CourtListener 10705925•In re S.F. CA2/5
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Filed 10/17/25 In re S.F. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re S.F., a Person Coming B344123 c/w B344126
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 20LJJP00581A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jennifer W. Baronoff, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mother appeals from orders denying her petition under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 and terminating
parental rights over her fourth child (minor) pursuant to section
366.26.2 Mother contends it was error to find inapplicable the
parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights
under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Mother does not
make any legal argument for why the juvenile court erred in
summarily denying her petition to change a prior court order
under section 388. The Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) contends the court
did not err in finding an insufficiently substantial bond between
mother and minor to support a finding that any detriment
associated with breaking that bond was outweighed by the
benefit of permanency. The Department further contends that
mother has forfeited any contention of error as to the court’s
section 388 order by failing to raise any argument on appeal. We
agree with the Department, and therefore affirm the summary
denial of mother’s section 388 petition on January 31, 2025 and
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Minor’s father is not a party to the current appeal.
Mother filed two separate notices of appeal. Her appeal from the
termination of parental rights under section 366.26 is case
number B344123, and her appeal from the order denying
mother’s section 388 motion is case number B344126. On
May 29, 2025, this court granted mother’s motion to consolidate
the two cases, ordering that documents in case B3244126 would
be re-filed into lead case B344123 and all future filings would be
made in the lead case.
2
the termination of parental rights as to minor on February 10,
2025.
BACKGROUND
As a child, mother was involved in the foster care system.
She has four older children, born between 2007 and 2016, who
are half-siblings of minor; the oldest is over the age of 18, and
mother’s parental rights have been terminated as to the other
three. It is not necessary to provide extensive detail about the
earlier dependency proceedings involving minor’s half siblings.
We note, however, that mother was convicted of cruelty to a child
in July 2014, and in November 2014, a juvenile court sustained
allegations that mother physically abused a child, resulting in
facial swelling and lacerations to the child’s nose, shoulder, back,
and buttocks, resulting in the child’s hospitalization, and mother
pulled braided hair from the child’s scalp. In addition, in
September 2020, when the halfsibling closest in age to minor was
three years old, the dependency court sustained section 342
petition allegations that mother physically and emotionally
abused the child.3
Minor was born in July 2020, and a Department social
worker interviewed mother at the hospital on August 1, 2020, in
part because mother had previously denied being pregnant even
when asked directly, and there had been a domestic violence
incident at the home in March 2020 resulting in father’s arrest,
raising concerns about minor’s safety. In early September 2020,
3 A petition filed under section 342 involves new or
amended allegations raised in an ongoing dependency
proceeding.
3
the Department obtained a removal order for minor, based on
domestic violence between mother and father, allegations that
ultimately formed the basis for exercising dependency
jurisdiction over minor. The court denied reunification services
for mother under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11), and
(b)(12), based on the earlier dependency proceedings involving
mother’s older children.4 It also granted mother monitored
visitation for nine hours a week.
After a brief placement with Mrs. H for a little over a week
when minor was one-month-old, minor lived in the home of Mr.
and Mrs. T (the Ts) from September 2020 through February
2024. The Ts notified the Department in March 2022 that they
would not be adopting minor because they had decided to adopt
another child and could not provide permanency to two children.
In addition, the Ts had problems with minor having tantrums
and showing aggression towards other children in the home. The
Department investigated possible relative placements with a
4 The subdivisions the court relied on permit a juvenile
court to bypass reunification services when “the court ordered
termination of reunification services for any siblings or half
siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to
reunify with the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or half
sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian pursuant
to [s]ection 361 and that parent . . . has not subsequently made a
reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the
sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent or guardian,”
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A)) “the parental rights of a parent over
any sibling or half sibling of the child had been permanently
severed,” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11)(A)) and “the parent or guardian
of the child has been convicted of a violent felony.” (§ 361.5, subd.
(b)(12))
4
paternal aunt and maternal grandmother, but ultimately in
February 2024, minor was placed with Mrs. M, a foster mother
who was willing to provide permanency. Minor’s tantrum
behaviors initially escalated, and Mrs. M sought additional
supportive services in March 2024, but when services were
delayed in late June and early July, Mrs. M reported she no
longer wanted services.
Throughout most of minor’s life, mother has maintained
consistent weekly visitation for around three to four hours. On
several occasions, mother asked for additional visitation, and the
court ordered the Department to provide mother with three
weekly three-hour visits, but the frequency and length of visits
did not appear to change much. Mother consistently arrived on
time and prepared for visits, and was observed to interact
appropriately with minor, often spending time braiding his hair,
an interaction that mother described as part of her culture and as
time when minor could relax and open up to her. Describing
mother’s visits in an August 2024 report, the Department noted
that the visits “appear to be nurturing and positive,” but that
mother would only braid minor’s hair, watch him play, and watch
children’s programming with him on a tablet. Mother did not
bring educational or developmental books or toys. The
Department also noted that since minor’s initial detention in
September 2020, mother had shown little to no interest in
minor’s development, doctor’s appointments, or therapy. The
Department was most concerned that mother continued to be in
denial about the reasons why dependency jurisdiction had been
asserted over her older children and the factual background
behind her conviction and two-year incarceration for child
cruelty.
5
Over the course of the dependency case, mother filed four
different section 388 petitions seeking a change in court orders to
either return minor to her custody or reinstate reunification
services. She filed her first petition in August 2022, and the
Department filed a response a few weeks later, raising concerns
that mother was not being candid about her continued
relationship with father. After an evidentiary hearing on
November 10, 2022, at which mother testified, the court took the
matter under submission. The court later denied mother’s
petition, noting that circumstances had not changed from
disposition, when the court had ordered mother’s reunification
services bypassed. It explained that while mother had enrolled in
programs, she did not appear to have learned from the programs,
as she continued to deny any responsibility for the earlier
allegations of neglect, abuse, and child cruelty.
Mother filed her second section 388 petition in March 2024,
and a third petition in May 2024. The Department responded in
August 2024, recommending that minor remain with Mrs. M.
After hearing argument, the court denied both petitions, again
finding that mother’s participation in classes and counseling did
not constitute a change in circumstances, and she had not shown
that the requested relief would be in minor’s best interest.
In December 2024, more than four years after minor was
last in her custody, mother filed a fourth petition under section
388, once again seeking to change the court’s November 2021
order bypassing reunification services, and asking the court to
either place minor with mother or to order reunification services
and permit unmonitored visits between mother and minor.
Mother cited as changed circumstances that she continued to
have regular visits with minor, and now that minor was older, he
6
was expressing how much he loved his mom and wanted to live
with her. In addition, mother’s counselor, who had worked with
her for years, could provide a professional assessment of the work
mother had done. Mother alleged that the requested relief was in
minor’s best interest because she had maintained consistent
visitation and shown a pattern of regular and appropriate
parenting during visits, and based on recent information she did
not present a risk of harm to minor. On January 31, 2025, the
juvenile court denied mother’s petition without an evidentiary
hearing, again pointing out the severity of the prior allegations
against mother involving her older children. The court explained
that minor’s young age and the fact that he had been out of
mother’s custody for most of his life meant that mother’s
requested relief was not in minor’s best interests.
At a permanency planning hearing on February 10, 2025,
the court heard testimony and argument relating to the
termination of parental rights under section 366.26. Minor, who
was then four years old, testified in chambers. After asking some
preliminary questions, the court determined that minor knew the
difference between the truth and a lie, but his responses could be
difficult to decipher. Minor testified he knew who his mom was,
he loved her, he played with her at the mall, and he liked doing
that. He also liked when his mother did his hair. His mother
taught him the alphabet, but not numbers or colors. Mrs. M (who
minor referred to as “Gigi”) taught him colors. When mother’s
counsel asked minor how he felt when he didn’t get to see mother,
minor conveyed that he was happy when he saw her, but his
responses did not explain how he felt when he did not get to see
her. Minor’s responses also conveyed that he did not have an
accurate sense of how often he saw mother. On cross-
7
examination, minor testified that Mrs. M drops him off at school
and puts him to bed.
Mother testified she had four-hour weekly visits with minor
for the past two years, and that minor was always excited to see
her. Addressing the Department’s reports that she does minor’s
hair during visits, she explained it was culturally important.
When she did his hair, minor was comfortable and would open
up, talking to her about his day, and he loved the way he looked
afterwards. Mother described how she handled the situation if
minor had a tantrum or a toileting accident, redirecting him and
letting him know that he is loved. They both told each other all
the time that they love each other. Mother testified minor did
not like to leave her at the end of visits.
The Department argued that mother’s evidence did not
warrant application of the parental relationship exception under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The court emphasized
that minor had been out of mother’s custody for almost all of his
life, and that mother’s history minimized any benefit associated
with permitting the parent-child relationship to continue,
especially considering minor’s testimony that in his daily life, he
relies on Mrs. M. Minor’s counsel joined in the Department’s
argument that the parental relationship exception was not
applicable here, arguing that while there was a positive
attachment between mother and minor, the harm associated with
ending that relationship could be addressed with services, given
minor’s level of comfort with Mrs. M, and so it would be in
minor’s best interests to terminate parental rights. Mother’s
counsel asked the court to not terminate parental rights, but
instead to apply the parental relationship exception under In re
8
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) based on the
significant role mother played in minor’s life.
The juvenile court took judicial notice of the case file and
considered the Department’s reports before finding that no
exception to adoption applied to minor. The court applied the
Caden C. factors, finding mother had visited consistently, but
that the benefit minor derived from the relationship was limited,
and did not outweigh the benefit of adoption.
Mother timely appealed the court’s January 31, 2025 order
summarily denying her section 388 petition. She also timely
appealed the order terminating parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A. Mother’s Section 388 Petition
Mother does not make any legal argument for why the
juvenile court erred when it summarily denied her section 388
petition seeking to have minor placed with her or to have
unmonitored visits and reunification services reinstated. “The
juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is
appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error.’ ” (In re J.F.
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79.) A brief must contain reasoned
argument and legal authority to support its contentions or the
court may treat the claim as waived. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793;
Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836,
852.) Given the lack of any argument in mother’s brief regarding
the denial of her section 388 petition, we affirm the order.
9
B. Parental Relationship Exception
Mother contends the juvenile court improperly ignored the
substantial positive bond that existed between mother and minor
when it found inapplicable the parental relationship exception to
termination of parental rights. She argues that the parental
bond was sufficiently strong to provide a benefit to minor, and
that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that the
benefit of the parent-child bond was outweighed by the benefits of
permanency.
1. Relevant Law and Standard of Review
The express purpose of section 366.26 is “to provide stable,
permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)
If the juvenile court has decided to end reunification services,
adoption is the legislative preference. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)
“ ‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the
child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a
responsible caretaker.’ ” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45,
53.) Guardianship is a less preferable option, because it “ ‘falls
short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in
mind for the dependent child.’ ” (Ibid.)
Once it has been determined that a minor is adoptable, “the
court must order adoption and its necessary consequence,
termination of parental rights,” unless a parent can demonstrate
one of the exceptions set forth in section 366.26 applies. (In re
Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1);
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625.) The specified
circumstances in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) are
10
“actually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must
choose adoption where possible.” (In re Celine R., at p. 53.) They
“ ‘must be considered in view of the legislative preference for
adoption when reunification efforts have failed.’ [Citation.] At
this stage of the dependency proceedings, ‘it becomes inimical to
the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the
child in a permanent alternative home.’ [Citation.] The
statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.” (Ibid.; see In re A.L. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1131, 1150.)
The exception mother relies on here is the parental
relationship exception, which permits the selection of another
permanent plan if the “parents have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The parent has the burden of establishing this exception. (In re
A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153.) The exception requires a
parent to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the
parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the
child, “taking into account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2)
the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the
parent such that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship; and (3) terminating the relationship “would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The “language of this exception,
along with its history and place in the larger dependency scheme,
show that the exception applies in situations where a child
cannot be in a parent’s custody but where severing the child’s
11
relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the
benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child.”
(Id. at p. 630.) When the benefits of a stable, adoptive,
permanent home outweigh the harm the child would experience
from the loss of a continued parent-child relationship, the court
should order adoption. (Id. at pp. 633–634.) However, if
“ ‘severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive
the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such
that,’ even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home,
termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court should not
terminate parental rights. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 633.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the
parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the
child and the existence of a parental relationship for substantial
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) We
review the third step—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship
with his or her parent—for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.)
2. Analysis
The juvenile court found that mother met the first
requirement of maintaining consistent visits with minor, and
both, mother and the Department agree this ruling was correct.
On the second factor under Caden C., mother contends the trial
court erred in finding that the relationship between mother and
minor did not support a “substantial, positive, emotional
attachment” such that minor would benefit from continuing the
relationship with mother. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) Mother argues the court improperly minimized the
12
connection minor shared with mother and that she had been the
only constant in his life. She further argues the court erred by
focusing on the issues that led to the dependency and mother’s
inability to progress beyond monitored visits. The Caden C. court
explained that in determining whether a child has a positive
emotional attachment, courts must consider that “the
relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age
of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Id. at
p. 632; In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1183.) The issues
leading to dependency and a parent’s continued struggles “are
relevant only to the extent they inform the specific questions
before the court: would the child benefit from continuing the
relationship and be harmed, on balance, by losing it?” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 638; In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833,
853.)
According to the juvenile court’s minute order, the court
found that mother had not established a bond with minor. While
the court agreed with the Department’s position that mother had
not shown a substantial beneficial relationship, it also
acknowledged that minor knew who his mother was and enjoyed
spending time with her. The court concluded, however, that the
benefit to minor from that relationship was limited, in part
because mother continued to struggle with the issues leading to
the dependency. It also agreed with minor’s counsel that with
services in place, any detriment to minor could be overcome.
Even assuming for the sake of discussion that it was improper for
the court to consider mother’s earlier struggles in the dependency
context in evaluating whether the relationship between mother
13
and minor was substantial and beneficial, the overall factual
determination is multifaceted, ranging from “the specific features
of the child’s relationship with the parent and the harm that
would come from losing those specific features to a higher-level
conclusion of how harmful in total that loss would be. The court
must also determine, for the particular child, how a prospective
adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those
harms.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Considering the
record as a whole, we cannot say that the court’s finding was
unsupported by substantial evidence.
Finally, mother has not shown the court abused its
discretion in finding that the benefits of adoption outweighed any
detriment that minor might suffer from ending his relationship
with mother. As the court pointed out, then four-and-a-half-year-
old minor had not lived with mother ever, and had lived with
Mrs. M for a year. The reports and minor’s testimony
demonstrated that his relationship with Mrs. M and the benefits
of that relationship were strong, and that, with supportive
services, the benefits of permanency through adoption would
outweigh the benefit of preserving minor’s relationship with
mother.
14
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s January 31, 2025 order denying the
mother’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and
its February 10, 2025 order terminating parental rights under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 are both affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
I CONCUR:
KIM (D.), J.
15
In re S.F.
B344123
BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring
I agree the juvenile court’s orders should be affirmed
because there is no challenge to the juvenile court’s Welfare and
Institutions Code section 388 ruling and because the court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding the harm from severing
S.F.’s relationship with M.F. would not outweigh the benefit to
the child of placement in a new adoptive home (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 632).
BAKER, Acting P. J.
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