Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC

CourtListener 10705896CalctappOct 17, 2025

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Filed 9/25/25 Certified for Publication 10/17/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SARAH GURGANUS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170738
v.
IGS SOLUTIONS LLC, (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. CU23-04101)
Defendant and Appellant.

IGS Solutions LLC (IGS) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its
motion to compel arbitration of a lawsuit brought by its former employee,
Sarah Gurganus. IGS contends the trial court erred by concluding the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable and in refusing to sever the
offending provisions. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
IGS provides employee management services for various operational
entities, including some retail locations. IGS employed Gurganus at a
California facility between September 2021 and April 2023.
When Gurganus began working for IGS in September 2021, she logged
into the company’s online portal and filled out onboarding documents, none of
which included an agreement to arbitrate or mention of arbitration.

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Subsequent Agreements
On February 20, 2022, about five months into her employment at IGS,
Gurganus electronically signed numerous additional employment documents
in the company’s online portal. Among those documents were an agreement
to arbitrate (Arbitration Agreement), a “Voluntary Dispute Resolution
Policy,” and a “Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement” (CND).
The Arbitration Agreement provides in relevant part: “Employee and
the Company . . . mutually agree to resolve by final and binding arbitration
any dispute, claim or controversy, including but not limited to those related
to Employee’s employment with or termination of employment by the
Company, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [and] give up each of their rights to trial by jury for
the claims covered by this Agreement.” The Arbitration Agreement excludes
certain claims from arbitration, including those “that, as a matter of law,
cannot be resolved by arbitration, such as . . . claims seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief regarding use or unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information.”
Additionally, the Arbitration Agreement contains a confidentiality
provision, stating that “[n]o party may disclose any information to any other
party not involved in the arbitration hearing unless written approval has
been given by the other party.”
The eleventh paragraph of the Arbitration Agreement states
arbitration is not a required condition of employment and the signor may
choose not to sign the agreement or, within 30 days of signing it, may opt out
by notifying IGS in writing.
It also contains an integration clause stating it is “the entire agreement
between the Employee and the Company regarding dispute resolution and

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this Arbitration Agreement supersedes any and all prior agreements
regarding this issue.”
The Voluntary Dispute Resolution Policy is a distinct document, which,
contrary to the Arbitration Agreement, provides that “any dispute” (italics
added) between Gurganus and IGS will be decided by binding arbitration if
Gurganus “sign[s] a Dispute Resolution Agreement”; it also states there will
be no negative employment consequences or retaliation if Gurganus decides
not to sign such an agreement.
The CND is another separate document that Gurganus signed the same
day as the Arbitration Agreement and Voluntary Dispute Resolution Policy;
it prevents her from disclosing certain confidential information disclosed to
her for business purposes (such as trade secrets and proprietary information).
Relevant here, the CND contains a dispute provision that permits IGS to
enforce the CND in court: “Any disputes under this Agreement may be
brought in the state courts and the Federal courts for the county in which
Company’s principal place of business is located, and the parties hereby
consent to the personal jurisdiction and exclusive venue of these courts.”
Additionally, the CND provides that, in the event of breach, and among
other available remedies, IGS “will be entitled to obtain timely injunctive
relief (without the posting of any bond and without proof of actual damages)
under this Agreement.”
The CND terminates three years after its effective date “or may be
terminated by either party at any time upon thirty (30) days written notice to
the other party.” Unlike the Arbitration Agreement, the CND does not state
the employee may choose not to sign the agreement or may opt out of the
CND; it also does not state that signing is not a condition of employment.

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Both the Arbitration Agreement and CND contain severability
provisions stating generally that, if any portions of the agreements were
found to be unenforceable or invalid, the offending provisions will be modified
or interpreted so as to make them enforceable.
Gurganus’s Lawsuit and IGS’s Motion To Compel Arbitration
Gurganus’s employment at IGS ended in April 2023.
On September 1, 2023, Gurganus filed a complaint alleging eight
causes of action against IGS: (1) disability discrimination in violation of the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.;
FEHA); (2) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to engage in the
interactive process to determine reasonable accommodations; (4) failure to
provide reasonable accommodations; (5) retaliation in violation of the
California Family Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 12945.2; CFRA); (6) interference
with CFRA rights; (7) wrongful termination; and (8) unlawful business
practices under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et
seq.).
On January 23, 2024, IGS filed a motion to compel arbitration and to
dismiss or stay Gurganus’s lawsuit. IGS argued all the claims in the lawsuit
were subject to the Arbitration Agreement as they arose out of Gurganus’s
employment with IGS. IGS asserted the Arbitration Agreement was
enforceable and, if the court found any provision unenforceable, that
provision should be severed.
In support of the motion, IGS submitted a declaration by its director of
human resources describing the process by which Gurganus signed the
Arbitration Agreement and other employment documents on February 20,
2022. The declaration stated IGS requests that employees sign the
agreement but does not require it, and while it allows them to opt out,

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Gurganus had not done so. The Arbitration Agreement was attached to the
declaration, but the declaration did not mention or attach the CND.
Gurganus opposed the motion on unconscionability grounds. Gurganus
did not contest that she signed the Arbitration Agreement on February 20,
2022, but argued she was required to do so in an oppressive manner as a
condition of continued employment, and that there was evidence of surprise
in the manner it was presented to her, rendering it procedurally
unconscionable. She further contended the confidentiality provision in the
Arbitration Agreement and lack of mutuality in the CND—which she
asserted should be read together as they were signed on the same day within
the same transaction—were substantively unconscionable. Finally,
Gurganus contended the unconscionability could not be cured by severance.
In support, Gurganus attached a declaration stating she was told to
sign various documents as a requirement for employment and that she
complied because she was not in a financial position to refuse employment.
She further stated no one explained the documents to her or that she was
giving up her right to file a lawsuit in court. Gurganus also attached a copy
of the CND.
The court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion to compel
arbitration, finding the Arbitration Agreement was both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable and that severance was not warranted. The
ruling stated there was “at least a modest degree of procedural
unconscionability” inherent in the employment relationship as an employee
lacks a meaningful opportunity to negotiate terms other than those proposed
by the employer. As to substantive unconscionability, the court determined
the Arbitration Agreement and CND together had the “net effect” of
destroying the mutuality of arbitration, because they required Gurganus’s

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claims to go to arbitration while permitting many of IGS’s potential claims to
go to court. Further, the confidentiality provision restricted employees from
contacting or interviewing potential witnesses outside of the formal discovery
process, which also weighed in favor of finding substantive unconscionability.
At a May 10, 2024 hearing on the motion, the trial court rejected IGS’s
assertion that the Arbitration Agreement was voluntary merely because the
document stated arbitration was not a required condition of employment and
allowed Gurganus to opt out. The court found instead that suddenly asking
an established employee to change a material term of her employment (as to
arbitration) for no consideration showed it was not a voluntary choice and
was therefore procedurally unconscionable. The court further rejected IGS’s
arguments as to substantive unconscionability for the reasons stated in its
tentative ruling.
The court adopted the tentative ruling as its permanent order and
denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court also denied IGS’s request
for a statement of decision—wherein IGS did not specify any controverted
issue on which the request was based—stating that IGS was not entitled to a
statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632.1 IGS
appealed.
DISCUSSION
IGS challenges the trial court’s determination that the Arbitration
Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable, its decision not
to sever any unconscionable provisions, and its refusal to issue a statement of
decision. We address each issue in turn and affirm.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

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I. The Arbitration Agreement Is Unconscionable
“Unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element.
[Citation.] Procedural unconscionability ‘ “addresses the circumstances of
contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to
unequal bargaining power.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Substantive unconscionability
pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of
whether they are overly harsh or one-sided.” ’ [Citation.] Both elements
must be proven, but they are evaluated on a sliding scale: ‘the more
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required’ to find it unenforceable, ‘and vice versa.’ ”
(Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1287 (Haydon).)
We review the court’s findings of disputed facts for substantial evidence
and its finding of unconscionability based on those facts de novo. (Haydon,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287.)
A. Relation Between Arbitration Agreement and CND
As an initial matter, IGS asserts the trial court “improperly merged”
the CND and Arbitration Agreement when conducting its analysis. However,
the trial court merely read the CND and the Arbitration Agreement together
to determine the “net effect” of both agreements’ terms regarding the parties’
respective rights when bringing claims against the other because both
agreements were presented to Gurganus at the same time. This was not
error. (See Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 490–
491 (Alberto) [arbitration agreement and confidentiality agreement executed
as part of a single transaction properly construed together where they relate
to same subject matter, even though they do not refer to each other].)
IGS does not dispute that both documents were executed by Gurganus
on the same day as part of the same primary transaction. Further, both

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documents “governed, ultimately, the same issue—how to resolve disputes
arising between [Gurganus] and [IGS] arising from [Gurganus]’s
employment.” (Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 490–491.) Accordingly,
“[f]ailing to read them together artificially segments the parties’ contractual
relationship” and “fails to account for the overall dispute resolution process
the parties agreed upon.” (Id. at p. 491.)
We note that the Voluntary Dispute Resolution Policy provides—in
contrast to the Arbitration Agreement and CND—that all disputes between
the parties (by either side) will be decided by binding arbitration if Gurganus
“sign[s] a Dispute Resolution Agreement.” It therefore further confuses
which claims are subject to arbitration and supports the need to read the
Arbitration Agreement and CND together to understand the parties’ overall
dispute resolution process.
We therefore read the Arbitration Agreement and CND together when
assessing unconscionability.
B. Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability is generally established by showing the
agreement is a contract of adhesion, where a standardized contract drafted
by the party with greater bargaining strength is imposed on the other party,
leaving the subscribing party with only the option to adhere to the contract or
reject it. (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478,
492–493 (Ramirez).) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of
employment are typically adhesive and may include elements of oppression,
including when employees are required to accept an arbitration agreement in
order to keep their job after they have begun working for an employer. (OTO,
L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126–127.)

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In its briefing, IGS contends in general terms that the court erred in
finding the Arbitration Agreement was procedurally unconscionable, but it
fails to raise any specific arguments in support of that claim or meaningfully
challenge the court’s finding that the Arbitration Agreement was a contract
of adhesion and has therefore forfeited that claim. (See Allen v. City of
Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [points not stated under a
separate heading and supported by reasoned legal argument and citation to
authority may be deemed forfeited].2 Instead, IGS asserts the degree of
procedural unconscionability is low, requiring a high level of substantive
unconscionability to prevent its enforcement.
Nonetheless, “although adhesion alone generally indicates only a low
degree of procedural unconscionability, the potential for overreaching in the
employment context warrants close scrutiny of the contract’s terms.”
(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 494.) As we discuss below, scrutiny of the
Arbitration Agreement and CND reveals a high degree of substantive
unconscionability.

2 At oral argument, IGS asserted that the Arbitration Agreement is not

procedurally unconscionable and, without citing any basis for doing so, urged
us to exercise our discretion to consider that argument though raised for the
first time at oral argument. We decline to do so. (See People v. Carrasco
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 990 [“ ‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate against
consideration of an issue raised initially’ at oral argument.”].)

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C. Substantive Unconscionability
The trial court found substantive unconscionability based on both a
lack of mutuality of arbitration and the confidentiality provision in the
Arbitration Agreement. IGS challenges both findings.
1. Lack of Mutuality of Arbitration
IGS argues the court erred by concluding there was a lack of mutuality
of arbitration. We are not persuaded.
If an arbitration agreement singles out specific claims for arbitration,
there must be mutuality between the parties. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 495.) “Given the disadvantages that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating
disputes, it is unfairly one-sided for an employer with superior bargaining
power to impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept
such limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee,
without at least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based
on ‘business realities.’ ” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 117 (Armendariz).)
Lack of mutuality exists when an arbitration agreement directs a wide
range of claims that would typically be brought by an employee into
arbitration, but specifically excludes from arbitration claims that would
typically be brought by an employer, including claims related to intellectual
property rights and those for equitable relief related to unfair competition or
the disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information. (Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at pp. 498–500.) Hence, the trial court correctly found there was a
lack of mutuality in the Arbitration Agreement and CND as claims that are
typically brought by an employee are forced into arbitration while claims that
are more likely to be brought by IGS may be brought in court. (Ibid.)

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Specifically, the Arbitration Agreement requires any employment-
related dispute to be sent to arbitration and lists various claims that are
more likely to be brought by an employee, such as “tort claims; benefits
claims; family or medical leave claims; claims of discrimination, retaliation,
or harassment under federal or state law; claims of wrongful termination;
claims for unpaid wages, reimbursements, meal and/or rest breaks; . . . and[]
any other claim that could be brought under local, state, or federal
employment statutes or common law.”
On the other hand, the Arbitration Agreement expressly excludes
claims that are more likely to be brought by IGS against its employees, such
as “claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief regarding use or
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.” In addition, the CND
permits any claims under that agreement—i.e., those related to intellectual
property rights and the disclosure of confidential information and trade
secrets—to be brought in court.
In Ramirez, the California Supreme Court concluded an arbitration
agreement with similar covered and excluded claims to the Arbitration
Agreement here lacked mutuality. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 498–
500.) The Court noted that such agreements have been found to be
substantively unconscionable “because they ‘compel[led] arbitration of the
claims employees are most likely to bring’ and ‘exempt[ed] from arbitration
the claims [the employer] is most likely to bring against its employees.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 497–498, quoting Mercuro v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
167, 176, and citing Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 724–726.)
We, too, conclude the covered and excluded claims under the Arbitration
Agreement lack mutuality for the same reason—which is even further
reinforced by the breadth of claims excluded from arbitration under the

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CND—thereby supporting the trial court’s finding of substantive
unconscionability.
In arguing to the contrary, IGS asserts the excluded claims in this case
are akin to those in Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237
(Baltazar), where the California Supreme Court found the arbitration
agreement was not unconscionable. In that case, the agreement provided
that either party could seek provisional relief, including a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, pursuant to section 1281.8.
(Baltazar, at p. 1241.) The Court concluded the “provisional relief clause does
no more than recite the procedural protections already secured by section
1281.8[, subdivision (b)],” and was therefore not unfairly one-sided.
(Baltazar, at p. 1247.)
Here, by contrast, the Arbitration Agreement’s carve-out for injunctive
and declaratory relief is not limited to provisional relief and therefore exceeds
the protections offered by section 1281.8. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 499.) Like in Ramirez, there is a lack of mutuality because the agreement
“excludes any request for injunctive relief, including one for a permanent
injunction, related to unfair competition or unauthorized use of trade secrets
or confidential information,” which is more likely to be initiated by the
employer. (Ibid., italics added.) The CND goes even further by excepting all
claims related to confidential information and is not limited to only injunctive
or declaratory relief.
Additionally, and making the availability of remedies even more one-
sided, the CND specifically allows IGS to seek injunctive relief “without the
posting of any bond and without proof of actual damages.” Several courts
have found that similar provisions, which go beyond merely permitting
provisional injunctive relief and instead “authorize[] the stronger party to

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obtain injunctive relief without establishing all of the essential elements for
the issuance of an injunction,” lack mutuality and are substantively
unconscionable. (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 250;
accord, Lange v. Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 436, 451
[injunctive relief provisions that waive bond and requirement to show
irreparable harm substantively unconscionable]; Alberto, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at p. 492 [provisions that waive employer’s need to obtain bond
or show irreparable harm, and require an employee to consent to immediate
injunction, unconscionable as they “exceed the legitimate ‘margin of safety’
for the employer and are not mutual”].) We agree with those cases and find
the provision lacks mutuality.
Although IGS suggests the one-sided nature of the excluded provisions
serves its legitimate need to protect confidential information, it fails to
provide a justification as to why a provisional remedy, such as the one found
conscionable in Baltazar, would be insufficient to do so, and it offers no
explanation for why the even greater carve-out in the CND is justified.
Moreover, IGS does not assert any legitimate commercial need for the CND’s
provision permitting it to seek an injunction without meeting all the essential
elements for an injunction, and we can discern no such legitimate need.
(Lange v. Monster Energy Co., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 451.)
Accordingly, we conclude the lack of mutuality is substantively
unconscionable to a high degree as IGS has failed to provide a justification for
such expansive carve-outs in its favor. (See Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 500 [“In the absence of a cognizable justification, . . . we ‘must assume’ the
Agreement’s lack of mutuality is unconscionable.”].)

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2. Confidentiality Provision
IGS contends the trial court erroneously found the confidentiality
provision in the Arbitration Agreement “would preclude any employee such
as [Gurganus] from contacting or interviewing any potential witnesses
outside of the formal discovery process,” and that it was therefore
substantively unconscionable under Haydon, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 1280.
According to IGS, the court misconstrued the confidentiality provision, which
it asserts extends only to “confidentiality between the parties as to the
arbitration hearing itself” but does not prevent Gurganus from contacting or
interviewing a third party as part of the discovery process.
In Haydon, a confidentiality provision was found unconscionable that
barred the parties from “ ‘ “disclos[ing] the existence, content, or results of the
arbitration” ’ ” because it “would restrict the plaintiff from gathering
information informally, increasing his or her costs unnecessarily and
‘defeat[ing] the purpose of using arbitration as a simpler, more time-effective
forum for resolving disputes.’ ” (Haydon, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290,
quoting Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1066 (Ramos).)
Similarly, and contrary to IGS’s assertion, the plain language of the
confidentiality provision here supports the trial court’s finding that it would
broadly limit Gurganus from conducting informal discovery. Specifically, the
provision prohibits either party from “disclos[ing] any information to any
other party not involved in the arbitration hearing unless written approval
has been given by the other party.” Hence, “the practical impact” of the
confidentiality provision is that Gurganus would be in violation if she
attempted to informally contact or interview any other party—including by
providing any information related to her claims to possible witnesses—unless

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doing so as part of the formal discovery process. (Ramos, supra, 28
Cal.App.5th at p. 1066.)3
Just as in Haydon, we find unavailing IGS’s reliance on Woodside
Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 723, and
Sanchez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
398, disapproved on other grounds in Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pages 505–506, as those cases “considered narrower provisions requiring only
the proceedings themselves to remain confidential.”4 (Haydon, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 1290.)
In sum, the practical effect of the confidentiality provision here is akin
to those found unconscionable in Haydon and Ramos, and we conclude it is
substantively unconscionable. When considered under the sliding scale
approach in combination with the high degree of substantive
unconscionability due to the lack of mutuality (section I.C.1., ante) and the
procedural unconscionability present in a contract of adhesion (section I.B.,
ante), the trial court did not err in finding the Arbitration Agreement
unconscionable.

3 Accepting IGS’s contention that the confidentiality provision could be

read more narrowly (to prevent disclosure only of information related to the
arbitration hearing itself) demonstrates the provision is at best ambiguous.
To the extent it is ambiguous, any ambiguity “must be construed against the
drafting employer and in favor of the nondrafting employee” where, as here,
the agreement was prepared entirely by the employer. (Sandquist v. Lebo
Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 248.)
4 We also find IGS’s reliance on Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Company

(9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3d 1251 unconvincing, as that case expressly relied
upon Sanchez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC, supra, 224
Cal.App.4th 398. In any event, unlike Haydon and Ramos, Poublon is not
binding on this court.

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II. Trial Court’s Refusal To Sever Was Not Abuse of Discretion
IGS argues the trial court abused its discretion by declining to sever
any unconscionable terms. We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of
discretion (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124) and conclude there was
none.
If a trial court finds a contract or any provisions therein to be
unconscionable, the court has the discretion to either refuse to enforce the
entire agreement if the agreement is permeated by unconscionability, or to
sever the unconscionable portion and enforce the remainder of the contract.
(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 121–122; Civ. Code, § 1670.5,
subd. (a).) Where an arbitration agreement contains more than one unlawful
provision, those “multiple defects indicate a systematic effort to impose
arbitration on an employee not simply as an alternative to litigation, but as
an inferior forum that works to the employer’s advantage,” supporting a
finding that the arbitration agreement is “permeated by an unlawful
purpose.” (Armendariz, at p. 124.)
The trial court found that, as there was more than one substantively
unconscionable provision, severance was not warranted. It cited Carlson v.
Home Team Pest Defense, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 619, 639, for the
proposition that, where there is more than one unlawful provision, an
arbitration agreement can be considered permeated by unconscionability.
Thus, we presume the court found the Arbitration Agreement was permeated
by unconscionability, and we see no abuse of discretion in that finding. (See
Haydon, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1292.)

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III. Any Error in Court’s Refusal To Issue a Statement of Decision
Was Harmless
Finally, IGS argues the trial court erred by denying its request for a
statement of decision. IGS relies on Metis Development LLC v. Bohacek
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 679, 689, where Division Five of this court held that,
“at least where there is an adjudication of a question of fact by the court in
deciding a petition to compel arbitration, a request for a statement of decision
in the manner required by section 632 obligates the court to issue one.”
Even assuming, arguendo, IGS made a proper request for a statement
of decision and that the trial court erred by denying that request, we would
find any error harmless as the trial court’s tentative and oral rulings were
sufficient to permit adequate appellate review. (See F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1099, 1116; cf. Metis Development LLC v. Bohacek, supra, 200
Cal.App.4th at p. 688 [statement of decision for hearing on petition to compel
arbitration needed “to enable meaningful appellate review”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying IGS’s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Gurganus shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(2).)

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PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, P. J.

FUJISAKI, J.

A170738 / Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC

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Filed: 10/17/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

SARAH GURGANUS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170738
v.
IGS SOLUTIONS LLC, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. CU23-04101)
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:**
The written opinion which was filed on September 25, 2025, has now
been certified for publication pursuant to rule 8.1105(b) of the California
Rules of Court, and it is ordered published in the official reports.

Dated: __10/17/25________________ ____Tucher, P.J.___
Presiding Justice

** Tucher, P.J., Petrou, J., and Fujisaki, J.
Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Stephen Gizzi

Counsel: Fisher & Phillips, Todd B. Scherwin, Christopher D.
Chaplin, Danielle Zobel and Cindy A. Kaoud for
Defendant and Appellant

Falakassa Law, Joshua Falakassa; and Bokhour Law
Group, Mehrdad Bokhour for Plaintiff and Respondent

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