N.S. v. H.C. CA4/1

CourtListener 10705900CalctappOct 17, 2025

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Filed 10/17/25 N.S. v. H.C. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

N.S., D084798

Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 19FL012075E)

H.C.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Terrie E. Roberts, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
with directions.
Holstrom, Block & Parke and Ronald B. Funk; Law Office of Peter H.
Gold and Peter H. Gold for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
In this family court matter, N.S. (father) appeals a custody and
visitation order granting to him and mother, H.C., joint legal and physical
custody of their daughter, who was born in 2016 and their son, who was born
in 2018. Father contends the court erroneously (1) failed to protect his
fundamental constitutional right to raise the children in his Sikh faith;
(2) admitted hearsay evidence regarding the children’s haircut preferences;
and (3) denied his request for sole legal and physical custody of the children.
We affirm the court’s custody and visitation ruling, but reverse its ruling on
the children’s religious observances, and remand with directions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Background Information and Proceedings
In May 2022, following a trial on custody and visitation, the family
court (Judge Birchak) granted father sole physical custody of the children.
Except for granting father sole authority to initially determine their school
and primary medical providers, it granted the parties joint legal custody.
The court granted father’s motion to move the children from mother’s
Washington state residence to father’s San Diego residence. It ruled as to the
parents’ religious practices: “Neither parent has demonstrated any
detriment to the other parent exposing the children to their religious beliefs.
Therefore, each parent may involve the children in their religious practices
and beliefs. Neither parent may prohibit the other from doing so.”
In September 2022, following a grant of mother’s petition for a
temporary restraining order (TRO), the family court awarded mother sole
legal and physical custody of the children, and denied father visitation rights.
In October 2022, the family court amended the TRO and ordered joint
legal custody, with father having physical custody of the children.
In December 2023, the family court denied both parties’ requests for
restraining orders and set a trial date for the underlying postjudgment
motion to modify child custody and visitation, among other matters.

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The Parties’ Trial Briefs in the Underlying Proceeding
Father argued in his trial brief: “[Mother] has shown a complete
disregard for [his] raising the children in the tradition of his Sikh faith.
Bracelets the children wear as reminders of their faith, as well as the head
covering for their son, are discarded by [her] during their time with her, and
she insists upon cutting their hair exceedingly short, knowing that a tenet of
the Sikh faith is to leave hair uncut. The evidence will show that [mother]
refuses to communicate with [father] about amending the [telephone] call
schedule such that it will permit him to attend temple on Wednesdays.”
Father sought sole legal and physical custody under Family Code sections

3011 and 3020,1 “such that the children primarily reside in [his] home, with
visits with the mother every other weekend and one non-overnight visit each
midweek.”
Mother argued in her trial brief: “[Father] has repeatedly harassed
[her] with requests to not cut the children’s hair and leave their hair ‘uncut’
despite the children having haircuts beginning as early as [four] months old;
despite the children’s preference and standard to have their hair groomed to
their liking, hygiene, and social standards. There is no court order
prohibiting the children having their hair cut.” She recounted that in 2023,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. Section
3011 subdivision (a) lists several factors the court must consider in making a
determination of the best interests of the child in a proceeding. Section 3020,
subdivision (b) provides: “The Legislature finds and declares that it is the
public policy of this state to ensure that children have frequent and
continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or
dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encourage
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to
effect this policy, except when the contact would not be in the best interests of
the child[.]”
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father was arrested for domestic violence based on an incident in which he
came between their son and her. She claimed father harassed her by going to
the children’s jiu jitsu gym and video recording the owner while asking him if
mother is attending classes and demanding to know what days she is taking
the children there. She stated father has filed several civil suits against her
in both California and Washington. She asserted she has put “the children’s
best interests before her own by uprooting her life, her older children’s lives,
her career, friends and family to move to California to be a present parent for
the children that she loves deeply. [She] has taken [two] jobs and works the
week the children are in [father’s] home in order to be fully present for the
time the children are home in her care.” Mother requested “sole legal and
physical custody with alternating weekends and a weekday visit on opposing
weeks.”
Father’s Testimony
Father testified he practices the Sikh faith, whose primary tenets are
uncut hair from birth (kesh), as well as use of a bracelet (kara), a small comb
(kanga), undergarment (kacha) and a small dagger (kirpan). When their first
child was conceived, he and mother discussed raising her in the Sikh faith.
The children wear a bracelet “to remind you not to do wrong. To remind you
to practice the teachings of your faith and you put it on the hand that you do
stuff with. It’s sort of a symbolic chain that, hey, you’re being watched.” The
children had no objection to wearing the bracelets. The court admitted into
evidence various photos showing the children wearing the bracelets starting
from infancy.
Father testified that son started wearing a head covering, called a
patka, before he was two years old, and has continued doing so without
objections. Girls are not required to wear the patka. The children attend

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temple and are enrolled in temple classes to learn music. Father testified
that to ensure the bracelets did not hurt the children, he wrapped them with
athletic tape before they participated in sporting activities.
Father testified he never supported cutting the children’s hair, and it
was not until mother moved them to Washington that she started that
practice. He asked her not to do so, but she responded that the children
“want to look like their peers or their family.” Father added, “That means
she wants them to look White and act White.” Mother also claimed uncut
hair was “unhygienic or something to that extent. It’s not within societal
normals [sic].”
Father testified he and mother were together for five years, during
which she was essentially a nonpracticing Christian. He was unaware of
anything in the Christian faith requiring the children’s hair be cut. Father
asserted his religious faith and mother’s are not opposed, as “the kids can
have their hair uncut and when they’re old enough, they can make their own
choice. But . . . she could still practice her faith, whatever that is at this
point with the children and they could coexist.”
On father’s direct examination, father’s counsel asked, “Do you recall
[mother] sending a response to you indicating that you could practice your
faith on your time and she could practice her faith on her time?” He
answered in the affirmative. Counsel asked “how that would function if she
cut their hair on your time [sic] and it remains uncut on yours. Was that a
possibility to kind of coexist in that way?” Father replied, “No. It’s either cut
or uncut.”
On the topic of the children’s bracelets, father’s counsel asked him:
“When you sent the children [to mother’s home]—when you were realizing
they were not coming back with these bracelets, why did you send them with

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the bracelets?” Father replied, “So it’s against my faith to take them off. So
I’ve never insisted that she practice my faith, but since birth [the children]
had them on. And only as of the separation, in particular as of August
[2022], [mother] made it clear that she’s not going to allow them to wear
them.” Father said he “simply asked [the bracelets] be returned when the
children came back to me.” He claimed he never demanded the children keep
the bracelets on while in mother’s care.
Father was unsure but believed, based on photos he saw, that son did
not wear his patka while in mother’s care. After the son’s visits with her, she
returned the patkas only about 30 percent of the time.
Mother, who was self-represented, cross-examined father about the
consequences of the children’s hair having been cut:
“[Mother]: After someone’s hair has been cut, is it possible for it to go
back to being uncut?
“[Father]: You leave it.
“[The court]: You mean is it possible for it to grow back?
“[Mother]: No, I’m saying uncut hair—once the hair’s cut, it’s cut.
There’s no going back to uncut?
“[Father]: If you don’t cut it, it’s uncut. If you don’t cut it again, it’s
uncut.”
Mother cross-examined father about the age the children should be
before they can decide for themselves about their haircuts:
“[Mother]: When [our daughter] asks if she can cut her hair, sitting in
the haircut chair, if she can cut her hair to her shoulders like mine, like her
sisters, is she of age to make that decision?
“[Father]: No.

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“[Mother]: What I’m saying is what is the age she can make that
decision?
“[Father]: It’s not five. I can tell that.
“[Mother]: She’s not five, she’s seven.
“[Father]: Okay. When you started, which is a year ago, it’s not five
and it’s not three for my son.”
Mother’s Testimony
During mother’s testimony, without objection from father, the court
asked her, “[Did your son] ask for a crew-cut?” She replied: “[M]y
grandson . . . . [is] eight years old. My daughter has kept his hair very short
for his whole entire life. He’s never had long hair. And my son wanted to
look like—he said, ‘I want a haircut like [the grandson’s].’ ” The court asked
mother when she started cutting the children’s hair, and she replied when
son was around four months old, and daughter was around 13 months old.
Defense counsel asked mother on cross-examination: “When [father]
has asked you—well, we’ve seen in the record there are multiple requests.
What—other than responding to the children’s apparent or alleged desire to
have shorter hair, what consideration have you given to [father’s] faith in
making the decision to cut their hair?” Mother responded, “Like I said before,
I have never agreed to raise the children Sikh. And I started cutting their
hair back at a time where [father] wasn’t as present of a parent, and he
wasn’t even aware that I was cutting their hair.” Mother elaborated:
“[Father] was not. I mean, he wasn’t there. He wouldn’t have noticed their
hair a little bit shorter or whatever. He was coming and going months at a
time. He never said, ‘Do not cut the children’s hair’ at that time. He never
made that statement. [¶] We never had a discussion about this until after
the court proceedings started where he said, ‘I am now going to practice my

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Sikh faith, and the children’s hair needs to be uncut.’ Well, they’ve already
had a haircut, so that’s a moot point for their hair to stay uncut. Once it’s
cut, it can’t go back to uncut. That was kind of my point. Their hair has been
cut.”
Mother testified about the children’s bracelets in this colloquy:
“[Father’s counsel]: Are there any [bracelet] sets that you have not
returned [to father]?
“[Mother]: I’m sure—when the kids take them off, they usually put
them in a spot. But like I’ve asked [father], when they don’t wear them for a
week, I can’t always be responsible for where they go.
“[Father’s counsel]: So your testimony is if the kids want their hair cut,
they get their hair cut; correct? That’s your testimony?
“[Mother]: Yeah.
“[Father’s counsel]: If the kids take off their jewelry and it gets lost, so
be it. Is that your testimony?
“[Mother]: Not necessarily.
“[Father’s counsel]: What have you done to preserve these things? You
know they take them off. You know that [father’s] complaining that they’re
getting lost. What have you done to ensure that they go back to him, if
anything?
“[Mother]: . . . [W]hat I’ve asked to just completely reduce the conflict
is to do exactly what [father] did in the two years from 2020 to 2022. When
the kids flew down on the airplane, he took those [bracelets] and he kept
them with him. And then when he picked them up at the airport, he put
them back on the kids. There is not a single message in those two years
about any conflict with it. I’d simply just ask that we could continue to do
that. [¶] So there was absolutely no conflict in that area. If the kids want to

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take them off, which I’ve told him, then I’m responsible for finding those and
I’m blamed if they’re gone. When if they just were to stay at his house [sic]
preserved and special to put back on when they got home, there would never
be a problem.
“[Father’s counsel]: You understand his testimony is that it’s against
his faith to take them off.
“[Mother]: I understand that. But for two years, from 2020 to 2022,
during the plane exchanges, they didn’t come to my house in Spokane for two
weeks with the bracelets on. So that’s kind of—
“[Father’s counsel]: And his testimony is to the contrary, that
[daughter] never took hers off until August of 2022; correct?
“[Mother]: That is his testimony.”
The court explored the bracelet issue with mother in this colloquy:
“[The court]: . . . So my question is did you have a problem with [the
children] wearing the bracelets before they ended up losing them? My point
is did you ever have a problem with them wearing the bracelets, ‘Yes’ or ‘No’?
“[Mother]: No.
“[The court]: Okay. And do you have a problem with them wearing the
bracelets now?
“[Mother]: I don’t have a problem. But if they want to take them off, I
don’t insist that they wear them.
“[The court]: So is it your testimony that when they come to your home
for the week, they immediately want to take them off?
“[Mother]: They take them off, yes.
“[The court]: And do you know why when they get to your home they
immediately take them off?
“[Mother]: I don’t know. They—

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“[The court]: You’ve never told them that they can just take them off?
“[Mother]: I’ve told them if they don’t want to—because my daughter
has said, ‘Papa makes us wear these.’ And I said, ‘Whatever you want to do.’
“[The court]: So you told them they don’t have to wear them.
“[Mother]: Yes.”
Court’s Ruling on Hair, Patka and Bracelet Issues
While the court was ruling from the bench, it addressed father: “I’ve
heard testimony that [son] sleeps in the head covering. I’ve heard
testimony . . . that sometimes [he] would say ‘I don’t want to wear the hair
covering to sleep’. . . . . [¶] But with respect to the hair that is so personal to
the children, sir, you are going to have to compromise on that. [Mom is] not
going to be able to ever give [son] a cut like she did, the buzz cut, the crew
cut. But if [son] wants to wear his hair where he has a little bang there and
he can put gel on it—he’s only five. When he starts school, he may want to
start wearing it a different way. I don’t know. But when he’s in your care, he
can wear the head covering. When he goes to mom’s house, he can have on
the head covering.”
The court addressed father’s objections to its ruling in this colloquy:
“[The court]: With respect to the hair, sir, by your own message you
say you now have to put [daughter’s] hair in two braids. You are going to
have to put her hair in two braids. She likes her hair—first of all, the point is
that their hair has already been cut. It’s no longer uncut. At no time shall
[son]—until, obviously, maybe at [age] 15 he is not going to listen to any of
you and he might just get a crew cut. So—but it’s understandable that
[daughter] wants to have shoulder-length hair like her mom. It’s
understandable. It shouldn’t be because—I know you believe that she wants
them to look White. The reality is that her mom is White, you are not.

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[Daughter] is a beautiful combination of both of you. [Son] is a beautiful
combination of both of you, which is why I don’t want them to feel I’m going
to my mom’s house now and I take everything related to dad off.
“[Father]: But cutting her hair is not against her religion, but it is
mine. That is the difference.
“[The court]: Your testimony, sir, is it should be uncut. Her hair has
been cut.
“[Father]: It can be uncut from this point.
“[The court]: I am not going to make that order. If [daughter]—it could
be next year she wants to grow her hair down to her bottom, great. I am
ordering that it should not be cut shorter than what it is now—is it at her
shoulder?
“[Mother]: Yes, right here.
“[The court]: Where dad is prevented from braiding her hair. Her hair
should be long enough where dad can braid it either in one braid or two
braids. You say yourself, [in a chat conversation with mother], ‘[N]ow I have
to braid it in two braids.’ It may take you 30 more seconds.
“[Father]: It is not a matter of braiding it, your honor.
“[The court]: Listen, I understand.
“[Father]: It is the matter of the hair being cut. That is part of my
faith.
“[The court]: I understand. I understand you don’t agree with my
order. [¶] From what I can see, this is a huge conflict. I’m trying to talk the
conflict away. No one is going to be happy with my order. I don’t see that
any other judicial officer has dealt with it directly. So I’ve tried to balance, as
the law requires me to, to make an order that is in the best interest of the
children. So I understand that you don’t agree with it, but I do not believe it

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is appropriate for your daughter, who is going to be [eight years old], if she
wants to wear her hair shoulder length that she cannot do so, that she must
let it keep growing, something that tangible, that personal, personal to her.
Again, I said this before, these are conversations that the two of you should
have had when you decided to have children. So now the court has to be
involved. So I understand you don’t agree, but that is what the order is until
another judge—if another judge makes a different order.”
The court’s written ruling states: “The court finds it is in the best
interest of the children that the mother acknowledges and respects . . .
father’s Sikh faith and the fact that it is important to father that the children
wear their bracelets on their right arm. Mother is ordered not to tell the
children that they do not have to wear the bracelets. If, when the children
are in mother’s care, they express a desire to remove the bracelets, mother is
ordered to place the bracelets within a box or [plastic] baggie for safekeeping,
to assure that the bracelets are returned with the children when they return
to father’s care. . . . [F]ather is not required to remove the bracelets from the
children’s arms before exchanging the children with the mother.”
The court added, “With respect to [son’s] patka, the court again finds
that it is in [his best interest] that the mother acknowledges and respects . . .
father’s Sikh faith and the fact that it is important to him that [son] wear the
head covering. Mother is ordered not to tell [son] he does not have to wear it.
If, when in mother’s care, [son] expresses a desire to remove the patka, then
mother is ordered to place the patka in a bag or container for safekeeping, so
that it is returned with [son] when he returns to father’s care.”
The court concluded, “With respect to the hair, . . . father testified that
the Sikh faith does not allow the children’s hair to be cut at all. However,
mother testified that he has known the children’s hair was cut from the time

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they were very young, and he never complained. In fact, mother testified
that the cutting of the children’s hair never became an issue until the court
proceedings began. The court finds that it is in the best interest of the
children to feel comfortable with their hair and the length of the hair.
However, the court finds that there have been times when mother has
engaged in cutting [son’s] hair, in particular, to intentionally upset . . . father.
The court orders that if the children express a desire to have their hair cut,
they may have their hair cut; however, at no time shall [son] receive a buzz
cut and at no time shall [daughter’s] hair be cut shorter than shoulder length.
This assures that her father will still be able to braid her hair,
notwithstanding that it is in two braids, rather than one braid.”
Court’s Ruling on Custody Issues
The court ruled from the bench that father had failed to meet his
burden of showing changed circumstances in order for it to modify the
custody order: “[I]t would be against the children’s best interest for me to
give father sole legal custody, because it will only result in further conflict.
The court finds that the sole legal custody he was given in August of 2022 has
caused father to be less cooperative, to feel that he makes the rules and that
the rules don’t apply to him, the court orders don’t apply to him, but they all
apply to mom. So the court believes it would be dangerous to give father sole
legal custody, because he will wield even more power than he already
believes he has, even after Judge Mody changed the custody order to joint
legal. . . . [¶] With respect to requesting that he have sole physical custody,
the court has absolutely no reason to make such an order. These children
have been through so much. Mother unlawfully took them [to Washington] in
2019. The judge made orders for her to keep them there. . . . [F]ather had to
travel monthly to see his very young children. The court then made orders

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that it was in their best interest for father to have sole legal custody and for
the children to move here to California with him. So mom was then visiting.
Now, mother has moved back to California. So these children have an
opportunity that many kids don’t where both of their parents live in the same
city. So I am not going to order that mom only sees them on the weekend
when they have been used to seeing her 50 percent of the time. There is no
change in circumstances for me to do that. I don’t find it would be in their
best interest.”
The court further ruled that under sections 3011 and 3020, the children
should have frequent contact with both parents, as long as it is not contrary
to their health, safety and welfare. The court relied on testimony about a
weekend incident where “[mother] automatically had [the children] until
Monday and there was another weekend when she only had them until
Sunday. Well, [father] knew she was back. She was in the same city. He
could have said, okay, you can have them until Monday. . . . This is not a
person I would give the sole legal custody to.” Based on that incident, the
court ruled that under section 3040, subdivision (a)(1), father was not the
parent who is more likely to allow the children frequent and continuing
contact with the noncustodial parent.
Moreover, the court summarized testimony about an incident involving
the children’s care provider, “who knows mom, mom had called her and said
she was running late, and the child care provider—father is her boss. She
was going to do what her boss says. So she asked him, should she leave?
And he said, yes. And he could have said, ‘[N]o. You can just let them go
with mom.[’] Their child care provider was there. [Father] said, no,
regardless of the fact that those children were in the car and they saw their
mom. And as the child care provider testified, they were so upset, they were

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[hysterical] and should not have been in that position. That is another
example of where father’s determination to be rigid about court orders when
it comes to mom, but yet he can ignore court orders, he cannot pay her child
support. His request to have sole legal and sole physical custody, he has
shown that that is not appropriate.”
The court ordered the parties to have joint legal custody and joint
physical custody.
DISCUSSION
I. Hair, Patka, and Bracelets
Father contends the family court “failed to provide the necessary legal
protections for [his] right to raise his children in the Sikh faith. Instead of
recognizing that allowing [m]other to continue cutting the children’s hair
constituted an ongoing violation of [his] religious freedoms, the trial court
treated the matter as an issue of ‘compromise’ between the parents, rather
than one of constitutional and statutory significance. In doing so, the court
not only misapplied governing legal standards but also enabled continued
religious interference that undermines [his] ability to instill the religious and
cultural traditions that are central to the children’s Sikh identity.”
A. Applicable Law
The United States Supreme Court has “recognized the fundamental
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children.” (Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 66 [and cases cited
therein].) Parents have a constitutional right “to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control”; this includes “the inculcation of
moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”
(Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 233.)

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California courts have addressed the question whether or how to
accommodate diverse religious practices of parents, living apart, in the
upbringing of minor children: “[W]hile the custodial parent undoubtedly has
the right to make ultimate decisions concerning the child’s religious
upbringing, a court will not enjoin the noncustodial parent from discussing
religion with the child or involving the child in his or her religious activities
in the absence of a showing that the child will be thereby harmed.” (In re
Marriage of Murga (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 498, 505.) The parent seeking to
enjoin the other parent from involving the children in religious activity bears
the burden of making “a clear affirmative showing that these religious
activities will be harmful to the child[ren ].” (Id. at pp. 505-506; In re
Marriage of Mentry (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 260, 266; In re Marriage of Weiss
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 117.)
B. Analysis
The evidence shows father has a sincere belief in his Sikh faith, which
he practices, and that he has tried to raise his children in that faith from an
early age. The court implicitly recognized this by ruling that it is in the
children’s best interests that mother acknowledges and respects father’s Sikh
faith. Despite thoughtfully grappling with the issues presented here, the
court erred by failing to determine, under the caselaw cited above, whether
mother had made a clear affirmative showing that if the children adhered to
father’s Sikh faith as regards the haircuts, patka and bracelets, it would be
harmful to them. “[H]arm to the child from conflicting religious instructions
or practices . . . should not be simply assumed or surmised; it must be
demonstrated in detail.” (In re Marriage of Mentry, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at
p. 265, italics omitted.)

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Mother testified the children requested the haircuts, which made them
fit in with their family and friends on her side. She added that the children’s
hair was already cut more than once. Likewise, mother’s testimony
regarding the use of the bracelets and the patka in summary was: As the
children asked to take them off, she allowed them to do so. She should not be
responsible for finding them before the children’s return to father. She
instead proposed he keep the bracelets at his house and thus eliminate any
problem. Father also testified that at some point mother considered that the
children’s uncut hair was “unhygienic.” But that testimony regarding
hygiene was not developed or supported at the hearing, and therefore any
claim in that regard lacks foundation. Judicial intervention in the children’s
religious upbringing must be “conditioned upon a clear affirmative showing of
harm or likely harm to the child.” (In re Marriage of Mentry, supra, 142
Cal.App.3d at p. 269.)
Additionally, the court specifically ruled that mother sometimes cut
son’s hair “to intentionally upset . . . father.” Mother’s conduct evinces a
disregard for Judge Birchak’s ruling, which was based on father’s
constitutional right to raise the children in his faith. Finally, the court’s
conclusion that the daughter’s desired hair length is something “personal to
her” is untethered from the constitutional requirement of a showing of harm
before a parent’s religious right may be abridged.
In reaching its ruling, the court characterized mother’s testimony as
“that [father] has known the children’s hair was cut from the time they were
very young, and he never complained.” However, that characterization is not
supported by the record. In fact, mother testified that when she cut the
children’s hair in their infancy, father never had occasion to notice it because
he was “not as present a parent,” and was gone for months at a time.

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Mother’s separate argument, which the court adopted, is that the children’s
hair, once cut, can no longer be uncut, and therefore further haircuts are
permissible. But that reasoning overlooks father’s repeated testimony that
the previous haircuts are not determinative for purposes of religious
observance because, in effect, the prior lapses may be ameliorated by
prohibiting further haircuts.
The court’s other fundamental error was subordinating father’s
constitutional rights to religious exercise and to raise the children in his faith
to the children’s personal desires and their “comfort” considerations. It
specifically ruled: “If, when the children are in mother’s care, they express a
desire to remove the bracelets, mother is ordered to place the bracelets within
a box or [plastic] baggie for safekeeping”; “[i]f, when in mother’s care, [son]
expresses a desire to remove the patka, then mother is ordered to place the
patka in a bag or container for safekeeping;” and, “if the children express a
desire to have their hair cut, they may have their hair cut.” (Italics added.)
It also reasoned, “[I]t is in the best interest of the children to feel comfortable
with their hair and the length of the hair.” (Italics added.) But at the time of
trial, the children were seven and five years old respectively. The court
nowhere explains, and the record fails to show, they had sufficient maturity
to hold informed views about the religious observances at issue here. Under
section 3042, subdivision (a), the court is only required to consider the
preference of the child if the child “is of sufficient age and capacity to reason
so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody[.]” We are not aware of
any reported decision holding that a child of the ages of son and daughter had
such capacity. (See In re Marriage of Slayton (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 653, 659;
accord, Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 232 [“There is nothing in the
record or in the ordinary course of human experience to suggest

18
that . . . parents generally consult with children of ages 14-16 if they are
placed in a church school of the parents’ faith”].)
In light of the above, we reverse the portion of the court’s ruling
permitting either child’s hair to be cut and deferring to their wishes
regarding the removal of their bracelets or, for the son, his patka. The court
is directed to conduct new proceedings specifically to ascertain whether the
children’s adherence to father’s Sikh religion regarding the cutting of their
hair, the use of bracelets, and son’s use of a patka would harm the children.
For the court’s guidance in formulating a new order regarding these issues, a
California case has set forth some general considerations: “ ‘In all events, the
question that comes to the courts is whether, in particular circumstances, such
exposures [to the parents’ religious practices] are disturbing a child to its
substantial injury, physical or emotional, and will have a like harmful
tendency for the future. [Citation.] The critical literature warns against
perverting a quest for the child’s best interests into one for the psychic
comfort of the parents—a warning against overvaluing the parents’
constitutional liberties. [Citation.] A warning is equally in order against
depriving a parent of all connection with the child, or connection on the
religious plane, out of an exaggerated fear of injury to the child. [Citations.]
It is often said that if accommodation appears necessary, that form should be
sought which intrudes least on the religious inclinations of either parent and
is yet compatible with the health of the child.’ ” (In re Marriage of Mentry,
supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 265-266, quoting Felton v. Felton (1981) 383
Mass. 232, 235 .)
II. Hearsay Testimony
As stated, father did not object to the court’s questions of mother about
the children’s haircuts; therefore, he has forfeited his claim the court abused

19
its discretion by admitting that assertedly hearsay testimony. “[T]he general
rule [is] that trial counsel’s failure to object to claimed evidentiary error on
the same ground asserted on appeal results in a forfeiture of the issue on
appeal.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 756.) “What is important is
that the objection fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering
the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the
evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond
appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.” (People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.)
In any event, our ruling renders moot father’s contention. As he puts it
in his brief, “this improperly admitted hearsay was outcome-determinative.
By accepting mother’s hearsay statements as dispositive of the children’s
preferences, the court side-stepped the constitutional implications of its
ruling and improperly framed a fundamental rights issue as a question of
transient child preference[.]” As our ruling has addressed the constitutional
issue raised, we need not discuss this contention further.
III. Custody Decision
Father contends: “[T]he evidence overwhelmingly established that
[mother] repeatedly and willfully disregarded court orders governing
religious practices and custodial exchanges, undermining both the children’s
religious identity and [father’s] ability to exercise his custodial rights. The
trial court acknowledged many of these violations but inexplicably refused to
modify legal custody, leaving Father powerless to prevent further
interference with his children’s religious upbringing. This ruling fails to
provide the necessary legal protections for [father’s] fundamental rights.” He
urges reversal and a “remand with instructions to grant [him] sole legal
custody, ensuring that decisions regarding religious upbringing and other

20
major custodial matters are made by the parent committed to respecting the
children’s established faith and court-ordered custodial structure.”
The California Supreme Court has held: “Once the trial court has
entered a final or permanent custody order reflecting that a particular
custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, ‘the paramount
need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm
that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional
bonds with the primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining’
that custody arrangement. [Citation.] In recognition of this policy concern,
we have articulated a variation on the best interest standard, known as the
changed circumstance rule, that the trial court must apply when a parent
seeks modification of a final judicial custody determination. [Citations.]
Under the changed circumstance rule, custody modification is appropriate
only if the parent seeking modification demonstrates ‘a significant change of
circumstances’ indicating that a different custody arrangement would be in
the child’s best interest.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th
947, 956.)
“The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is
the deferential abuse of discretion test. [Citation.] The precise measure is
whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in
question advanced the ‘best interest’ of the child.” (In re Marriage of Burgess
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32.) “Under this test, we must uphold the trial court
‘ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was
actually invoked.’ ” (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 255.)
The court provided several reasons for its finding of no changed
circumstances to justify modifying the custody order: Father had changed
since Judge Birchak’s order: he was less cooperative with mother and had

21
assumed the court orders applied only to her, but not to him. It pointed to
instances where father deliberately denied mother any consideration
regarding visitation matters. It specifically relied on section 3040,
subdivision (a)(1), which provides: “In making an order granting custody to
either parent, the court shall consider, among other factors, which parent is
more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the
noncustodial parent[.]” It referred to section 3011, dealing with
considerations of the best interests of the children, and section 3020 which
provides that the health, safety, and welfare of children shall be the court’s
primary concern in determining the best interests of children when making
any orders regarding the physical or legal custody or visitation of children.
We conclude the court’s ruling was not arbitrary and capricious” and did not
“exceed[ ] the bounds of reason” (In re Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d
590, 598) so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Father has not addressed the specific bases for the court’s ruling,
instead arguing in his opening brief, without citation to legal authority or to
the record: “[T]he court’s own reasoning demonstrates why joint legal
custody is unworkable in this case. The trial court found that both parents
have engaged in conflict, yet it failed to acknowledge that pattern of [m]other
unilateral decision-making, interference with religious practice, and
disregard for court orders is the primary driver of that conflict.” As shown,
this characterization of the court’s ruling is at best partial and incomplete. It
does not compel reversal of the court’s custody ruling.

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DISPOSITION
The part of the judgment titled “Legal custody” is affirmed. The part of
the judgment titled “Hair, Patka and bracelet issue” is reversed. On remand,
the court is directed to determine whether the religious practices of barring
haircuts, requiring the wearing of bracelets, and requiring the son to wear a
head covering will be harmful to the children, and to enter a new order on
these issues in accordance with this opinion. Each party is to bear its own
costs on appeal.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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