People v. Parkin CA1/4

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Filed 10/14/25 P. v. Parkin CA1/4

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, A171064
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Mendocino County
COLE BRUCE PARKIN. Super. Ct. No. 24CR04637)

Defendant and Appellant.

Cole Bruce Parkin appeals from a judgment finding him in violation of
conditions of his Post-Release Community Supervision. He challenges the
judgment on the ground it was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence, and
further asserts one of his supervision conditions is unconstitutionally vague
and improperly delegates authority to the probation department. We agree
the judgment was based on inadmissible hearsay and reverse.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2021, Parkin was charged with one count of recklessly
causing the fire of a structure or forest (Pen. Code, § 452, subd. (c)).1 One
month later, Parkin was sentenced to probation.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
After sustaining several probation violations, Parkin’s probation was
revoked on November 14, 2023, and he was sentenced to 16 months in prison.
That same day, he was released from custody on Post-Release Community
Supervision (PRCS).2 The conditions of Parkin’s release included standard
terms set by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
and “Special Conditions” set by the Mendocino County probation department.
The special conditions included Special Condition D which stated in relevant
part: “You shall cooperate fully with any form of rehabilitation or counseling
program as directed by your Probation Officer, and remain working
constructively within that program for the length of time felt to be necessary
by your Probation Officer.” Parkin was also required to keep his probation
officer informed of his residence and mailing address at all times.
In June 2024, the probation department filed a petition to revoke
Parkin’s PRCS based on his failure to attend the Geo Reentry Program he
was referred to, and his failure to attend a probation office appointment. The
probation department also indicated that Parkin’s whereabouts were
unknown. Parkin was subsequently arrested based on his PRCS violations.
At the PRCS hearing held the following month, Parkin did not testify
but Probation Officer Rodriguez-Cruz testified that Parkin was
unsuccessfully discharged from the Geo Reentry Program.3 Officer
Rodriguez-Cruz based his testimony on a letter he said he received from the
program in June 2024 which stated that Parkin had been discharged for

2 “PRCS was created by the Legislature in 2011 as an alternative to

parole for non-serious, nonviolent felonies. It is similar, but not identical to
parole.” (People v. Gutierrez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 393, 399.)

3 Officer Rodriguez-Cruz stated the Geo Reentry Program offers online

services to help individuals on PRCS with structure.

2
missing more than 10 days in the program. Defense counsel observed no
documentary evidence was presented and objected on hearsay grounds. The
trial court overruled the objection, stating that “reliable hearsay is
admissible.”
Officer Rodriguez-Cruz additionally testified that he ordered Parkin to
report to the probation office on May 21, 2024, but Parkin failed to show up.
Officer Rodriguez-Cruz also attempted to call Parkin multiple times, but
Parkin did not answer.
In closing, the People argued Parkin failed to complete the Geo Reentry
Program, failed to report to his probation officer, did not attend meetings
directed by his probation officer, and failed to notify his probation officer of
his address. Defense counsel did not dispute these facts. Instead, she argued
that Special Condition D, which required Parkin to comply with “ ‘any’ ” form
of rehabilitation or counseling required by the probation department was
unconstitutionally vague under In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
888−889 as it did not apprise Parkin of what was expected of him. Defense
counsel asked that that condition be dismissed as void for vagueness.
The trial court held that Parkin violated his PRCS conditions, and
Special Condition D wasn’t vague. The court also stated that
“[i]ndependently, on each of those bases, an explanation [for a PRCS
violation] would have served as a mitigation factor in the court’s sentencing.”
In the absence of any such explanation, the court reinstated Parkin to PRCS
with 60 days in custody, 18 days custody credits, and 50 hours of community
service.
At the probation officer’s recommendation, the court also referred
Parkin to “Geo Reentry Services for a rehab, a residential rehabilitation
facility, as directed by probation.” The court later reiterated that the minutes

3
would reflect that Parkin would be “referred to Geo Reentry Services for [sic]
residential treatment program as directed by probation.” The court declined
to modify any of the PRCS terms.
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Parkin argues the trial court erred in considering Officer Rodriguez-
Cruz’s hearsay testimony regarding the Geo Reentry Program letter he
received stating that Parkin had been terminated from the program after
missing more than 10 days.4 Parkin also asserts Special Condition D’s
requirement that he cooperate with “any” form of rehabilitation or counseling
as directed by probation was unconstitutionally vague and an improper
delegation of authority to the probation department.
We need not address Parkin’s arguments regarding Special Condition
D because we conclude the trial court erred in admitting Officer Rodriguez-
Cruz’s testimony regarding Parkin’s termination from the Geo Reentry
Program.
A. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Before a defendant’s probation or parole may be revoked, the
prosecution must prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
(People v. O’Connell (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066 (O’Connell).) “A trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence in a [] revocation hearing will
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1197-1198 (Shepherd).) “We
[therefore] review rulings on whether hearsay was improperly admitted at a

4 Parkin does not contest the trial court’s finding that he failed to

report to probation.
4
violation hearing for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Abrams (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 396, 400 (Abrams).)
Probation and parole revocations are not part of a criminal prosecution;
as such, “ ‘the full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal]
proceeding does not apply.’ ” (People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 163.) For
instance, “the Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation does not apply to
probation violation hearings”; rather, “[a] defendant’s right to cross-examine
and confront witnesses at a violation hearing stems . . . from the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Abrams, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at
p. 400.) This right to confrontation, however, is not absolute and the parole
revocation process should be “ ‘flexible enough to consider evidence including
letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an
adversary criminal trial.’ ” (People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 716, 719
(Winson).)
In considering the admissibility of hearsay evidence at a parole or
probation revocation hearing, a “case-by-case consideration is necessary”
because “[u]nder a due process analysis, the importance of a defendant’s
confrontation right will vary with the circumstances.” (People v. Liggins
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 55, 66−67.) In the context of the more flexible process
of parole or probation revocation hearings, “there will be cases where the
confrontation right must give way to the state’s countervailing interests in
presenting hearsay.” (Id. at pp. 66−67.)
Based on these principles, the California Supreme Court has discussed
the admissibility of hearsay at probation or parole violation hearings and has
established two separate standards for admitting hearsay evidence
depending on whether the hearsay is “testimonial” or “documentary” in
nature. (Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.)

5
Testimonial Evidence
With respect to testimonial evidence, in Winson, the high court held
that a preliminary hearing transcript of a witness’ testimony is not
admissible at a parole or probation revocation hearing absent a showing of
good cause. (Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 713−714.) The court later
reaffirmed this holding in People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144 (Arreola),
and further stated the broad standard of good cause is met “(1) when the
declarant is ‘unavailable’ under the traditional hearsay standard (see Evid.
Code, § 240), (2) when the declarant, although not legally unavailable, can be
brought to the hearing only through great difficulty or expense, or (3) when
the declarant’s presence would pose a risk of harm (including, in appropriate
circumstances, mental or emotional harm) to the declarant.” (Id. at
pp. 1159−1160.) In both Winson and Arreola, the high court noted the good
cause requirement is compelled by the value of cross-examination and the
opportunity for observation of an adverse witness’ demeanor. (Winson, at
p. 717; Arreola, at p. 1155.)
Since these cases were decided, what has been somewhat less clear is
what constitutes “testimonial” evidence. In a more recent case, People v.
Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608, 619 (Dungo), the California Supreme Court
noted that “the high court has not agreed on a definition of ‘testimonial.’ ”5

5 Dungo related to a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to

confront adverse witnesses and not to a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process which gives rise to a similar right of cross-examination
and confrontation. (See Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 612.) Regardless, this
distinction does not render inapplicable the principles the high court set out
regarding the general characteristics of testimonial evidence. (See, e.g.,
People v. Johnson (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1409 (Johnson) [Sixth Amendment
cases may provide helpful examples in determining the scope of the right of
confrontation held by probationers under the due process clause].)

6
With that said, the court observed that testimonial hearsay has two critical
components: “First, to be testimonial the statement must be made with some
degree of formality or solemnity. Second, the statement is testimonial only if
its primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.” (Id.
at p. 619; see also People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 582 (Lopez) [same].)
Statements which merely record objective facts or observations of fact are
generally not testimonial in nature. (Dungo, at p. 620.) Nor are official
records which serve purposes other than to aid a criminal investigation. (Id.
at p. 621.)
Documentary Evidence
In contrast to the good cause standard for testimonial hearsay, the
California Supreme Court held in People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707, 709
(Maki) that documentary hearsay evidence may be admitted at a probation or
parole revocation proceeding if there are “sufficient indicia of reliability
regarding the proffered material.” In coming to this conclusion, the court
noted that the right of confrontation is not absolute, that revocation
proceedings should be flexible enough to allow for conventional substitutes
for live testimony (including affidavits, depositions, and documentary
evidence), and that various federal courts had demonstrated a willingness to
consider inadmissible hearsay evidence when it is accompanied by a
reasonable indica of reliability. (Id. at pp. 710, 714−715.)
The Maki court then considered the admissibility of a car rental invoice
and hotel receipt which indicated that defendant had left his county and state
without the permission of his probation officer. (Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at
pp. 1156−1157.) The high court found the question to be “close” but
ultimately concluded that though the hotel receipt alone (a printed form with
defendant’s last name on it) had “minimal probative value,” the identification

7
of defendant’s signature on the car rental invoice and the fact the invoice was
the type relied on by parties for billing and payment of money rendered the
documents a sufficient basis upon which to find defendant violated the terms
of his parole. (Id. at pp. 716−717.)
In discussing the difference between testimonial hearsay evidence and
documentary hearsay evidence, the high court has noted that there is an
“evident distinction between a transcript of former live testimony and the
type of traditional ‘documentary’ evidence involved in Maki that does not
have, as its source, live testimony.” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1157.)
More particularly, the court observed that whereas “the need for
confrontation is particularly important where the evidence is testimonial,
because of the opportunity for observation of the witness’s demeanor,” the
witness’s demeanor is “not a significant factor in evaluating foundational
testimony relating to the admission of evidence such as laboratory reports,
invoices, or receipts.” (Ibid.) This is because, often, the purpose of such
foundational testimony is simply to authenticate the document, and the
author, signator or custodian of the document may not even be able to recall
from memory the specific contents of the writing. (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Parkin argues the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed
Officer Rodriguez-Cruz to testify about the letter he received from Geo
Reentry regarding Parkin’s discharge from the program after missing more
than 10 days, without producing the letter or offering any good cause for the
absence of the declarant. In response, the People assert Officer Rodriguez-
Cruz’s testimony was not testimonial hearsay which requires a showing of
good cause, but documentary hearsay which can be admitted when there are
sufficient indicia of reliability. In any event, the People argue any error in

8
admitting the hearsay evidence was harmless because the trial court found
Parkin had violated three other terms of his PRCS.
We address each of these contentions in turn.
Hearsay Testimony Regarding Parkin’s Termination from Geo
Reentry Program
The parties dispute whether Officer Rodriguez-Cruz’s testimony about
the Geo Reentry discharge letter was testimonial evidence which required
application of the good cause standard, or documentary evidence which could
be admitted if there were sufficient indicia of reliability. We observe the
subject testimony does not neatly fit into either category.
At the outset, we are not persuaded Officer Rodriguez-Cruz’s testimony
regarding the Geo Reentry discharge letter was testimonial evidence
requiring a showing of good cause. Once again, the California Supreme Court
has held that evidence is testimonial if it was made with some degree of
formality or solemnity, and if its primary purpose relates in some way to a
criminal prosecution. (Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 619.) Examples of
statements made with some degree of formality or solemnity include reports
that have been sworn before a notary or signed with the knowledge that the
statements may be used in a court proceeding. (See, e.g., Lopez, supra, 55
Cal.4th at pp. 584−585.)
Here, there was no indication the Geo Reentry discharge letter was
characterized by a similar degree of formality or solemnity. Further, the
letter did not pertain to a criminal investigation; instead, it merely reported
the objective fact that Parkin had missed more than 10 days of his program.
(See Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 619 [statements that record objective
facts generally not testimonial].) As such, the letter was not testimonial and

9
the good cause standard for admitting testimonial hearsay did not apply.
(See Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 713−714.)
Parkin argues for a contrary conclusion, relying on Shepherd, supra,
151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202 in support. His reliance on that case is misplaced.
In Shepherd, defendant’s probation officer testified over defense
counsel’s objection that he had been informed by defendant’s caseworker and
treatment program administrator that defendant had smelled of, and tested
positive for, alcohol consumption, and had been ordered to leave the
treatment program. (Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.) Division
3 of our court held that both the testimony regarding defendant’s alcohol
consumption and the testimony regarding defendant’s failed alcohol test was
testimonial hearsay and, as such, the good cause standard set forth in
Winson and Arreola applied. (Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1201−1203.) In the absence of a good cause showing, we concluded the
trial court erred in admitting the probation officer’s testimony as defendant
had no opportunity to cross-examine the program administrator or observe
her demeanor. (Id. at p. 1202.)
Though we maintain Shepherd was well-reasoned, critically, we
observe the case was decided five years before the California Supreme Court
enumerated its principles for determining if hearsay is testimonial in Dungo
and Lopez. As such, the standard applied by the Shepherd court in
determining if the subject hearsay was testimonial did not reflect the criteria
that was later enumerated by the high court regarding formality of the
testimonial statements and their relation to a criminal prosecution. (See
Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 619.) We therefore cannot rely on Shepherd’s
rationale and similarly conclude that Officer Rodriguez-Cruz’s testimony
about the Geo Reentry discharge letter was testimonial.

10
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we are also not persuaded by the
People’s argument the Geo Reentry discharge letter was properly admitted by
the trial court as documentary evidence under Maki, because it was reliable.
The People refer to a number of cases that upheld the admission of
documentary hearsay when there were sufficient indicia of reliability. Most
of these cases, however, are distinguishable because they dealt with the
admission of an actual document that was before the trial court during the
revocation hearing. (See, e.g., Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 709 [addressing
whether car rental invoice and hotel receipt, both of which were present and
examined at the probation revocation hearing, were admissible documentary
hearsay]; O’Connell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [discussing
admissibility of drug treatment program report which stated defendant had
been terminated from the program due to “ ‘Too Many Absences’ ”]; People v.
Gomez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038−1039 [evaluating admissibility of
probation report reviewed by the trial court which indicated defendant had
failed to report to probation officer, pay restitution or submit verification of
employment or attendance at counseling sessions]; Johnson, supra, 121
Cal.App.4th 1409, 1412 [addressing trial court’s admission of a laboratory
report that analyzed a rock of cocaine defendant was selling].)
Here, in contrast, the trial court was not faced with the admissibility of
an actual document (i.e. the Geo Reentry discharge letter). Instead, the court
was faced with a probation officer’s statements about the contents of a letter
he had read. As such, the aforementioned cases are inapposite.
The People additionally rely on Abrams, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at
p. 401 for the proposition that Officer Rodriguez-Cruz’s testimony about the
Geo Reentry discharge letter was admissible. It is true the facts in Abrams
are more similar to ours as the issue before the Abrams court was not the

11
admission of an actual document, but the admission of testimony based on
the hearsay contents of that document. (See Abrams, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th
at p. 401.) Notwithstanding this fact, the People’s reliance on Abrams is also
misplaced.
In Abrams, one probation officer testified as to what another probation
officer had written in his probation report, and to the fact the probation
department records indicated defendant had failed to contact the probation
office. (Abrams, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 401.) The Second District held
this testimony was admissible because the evidence from the probation
reports, which had been prepared contemporaneously to and specifically for
the purpose of the revocation hearing, had sufficient indicia of reliability. (Id.
at p. 404.) However, a key factor sets Abrams apart from our case.
Specifically, in Abrams, the testifying probation officer had his colleague’s
probation report with him on the witness stand and referred to it while
testifying. (Id. at p. 404.) This circumstance therefore lent itself much more
clearly to a finding of reliability.
Here, in contrast, there is no indication the trial court was ever
presented with the Geo Reentry discharge letter. Nor did Officer Rodriguez-
Cruz appear to have the letter with him. Nor does the letter even appear in
the record. In the absence of any documentary evidence, we conclude it was
error for the trial court to find the evidence sufficiently reliable.
Further, even if the Maki standard applied, it is clear there were not
sufficient indicia of reliability regarding the Geo Reentry discharge letter.
We observe that even in Maki, where the high court had before it a formal car
rental invoice and hotel receipt with defendant’s name on it that had been
seized from defendant’s home, the court stated the case was a “close one.”
(Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 716.) Ultimately, the Maki court concluded the

12
documents were properly considered by the trial court because defendant’s
signature was identified on the car rental invoice and the invoice was of the
type typically relied on by parties for the billing and payment of money. (Id.
at p. 717.) However, the high court also stated that if the car rental invoice
had been merely printed and filled out without defendant’s signature, the
invoice alone or even accompanied by a hotel receipt, would be insufficient to
find a violation of probation. (Ibid.) Thus, it is clear that the standard for
finding sufficient indicia of reliability requires some level of exactitude and is
not effortlessly met.
If the Maki court found that the car rental invoice and hotel receipt
barely passed muster in terms of forming a sufficient basis for finding a
probation violation, we cannot conclude there were sufficient indicia of
reliability for the Geo Reentry discharge letter which was not even presented
to or available for examination by the trial court. As such, the trial court
erred in admitting Officer Rodriguez-Cruz’s testimony regarding the contents
of the letter.
Whether Trial Court’s Error was Harmless
The People argue that even if the trial court erred in admitting Officer
Rodriguez-Cruz’s testimony, any error was harmless because: (1) Parkin did
not dispute that he had missed his Geo Reentry Program appointments and
failed to meet with his probation officer, and (2) the court found Parkin in
violation of his PRCS on three other independent bases i.e. failing to report to
his probation officer, failing to attend meetings directed by his probation
officer in May 2024, and failing to notify his probation officer of his address
and whereabouts. We are not persuaded.
In determining whether the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence
prejudiced a defendant, we apply the “ ‘harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-

13
doubt’ ” standard as the error is of federal constitutional dimension. (Arreola,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1161.)
We cannot say the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. With respect to Parkin’s failure to dispute his PRCS violations, the
People rely on Abrams, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 405 and O’Connell,
supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067, where the courts of appeal found harmless
error because defendants admitted to the subject probation violations. These
cases are distinguishable because, here, Parkin did not testify at the PRCS
revocation hearing or admit to any PRCS violations.
Further, we are not persuaded the trial court’s finding of three PRCS
violations apart from Parkin’s failure to complete the Geo Reentry Program
renders the improper admission of Officer Rodriguez-Cruz’s testimony
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 1161.) In this regard, we observe the court stated at the PRCS revocation
hearing that if Parkin had provided an explanation as to any one of the
alleged PRCS violations, “[such] explanation would have served as a
mitigation factor in the court’s sentencing.” As such, the court itself
indicated that the sentence imposed took into account each and every one of
the PRCS violations, and a satisfactory explanation provided as to even one
of the violations could have affected the court’s sentencing decision. It is
therefore not unreasonable to conclude that the trial court would have
imposed a lesser sanction on Parkin had it not found that in addition to the
other three violations, he also failed to complete the Geo Reentry Program
(arguably the most serious violation).
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Parkin’s objection to the
admission of Officer Rodriguez-Cruz’s testimony about the Geo Reentry
discharge letter should have been sustained. For this reason, we will not

14
address in detail Parkin’s other contentions that Special Condition D., which
required him to “cooperate fully with any form of rehabilitation or counseling
program as directed by [his] Probation Officer . . . for the length of time felt to
be necessary [by his] Probation Officer,” was unconstitutionally vague and
impermissibly delegated the authority to place Parkin in a residential
treatment program to the probation department.6
DISPOSITION
Because the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony, the order
revoking Parkin’s probation is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

6 In any event, we are not persuaded Special Condition D was

unconstitutionally vague when considered in light of the trial court’s
comments upon reinstating PRCS that Parkin would be “referred to Geo
Reentry Services for [sic] residential treatment program, as directed by
probation.” (See People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 [in
determining whether a condition is unconstitutionally vague, any oral or
written comments clarifying the probation condition made by the trial court
may be considered].) This statement was very specific and provided Parkin
with notice of what would be required of him. Similarly, given the court
specifically stated Parkin would be referred to a “residential treatment
program,” it does not appear the court delegated to the probation department
the authority to decide if Parkin would participate in a residential program.
(Italics added.) Instead, the court itself mandated residential treatment.

15
_________________________
Clay, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Brown, P. J.

_________________________
Streeter, J.

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