People v. Kelley CA1/5

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Filed 10/14/25 P. v. Kelley CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171800
v.
TSHOMBE KELLEY, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. 139184)

Tshombe Kelley appeals from an order denying his petition
for resentencing (Pen. Code, § 1172.6).1 He argues that his
appointed counsel’s assistance was ineffective because counsel
explicitly conceded, in his memorandum in support of Kelley’s
petition, that Kelley was not eligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6. We conclude any error was harmless because
Kelley is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

BACKGROUND

A.

To be convicted of murder, a jury must ordinarily find that
the defendant acted with the requisite mental state, known as
malice aforethought. (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172,
1181, quoting § 187, subd. (a).) Until 2019, the felony murder
rule provided an exception that made “a killing while committing

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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certain felonies murder without the necessity of further
examining the defendant’s mental state.” (Chun, at p. 1182.)
Under a separate rule known as the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, a person who knowingly aids and abets
the criminal conduct of another person is guilty of not only the
intended crime but also of any other crime the other person
actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of
the intended crime. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161,
superseded by statute as stated in People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 958-959 & fn. 3 (Lewis).)

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437), effective January 1, 2019, changed the law relating to
accomplice liability for murder to better align punishment with
individual culpability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b), (f).) To that
end, Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as to murder and narrowed the felony-
murder exception to the malice requirement. (People v. Mancilla
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 862.)

Specifically, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 189, which
defines the degrees of murder, to limit murder liability based on
felony murder or a natural and probable consequences theory to a
person who: (1) was the actual killer; (2) aided and abetted the
actual killer with the intent to kill; or (3) was a major participant
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as those terms are used in the statute defining
felony-murder special circumstances. (§ 189, subd. (e); Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 3; accord, People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708.) The definition of malice in section 188 was also
amended to provide that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)

As a result of these amendments and later Senate Bill No.
775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. January

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1, 2022), a person convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter before Senate Bill 1437 may seek relief by filing a
petition in the trial court alleging that (1) the information or
indictment allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory under which malice is
imputed based solely on the defendant’s participation in a crime;
and (2) the petitioner could not be convicted of murder or
attempted murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a),
renumbered from § 1170.95 by Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022; Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-960.) The petition must include a
declaration stating the petitioner is eligible for relief based on the
above requirements; the trial court case number and year of
conviction; and whether the petitioner requests the appointment
of counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b).)

If the petitioner complies with these requirements, the trial
court must appoint counsel (if requested), receive briefing from
the parties, and then determine whether the petitioner has made
a “prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c); Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 960, 966.) If so, then the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing—
where the burden is on the prosecution to prove (beyond a
reasonable doubt) that the petitioner is ineligible for relief
because they are guilty of murder or attempted murder under the
law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c)-(d);
People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 709; Lewis, at p. 960.)
On the other hand, if the petition and record of conviction
establish conclusively that the petitioner is ineligible for relief—
because they were the “actual killer”—the trial court may dismiss
the petition. (See §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e)(1), 1172.6,
subd. (c); Lewis, at pp. 970-972.)

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B.

In 2000, Aaron Stewart died after Kelley shot him in the
back multiple times. Stewart and Kelley had been friends but
their relationship had frayed after Stewart had an affair with
Kelley’s girlfriend. On a separate occasion before the shooting,
Kelley went to Stewart’s house, argued with him, and fired a gun
in the air.

A jury convicted Kelley of first degree murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count one), willfully discharging a
firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3; count two) and
found true (among others) an enhancement for personally and
intentionally discharging a firearm proximately causing great
bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court
sentenced Kelley, in 2001, to a prison term of 52 years to life. On
direct appeal, this division affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Kelley (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 853, 855, 860, review den. Jan. 22,
2003, S111615.)

C.

In 2023, Kelley petitioned for resentencing in the superior
court. He requested the appointment of counsel and included a
declaration stating that an information had been filed against
him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under felony murder
or natural and probable consequences theories, and he could not
now be convicted of murder because of the 2019 amendments to
sections 188 and 189.

The People opposed Kelley’s petition for resentencing,
arguing that he could not establish a prima facie case of
eligibility because Kelley was the actual killer and the jury had
not been instructed on aiding and abetting, felony murder, or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.

In response, Kelley’s court-appointed counsel stated: “A
review of the reporter’s transcript from the trial, and in
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particular, the court’s instructions to the jury as well as the
opening and closing statements of the prosecutor . . . does not
show that the Felony Murder Rule, or the Natural and Probable
Consequences Doctrine as it applies to accomplice liability, was
ever mentioned as a possible theory of liability.” Counsel
continued: “Section 1172.6 provides a limited avenue for relief
where the trial record shows that the jury may have convicted the
defendant on a theory of liability that is no longer valid. In
particular, those theories are the Felony Murder Rule and the
Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine as it applies to
accomplice liability. Counsel is only taking the very narrow
position that the trial record is not showing that [Kelley] was
convicted on either of these theories, or stated in other words, on
a theory of liability that is no longer valid. [¶] On the issue of
whether relief should be granted pursuant to [Kelley’s section]
1172.6 petition, the matter is submitted to the court. If the court
disagrees with the above analysis, counsel is ready to brief any
issues as directed to do so.”

The superior court denied Kelley’s petition, concluding that
he had not established a prima facie case because the jury was
not instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory under which malice
could be imputed based solely on Kelley’s participation in a
crime.

DISCUSSION
A.

Kelley maintains he received ineffective assistance because
his appointed counsel conceded that Kelley had not stated a
prima facie case for resentencing. We disagree.

A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel is derived from the Sixth Amendment right
to the “ ‘[a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defence’ ” in a criminal

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prosecution. (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 650 &
fn. 1, 654-655, 658.) However, a petition under section 1172.6 “is
not a criminal prosecution.” It is the opposite because it can only
help the defendant. (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
575, 588; see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974 [“prima facie
stage under [section 1172.6,] subdivision (c) is not similarly
adversarial” to trial].)

Our Supreme Court has held that petitioners in section
1172.6 proceedings have only a statutory right to counsel at the
prima facie inquiry stage (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973; see
§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3)) and that there is no constitutional right to
counsel on appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition.
(People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, 226-227.)
Moreover, our Supreme Court concluded, in Lewis, that when a
petitioner is denied the assistance of counsel at the prima facie
review stage, that deprivation is a state law violation only—not a
structural or constitutional error—that is reviewed for harmless
error under the test in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
(Lewis, at pp. 972-974; accord, Delgadillo, at p. 227 [“the right to
counsel at that point in the proceedings is purely statutory”].)

Although it is unclear whether the statutory right to
counsel under section 1172.6 includes the right to claim
ineffective assistance on appeal, we assume (without deciding)
that Kelley has an implicit statutory right to competent counsel.
(Cf. In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 780, superseded by statute
on another ground as stated by In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th
720, 739-740; In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 248 [explicit
statutory right to competent representation in dependency
proceedings includes right to seek review of claims of
incompetence of counsel].)

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Kelley must
show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable

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probability that the result would have been more favorable but
for counsel’s error. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 691-694.) “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course
should be followed.” (Id. at p. 697.)

Even if we assume that appointed counsel was deficient in
explicitly conceding Kelley’s ineligibility for section 1172.6
relief—instead of simply submitting the matter after
summarizing the record as Kelley suggests was required—
Kelley’s ineffective assistance claim fails because he cannot
establish prejudice.

Here, Kelley’s jury was not instructed on felony murder,
accomplice liability under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or any other theory under which malice could be
imputed to Kelley based solely on his participation in a crime.
Accordingly, the record of conviction—including the jury’s verdict
that Kelley was guilty of first degree murder and the firearm
enhancement finding that Kelley personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing Stewart’s death—establishes that
Stewart was convicted as the actual killer, not on an imputed
malice theory.

The trial court correctly concluded Kelley is ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52; People v. Daniel (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 666, 677.) Accordingly, any error was harmless.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Kelley’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.

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BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
CHOU, J.

P. v. Kelley (A171800)

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