People v. Thornton CA1/4

CourtListener 10705897CalctappOct 17, 2025

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Filed 10/17/25 P. v. Thornton CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172858
v. (Alameda County
JALEN JUWAN THORNTON, Super. Ct. No. 175047)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Jalen Juwan Thornton pled no contest in criminal court in
2014 to a charge of attempted murder and a related enhancement and was
sentenced to 17 years in prison.1 Thornton was 16 years old at the time of
the offense. In early 2025, at Thornton’s request, the trial court recalled his
sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1.2 After a hearing, the court
resentenced Thornton to a prison term of 17 years.

1 “We will use the terms ‘adult court’ and ‘criminal court’

interchangeably to refer to the court system for adults and juveniles who are
tried as adults, and to distinguish that system from the juvenile court
system, where most juvenile matters are handled.” (People v. Superior
Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303, fn. 1 (Lara).)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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On appeal, Thornton contends that, upon recalling his sentence under
section 1172.1, the trial court should have certified his case to juvenile court
for a transfer hearing under Proposition 57 (as approved by voters, Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016)) (Proposition 57). The Attorney General concedes this
point, and we accept the concession. We will conditionally reverse the
judgment and remand for the juvenile court to determine whether it would
have transferred Thornton to criminal court under current law.3
I. BACKGROUND
Thornton was charged by complaint with six counts of attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and one count of shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle (§ 246), as well as firearm and gang enhancements. According
to the probation report, the charges arose from two shootings on city buses
in the fall of 2013. Thornton admitted his involvement in one of the
shootings.
In late 2014, Thornton pled no contest to one count of attempted
murder, with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)), as part of a plea agreement that provided he would be sentenced
to prison for a term of 17 years. The prosecution dismissed the remaining
charges and enhancements. Consistent with the plea agreement, the trial
court imposed a 17-year prison term, which included a seven-year midterm

3 In his opening appellate brief, Thornton presented an alternative

argument, contending that if his case is not remanded to juvenile court, the
sentence imposed by the trial court at resentencing should be vacated
because the court allegedly did not adequately explain its sentencing
decisions. But following the Attorney General’s concession as to Thornton’s
primary argument that he is entitled to a juvenile court transfer hearing
under Proposition 57, Thornton’s counsel submitted a letter stating
Thornton will not file a reply brief and is withdrawing his alternative claim
that the trial court committed error during the resentencing hearing.

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sentence for attempted murder and a 10-year term for the firearm use
enhancement.
In January 2025, Thornton, through counsel, invited the superior
court to recall his sentence under section 1172.1.4 Thornton asked the court
to recall his sentence and then to (1) resentence him to a shorter term in
state prison (which would result in his release from custody, given the
amount of time he had served), or (2) “certify the matter back to juvenile
court for a transfer hearing” pursuant to Proposition 57, to determine
whether his case would remain there or return to criminal court.
At a hearing in March 2025, the trial court recalled Thornton’s
sentence. But in resentencing Thornton, the court decided to reimpose a 17-
year sentence. The court denied defense counsel’s request to transfer the
case to juvenile court.
Thornton appealed.

4 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) states: “When a defendant, upon
conviction for a felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or to the
custody of the county correctional administrator pursuant to subdivision (h)
of Section 1170, the court may, on its own motion, within 120 days of the
date of commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the
time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law, at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary
or the Board of Parole Hearings in the case of a defendant incarcerated in
state prison, the county correctional administrator in the case of a
defendant incarcerated in county jail, the district attorney of the county in
which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if the
Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case, recall the sentence
and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the
same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not
the defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no
greater than the initial sentence. Recall and resentencing under this section
may be initiated by the original sentencing judge, a judge designated by the
presiding judge, or any judge with jurisdiction in the case.”

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II. DISCUSSION
The parties agree that, upon recalling Thornton’s sentence pursuant
to section 1172.1, the trial court was required under Proposition 57 to certify
the case to juvenile court. We accept the Attorney General’s concession on
this point, and we will conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for
the juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing.
At the time of Thornton’s offense, “prosecutors were permitted, and
sometimes required, to file charges against a juvenile directly in criminal
court, where the juvenile would be treated as an adult.” (Lara, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 305.) In 2016, the voters approved Proposition 57, which
eliminated prosecutors’ ability to file charges directly against minors in
adult court. (Lara, at p. 303.) After Proposition 57, a juvenile court must
first conduct a “ ‘transfer hearing’ ” to determine whether the matter should
remain in juvenile court or be transferred to adult court. (Lara, at p. 303.)
To make this determination, the juvenile court must consider various
factors, including “ ‘the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication,
prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated.’ ” (Id.
at p. 305.)
Proposition 57 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. (Lara,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 303–304.) And when a defendant’s sentence is
vacated or recalled, Proposition 57 applies retroactively because any new
sentence is not yet final. In People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158, the
California Supreme Court held Proposition 57 applied when a criminal court
sentence that was imposed on a juvenile offender before the initiative’s
passage was later vacated on habeas corpus. The court explained: “Because
the judgment in Padilla’s case became nonfinal when his sentence was

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vacated on habeas corpus, Proposition 57 applies to his resentencing.”
(Padilla, at p. 170.)
We considered a similar question in People v. Lopez (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 835, 839–840, review granted January 27, 2021, S265936,
review dismissed July 20, 2022, where the defendant was tried and
convicted in adult court for charges based on his actions as a minor. The
defendant’s sentence was later recalled under section 1170, former
subdivision (d)(1) (a predecessor of § 1172.1), and the trial court resentenced
the defendant. (Lopez, at p. 840.) We held that, “Applying Lara’s conclusion
that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to any judgment that is not final to
defendant’s new sentence, we conclude the new sentence is not final and so
he is entitled to a retroactive transfer hearing in juvenile court.” (Id. at
p. 845; accord, e.g., People v. Montes (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 48 [same
conclusion under different resentencing provision].)
Here, the recall of Thornton’s sentence effectively vacated the earlier
judgment, so Proposition 57 applies retroactively and requires that he
receive a transfer hearing in juvenile court. (See People v. Padilla, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 161; People v. Montes, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 48.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the criminal court is conditionally reversed. The
cause is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to conduct, no later
than 90 days from the filing of the remittitur, a hearing to determine if it
would have transferred the cause to adult criminal court had it originally
been filed in juvenile court in accordance with current law. If the juvenile
court determines it would not have transferred the cause to criminal court
under current law, it shall treat Thornton’s convictions as juvenile
adjudications as of the date Thornton was convicted and impose an

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appropriate disposition within its usual timeframe. If the juvenile court
determines it would have transferred Thornton to adult criminal court, it
shall transfer the case to criminal court, which shall then reinstate
Thornton’s new sentence.

STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
CLAY, J.*

* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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