CourtListener 10704609•People v. Ramirez CA4/3
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Filed 10/15/25 P. v. Ramirez CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062751
v. (Super. Ct. No. INF1700358)
JAIME RAMIREZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Dean Benjamini, Judge. Affirmed in part, modified in part, reversed
in part, and remanded with directions.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Jaime Ramirez was convicted of multiple sex crimes
against his biological daughter and two stepdaughters. On appeal, Ramirez
raises the following claims of error: (1) the evidence to support his convictions
on counts 4 and 7 was insufficient because the prosecution failed to prove the
victim was 14 years of age or older, and the evidence was insufficient to prove
the great bodily injury enhancement as to count 9; (2) the trial court failed to
properly instruct the jury; (3) his conviction on count 21 for sodomy with a
minor must be reduced to sodomy because sodomy with a minor is not a
lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age
of 14 by committing forcible sodomy; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct
by indoctrinating and conditioning the jury panel during voir dire and
improperly vouching for the witnesses during closing argument;
(5) cumulative error requires reversal of his conviction; (6) the court erred by
failing to stay sentence on two counts pursuant to Penal Code1 section 654;
(7) the court erred in imposing sentence on counts 4, 6, 7, and 15–17
pursuant to a sentencing enhancement that had not been pled and proven;
(8) the court erred in imposing a consecutive indeterminate term on count 11;
and (9) the first amended abstract of judgment must be corrected to
accurately reflect the judgment.
We conclude Ramirez’s conviction on count 21 must be modified
to sodomy because he was improperly convicted of a lesser related offense of
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
2
sodomy with a minor. We further conclude the trial court erred in imposing
sentence pursuant to a sentencing enhancement which had not been pled and
proven at trial, and therefore, Ramirez’s sentences on counts 4, 6, 7, and 15–
17 must be reversed and remanded to the court for resentencing. We also find
the court erred in imposing sentence on count 11 and reverse and remand for
resentencing. Finally, the first amended abstract of judgment must be
corrected to accurately reflect the judgment, and we therefore remand to the
court for that purpose. We reject Ramirez’s other claims of error and
otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTS
A.P. met Ramirez in 2000; she and her two young daughters,
then 9-year-old M. and 6-year-old C., moved in with Ramirez and his
brother’s family in 2001. A.P. gave birth to Ramirez’s daughter D. that year
and to their son in 2003. Ramirez committed numerous sexual crimes against
his two stepdaughters, M. and C., and his biological daughter, D., beginning
when they were young and continuing until adulthood. Ramirez was initially
charged with 24 counts against C., M., and D.
A jury found Ramirez guilty of the following crimes against C.:
(1) lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288,
subd. (a); count 1); (2) aggravated sexual assault upon a child under the age
of 14 and seven or more years younger than the defendant, by committing
rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 2); (3) forcible sexual penetration of a minor 14
years of age or older (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C); count 4); (4) two counts of forcible
rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 6, 9); and (5) sodomy by force on a minor 14
years of age or older (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 7).
The jury found Ramirez guilty of the following crimes against M.:
(1) lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd.
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(a); count 10); (2) aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of 14 and
seven or more years younger than the defendant, by committing rape (§ 269,
subd. (a)(1); count 11); (3) two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act
by force upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 12, 13);
(4) oral copulation with a person under the age of 16 years by a person over
the age of 21 years (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2); count 14); (5) two counts of forcible
rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 15, 17); and (6) oral copulation by force, fear,
or threats (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2); count 16).
The jury found Ramirez guilty of the following crimes against D.:
(1) lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a);
count 18); (2) lewd or lascivious act by force upon a child under the age of 14
(§ 288, subd. (b)(1); count 19); (3) aggravated sexual assault of a child under
the age of 14 and seven or more years younger than the defendant by
committing sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 20); and (4) by
committing attempted rape by force (§§ 664/261, subd. (a)(2); count 22). The
jury also found Ramirez guilty of the lesser included offense of sodomy with a
minor, defendant 21 years of age or older (§ 286, subd. (b)(2), count 21).
The jury found true the allegation the victims were minors 14
years of age or older (§ 667.61, subd. (m)) as to counts 4, 6, 7, and 15–17;
Ramirez inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.8) as to
count 9; and he committed a qualifying sex offense against more than one
victim (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)).
The trial court sentenced Ramirez to prison for a term of
105 years to life plus 56 years, 2 months, consisting of an indeterminate
sentence of consecutive terms of 15 years to life on each of counts 4, 6, 7, 11,
and 15–17, and a determinate term of six years on each of counts 1, 2, 12, 13,
and 20; six years for the offense plus five years for the section 12022.8
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enhancement on count 9; two years on each of counts 10 and 18; eight years
on count 19; eight months on each of counts 14 and 21; and one year and
10 months on count 22.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Ramirez contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
forcible sexual penetration of a minor 14 years of age or older in count 4 and
forcible sodomy with a minor 14 years of age or older in count 7 because the
prosecution failed to prove C. was 14 years of age or older at the time of the
crimes. Ramirez also argues the evidence was insufficient to prove the great
bodily injury enhancement as to count 9. We conclude the evidence adduced
at trial was sufficient to prove each of these counts.
A. Factual Background
1. Count 4
C., who was an adult at the time of trial, testified the family was
living in apartment number 56 at the time Ramirez began inappropriately
touching her when she was approximately 11 years old. The four children
shared a bedroom, but the girls’ younger brother would often be in A.P. and
Ramirez’s bedroom. Ramirez would touch C. when her mother and older
sister went to the store, and C. stayed home to watch her younger siblings.
The touching started with Ramirez rubbing his hand on C.’s leg, breasts, and
buttocks, both over and under her clothing.
Although it was difficult to remember exactly when, C. believed
she may have been about 12 or 13 years old when Ramirez began touching
the outside of her vagina under her clothing, as well as putting his fingers
inside her vagina. These incidents occurred either in Ramirez’s bedroom or
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the living room when the other family members were absent. Ramirez told C.
not to tell anyone and threatened to take her brother and sister away if she
reported the sexual abuse. These incidents continued after C.’s 18th birthday.
During cross-examination, C. was asked if she told a police
investigator in 2017 that these incidents occurred when she was “probably
14.” C. responded, “I don’t remember the age.”
As charged in the first amended information and reflected in the
verdict on count 4, the offense occurred “on, or between March 5, 2009
through March 4, 2010.” The amended information further alleged the
offense occurred in “9th Grade, Mom’s room.” C. was born in March 1995, and
she graduated from high school at the age of 18, which would have been in
2013. Therefore, C. would have turned 14 in March of 2009, when she was in
ninth grade.
2. Count 7
Ramirez put his penis “inside [C.’s] butt” on a single occasion in
her mother’s bedroom. C. asked Ramirez to stop and told him it was hurting
her. C. believed she was in ninth grade when this occurred.
Count 7 was alleged to have occurred “on, or between March 5,
2009 through March 4, 2010.” The amended information states the offense
occurred in “9th Grade, Younger sibling’s room.” However, the verdict form
for count 7 describes the event as occurring in “Mom’s Room.”
3. Count 9
C. testified Ramirez raped her on multiple occasions. The last
time occurred after she had graduated from high school, around September or
October 2013. Ramirez led her to the bedroom and took her clothes off, made
her lie on the bed, and put his penis inside her vagina. C. did not want to
have sex with Ramirez and did not agree to do so. On other similar occasions,
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he had ejaculated on her breasts or her buttocks but this time he ejaculated
inside her vagina. Ramirez seemed worried and told C. to hurry to the
bathroom to urinate.
During this time period, C. was dating D.C., whom she later
married. C. gave birth to a daughter born in June 2014. When C. turned 21,
she got drunk and told D.C. that her daughter might be Ramirez’s child.
After C. reported Ramirez to the police, an investigator took a sample of both
Ramirez’s and C.’s daughter’s DNA. The test confirmed Ramirez was the
father of C.’s daughter.
C. reported the sexual abuse to her mother on two separate
occasions, one of which was when she was in middle school, but her mother
did not do anything about it.
B. Legal Standard
“When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, the appellate court reviews the entire record to see
‘“whether it contains substantial evidence—i.e., evidence that is credible and
of solid value—from which a rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”’”(People v. Cochran (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 8, 12–13 (Cochran), disapproved on other grounds in People
v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 248, fn. 12.) “We view the facts in the light
most favorable to the judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in its
support.” (Cochran, at p. 13.) “The test on appeal is not whether we believe
the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether ““any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.””” (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court has held that generic testimony regarding
sexual molestation may constitute substantial evidence to sustain a
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conviction under section 288, subdivision (a): “It must be remembered that
even generic testimony (e.g., an act of intercourse ‘once a month for three
years’) outlines a series of specific, albeit undifferentiated, incidents each of
which amounts to a separate offense, and each of which could support a
separate criminal sanction.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314
(Jones).) The court noted, “the victim’s failure to specify precise date, time,
place or circumstance [does not] render generic testimony insufficient,”
because “the particular details surrounding a child molestation charge are
not elements of the offense and are unnecessary to sustain a conviction.” (Id.
at p. 315.)
In order for generic testimony to be sufficient to sustain a
conviction, “[t]he victim . . . must describe the kind of act or acts committed
with sufficient specificity, both to assure that unlawful conduct indeed has
occurred and to differentiate between the various types of proscribed conduct
(e.g., lewd conduct, intercourse, oral copulation or sodomy). Moreover, the
victim must describe the number of acts committed with sufficient certainty
to support each of the counts alleged in the information or indictment (e.g.,
‘twice a month’ or ‘every time we went camping’). Finally, the victim must be
able to describe the general time period in which these acts occurred (e.g., ‘the
summer before my fourth grade,’ or ‘during each Sunday morning after he
came to live with us’), to assure the acts were committed within the
applicable limitation period. Additional details regarding the time, place or
circumstance of the various assaults may assist in assessing the credibility or
substantiality of the victim’s testimony, but are not essential to sustain a
conviction.” (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 316.)
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C. Analysis
1. Counts 4 and 7
Here, the generic testimony was sufficient for the jury to find
Ramirez guilty of the crimes in counts 4 and 7. Regarding count 4, C. testified
about the type of act, i.e., Ramirez’s digital penetration of her vagina, when
these acts occurred, i.e., on occasions when her mother and M. went to the
store, and the general time period in which they happened, i.e., beginning
when she was 12 or 13 years old and continuing after she graduated from
high school. Because C. testified to multiple incidents occurring from the age
of 12 or 13 years and continuing after high school, the jury could reasonably
have found Ramirez committed at least one violation of section 289,
subd. (a)(1)(C), in the period between March 2009, when C. turned 14,
through March 2010, when she turned 15.
Regarding count 7, C. testified about the type of act, i.e., Ramirez
forcibly putting his penis inside her anus; when this act occurred, i.e., on a
single occasion in her mother’s bedroom; and the general time period in
which it happened, i.e., when she was in ninth grade, during which time she
was 14 years of age.
2. Count 9
The prosecution’s theory of great bodily injury was premised on
C.’s pregnancy, which occurred as a result of the forcible rape in count 9. In
order to establish a great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.8,
the prosecution must prove the defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury, as defined in section 12022.7, during the commission of one of the
sexual felonies enumerated in section 12022.8. Such felonies include rape “by
force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
9
injury on the person or another.” (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); see also People v. Cross
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 63, fn. 2 (Cross).)
Great bodily injury is defined in section 12022.7, subdivision (f),
as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” The victim need not have
suffered a permanent or prolonged injury, disfigurement, or impairment.
(People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 (Escobar); Cross, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 64.) The great bodily injury must be “‘beyond that inherent in
the offense’’’ of rape. (Ibid.)
The question regarding “whether a victim has suffered physical
harm amounting to great bodily injury is not a question of law for the court
but a factual inquiry to be resolved by the jury.” (Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 64.) The jury’s finding must be upheld as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence. (Escobar, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 750.)
Courts have held a pregnancy may qualify as a great bodily
injury. In People v. Sargent (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 148, 150, the defendant
forcibly raped a 17-year-old girl at knifepoint. The girl became pregnant and
had an abortion. (Ibid.) The court held “[p]regnancy resulting from rape is
great bodily injury.” (Id. at p. 151.) Given the “[m]ajor physical changes” that
take place in a woman’s body during pregnancy, the court observed
“[p]regnancy cannot be termed a trivial, insignificant matter,” and “[i]t is all
the more devastating when imposed on a woman by forcible rape.” (Ibid.)
In Cross, our Supreme Court found there was sufficient evidence
to support a great bodily injury enhancement based solely upon a pregnancy
without medical complications that resulted from unlawful but nonforcible
sexual conduct with a minor. (Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 65–66.) The
court found it unnecessary, however, to decide “whether every pregnancy
resulting from unlawful sexual conduct, forcible or otherwise, will invariably
10
support a factual determination that the victim has suffered a significant or
substantial injury, within the language of section 12022.7.” (Id. at p. 66.) The
court in Cross limited its holding to the factual circumstances of the victim’s
pregnancy, which resulted in a late term surgical abortion and hospital stay.
(Id. at pp. 62, 66.) Because the underlying crime in Cross involved a
nonforcible sexual offense, the court did not consider whether forcible rape,
resulting in pregnancy, invariably supports a factual determination of great
bodily injury.
Ramirez attempts to distinguish these cases, arguing C.’s
pregnancy did not constitute great bodily injury because she was not a minor
or virgin when impregnated, and there was no evidence presented at trial
that her pregnancy or labor was difficult. However, the fact C. was not a
minor or virgin does not compel a finding she did not suffer great bodily
injury as a result of the forcible rape, nor does a lack of evidence regarding
the particular circumstances of C.’s pregnancy. (People v. Smith (2005) 37
Cal.4th 733, 738–739.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s
findings, the reviewing court may not reverse the judgment merely because it
believes that the circumstances might also support a contrary finding.”
(People v. Gresham (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 59, 68.)
II.
INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR
Ramirez raises the following claims of instructional error: (1) the
trial court failed to instruct the jury on the offense of forcible sexual
penetration of a minor 14 years of age or older in count 4; (2) the court failed
to instruct the jury regarding unanimity on counts 6, 14, and 15; (3) the court
erred in instructing the jury regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (CSAAS); and (4) instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3515
11
reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof. We reject Ramirez’s claims of
instructional error.
A. Legal Standard
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210 (Cole).) “‘Instructions should be interpreted, if
possible, so as to support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are
reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.’” (People v. Martin (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1112.) “‘“[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be
determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of
parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.”’” (People v.
Musselwhite (1998)17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248. ““‘The absence of an essential
element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the
instructions as a whole.”’” (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016
(Castillo).)
In determining whether an instruction is ambiguous or
misleading, the court considers “the specific language challenged, the
instructions as a whole[,] the jury’s findings” (People v. Cain (1995)
10 Cal.4th 1, 36 (Cain)), and closing arguments by counsel to determine
whether the instructional error “would have misled a reasonable jury” (id. at
p. 37).
Reversal is not required unless it is reasonably likely the jury
misunderstood and misapplied the court’s instructions to the defendant’s
detriment. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 963–964.) A trial
court’s failure to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a
constitutional error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the
California and United States Constitutions.” (People v. Flood (1998) 18
Cal.4th 470, 475.)
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B. Analysis
Ramirez claims the trial court committed reversible error in
instructing the jury. We address each alleged instructional error in turn.
1. Failure to Instruct on Forcible Sexual Penetration of a Minor
Ramirez contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury
regarding the crime of forcible sexual penetration with a minor 14 years of
age or older (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C)) in count 4. Although the jury was
instructed on the offense of forcible sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)),
the instruction stated it applied to count 20, not count 4. Additionally, the
jury was not instructed on the age requirement element of the offense in
count 4. Ramirez contends this instructional error was not harmless, and
therefore, reversal of his conviction of count 4 is required.
When initially discussing jury instructions, the trial court and
counsel agreed that the court would instruct the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1045 regarding forcible sexual penetration. They also agreed that,
because C. testified Ramirez had sexually penetrated her by force from the
age of 13 until she was in the 12th grade, the specification of the age element
for section 289, subdivision (a)(1)(C) was not required. The court agreed to
give an unanimity instruction for count 4. The court also discussed the
instructions for the lesser included offenses for count 4.
However, when later finalizing the jury instructions, the trial
court asked counsel whether count 20 was the only sexual penetration count
for which the court would instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1045. Both
the prosecutor and defense counsel mistakenly agreed count 20 was the only
count brought pursuant to section 289.
The trial court instructed the jury regarding count 4 as follows:
“To decide whether the defendant intended to commit sodomy, in violation of
13
. . . . section 286[, subdivision] (c)(2)(C) or [section] 286[,subdivision] (c)(2)(B);
sexual penetration by force, in violation of . . . section 289[, subdivision]
(a)(1)(C); or rape, in violation of Penal Code section 261[, subdivision] (a)(2),
please refer to [CALCRIM Nos.] 1030, 1045, and 1000, which define[] those
crimes. Those instructions are going to be coming up in a couple of minutes
here.”
The trial court then instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1045,
but only as to count 20, “The defendant is charged in Count 20 with sexual
penetration by force, in violation of . . . section 289[, subdivision] (a)(1)(A).·To
prove the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶]
One, the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another
object—another person. Excuse me. [¶] Two, the penetration was
accomplished by use of a foreign object. [¶] Three, the other person did not
consent to the act. [¶] And four, the defendant accomplished the act by force
or duress.”
The trial court further instructed the jury that, if it found
Ramirez guilty of count 4, it also had to decide whether the prosecution
proved the additional allegation he committed the crime against a victim who
was over the age of 14 at the time of the offense.
The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3501
regarding unanimity as to count 4 as follows: “The defendant is charged with
sexual penetration by force , . . . section 289[, subdivision] (a)(1)(C), in Count
4, sometime during the period of March 5, 2009, to March 4, 2010. [¶] The
People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove the defendant
committed this offense. You must not find the defendant guilty unless: [¶]
One, you all agree the People have proved the defendant committed at least
one of those acts, and you all agree on which act Defendant committed. [¶] Or
14
you all agree the People have proved the defendant committed all the acts
alleged to have occurred during the time period.”
During closing argument, the prosecution explained count 4 as
follows: “Count 4, for your consideration with regards to [C.], was sexual
penetration with [C.]. Now, remember, this is different than sexual
intercourse. This is different than what we think about rape. This is not a sex
organ in her vagina. This is not a penis inside her vagina. This is a foreign
object, and in this case, this would have been his fingers inside her vagina.
“So it’s sexual penetration, no matter how slight; right?·That
means if you just break the labia minora—the majora on the very top of that
vagina, you’ve done enough. Again, it’s a different standard than what we
look for in actual sexual penetration or rape. She did not consent.
“Again, in all of these cases, ladies and gentlemen, in all of these
situations, there’s nothing to suggest that [C.] consented to any of these.
“And that force or fear was used. She talks about the defendant
mentioning that she wouldn’t see her brother and sister. She talks about
having to push him away during this time, during this occurrence. It’s the
People’s position, folks, that Penal Code section 289[, subdivision] (a)(1), the
sexual penetration with force or duress has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
Here, the jury instructions as a whole, together with closing
arguments, adequately instructed the jury as to the essential elements of
count 4. (Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1016.) Although the jury did not
receive instruction specifically related to count 4, it nevertheless was
instructed with CALCRIM No. 1045 regarding the elements of sexual
penetration by force as to count 20. Furthermore, the prosecutor accurately
described all of the required elements of sexual penetration by force of a
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minor age 14 years or older during closing argument. Additionally, regarding
the age element for count 4, the jury found true the allegation that C. was
over the age of 14 when Ramirez digitally penetrated her.
Even if the trial court erred in failing to specifically instruct the
jury regarding count 4, any error was harmless. As discussed above, C.’s
testimony constituted sufficient evidence to prove count 4 beyond a
reasonable doubt, including that she was 14 years of age or older at the time
of the crime. It is not reasonably likely the jury would have acquitted
Ramirez of count 4 if it had been instructed regarding the elements of sexual
penetration by force.
2. Failure to Instruct Regarding Unanimity
Ramirez contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct on
unanimity regarding counts 6, 14, and 15 because the prosecution presented
evidence of more than one act for each of these crimes. We conclude the court
was not required to provide an unanimity instruction on counts 6, 14, and 15
because the prosecutor elected a specific incident in closing argument for
each of those counts.
During discussions regarding jury instructions, neither the trial
court nor the parties requested an unanimity instruction regarding counts 6,
14, or 15.
The prosecutor addressed count 6 in closing argument:
“The next count for your consideration, folks, is Count 6, and
that’s a [section] 261[, subdivision] (a)(2). Again this is unlawful sexual
intercourse with [C.]. This would have taken place per her testimony in the
10th grade. She describes this instance taking place in her sibling’s room;
right?”
16
The prosecutor addressed count 14 in closing argument:
“Count 14, this would have been the aforementioned oral
copulation with [M.]. This would have been the defendant having [M.] place
his penis in her mouth. Again, one of the elements is the defendant was at
least 21 years of age. We know that to be true and that [C.] [sic] was under
the age of 16.
“This incident would have taken place in Apartment 30, so we’ve
shifted venues a little bit. Just for sake of ease, just so you, folks, can keep
things straight, now we’re at Apartment 30.·If you recall, there were two
apartments. The family lived in Apartment 30 for about four years, and then
they moved to Apartment 56.
“[M.]’s testimony was that she recalls moving into that
apartment, Number 30, in the 7th grade. This would have been an incident—
and we’ll talk about this in a minute, but just for sake of clarity, so we can
kind of keep things together and keep them straight, this would have been
before an incident concerning her request to go to prom. This would have
been a different oral copulation with the defendant, different than what she
describes taking place when she asked Mr. Ramirez if she could go to the
dance with Juan. That’s a separate incident. We’ll talk about that. I want to
point that out because one of the elements is that she was under the age of
16, and this happened before the incident that she describes being a
sophomore in high school. It’s the People’s position that . . . [M.] was under
the age of 16 when this took place.”
The prosecutor addressed count 15 in closing argument:
“Count 15, this would have been a separate incident from the
prom incident. I keep going back to that so we can keep these in order. Again,
this is unlawful or consensual sexual intercourse with [M.].·Defendant and
17
[M.] were not married at the time nor did [M.] consent. We’ll talk more about
that a little later. But, again, as the case with [C.], at no point did [M.]
consent to any of these acts that took place.
“The defendant used force or fear or used force or duress. This
was at Apartment 30.·And again, this was a sexual act that she described
penis in vagina before the prom incident, so this was in a separate incident
that took place between [M.] and the defendant.”
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a unanimous
jury. (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) “To protect this right, ‘if
one criminal act is charged, but the evidence tends to show the commission of
more than one such act, “either the prosecution must elect the specific act
relied upon to prove the charge to the jury, or the court must instruct the jury
that it must unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same
specific criminal act.”’” (People v. Brown (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 332, 341
(Brown).)
The presentation of evidence showing the commission of more
than one act supporting a charged offense creates the requirement of either
an unanimity instruction or the ““‘prosecution must elect the specific act
relied upon to prove the charge to the jury.’”” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th
at p. 341.) “The prosecution can make an election by ‘tying each specific count
to specific criminal acts elicited from the victims’ testimony’—typically in
opening statement and/or closing argument. [Citations.] Such an election
removes the need for an unanimity instruction. [Citation.] [¶] Under these
principles, there is an implicit presumption that the jury will rely on the
prosecution’s election and, indeed, is bound by it.” (Ibid.)
Here, no unanimity instruction was required because the
prosecutor elected a specific act to prove each of the crimes charged in
18
counts 6, 14, and 15. The prosecutor expressly claimed count 6 was a single
“instance” of “unlawful sexual intercourse” which “t[ook] place in [C.’s]
sibling’s room.” The prosecutor similarly described count 14 as an “incident”
of “oral copulation” which “t[ook] place in Apartment 30” and which occurred
“before . . . her request to go to prom.” Finally, the prosecutor expressly
claimed count 15 was a “separate incident” of “penis in vagina” which
occurred “before the prom incident.”
By making such an election regarding counts 6, 14, and 15, the
prosecution negated the need for an unanimity instruction. (Brown, supra,
11 Cal.App.5th at p. 341; see also People v. Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128,
162 [no need for unanimity instruction for multiple sex crimes where
prosecutor made election in closing argument and expressly tied specific
counts to specific acts of oral copulation and touching].)
3. Jury Instructions Regarding CSAAS
Ramirez argues the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM
No. 1193 because it improperly allowed the jury to use the expert’s testimony
regarding CSAAS as evidence of his guilt.
The trial court admitted expert testimony by Dr. Veronica
Thomas, a forensic psychologist. Thomas testified CSAAS evidence is used to
describe and explain characteristic behaviors or stages commonly found in
children who have been sexually abused. CSAAS is a tool to help therapists
and others, such as jury members, understand why children who have
allegedly been sexually abused behave as they do because these behaviors
might otherwise seem counterintuitive or evidence of untruthfulness.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193: “You
have heard testimony from Dr. Veronica Thomas regarding child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome. [¶] Child sexual abuse accommodation
19
syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that may be present in child sexual
abuse cases. Testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is offered only to
explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse. [¶] Dr.
Veronica Thomas’ testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes
charged against him. [¶] You may consider this evidence only in deciding
whether or not [C., M., or D.]’s conduct was consistent with the conduct of
someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of the
alleged victim.”
CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to prove that the complaining
witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to rehabilitate such
witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct
after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation.” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289,
1300.) Thus, CSAAS is relevant solely for the limited purpose of evaluating
the credibility of an alleged child victim. (People v. Mateo (2016)
243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069.) This evidence ‘“is needed . . . to explain the
emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching
behavior.”’ (McAlpin, at p. 1301.)
Ramirez argues it was impossible for the jury to use the CSAAS
testimony to evaluate the victims’ credibility without also using it as proof
that he committed the charged crimes, and therefore the trial court
committed reversible error in giving the instruction.
Courts reviewing this issue have concluded CALCRIM No. 1193
“accurately informs the jury on the limited use of CSAAS evidence” and does
not, as Ramirez argues, “improperly allow an alleged minor victim of sexual
abuse to corroborate her own testimony.” (See, e.g., People v. Lapenias (2021)
20
67 Cal.App.5th 162, 175.) Here, the instruction properly limited the jury’s
consideration of the CSAAS evidence, explicitly informing the jury that it
could only use the CSAAS testimony to evaluate the victims’ credibility, not
as evidence of Ramirez’s guilt. We presume the jury understood and followed
the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19,
26 (Washington).) Accordingly, we find that the instruction did not permit an
improper inference of Ramirez’s guilt. (People v. Gonzales (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504.)
4. CALCRIM No. 3515
Ramirez argues CALCRIM No. 3515 reduced the prosecution’s
burden of proof in violation of his right to due process because it erroneously
instructed the jury it did not have to separately consider counts 2, 4, 6, 7, 9,
11–13, 15, 17, and 19–22.
At the time of its deliberations, the jury was asked to return
verdicts on 20 separate counts. Defense counsel requested the trial court
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3515 regarding separate crimes. During
a jury instruction conference, the court stated, “3515, I believe still needs to
be given. These are the counts. Well, this specifies for each count is a
separate crime other than the ones that have lesser included offenses, and
those are specified as 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11 to 13, 15, 17, and 19 to 22. I think those
are all the ones that have lessers.” Defense counsel submitted on the
instruction.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3515 as
follows: “Each of the counts charged in this case is a separate crime. You
must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each
one except for Counts 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11-13, 15, 17, 19–22, which are for lesser
included offenses and will be addressed in other instructions.”
21
The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3517
regarding the counts for which the jury received instructions on lesser
included offenses, which also identified the applicable lesser crimes. The
instruction stated, “If all of you find that the defendant is not guilty of a
greater charged crime, you may find him guilty of a lesser crime, if you are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that
lesser crime. A defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser
crime for the same conduct.” The instruction also stated, “It is up to you to
decide the order in which you consider each crime and the relevant evidence,
but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if you have found the
defendant not guilty of the corresponding greater crime.”
During deliberations, the jury sent the following question to the
trial court: “Some jurors are concerned that an inability to come to consensus
on some charges might negate the consensus found on the other charges. Can
we get clarity on this?” In response, the court further instructed the jury in
person as follows:
“What I’m going to do is two things: One, I’m going to refer you
back to instruction [CALCRIM] 3517, that is the very long one. But I’m also
going to try to give you some clarity as well.
“There are two potential issues. One, every count stands
individually. So a verdict on Count 1—or a lack of a verdict on Count 1, for
instance, has no bearing on what you do on Count 4 or 7 or 13 or whatever or
vice versa. Each one stands individually.
“You must try to reach a verdict on each count. If you’re unable to
do so, then you need to let me know which ones or one you cannot reach a
verdict on, but you still must try to reach a verdict on all other counts.
22
“Then internally, for any count that has a lesser included offense
or offenses, you always have to determine whether or not you can reach a
verdict on the greater charge, the first charge first. If you cannot reach a
verdict on that, then you simply stop. You don’t go down the line further. The
only time you go down the line further to lesser included offenses is if you
have reached a verdict of not guilty as to that particular offense.”
This claim is waived for failure to object to the instruction below.
Defense counsel neither objected to, nor requested to modify the wording of,
CALCRIM No. 3515. (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 189 [claim
was forfeited where “[d]efendant did not request in the trial court that the . . .
instruction be modified or limited in any way”].)
Even if the claim were not waived, it fails on the merits. The
wording of CALCRIM No. 3515 accurately stated the law and did not allow
the jury to consider all of the listed counts together or lessen the
prosecution’s burden of proof on any of these counts. (See People v. Felix
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 849, 865 [CALCRIM No. 3515 does not suggest that
charged counts constitute proven crimes or improperly inform the jury it
must return verdicts].)
The instructions as a whole accurately informed the jury it must
consider each charge separately, while also determining whether Ramirez
was guilty of any lesser included offenses for the crimes charged in counts 2,
4, 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 15, 17, and 19–22. Moreover, CALCRIM No. 3517 made
clear to the jury it could only convict Ramirez of either the greater or lesser
crime, not both. In response to the jury’s note, the trial court further
explained to the jury it must consider each charge separately and could only
convict Ramirez of a lesser included offense if it first found him not guilty of
the greater offense. We assume the jury understood and followed the court’s
23
instructions. (Washington, supra,15 Cal.App.5th at p. 26.) Under these
circumstances, it is not reasonably likely the jury misinterpreted the
instructions.
III.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
Ramirez contends his conviction on count 21 for sodomy with a
minor (§ 286, subd. (b)(2)) must be reduced to sodomy (§ 286, subd. (b)(1))
because sodomy with a minor is not a lesser included offense of the predicate
crime of aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 by
committing forcible sodomy. The Attorney General concedes sodomy with a
minor is not a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault on a child
under the age of 14, but argues Ramirez impliedly agreed to the charge as a
lesser related offense. Because we conclude Ramirez did not agree to the
inclusion of section 286, subdivision (b)(2) as a lesser related offense, he can
only be convicted of the offense of sodomy (§ 286, subd. (b)(1)).
A. Factual Background
Count 21 of the amended information charged Ramirez with
“violation of . . . section 269, subdivision (a), subsection (3), a felony, in that
on, or between August 26, 2015 through November 20, 2015, . . . the
defendant did commit a violation of subsection (2) or (3) of subdivision (c), or
subdivision (d) of . . . section 286, SODOMY, by force, violence, duress,
menace and fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, upon [D.], a child
who was under 14 years of age and seven or more years younger than the
defendant . . . .”
Ramirez requested the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser
included offenses of simple assault and the underlying crime of sodomy on
count 21. During initial discussions regarding jury instructions, the court and
24
parties agreed the predicate offense for count 21 was sodomy (§ 286, subd.
(c)(2)(B)). Defense counsel requested the court instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of attempted sodomy, to which the court agreed. In response
to the prosecutor’s question, the court confirmed the attempted sodomy
instruction would be pursuant to section 286, subdivision (c)(2)(B). The court
also stated it would instruct on assault with intent to commit sodomy of a
person under 18 years of age (§ 220, subd. (a)(2)) as a lesser included offense.
During a subsequent conference, the trial court raised count 21,
which it characterized as “a difficult count with the lesser includeds.” The
court observed D. testified the offense occurred when “she was in 9th grade,
but it was before her 14th birthday, and those are internally inconsistent, so
the jury might find one way or the other.” The court therefore concluded an
appropriate lesser included offense for count 21 would be sodomy of a person
under 16 years of age by any person over 21 years of age (§ 286, subd. (b)(2)).
The court explained, “By giving [section] 286[, subdivision] (c)(2)(C) and
[section] 286[, subdivision] (b)(2), we’re covering the situation where the jury
believes that the minor was over the age of 14 but either with force or
without force.” “So it’s any person 21 years of age or over who participates in
an act of sodomy with someone who is under 16, would be [section]
286[, subdivision] (b)(2). I think that is an appropriately given lesser.” The
court noted, “There’s substantial evidence that [D.] was under 14. There’s
substantial evidence that she was over 14,” and “the jury has to decide which
one it is.” The court then stated it believed the instruction “had to be given,”
to which the prosecutor replied, “Okay,” and defense counsel stated,
“Submit.”
The trial court instructed the jury on count 21 with CALCRIM
No. 1123, “Aggravated Sexual Assault of Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code,
25
§ 269[, subd.] (a)).” The instruction stated the prosecution had to prove “[t]he
defendant committed . . . Sodomy in violation of . . . section 286
[, subdivision] (c)(2)(B)” and “[w]hen the defendant acted, the other person
was under the age of 14 years and was at least seven years younger than the
defendant.”
The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1030,
“Sodomy by Force (Pen. Code, § 286[, subd.] (c)(2)(B)),” which stated the
prosecution had to prove “[t]he defendant committed an act of sodomy with
another person; [¶] . . . [t]he other person did not consent to the act; [¶] . . . [¶]
. . . [t]he defendant accomplished the act by force or duress; [and] [¶] . . . [t]he
other person was under 14 years of age when the act was accomplished.”
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1091, “Sodomy With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code,
§ 286[, subd.] (b)(2)),” which provided the prosecution must prove “[t]he
defendant participated in an act of sodomy with another person; [¶] . . . [t]he
defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the act; [¶] AND [¶] . . .
[t]he other person was under the age of 16 years at the time of the act.”
The jury found Ramirez not guilty of the principal offense in
count 21, aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 (§ 269, subd. (a)(3)); it
instead found him guilty of the lesser included crime of sodomy with a minor
(§ 286, subd. (b)(2)).
B. Legal Standard
Due process requires an accused be afforded “‘fair notice of the
charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity
properly to prepare a defense and avoid unfair surprise at trial.’” (People v.
Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 973, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 568, fn. 3.; see also People v. Anderson (2020)
26
9 Cal.5th 946, 964 [proper notice allows the defendant “to make informed
decisions about the case, including whether to plead guilty, how to allocate
investigatory resources, and what strategy to deploy at trial”].) Therefore, a
defendant generally cannot be convicted of an uncharged offense unless it is a
necessarily included offense. (In re Hess (1955) 45 Cal.2d 171, 174–175.) This
prohibition also applies to lesser related offenses unless the defendant
consented to the lesser related crime. (Toro, at p. 973 [“where a defendant
expressly or impliedly consents to have trier of fact consider a nonincluded
offense,” the defendant cannot claim lack of notice]. We review claims of
instructional error de novo. (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1210.)
C. Analysis
We agree with Ramirez that he did not expressly or impliedly
consent to sodomy with a minor as a lesser related offense of aggravated
sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 by committing forcible sodomy.
Here, the trial court erroneously believed sodomy with a minor was a lesser
included offense and instructed the jury accordingly. There is no indication in
the record that defense counsel was agreeing to the jury being instructed on
the crime as a lesser related offense. (See People v. Parks (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [where trial court asked parties to address lesser
included offenses but convicted the defendant of lesser related offense, the
defendant had no notice court was considering lesser related offenses]; In re
Alberto S. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1465 [noting “silence at the time the
[erroneous] decision was announced cannot support an inference of [the
defendant’s] consent” where “[n]o mention was made during the proceedings
of lesser, nonincluded offenses”].)
Accordingly, we reduce Ramirez’s conviction on count 21 to
sodomy (§ 286, subd. (b)(1)), a lesser included offense of the crime of
27
aggravated sexual assault on a child under the age of 14 by committing
forcible sodomy and affirm the judgment as modified. (§§ 1260, 1181, subd. 6;
see also People v. Rivera (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 872, 879 [“‘“Where the
prejudicial error goes only to the degree of the offense for which the
defendant was convicted, the appellate court may reduce the conviction to a
lesser degree and affirm the judgment as modified, thereby obviating the
necessity for a retrial”’”].
IV.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Ramirez argues the prosector committed misconduct by
indoctrinating and conditioning the jury during voir dire and improperly
vouching for the credibility of the witnesses during closing argument. We
conclude that, although the prosecutor’s statements during voir dire
constituted misconduct, any error was harmless. We further conclude the
prosecutor’s statements during closing argument did not constitute
misconduct.
A. Factual Background
1. Voir Dire
The prosecutor asked potential jurors several questions regarding
why sexual abuse generally occurs in private without additional witnesses.
The prosecutor queried, “Would it make sense, then for somebody who’s
committing those types of acts to do that when maybe there’s no one else
around but that person—the person being abused?” The trial court sustained
defense counsel’s objection to this line of questioning as “improper voir dire.”
The prosecutor then began questioning potential jurors about
delayed disclosure of child sexual abuse. One potential juror responded,
“Well, if you—if you read and you learn a few things about it, it’s usually a
28
person in power, like a teacher, or student, coach, athlete, principal, teacher,
or whatever. It’s always a person that has some kind of authority or authority
figure, something like that.” The prosecutor then asked, “Could that also
extend to a family member?” Defense counsel objected, and the trial court
requested to speak to counsel at sidebar.
The trial court directed the prosecutor to limit discussion of child
abuse. The prosecutor explained, “I think in talking to the jurors about
whether there might be witnesses or not would go to the law on the
instructions they will get under one witness being sufficient. That’s why I
went in that direction.” “And then with regards to asking about why a person
may not disclose right away, I think that does go directly to the credibility of
the witnesses who will testify because they didn’t disclose right away, and I
want to see if that does play a determining factor in the jurors’—or potential
jurors’ credibility decision making, and that’s why I asked that question,
Your Honor.” The court sustained defense counsel’s objection noting “all I’m
hearing is a discussion about child abuse which really does start to rise to the
level of indoctrination and so forth.”
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing Ramirez could no
longer receive a fair trial because the prosector had improperly conditioned
the jury. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, concluding the
prosecutor’s questions had not risen “to a level where it’s
affected/preconditioned the entire jury to deprive [Ramirez] of his due process
right to a fair trial . . . .” The prosecutor did not ask any similar questions
upon resuming voir dire.
2. Closing Argument
Defense counsel asked D. on cross-examination whether she had
been told by anyone that when she came to court to testify, she should look
29
away from her father. D. replied the prosecutor told her “if it made [her] feel
more comfortable, [she could] look somewhere else instead of at [her] father.”
During closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the manner
in which M., C., and D. testified:
“I want you also to not forget how they testified, and I want you
to recall that. I want you to remember that because that’s crucial. Because
it’s not simply what they said, but it’s how they said it, and how they sat
there, and when they needed breaks, and why they needed breaks, and how
they sat positioned away from the defendant, which I suppose one could
argue is indicative of lying. One could say, ‘Well, you’re being dishonest. You
can’t even face that person.’ That’s one way to look at it.
“The other way—the more reasonable interpretation of that is
that these young women came in here, talked about horrific abuse over the
course of several years at the hands of a man they put their trust in, and
when they did that, that man sat near feet from them. And so if they turned
in their chair, they didn’t want to look directly at him, folks, that’s
understandable—that’s understandable.
“We talked about this in jury selection and how there really is no
right way to respond to trauma. There’s no handbook on how a person should
recall that, particularly in a room full of strangers, particularly in front of the
person who has abused you.”
During closing argument, defense counsel pointed out that none
of the alleged victims had looked at the jury, counsel, or Ramirez during their
testimony. Defense counsel reminded the jury that D. testified the prosecutor
told her she could look away when she testified. Defense counsel refuted the
prosecutor’s argument that D. was so traumatized by Ramirez’s abuse that
30
she could not even look at him, arguing that the prosecutor “told [D.] not to
look at us. He told her to not to look at you. You were denied that.”
Defense counsel continued, “And that is something the jury
instructions tell you. Look at the witness’s behavior on the stand. . . . [W]e
always talk about witnesses who have, you know, shifty eyes and where they
look down when they testify, they can’t look you in the eye. Those are things
that we all know from life experience. Yeah, those are the hallmarks of a liar.
[¶] Here we don’t even get to see that because she can’t face us. She can’t face
her father when she makes these bald lies against him. She can’t face you.
You’re the jury, the trier of fact, and you’re the ones who determine
credibility and whether or not these facts are true. She can’t face you.”
The following day, while the jury was deliberating, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing the prosecutor committed misconduct
by improperly vouching for the witnesses’ credibility during closing
argument. More specifically, defense counsel contended the prosecutor
impermissibly directed the witnesses not to look at Ramirez while testifying
and then used their failure to make eye contact as evidence they were telling
the truth.
The trial court noted there was “a webcam pointed at the witness,
which is projected to all members of the jury,” and there were also
“large-screen” television monitors in the courtroom where any observer could
see the witnesses’ facial expressions. The court then denied the motion for
mistrial, concluding there had not been any intentional misconduct by the
prosector and Ramirez had not been denied his right to due process and a fair
trial.
31
B. Legal Standard
“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on
remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the
jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or
erroneous manner. [Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not lightly
infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th
894, 970 (Frye), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45
Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is governed by
the abuse of discretion standard of review. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14
Cal.4th 155, 213.)
C. Analysis
1. Voir Dire
In a criminal case, “(a) . . . the trial judge shall conduct an initial
examination of prospective jurors . . . . [¶] (b)(1) Upon completion of the trial
judge’s initial examination, counsel for each party shall have the right to
examine, by oral and direct questioning, any of the prospective jurors . . . . [¶]
. . . [¶] (g) The trial judge’s exercise of discretion in the manner in which voir
dire is conducted . . . is not cause for a conviction to be reversed, unless the
exercise of that discretion results in a miscarriage of justice, as specified in
Section 13 of Article VI of the California Constitution.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 223, subds. (a), (b)(1), (g).) We consider whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury construed or applied any of the prosecutor’s improper
remarks in an objectionable fashion. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225,
284.)
Additionally, as our Supreme Court has observed, ‘“it is unlikely
that errors or misconduct occurring during voir dire questioning will unduly
32
influence the jury’s verdict in the case. Any such errors or misconduct “prior
to the presentation of argument or evidence, obviously reach the jury panel at
a much less critical phase of the proceedings, before its attention has even
begun to focus upon the penalty issue confronting it.’”” (People v. Seaton
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 636.)
Here, the prosecutor’s comments, as a whole, appear to be an
attempt to precondition the jurors to believe the witnesses’ testimony by
asking leading questions regarding why child sexual abuse victims may not
immediately report the abuse and why there are likely to be no other
witnesses to these kinds of crimes. This constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.
(Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 971, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; People v. Castillo (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 364, 386.)
However, any error by the prosecutor did not result in a
miscarriage of justice. Reversal of a judgment of conviction based on
prosecutorial misconduct is called for only when, after reviewing the totality
of the evidence, we can determine it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to defendant would have occurred absent the misconduct. (See
People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 534; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836.) The evidence of Ramirez’s guilt was strong. M., C., and D. all
testified regarding Ramirez’s yearslong sexual abuse, and their testimony
regarding the kind, location, and method of abuse were all similar. Moreover,
a DNA test identified Ramirez as the father of C.’s daughter. We therefore
conclude Ramirez would not have received a more favorable result even
absent the prosecutor’s comments to the jury during voir dire.
33
2. Closing Argument
Prosecutors “ha[ve] a wide-ranging right to discuss the case in
closing argument.” (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 283.) Thus,
‘“‘“[p]rosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the
evidence [presented] at trial,”’”’ and the question of ‘“‘“[w]hether the
inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.”’”’
(People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127.) Accordingly, “prosecutorial
commentary should not be given undue weight.” (People v. Gonzalez (1990)
51 Cal.3d 1179, 1224, fn. 21, superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 691.) “Juries are warned in
advance that counsel’s remarks are mere argument, missteps can be
challenged when they occur, and juries generally understand that counsel’s
assertions are the ‘statements of advocates.’ Thus, argument should ‘not be
judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court. And the
arguments of counsel, like the instructions of the court, must be judged in the
context in which they are made.’” (Gonzalez, at p. 1224, fn. 21, quoting Boyde
v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370.)
Here, the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument did not
rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor’s comments
regarding the witnesses’ demeanors and reluctance to look at their father
while testifying was a fair comment on the evidence. It is the very function of
the jury to assess a witness’s credibility, including evidence of the witness’s
demeanor while testifying. (People v. Clark (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 270, 295.)
Moreover, any alleged error was ameliorated by the trial court
instructing the jury that the attorney’s arguments do not constitute evidence
upon which the jury can rely in deciding guilt. Further, defense counsel
refuted the prosecutor’s argument when counsel argued during closing that
34
the witnesses were not credible because they did not look at Ramirez,
counsel, or the jury while testifying. The prosecutor also noted during closing,
“My argument this morning is not evidence. Nothing I say is evidence . . . .”
Finally, as noted above, any alleged error was harmless given the strength of
the evidence against Ramirez.
V.
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Ramirez contends the errors alleged above, even if not
individually prejudicial, rendered his trial fundamentally unfair when viewed
in combination. In examining a claim of cumulative error, the critical
question is whether the defendant received due process and a fair trial.
(Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 82). There can be no cumulative error if the
challenged rulings were not erroneous. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th
1229, 1382, [no cumulative error where court “rejected nearly all of
defendant’s assignments of error”].) Because we reject Ramirez’s claims of
error individually, these claims necessarily do not constitute error when
viewed as a whole. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009.)
VI.
FAILURE TO STAY SENTENCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 654
Ramirez argues his conduct in committing the offenses in counts
11 and 12 and in counts 16 and 17 occurred during a continuous course of
conduct, and therefore, the trial court erred in failing to stay execution of
sentence on two of these counts. We disagree.
A. Factual Background
1. Counts 11 and 12
M. testified Ramirez raped her when she was 11 or 12 years old
and in the fifth grade. She further testified that, during the same incident,
35
Ramirez put her hand on his penis and had her move her hand back and
forth; he also put his hands on her breasts. Based on the prosecutor’s closing
arguments, the lewd act in count 12 was based on Ramirez putting M.’s hand
on his penis during the same incident as the rape in count 11.
Ramirez was convicted of aggravated sexual assault on a child
under the age of 14 by committing forcible rape as charged in count 11 and of
committing a lewd or lascivious act by force on a child under the age of 14 in
count 12. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms of 15 years to
life on count 11 and 6 years on count 12.
2. Counts 16 and 17
M. testified that, when she was in high school, Ramirez gave her
permission to go to the prom with her boyfriend. In exchange for his
permission, Ramirez required M. to orally copulate and have sexual
intercourse with him. Based on the prosecutor’s closing arguments and the
verdict forms, both of the acts which formed the bases for counts 16 and 17
occurred during “the prom incident.”
Ramirez was convicted of forcible oral copulation in count 16 and
forcible rape in count 17. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms
of 15 years to life on each of counts 16 and 17.
B. Legal Standard
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides, “[a]n act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” “Even though section 654 refers to
an ‘act or omission,’ . . . the relevant question is typically whether a
defendant’s “‘course of conduct . . . comprised a divisible transaction which
could be punished under more than one statute within the meaning of section
36
654.’” [Citation.] . . . ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and
therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654
depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were
incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such
offenses but not for more than one.’” (People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331,
335–336.)
“[S]ection 654 does not bar multiple punishment simply because
numerous sex offenses are rapidly committed against a victim with the ‘sole’
aim of achieving sexual gratification.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d
321, 325.) “Such offenses are generally ‘divisible’ from one another under
section 654, and separate punishment is usually allowed.” (People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 344, fn. 6.) If multiple punishment were barred for
separate lewd acts committed on the same occasion, “the clever molester
could violate his victim in numerous lewd ways, safe in the knowledge that
he could not be convicted and punished for every act.” (Id. at p. 347.) Thus,
“section 654 does not preclude separate punishment for multiple sex offenses
which, although closely connected in time and part of the same criminal
venture, are separate and distinct, and which are not committed as a means
of committing any other sex offense, do not facilitate commission of another
sex offense, and are not incidental to the commission of another sex offense.”
(People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 584–585 (Castro).)
“Whether [section 654] ‘applies in a given case is a question of
fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its
determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there
is any substantial evidence to support them.’” (People v. Vang (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 912, 915–916.)
37
C. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports Ramirez’s commission of two
separately punishable acts in counts 11 and 12 and in counts 16 and 17. A
review of M.’s testimony establishes the acts in counts 11 and 12 were
separate and were not incidental to each other. M. testified Ramirez raped
her when she was 11 or 12 years old, an act which formed the basis of
count 11, and that, during the same incident, he put her hand on his penis
and had her move it back and forth and also touched her breasts, acts which
formed the basis of count 12. Neither act was “committed as a means of
committing any other sex offense, [nor] facilitate[d] commission of another
sex offense, [nor was] incidental to the commission of another sex offense.”
(Castro, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 585.)
Similarly, although the acts which formed the basis for counts 16
and 17, forcible oral copulation and forcible rape respectively, both occurred
during the same “prom” incident, neither act was necessary to nor facilitated
the other. (See People v. Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1007 [trial court
could have reasonably concluded that kissing child was separately
punishable under section 654 and not “merely designed to facilitate the
subsequent acts of penetration and fondling”].)
Accordingly, the trial court properly imposed consecutive
sentences on each of counts 11 and 12 and counts 16 and 17.
VII.
IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 667.61
Ramirez next contends his due process rights were violated by
the trial court’s unauthorized imposition of sentence pursuant to
section 667.61, subdivision (b), because the enhancement was not pled and
proven at trial. He further argues the court had no authority to substitute the
38
subdivision (b) enhancement in place of the subdivision (m) enhancement
which had been improperly pled and found true. We agree with Ramirez he
was improperly sentenced under section 667.61, subdivision (b).
A. Factual Background
The first amended information, under the description of the
offenses in counts 4, 6, 7, and 15–17 stated: “It is further alleged that in the
commission of the above offense, a crime listed in subdivision (n) of section
667.61, to wit, [Penal Code section] . . . , the victim of the above offense was a
minor 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense within the meaning
of . . . section 667.61, subdivision (m).”
Section 667.61, subdivision (m), provides, “A person who is
convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (n) under one of the
circumstances specified in subdivision (e) against a minor 14 years of age or
older shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to
life.”
The first amended information also alleged the following special
allegation: “It is further alleged that in the present case and cases defendant
committed a qualifying sex offense against more than one victim as listed in
Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (e), subsection (4).”
The jury found true the section 667.61, subdivision (m)
enhancement allegations as to counts 4, 6, 7, and 15–17. The jury also found
true that counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9–10, 12–13, 15–20, and 23 had been committed
against more than one victim, pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4).
Although the jury found true the section 667.61, subdivision (m)
enhancements, the offenses alleged in the counts attached to these
enhancements each occurred prior to September 9, 2010, the operative date of
the statute. (See Stats. 2010, ch. 291, § 16.) Accordingly, as the trial court
39
acknowledged during sentencing, the subdivision (m) enhancements [of
section 667.61] were improperly pled and proven. However, the court
concluded it was appropriate to sentence Ramirez pursuant to section 667.61,
subdivision (b), instead:
“That being said, at the time of the commission of those
particular offenses, the exact same acts constituting what was charged as
[section] 667.61[, subdivision] (m) and found true by the jury under the (m)
subdivision, would have been an act under [section] 667.61, subdivision (b).”
The court continued, “The salient difference being [section]
667.61[, subdivision] (m) is applicable to specific offenses under
circumstances in subdivision (e) to a minor 14 years of age or older.
“Under subdivision (b) [of section 667.61], although it is a more
limited set of qualifying offenses, it still must be under one of the qualifying
factors—one or more of the qualifying factors under subdivision (a)—under
subdivision (e). Excuse me. So as it all kind of comes out in the wash, instead
of being a qualifying factor under [subdivision] (m), which would trigger the
alternative sentencing of 25 to life, I believe it comes out under [subdivision]
(b), triggering the alternative sentencing scheme of 15 years to life.
“I think this is much like a—I’m going to call it a lesser included.
Although I don’t know technically if that is the correct term of art or the
correct legal term to use, nonetheless, the exact same conduct which was
found by the jury to be true, which was a particular qualifying offense—
actually, the Court found the qualifying offense—not that it applies to a
qualifying offense, not the jury. And then the jury made the determination
that there were two or more victims in the same case. That was the factor
under subdivision (e) [of section 667.61], which the jury had to find true as
they were charged with in the jury instructions and then found true findings.
40
“So wherever there is a [section] 667.61[, subdivision] (m), my
intention is to not sentence under [subdivision] (m) of 25 to life but to
sentence under subdivision (b) which would be a 15 to life. I believe that that
is the only alternative which I would have at this point.
“All of the offenses for which Mr. Ramirez was convicted which
qualified under [subdivision] (m) [of section 667.61] also qualify under
subdivision (b). The list, although not identical, those particular offenses do,
in fact, appear on both sides of the equation, both under [subdivision] (m) and
. . . [subdivision] (b).”
Defense counsel objected to sentencing Ramirez under section
667.61, subdivision (b), because the jury had not made findings with respect
to that particular subsection. The trial court overruled the objection and
imposed sentences of 15 years to life on counts 4, 6, 7, 11, and 15–17,
pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (b).
B. Legal Standard
“A defendant has a due process right to fair notice of any
sentencing allegation that, if proven, will increase the punishment for a
crime.” (In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 717 (Vaquera).) Therefore, “the
prosecution must provide the defendant ‘fair notice of the qualifying statutory
circumstance or circumstances that are being pled, proved, and invoked in
support of One Strike sentencing.’” (Id. at p. 718) The factual circumstances
authorizing the imposition of the One Strike law must be pled and proved;
the court may not consider any sentencing factors that have not been alleged
in the accusatory pleading and found true by the jury or admitted by the
defendant. (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 (Mancebo).)
41
C. Analysis
The Attorney General acknowledges the charging document did
not include any section 667.61, subdivision (b), allegations but argues the
trial court, at sentencing, properly substituted these allegations on the counts
where the jury found true the allegations under section 667.61,
subdivision (m). More specifically, the Attorney General contends that,
because the elements for a longer sentence of 25 years to life under
section 667.61, subdivision (m), had been pled and proven, the court properly
sentenced Ramirez to the lesser sentence of 15 years to life under subdivision
(b) of section 667.61, even though that section was not proved. We disagree.
In Vaquera, the Supreme Court held that, in alleging a multiple
victim circumstance under section 667.61, subdivision (b), which provides for
a sentence of 15 years to life, the prosecution did not provide the defendant
with fair notice it would seek a sentence of 25 years to life, which is specified
when a victim is under 14 years of age under a different section of the “One
Strike” law. (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2).) (Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 722.)
The court reversed the 25 years to life sentence imposed by the trial court
and remanded for resentencing. (Id. at p. 726.) The court concluded the error
was not harmless because the defendant did not receive adequate notice of
the sentence before the case was submitted to the jury, and therefore, did not
have sufficient opportunity to request additional time to prepare a defense.
(Id. at p. 728.)
Here, the accusatory pleading did not reference subdivision (b) of
section 667.61 and therefore did not put Ramirez on fair notice he could be
sentenced under that subdivision in place of the sentencing enhancements
actually (although improperly) alleged under subdivision (m). (See, e.g.,
People v. Villegas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 253, 269–279 (Villegas) [information,
42
which alleged special allegations pursuant to section 667.61, subdivisions (b)
and (e), did not give the defendant adequate notice that the prosecution
would seek sentencing pursuant to subdivision (m)]; People v. Nash (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 483, 495 [“[W]here a pleading explicitly recites an exposure of
15 years to life as the sentencing effect of allegations under subdivisions (b),
(c), and (e) of section 667.61, it does not put a defendant on fair notice that he
might face exposure of 25 years to life under subdivision (j)(2), even if the
pleading alleges facts that would support the 25-year-to-life sentence if found
true”].)
The Attorney General argues Mancebo, Vaquera and Villegas are
inapposite because those cases “deal with the issue of applying a greater
sentence than what was pleaded in the charging document,” whereas here,
Ramirez was sentenced to a lesser sentence. However, the Attorney General
fails to cite, and we have been unable to locate, any authority to support its
position that the trial court’s imposition of an unauthorized sentence is
harmless simply because the defendant received a lesser sentence than he or
she might have otherwise. Here, the court improperly substituted subdivision
(b) of section 667.61 in place of subdivision (m). Accordingly, the sentences on
counts 4, 6, 7, and 15–17 are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the
court for resentencing on those counts.
VIII.
SENTENCING ERROR
Ramirez argues he must be resentenced on count 11 because that
count was not subject to sentencing under any provision of section 667.61. He
further contends that, although the offense is punishable by a term of 15
years to life, the trial court was not required to impose the indeterminate
43
term consecutively. We agree the sentence in count 11 must be reversed and
remanded for resentencing.
In count 11, Ramirez was convicted of aggravated sexual assault
of a child under 14 years of age (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)). The sentence for the
crime is 15 years to life in state prison (§ 269, subd. (b)). Although aggravated
sexual assault of a child under section 269 does not fall within any sentencing
scheme encompassed in section 667.61, the trial court nevertheless sentenced
Ramirez to a consecutive term of 15 years to life on count 11 “pursuant to
[section] 667.61, subdivision (b).”2
Furthermore, the first amended information and verdict form for
count 11 states the offense occurred “on, or between February 29, 2003
through February 28, 2005.” At the time count 11 was committed, section 269
did not include subdivision (c), which currently requires imposition of a
consecutive sentence under certain circumstances. Section 269 was amended
to add subdivision (c) in 2006 (See Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 6), after the instant
crime was committed. Thus, the statute in effect at the time of the charged
crime did not require a consecutive term for each offense, and the trial court
therefore imposed an unauthorized sentence.
The Attorney General argues any error was harmless because the
trial court stated that all of the life sentences would be imposed consecutively
2 We disagree with the Attorney General’s contention the trial
court correctly sentenced Ramirez under section 667.61 because count 11 was
charged as aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)) by
committing rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2) or (6)), and rape is one of the qualifying
offenses punishable under section 667.61. Ramirez was convicted in count 11
of aggravated sexual assault of a child, not rape, and aggravated sexual
assault of a child is not one of the qualifying offenses under section 667.61.
44
and therefore, it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had been
aware of the error.
““‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the
exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A
court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have
been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.’”” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424.) The appropriate
remedy in such cases “is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly
indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even
if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391; Salazar, at p. 425.)
Here, there is no clear indication in the record the trial court
would have imposed a consecutive sentence on count 11 if it had been aware
that aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)) was not a
qualifying offense subject to sentencing under section 667.61, subdivision (b),
and if it were aware that the version of the law in effect at the time of the
commission of the offense did not require a consecutive sentence. Accordingly,
we reverse the sentence in count 11 and remand for resentencing.
IX.
AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT
Ramirez argues the first amended abstract of judgment contains
clerical errors in its description of the offenses in counts 4, 7, 20, and 21.
Ramirez contends the abstract of judgment also incorrectly indicates the
sentence on count 17 was a consecutive full term, and the sentence on
count 11 was imposed pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (b). We agree
the amended abstract of judgment must be corrected.
45
Ramirez was convicted of sexual penetration by force (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)(C)) in count 4. However, the first amended abstract of judgment
describes the crime as “Sexual penetration w/bodily.” We agree the
description does not accurately describe the crime in count 4 and direct the
abstract of judgment be amended to “sexual penetration by force.”
Ramirez was convicted of sodomy by force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C))
in count 7, while the first amended abstract of judgment describes the crime
as “Participate in sodomy by force.” We agree the description does not
accurately describe the crime in count 7 and direct the abstract of judgment
be amended to “sodomy by force.”
Ramirez was convicted of sexual penetration by force (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)(A)) in count 20, while the first amended abstract of judgment
describes the crime as “Unlawful bodily injury/sex.” We agree the description
does not accurately describe the crime in count 20 and direct the abstract of
judgment be amended to “sexual penetration by force.”
Ramirez was convicted of sodomy with minor: defendant 21 or
older (§ 286, subd. (b)(2)) in count 21, while the first amended abstract of
judgment describes the crime as “Sodomy w/Under 16.” We agree the
description does not accurately describe the crime in count 21 and direct the
abstract of judgment be amended to “sodomy w/minor.”
Additionally, Ramirez argues the first amended abstract of
judgment should be amended to accurately reflect the sentences imposed in
counts 11 and 17. Because we conclude the sentences in counts 11 and 17
must be reversed and remanded for the reasons discussed above, we decline
to address Ramirez’s claim of error regarding these counts in the abstract of
judgment. Instead, the trial court is directed to amend the abstract of
46
judgment to accurately reflect the sentences imposed upon remand in counts
11 and 17.
Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court shall prepare an
amended abstract of judgment which corrects Ramirez’s sentence as
provided.
DISPOSITION
Ramirez’s conviction in count 21 is modified to find him guilty of
sodomy in violation of section 286, subdivision (b)(1), and the judgment on
count 21 is affirmed as modified. The sentences on counts 4, 6, 7, 11, and 15–
17 must be reversed and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Upon
resentencing and consistent with the above, the trial court is directed to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
47
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