CourtListener 10703757•People v. Collins CA5
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Filed 10/14/25 P. v. Collins CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087387
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F18908768)
v.
JOY FRANCES COLLINS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Heather
Mardel Jones, Judge.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and
Jennifer M. Poe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Joy Frances Collins was convicted by jury in October 2023 of two
counts of child abuse under Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a),1 and the jury found
true an enhancement allegation on one count for causing the death of defendant’s
daughter (§ 12022.95).2 Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of six years
determinate. On appeal, she seeks remand so that the trial court may reconsider her
request for pretrial diversion under the 2023 amendments to section 1001.36.
We affirm. For reasons we will explain, the 2023 amendments to section 1001.36
became effective on January 1, 2023, approximately nine months before defendant’s trial
began on September 26, 2023. The potential for retroactive application of the 2023
amendments was well understood during that time frame and was amply supported in the
substantive law. Defendant failed to present the issue to the trial court between January
2023 and September 2023, and, as such, the claim has been forfeited.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2018, defendant and her two young children were walking to a
bus stop when they encountered a passing train blocking their path. Defendant urged her
children to cross while the train was briefly stopped on the tracks in front of them.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Section 12022.95 provides as follows, in relevant part: “Any person convicted of
a violation of Section 273a, who under circumstances or conditions likely to produce
great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts
thereon unjustifiable physical pain or injury that results in death, or having the care or
custody of any child, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
willfully causes or permits that child to be injured or harmed, and that injury or harm
results in death, shall receive a four-year enhancement for each violation, in addition to
the sentence provided for that conviction.…”
2.
Defendant’s son successfully crossed, but her daughter became stuck while trying to
cross; the train began to move and crushed defendant’s daughter, killing her.3
Defendant was charged with two counts of willful harm or injury to a child
(counts 1 & 2; § 273a, subd. (a)) and an enhancement was alleged on the first count for
causing her daughter’s death (§ 12022.95). On June 6, 2019, through counsel, defendant
filed a petition for pretrial mental health diversion pursuant to sections 1001.35 and
1001.36. Attached to the petition were health records from May 2013 showing defendant
had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and referred to a therapist
for evaluation and treatment.
Also attached was a psychological evaluation completed in 2019 by Richard Blak,
Ph.D., who opined defendant suffers from major depression; generalized anxiety
disorder; and PTSD. According to Dr. Blak, defendant has ongoing mental confusion
that impairs her judgment. He opined that there is a nexus between her severe mental
disorder and the commission of the offenses for which she was charged.
In July 2019, the People filed a brief in opposition to defendant’s petition, arguing
she had not established she suffers from a qualifying mental health disorder or that it was
a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. In November 2019, the
trial court found a prima facie case for diversion had been made, but a more extensive
hearing was needed for suitability. In February 2020, defendant filed a supplemental
declaration of her counsel in support of the petition, describing her mental health
treatment since December 2019. In August 2020, the court ordered a mental health
evaluation of defendant for purposes of mental health diversion.4
3 Most of the background facts are not relevant to the issue raised on appeal, and so
we dispense with a more detailed account of the trial testimony.
4 No evaluation resulting from this order appears in the record on appeal.
3.
A hearing on the petition was held on October 10, 2020. The court explained its
ruling as follows on defendant’s mental health diversion request: “This Court feels as
though even though there is a mental health disorder that is involved in this case, that that
was not the motivating or it didn’t play a substantial [f]actor in the commission of the
offense.”
Trial began on September 26, 2023, and, on October 9, 2023, a jury convicted
defendant of both offenses and the enhancement on count 1. An amended information
alleged aggravating sentencing factors as to both counts (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(3), & (11)). As to count 2, the jury found the sentencing factors not true; on
count 1, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and the prosecutor dismissed
those allegations.
On December 19, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to the lower term of
two years on count 1, and a consecutive term of four years for the attached enhancement;
the court imposed a concurrent mitigated term of two years on count 2.
DISCUSSION
The sole claim defendant raises on appeal is for remand so the trial court may
reconsider pretrial diversion in light of the amendments to section 1001.36 effective
January 1, 2023. The People argue that because defendant could have raised this issue
with the trial court between January 1, 2023, and her trial on September 26, 2023, but
failed to do so, the claim has been forfeited.
I. Mental Health Diversion
In 2018, the Legislature enacted section 1001.36, which authorizes pretrial
diversion “[o]n an accusatory pleading” for defendants with qualifying mental health
disorders that were a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. (Stats.
2018, ch. 34, § 24; § 1001.36, subds. (a)–(b).) “The primary purposes of the legislation
are to keep people with mental disorders from entering and reentering the criminal justice
system while protecting public safety, to give counties discretion in developing and
4.
implementing diversion across a continuum of care settings, and to provide mental health
rehabilitative services. [Citation.] Diversion can be ‘viewed as a specialized form of
probation, … [that] is intended to offer a second chance to offenders who are minimally
involved in crime and maximally motivated to reform .…’” (People v. Qualkinbush
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 886.)
“As originally enacted, section 1001.36 provided that a trial court may grant
pretrial diversion if it finds all of the following: (1) the defendant suffers from a
qualifying mental disorder; (2) the disorder played a significant role in the commission of
the charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms will respond to mental health
treatment; (4) the defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy trial right;
(5) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.” People v.
Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626–627 (Frahs), citing § 1001.36, former subd. (b)(1)–(6).)
“The statute was later amended to specify that defendants charged with certain crimes,
such as murder and rape, were ineligible for diversion.” (People v. Doran (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Doron), citing Frahs, supra, at p. 627; see Stats 2018, ch. 1005, § 1.)
“This version of the statute only required that the court be ‘satisfied’ the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor and provided the court could make
such a conclusion based on ‘any relevant and credible evidence,’ including police reports,
preliminary hearing transcripts, statements by defendant’s mental health provider, and
other medical records.” (Doron, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 8, citing § 1001.36, former
subd. (b)(1)(B).) Once a defendant made a prima facie showing that he or she met all of
the threshold eligibility criteria and was suitable for diversion; and the trial court was
satisfied that the recommended program of mental health treatment would meet the
specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant, then the court had the
discretion to grant pretrial diversion. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 627.)
5.
In 2023, the Legislature amended section 1001.36 to “‘simplify the procedural
process for obtaining diversion by presuming that a defendant’s diagnosed “mental
disorder” has a connection to their offense’ and to permit the court to deny diversion if
the People rebutted the presumption.” (Doron, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 8, citing
Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess), as
amended June 23, 2022, p. 6.) The amendment recharacterized the first two requirements
as eligibility criteria that no longer turn on findings to the court’s satisfaction. Instead,
the amended statute now provides that defendants are generally eligible for pretrial
diversion if they “ha[ve] been diagnosed” with a recognized mental health disorder.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) The amended statute creates a presumption the defendant’s
diagnosed mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged
crime. Under this presumption, the trial court is required to find a causal connection
between the diagnosed mental disorder and the commission of the charged crime “unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that [the mental disorder] was not a motivating
factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged
offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
Once a trial court assesses the defendant’s eligibility, the remaining four criteria
relate to the defendant’s suitability for diversion. A defendant is suitable for pretrial
diversion if all of the following criteria are met: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental
health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to,
or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the
defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial (subject
to certain exceptions); (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of
diversion (subject to certain exceptions); and (4) the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)–(4).) An
unreasonable risk to public safety means a likelihood the defendant will commit a certain
subset of violent felonies. (People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1001.)
6.
Assuming the defendant meets the eligibility and suitability criteria, the trial court
must also be satisfied the recommended program of mental health treatment will meet the
specialized needs of the defendant. (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).) “Finally, even where
defendants make a prima facie showing that they meet all the express statutory
requirements, the court may still exercise its discretion to deny diversion. [Citations.]
But this ‘residual’ discretion must be exercised ‘“consistent with the principles and
purpose of the governing law.”’ [Citations.] That purpose includes a strong legislative
preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such
treatment to both the offending individual and the community. Where the court chooses
to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should
reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion
would not meet those goals.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882,
892–893.)
The 2023 amendments to section 1001.36 have been deemed ameliorative and
apply retroactively. (Doron, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 6–7; People v. Brown (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 113, 125.)
II. Analysis
Defendant timely sought diversion in 2019, which was denied, and the matter was
eventually brought to trial on September 26, 2023. Defendant’s sole contention on
appeal is that she is entitled to renewed consideration of diversion under the 2023
amendments to section 1001.36. The People maintain she has forfeited her claim to
renewed pretrial diversion consideration by failing to make the request to the trial court in
the first instance.
“A defendant may forfeit a right in a criminal case by failing to timely assert the
right before the tribunal with jurisdiction to determine it.” (People v. Brown, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 126, citing People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856.) “The
forfeiture doctrine is a ‘well-established procedural principle that, with certain
7.
exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but
were not—raised in the trial court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Strong policy reasons
support this rule: ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal
that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected
or avoided. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘“‘“The law casts upon the party the duty of looking
after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If
any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to
his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few
judgments would stand the test of an appeal.”’”’” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1107, 1114.) “‘[D]iscretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in
cases presenting an important legal issue.’” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887–
888, fn. 7.)
Absent a change in the law that applies retroactively, which could not be timely
raised in the trial court (e.g., Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 640), or an extenuating
circumstance such as futility (e.g., People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7–8), the policy
reasons underlying the forfeiture doctrine support its application where a defendant, as
here, remains silent during pretrial proceedings and then seeks to obtain appellate relief
based on changes in the law that could have been, but were not, timely brought to the trial
court’s attention.
In this case, the relevant amendments to section 1001.36 became effective on
January 1, 2023, approximately nine months before defendant’s trial began on
September 26, 2023. There was ample opportunity for defendant to seek renewed
consideration for pretrial mental health diversion under the amended statute. Defendant
argues a trial date had already been set by January 1, 2023, and the parties had moved
past pretrial proceedings. But pretrial diversion is defined to mean “postponement of
prosecution … at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is
charged until adjudication .…” (Id., subd. (f)(1).) The parties did not confirm trial
8.
readiness until September 14, 2023, and the trial did not commence until September 26,
2023. The case was not adjudicated within the meaning of section 1001.36, subdivision
(f)(1), until the attachment of jeopardy at trial. (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791,
819.)
Defendant points out the first published decision concluding the amendments to
section 1001.36 were retroactive was Doron, which was not published until August 31,
2023, only a few weeks before the trial.5 “Reviewing courts have traditionally excused
parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or
wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.” (People v. Welch (1993) 5
Cal.4th 228, 237; accord, People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 286–287.) We are
unpersuaded that the potential retroactivity of section 1001.36’s amendments could be
viewed as wholly unsupported by substantive law until Doron.
Changes to our state’s criminal laws have come at a feverish pace since 2018, and
whether those changes have retroactive effect has been an issue repeatedly considered by
our Supreme Court well before Doron, including the original enactment of this statute as
considered in Frahs. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299,
309 [changes in the law under Prop. 576 presumptively retroactive under In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740]; Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 624 [§ 1001.36 applies retroactively
to nonfinal cases]; People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 969 [Assem. Bill
No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) is an ameliorative statute that may be applied
retroactively under Estrada].) The potential for retroactive application of
section 1001.36’s amendments was well understood, and was amply supported in the
substantive law, upon enactment in 2022 and when they became effective January 1,
5 The original opinion in Doron was issued on August 9, 2023, and was ordered
published on August 31, 2023.
6 In November 2016, the electorate passed Proposition 57, the Public Safety and
Rehabilitation Act of 2016.
9.
2023 (see Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1); there is no reason why a request to reconsider
defendant’s petition for pretrial mental health diversion could not have been made
between January 1, 2023, and September 26, 2023. Even after Doron was published on
August 31, 2023, defendant had several more weeks before her trial to seek
reconsideration of the trial court’s diversion ruling pursuant to section 1001.36’s
amendments, but failed to do so. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(d) [“A published
California opinion may be cited or relied on as soon as it is certified for publication or
ordered published.”]; see generally People v. Braden, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 819 [in the
general course, a request for diversion must be made before attachment of jeopardy at
trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first].)
Unlike ameliorative legislation that becomes effective after the defendant has a
fair opportunity to seek its application in the trial court, here defendant had nine months
to ask the court to reconsider her request for pretrial mental health diversion under the
amended statute. Inasmuch as the trial court has no sua sponte duty to consider pretrial
mental health diversion (People v. Braden, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 814), it was incumbent
on defendant to timely raise the issue of diversion under the amended statute with the
trial court.
10.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P. J.
DeSANTOS, J.
11.
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