was
pregnant and that either father or another man was the father of
the unborn child. Father said he had no further contact with
mother and had never met F. Father clarified that he was not
trying to avoid responsibility if F. was his child, but could not
assume paternity without a DNA test.
Father subsequently shared with the social worker two text
threads between himself and mother. The November 2020
thread was as follows:
“[Mother:] Bad news. I’m pregnant. I don’t know for sure
if it’s yours it might be this other guy[’]s. To avoid all the drama
and shit that goes into finding out, I just want to have an
abortion. I’m completely broke . . . . Other dude is refusing to
help or even speak to me. If there’s any way you can send me a
Venmo, that would be great[ly] appreciated. Plan C is [$]240 if I
get it fast, or [$]120 if I take a little longer.”

6
“[Mother:] I’m just estimating your 18 years of child
support and it came out to $216,000. [¶] You can get out now for
a one time fee of $120[.] [¶] Think about it.”
“[Father:] If you legit needed some help [I] would have
been willing to help you. This is not how you do it.”
“[Mother:] I’m not trying to do crap to you but you did
ignore me and you have no idea what I’ve been through over the
last two weeks if you were puking your guts out you might lose
patience and get a little mean as well. [¶] And that is what it
took for you to respond to me so I don’t really feel that bad about
it. [¶] I already apologize[d] for being rude and honestly that’s
the least of our problems with this. [¶] I truly am sorry.”
“[Father:] I’m done here. Contact me when you have the
test.”
“[Mother:] You know [w]hat just don’t worry about it[.] I’ll
hit you up at nine months if the baby turns out to be brown.”
Mother and father exchanged additional texts in March
2021, as follows:
“[Father:] I’m only focused on trying to do what’s in the
best interest of a child who is potentially mine. There is no sense
in making this worse. I don’t care if you feel nothing for me, I
understand and have accepted that possible reality. My interest
here is purely for the confirmation of and wellbeing associated
regarding a child that I may share with you. This is a serious
matter for me, I’m only asking for your continued cooperation.
[¶] Have you been able to confirm whether it is a he/she? [¶] I’m
at peace with you Danielle, just asking you to cooperate with me.”
“[Mother:] I am disinclined to acquiesce to your request[.]
[¶] It’s a girl[.] [¶] You’re a little late to this party to be asking

7
me for shit[.] [¶] The only reason there’s not a paternity test
already is because you weren’t around[.]”
“[Father:] Understand, I am happy. [¶] Did you test the
other guy you mentioned? . . . [¶] I don’t hate you nor am I
angry. More caught off guard than anything. [¶] In the event
this is a child I . . . share with you, I will be a part of her life. [¶]
All I’m asking is just to confirm it for sure[ ] without you making
it hard for me to be in her life and I will be there.”
“[Mother:] I don’t agree to anything. [¶] You were not in
the picture this morning. I have no idea how your actions will be
in the future. You will not get my cooperation by asking for it.
[¶] Make arrangements for your paternity test and I will show
up.
“[Father:] Danielle, please understand. I’m here in an
honest effort to make this work with you. That is my intent. [¶]
Again, I don’t intend to leave a child of mine behind. [¶] That is
not who I am.”
On January 24, father appeared at the detention hearing
and requested a DNA test and visitation pending the DNA test
results. Through counsel, mother requested that F. be released
to her care at the conclusion of her psychiatric hold. Minor’s
counsel and DCFS requested that F. remain detained from
mother.
The court found that it would be contrary to F.’s welfare to
remain in mother’s care. It thus ordered F. detained in foster
care, ordered paternity testing, denied father’s request for visits
pending receipt of the results of the paternity test, and granted
mother monitored visits.
In February, it was reported that F. engaged in many
concerning behaviors. Specifically, F. hit herself in the face when

8
upset; ate sand and small rocks; seldom exhibited social smiles;
had a flat affect; appeared distressed during transitions or when
in noisy places; held her lips open with her tongue protruding
most of the time; did not play with other children; did not
understand verbal instructions; did not engage in age-
appropriate play; and exhibited distress if her caregiver was out
of sight. F. was diagnosed with an auditory processing disorder
and with gross motor, problem solving, and social delays. It was
recommended that F. be enrolled in preschool and receive early
childhood mental health supportive services.
F. was also determined to have significant dental decay
over most of her teeth. A pediatric dentist said F. needed to have
her four front teeth removed and cavities filled in other teeth.
She would also need a dental bridge after her front teeth were
removed.
Mother and F. had a monitored visit in early February.
When the monitor first arrived, F. clung to her caregiver and
cried for about 20 minutes. F. did not display any emotion when
she saw mother, but became warmer toward her as the visit
progressed. F. cried when the visit was over. F. appeared to
have no emotional reaction the next time she saw mother, and
she did not seem upset when it was time to leave.
In February 2024, mother disclosed that since her
discharge from the psychiatric hospital, she continued to hear
voices, including one voice telling her to hurt F. Mother
emphasized that she loved F., had no control over what the voices
said to her, and would never act on an instruction to hurt F.
Mother attributed the voices to “ ‘government technology.’ ”
Mother also insisted that there were voices in F.’s head. Mother

9
said: “ ‘I can’t get them to listen to me or shut up when I tell
them to. Whoever is doing this is not going to stop.’ ”
In April, results of DNA testing indicated that father was
F.’s biological father.
Mother underwent a second psychiatric evaluation in April.
Mother told the psychiatrist that she did not believe she had
schizophrenia, which she described as a “poison by the
government for entertainment,” and that she had been prescribed
an antipsychotic medication but refused to take it because she
didn’t want to gain weight. The psychiatrist diagnosed mother
with schizophrenia and described her as actively psychotic with
command auditory hallucinations and complex paranoid
delusions. The psychiatrist opined that mother’s “severe
untreated psychotic symptoms interfere with her ability to parent
her young child” and that mother “has no insight into her
diagnosis and refuses medications to treat her psychosis.” The
psychiatrist recommended antipsychotic medication, preferably
by injection; and opined that “[a] minimum of six months of
continuous treatment is necessary before reevaluation to assess
her mental state stability, compliance, and insight into her
disorder and her attitude toward medications.”
The juvenile court sustained the dependency petition in
April, finding: “Mother’s mental health condition has been
adequately reported by two doctors who expressed grave concerns
over the mother’s ability to care for the child. We don’t need . . .
to have proof that the mother has actually harmed the child due
to her . . . auditory hallucinations. [¶] There is a . . . future risk
of harm to the child in that both of these doctors reported that
the mother has an active and fluid psychosis.” Father was

10
deemed F.’s biological father and was granted monitored visits
with F.
III. Disposition.
DCFS assessed father’s home in May and determined it to
be appropriate. The same month, father took the train from
San Diego to Los Angeles and had a monitored visit with F. The
social worker reported that father greeted F. with a hug and kiss,
and the two drew on the sidewalk with chalk. F. reportedly was
very comfortable with father, asked him a lot of questions,
followed his directions, and “planted herself on father’s lap” when
he sat on the grass. F. called father “ ‘Daddy’ ” and got upset
when father did not pay attention to her for a couple of minutes
because he was speaking to the social worker. Father said he
was happy to be in F.’s life and would add F. to his medical
coverage so she could get appropriate dental care.
Father denied that his sexual contact with mother had
been nonconsensual, as she alleged. After an investigation,
DCFS assessed that mother’s allegation that F. was conceived as
the result of nonconsensual sexual intercourse was “not
supported by the investigative findings and appear[ed] to be a
byproduct of her untreated mental illness”—namely, mother’s
belief that voices in her head had instructed her to have sexual
relations with father. It recommended that F. be released to
father with family maintenance services, and that mother receive
family reunification services.
Father had a second three-hour monitored visit with F. in
June. Father had brought coloring supplies, and he and F.
colored, played on playground equipment, and ate lunch together.
F. reportedly responded well to father.

11
Mother reported being in compliance with her medication
regimen, but the social worker believed it was not benefiting
mother because she continued to talk about the FBI and
government conspiracies.
On June 14, 2024, F. had an overnight visit with father at
his home. At the beginning of the visit, father carried F. inside,
and F. seemed comfortable with father. The next day, F. cried
when it was time to leave father and said, “ ‘I don’t want to go.’ ”
Father responded appropriately.
At the June 2025 disposition hearing, father’s counsel’s
argued that father had openly held himself out as F.’s father once
he received the results of the paternity test and thereafter
received F. into his home. Further, a parental relationship had
developed between father and daughter in the short time
available to them. Father’s counsel thus asked that father be
deemed the presumed father. DCFS and minor’s counsel agreed,
urging that father had held himself out as F.’s father, received
her into his home, and made efforts to enroll her in services and
provide for her medically. Mother counsel objected to giving
father presumed or quasi-presumed parent status, urging that
father had not demonstrated a full commitment to parental
responsibilities and had not been prevented from doing so.
The juvenile court adopted the arguments of minor’s
counsel, father’s counsel, and DCFS, finding that father had
demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities,
including meeting F.’s special needs, once he was determined to
be her biological father. Further, father had been thwarted from
developing a relationship with F. because mother had not made
F. available for DNA testing. The court also found that F. was
bonded with father, cried when the visits were over, and looked to

12
father for support. Finally, the court rejected mother’s claim that
her sexual encounters with father were not voluntary. The court
thus deemed father a presumed and Kelsey S. father.3
With regard to disposition, the court found that removal of
F. from mother was necessary because there was clear and
convincing evidence that F. would be in substantial danger in
mother’s care. Specifically, the court noted that as recently as
June 10, mother had disclosed auditory hallucinations that
directed her to harm F. The court further found that father was
a previously noncustodial father who wished to have F. placed
with him, and placement of F. with father would not be
detrimental to her physical or emotional well-being.
Alternatively, the court found that placing F. with father was in
her best interests. The court thus released F. to father under
court supervision. The court ordered mother to complete a
parenting class, participate in individual counseling, take all
prescribed medications, and drug test upon reasonable suspicion
of drug use, and it ordered father to participate in a National
Alliance of Mental Illness family program and attend to all of F.’s
needs. Mother was granted twice-weekly monitored visits with F.
On July 12, the case was transferred to San Diego County,
where father resided.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends: (1) substantial evidence does not support
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings; (2) the juvenile court
abused its discretion by removing F. from mother’s custody; and
(3) the juvenile court erred by placing F. with father because he

3 Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.).

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was not a presumed or quasi-presumed father and, as a mere
biological father, he was not entitled to physical custody.
Mother’s contentions lack merit, as we discuss.
I. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings.
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D) provides that a child is
within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction if, among other things,
“[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of
. . . [t]he inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular
care for the child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness.”
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw
all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record
in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Mother contends that “[h]arm to the child cannot be
presumed from the mere fact of mental illness of the parent” (In
re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 540), and DCFS failed to
present evidence tying her mental illness to a substantial risk of
harm to F. We do not agree. As an initial matter, there was
substantial evidence that mother had severely neglected F. prior
to her detention: Specifically, mother had not recognized or
sought help for F.’s developmental delays or for her serious tooth
decay, which required extractions, fillings, and a dental bridge.

14
There was, moreover, substantial evidence that mother’s
untreated schizophrenia put F. at substantial risk of serious
future harm. Mother admitted hearing voices that instructed her
to hurt F., and although mother had never acted on those
instructions, she acknowledged having done other things against
her will at the direction of the voices, including having sex with a
variety of men. Further, mother’s siblings and two psychiatrists
expressed concern about F.’s safety in mother’s care. The first
psychiatrist opined that F. was not safe in mother’s care because
of mother’s active delusions, and the second opined that mother’s
“severe untreated psychotic symptoms interfere with her ability
to parent her young child.” The juvenile court was entitled to
rely on the opinions of these experts in finding that F. had
suffered, and was likely to continue to suffer, serious harm in
mother’s care as a result of mother’s untreated mental illness.
The present case is distinguishable from In re James R.
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129 (James R.), overruled on other
grounds by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628, 624, on which
mother relies. In James R., the juvenile court sustained a
petition alleging that three young siblings were at risk of harm
after their mother, who had a history of suicide attempts, was
hospitalized for consuming alcohol and taking prescription
ibuprofen. (Id. at pp. 131–132.) The Court of Appeal reversed,
noting that although the mother had a history of mental
instability, she did not have a diagnosed psychiatric illness, had
never abused or neglected the children, and lived with the
children’s father, who was protective. Further, the parents had
support from extended family who assisted with childcare. (Id. at
pp. 132–137.) On this record, the court concluded that “[t]here
was no evidence of a specific, defined risk of harm to the minors

15
resulting from [the mother’s] mental illness or substance abuse,
and no evidence [the father] did not or could not protect them.”
(Id. at p. 137.)
Here, in contrast to James R., mother had been diagnosed
with schizophrenia, which rendered her unable to distinguish
hallucinations from reality. Her hallucinations actively
interfered with her ability to parent F.: She insisted F. was not
on the autism spectrum, did not allow F. to socialize with other
children, was fearful of allowing F. to receive medical care, and
heard voices that she believed were instructing her to harm F.
Moreover, mother did not live with another adult who could
protect F., and she did not have support from her extended
family. Finally, mother did not accept her diagnosis and was
reluctant to take medication to control her psychosis. Unlike in
James R., therefore, mother’s mental illness in this case created a
“specific, defined risk of harm” to F. (James R., supra,
176 Cal.App.4th at p. 137.)
II. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
removal finding.
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides that a child shall
not be taken from the parents’ physical custody unless the
juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here
is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the
minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical
custody.” The court “shall make a determination as to whether
reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need
for removal of the minor from their home” and “shall state the

16
facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.” (§ 361,
subd. (e).)
We review a dispositional order removing a child from a
parent for substantial evidence, “ ‘ “keeping in mind that the trial
court was required to make its order based on the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence.” ’ (In re I.R. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.)” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944,
960.) In applying this standard of review, “ ‘the question before
the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.]
We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Ibid.)
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
removing F. from her care because she was cooperating with
service providers, including DCFS, an in-home counselor, the
Salvation Army case manager, and the medication management
team. We do not agree. In October 2023, mother refused to
participate in Project Safe, an early intervention child abuse
prevention program, or to drug test unless required to do so by a
court. Mother was reluctant to get medical care for F. because
she believed the health center wanted to sexually traffic F., and
she had not sought treatment for her schizophrenia because she
did not think schizophrenia was a “ ‘real illness.’ ” Further,
mother heard voices she believed were instructing her to harm F.,
both before and after she began taking antipsychotic medication.
And, two psychiatrists opined that mother should not be alone

17
with F. until she was stabilized on medication. On this record,
the juvenile court was well within its discretion in finding by
clear and convincing evidence that F. was in substantial danger
in mother’s care and could not be protected without removal.
III. The juvenile court did not err by deeming father a
Kelsey F. father and placing F. in his care.
Mother contends that the trial court erred by placing F.
with father because (1) he was not a presumed or quasi-presumed
father, and therefore he was not entitled to custody under
section 361.2, and (2) it was not in F.’s best interests to be placed
with father. These contentions lack merit, as we discuss.
A. The juvenile court did not err by deeming
father a quasi-presumed parent entitled to
custody under section 361.2.
Section 361.2, subdivision (a) provides: “If a court orders
removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first
determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the
child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions
arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300,
who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent
requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent
unless it finds that placement with that parent would be
detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.”
A presumed or quasi-presumed father—but not a biological
or alleged father—is a “parent” within the meaning of
section 361.2. (In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 437; In re
Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451.) A presumed father is one
who, among other things, “receives the child into his home and

18
holds himself out as the child’s father.” (In re Jayden G. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 301, 309; In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793,
801–802.) A quasi-presumed or Kelsey S. father (see Adoption of
Baby Boy W. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 438, 442) is one who has
been thwarted by the mother or a third party from obtaining
presumed parent status, but “ ‘promptly comes forward and
demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities—
emotional, financial, and otherwise.’ ” (M.M. v. D.V. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 733, 743.) A biological father “is one whose
paternity of the child has been established but who has not
qualified as the child’s presumed father.” (In re Jayden G., at
p. 309.) And, an alleged father is a man who may be the father of
the child but who has not established biological paternity or
presumed father status. (In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202,
1209.)
A man who claims presumed or quasi-presumed father
status has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence the facts supporting his claims. (In re E.T., supra,
217 Cal.App.4th at p. 437; In re T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1210.) On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s finding for
substantial evidence. (County of Orange v. Cole (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 504, 509.)
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by deeming
father a quasi-presumed father entitled to custody under
section 361.2 because he did not support mother and F. as soon as
he learned mother was pregnant. We do not agree.
Although quasi-presumed father status requires a father to
“promptly come[ ] forward and demonstrate[ ] a full commitment
to his parental responsibilities” (Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at
p. 849), courts have held that in some cases in which the identity

19
of a child’s father is in question, a man may be a quasi-presumed
father if he promptly assumes parental responsibilities as soon as
his biological paternity is confirmed. In In re Julia U. (1998)
64 Cal.App.4th 532 (Julia U.), for example, a biological father did
not assert his parentage as soon as he learned of the mother’s
pregnancy, but he did so as soon as it was confirmed through
DNA testing that he was the child’s father. Under these
circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court
erred by terminating parental rights without allowing the
biological father the opportunity to seek presumed father status
and an opportunity to reunify. (Id. at p. 544.) The court
explained: “The record indicates [the biological father] had no
more than a casual relationship with [the mother] and they had
sexual intercourse only twice. Before becoming pregnant with
Julia, [the mother] was engaging in multiple acts of sexual
intercourse with varying persons. She named three males as
Julia’s alleged father. Based on [the mother’s] promiscuity and
[the biological father’s] casual relationship with her, the evidence
is weak that he had reason to expect his sexual activity with [the
mother] would result in her pregnancy. According to [the
biological father], he did know [the mother] was pregnant, but
believed the father was [another man].” (Id. at p. 541.) Further,
from the biological father’s initial contact with child protective
services, he expressed his desire to establish a relationship with
the child if the paternity test showed he was her biological father.
(Id. at pp. 541–542.) Under these circumstances, the juvenile
court erred by refusing to allow the biological father to prove his
presumed father status. (Id. at p. 544.)
The present case is analogous to Julia U. As in that case,
father’s uncertainty that F. was his child was reasonable: Father

20
spent just two days with mother, and mother told father that F.
“might be this other guy[’]s” when she told him she was pregnant.
Father immediately asked mother to have a paternity test and
said he would “be a part of [F.’s] life” if testing revealed he was
the father. Further, as in Julia U., father appeared in court as
soon as he learned F. had been detained and asked the juvenile
court to order a paternity test. Additionally, father requested
visitation with F. pending receipt of the results of the test and, as
soon as he was permitted to do so, he submitted to an assessment
of his home, traveled to Los Angeles from San Diego for
monitored visits with F., had an unmonitored overnight visit with
her in his home, and requested custody of F. He then agreed to
add F. to his medical insurance and accepted full custody of her.
The juvenile court thus was within its discretion to deem father a
quasi-presumed father.4
The present case is distinguishable from In re D.S. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1238, on which mother relies. There, the mother
and biological father met when mother was 19 years old and the
biological father was 45 years old. The mother had just been
released from jail and needed a place to stay, so she moved in
with the biological father and began prostituting herself at his
request. The biological father subsequently was arrested and
remained incarcerated throughout the mother’s pregnancy and
the child’s birth. (Id. at pp. 1240–1241.) During that time,
mother moved in with a another man, whom she married and
who was present at the child’s birth. (Ibid.) After the biological
father’s release from prison, he attempted (unsuccessfully) to file

4 Having so concluded, we need not consider whether father
is also a statutory presumed father under Family Code
section 7611.

21
a parentage action, but he had limited contact with the child and
contributed only $120 towards the child’s support. (Id. at
p. 1241.) Approximately 18 months later, a juvenile dependency
petition was filed, and the biological father and the child’s
stepfather both sought presumed father status. (Id. at p. 1243.)
The Court of Appeal found that as a matter of law, the biological
father was not a presumed father because he had not “ ‘done all
that . . . he could have done’ ” to support the child: He provided
the child with only minimal financial support, threatened one of
the child’s caregivers, and did not vigorously assert his legal
rights until the dependency action was filed. (Ibid.) These
circumstances “preclude[d] a finding that [the biological father]
[was] a presumed father . . . under Kelsey S.” (Id. at p. 1246.)
The present case is distinguishable in significant ways from
In re D.S. There, although the biological father’s paternity was
never in doubt, he did not take meaningful steps to support the
child or to receive the child into his home. In the present case, in
contrast, father reasonably questioned whether he was F.’s
father, and once a DNA test established his paternity, he
immediately sought visitation and custody of F. Moreover, no
other man came forward in the present case to seek presumed
father status or to seek a role in F.’s life. In re D.S., thus, does
not preclude a finding that father is F.’s presumed father.
B. Alternatively, the juvenile court did not err by
concluding that placement with father was in
F.’s best interests.
In any event, even if father were not F.’s presumed or
quasi-presumed father, the juvenile court still had discretion to
place F. with him. Although a biological father who is not a
presumed or quasi-presumed father is not entitled to custody

22
under section 361.2 (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484,
1494), a juvenile court nonetheless has broad discretion pursuant
to section 362, subdivision (a), to issue “any and all reasonable
orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance,
and support of the child” (§ 362, subd. (a)). Under section 362,
subdivision (a), therefore, the juvenile court may order a child
placed with a biological parent if doing so is in the child’s best
interests. (See In re R.Q. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 462, 468–470
[juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by placing child with
“ ‘mere’ ” biological father; juvenile court had discretion to
determine placement was in child’s best interests because
biological father expressed interest in the child as soon as the
dependency proceedings began, appeared at most of the hearings,
participating in visits with child, and was attentive and loving
with child during visits].)
Mother contends that placing F. with father was not in F.’s
best interests because F. has some special needs, father was not
involved with F. during the first three years of her life, the court
had very little information about father’s relationship with his
other biological children, and father’s home is a distance from
mother’s, making it difficult for mother to reunify with F. While
these concerns are appropriately considered as part of a best-
interests analysis, that analysis is within the province of the
juvenile court, not the Court of Appeal, and the juvenile court’s
conclusion may not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
(In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1273; In re Baby
Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) Under the abuse of
discretion standard, “[w]e do not inquire whether substantial
evidence would have supported a different order, nor do we
reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the

23
juvenile court. [Citation.] We ask only whether the juvenile
court abused its discretion with respect to the order it made.”
(In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1195.)
We find no abuse of discretion here. The record before the
juvenile court reflects that father expressed interest in assuming
custody of F. as soon as he learned of DCFS’s involvement, and
he was loving and attentive to her during visits. F. was reported
to be comfortable with father during visits, calling him
“ ‘Daddy,’ ” seeking his attention, sitting on his lap, and crying
when visits were over. Father’s home was appropriate and safe
for F., and father was proactive in obtaining supplies for F. and
seeking out services to meet her special needs. On this record,
therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that placing F. with father was in her best interests.

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DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P.J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.

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