CourtListener 10703602•Hakob B. v. Tina S. CA2/5
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Filed 10/14/25 Hakob B. v. Tina S. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
HAKOB B., B339456
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STFL03541)
TINA S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Josh R. Freeman Stinn, Judge. Affirmed.
Jones Day and David Phillips; Family Violence Appellate
Project and Arati Vasan for Defendant and Appellant.
Kermisch & Paletz and Lauren M. Lookofsky for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a request
for renewal of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). The
party who sought the restraining order, Tina S. (appellant),1
invites this court to reweigh the evidence presented at the
hearing and reverse the trial court’s order. That is not the role of
an appellate tribunal. We review the trial court’s decision for
abuse of discretion and affirm the order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Renewal Hearing Testimony of Tina S.
A. The DVRO
In May 2020 Tina S. (Tina) filed a request for a DVRO,
naming her husband Hakob B. (Hakob) as the person to be
restrained. While there were numerous incidents alleged to
support the restraining order, the testimony at the renewal
motion highlighted those set forth below.
June 18, 2019. As Tina was preparing to depart the
residence for her mother’s home, Hakob told her that he wanted
her to return within two hours. Tina encountered traffic on the
way home and was delayed. She ultimately arrived after the two-
hour deadline. Hakob was not home, but when he arrived, he
was angry about Tina’s tardiness and slapped her face.
July 3, 2019. Tina was nine months pregnant with their
son (A.B.). During an argument, Hakob threatened to kill her.
1 We granted appellant’s request to use pseudonyms “Tina
S.,” “Hakob B.” (respondent), and “A.B.” (the parties’ minor child).
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1).)
2
He commented, “Watch after [the] divorce what I am going to do
to you.” Video of the event was played for the trial court.
February 25, 2020. Tina locked herself in a bedroom
because she believed a conversation she was having with Hakob
had the potential of escalating into a violent argument. Hakob
angrily banged on the door demanding that she open it. When
Tina called her mother and placed her on the speakerphone,
Hakob retreated downstairs. Tina left the bedroom because she
heard their baby crying. She encountered Hakob who
commented, “Why are you closing the door on me?” He grabbed
her arm and slapped her face. A bruise appeared on her arm a
day or two later.
March 20, 2020. Hakob compared “beautiful” women he
was watching on television to Tina and called her a “fat bitch.”
This upset Tina; she grabbed her keys to leave the residence.
Hakob blocked her path, put one of his hands on her neck, and
pushed her against the wall. With the other hand, he grabbed
her arm causing a bruise.2
2 Other allegations of Hakob’s abuse in Tina’s declaration
(but not mentioned in her testimony at the renewal hearing)
included:
(1) slapping her face and twisting her arm in late 2016 or
early 2017;
(2) slapping her face and pushing her onto the bed in
August 2017;
(3) striking her with his elbow as Hakob drove his car and
she was seated in the passenger seat in March 2018;
(4) striking her in the leg in September 2018;
(5) swinging her from side to side as she held her baby in
either late September or early October 2019;
3
On October 13, 2020, the parties stipulated to the issuance
of a restraining order for three years. The trial court filed an
order consistent with the stipulation; its expiration was October
13, 2023. Tina was granted custody of A.B. with Hakob having
visitation rights. Among the restrictions the order placed on
Hakob were (1) he was not permitted to contact Tina except for
the brief and peaceful contact necessary to facilitate visitation
with A.B., and (2) he was prohibited from being within 100 yards
of Tina.
B. The Throat-Slitting Gesture
Tina alleged in her declaration supporting renewal that,
during a July 2022 custody exchange, Hakob directed a throat-
slitting gesture to Tina from his vehicle. This event was not
referenced during her direct examination but, on cross-
examination, counsel asked her several questions about it. She
explained she did not have a video of the incident because it
occurred at the conclusion of the exchange, when she reached the
door to her residence and turned around to view Hakob’s car. A
police report was not filed, and Tina’s lawyer did not send a letter
to Hakob’s counsel, or anyone else, regarding the incident.
(6) slapping her face and pushing her against a wall in
September 2019;
(7) kicking her leg while she sat on the living room couch in
December 2019
(8) placing his hand over her mouth and pinching her nose
closed in March 2020; and
(9) throwing objects at her in November 2019 and March
2020.
4
C. Hakob’s Civil Harassment Restraining Order
Tina’s father generally accompanied Tina for A.B.’s custody
exchanges. After an exchange on August 29, 2022, as Tina and
her father were walking away, Hakob commented, “Do you think
your restraining order is finished? Well, think again.” Hakob
then sought a restraining order against Tina’s father but, on
October 12, 2022, the request was denied.
D. A.B.’s Injury
In mid-January 2023, A.B. injured his knee during play
time and was taken to the doctor by Tina. After the doctor visit,
she used an application entitled “Our Family Wizard” (OFW) to
send Hakob a written message explaining the doctor’s
assessment of A.B.’s knee. Hakob referenced the injury in a
January 15, 2023 message that accused Tina of being a bad
mother for neglecting to “keep [her] eye on [A.B.].” 3
While A.B. was visiting with Hakob on January 16, 2023, it
became apparent that the condition of A.B.’s knee was worsening,
and Hakob opted to take A.B. to an urgent care facility. He
contacted Tina about the problem and told her that he would be
unable to meet the drop-off time of 6:00 p.m. A.B. was ultimately
transferred from urgent care to a hospital emergency room.
On January 17, 2023, A.B. had surgery to remove bacteria
that formed on his knee. Prior to the surgery, Tina used her
mother’s phone to speak with Hakob. He wanted to be present
for the surgery and planned to be there even if it was contrary to
3 The doctor’s notes reviewed by Tina indicated Hakob told
the doctor that he reported Tina to the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS). A January 16, 2023, DCFS letter
(Ex. 19) reflected the case was closed.
5
her wishes. Because Tina considered the event to be “an
emergency situation” she allowed him to be at the hospital but
cautioned Hakob to stay far away from her. However, Tina spent
several hours with Hakob alone with A.B. in the hospital room
with the door slightly ajar. Tina and Hakob slept in A.B.’s room
for three nights.
E. The Request for Renewal is Filed
The request for renewal of the restraining order was filed
on October 6, 2023. It sought renewal for life or, alternatively,
for five years. Tina testified she was afraid of Hakob noting she
had been subjected to his threats, abuse, and harassment. She
referenced the July 3, 2019, pre-DVRO threat and expressed
concern that, if the renewal was denied, Hakob’s gun may be
returned to him and he may use it to kill her.
In addition to the previously referenced January 15, 2023
message, Tina testified about a September 2021 OFW message in
which Hakob indicated her “toxic behavior” is the reason why he
had to divorce her. When Tina’s counsel began to question her
about another message, a discussion with opposing counsel and
the trial court ensued regarding the need to have testimony
regarding the messages since the messages were included in the
exhibits. The trial court noted that it had read the
communications and will re-read all the highlighted portions of
the messages. Thus, Tina’s counsel changed the direction of his
direct examination and there was no further testimony about the
OFW messages.
OFW contacts referenced in the written request for renewal
but not during Tina’s testimony included the following: (1) three
October 2021 messages which, when read together, question her
6
mental health and suggest she is a bad mother who does not take
A.B.’s health seriously; (2) a October 2022 message in which
Hakob thanks God for not having to hear Tina’s arguments; (3) a
November 2022 message pointing out A.B.’s injuries while under
Tina’s care and questioning whether she believes it is necessary
to keep A.B. safe; and (4) two March 2023 messages suggesting
Tina needs “professional help.”
Since filing of the request for renewal, Hakob has come
within 100 yards of Tina on two occasions.
December 29, 2023. At approximately 5:00 p.m., when
Tina was picking A.B. up from preschool, Hakob was present to
pay the tuition and spoke to A.B. about a picture A.B. had drawn.
Hakob was due to commence visitation at 6:00 p.m. and asked
Tina if he could take him directly from the schoolyard. Tina
agreed. Hakob then asked if he could keep A.B. an extra day to
celebrate the new year. Tina again agreed. Hakob replied, with
surprise, “Really?” He said, “Thank you. Can I give you a hug?”
Tina did not allow Hakob to hug her.
March 28, 2024. Tina took A.B. to the hospital to have his
appendix removed. Upon their arrival, she encountered Hakob.
Tina told Hakob he could stay at the hospital as long as he is not
near her and “doesn’t deal with [her].” Nonetheless, although
there were plenty of empty tables in the cafeteria, the two of
them ate lunch together with other family members. A.B. spent
six days in the hospital; Tina saw Hakob each day. There was no
occasion where Hakob scared or threatened her. A photo was
shown to the trial court that depicted Tina clapping and smiling
as Hakob pretended to be the Easter bunny for A.B.
7
II. Renewal Hearing Testimony of Hakob B.
A. Allegation of Throat-Slitting Gesture
Hakob was asked about the portion of Tina’s declaration
wherein she alleged that, during a July 2022 custody exchange,
Hakob directed a throat-slitting gesture to Tina from his vehicle.
Hakob denied making such a gesture and offered that he had
never made a threatening gesture when leaving a custody
exchange.
B. A.B.’s Surgeries
In January 2023, during a visitation, A.B. was taken to an
urgent care facility by Hakob. Tina met Hakob at the urgent
care, just before A.B. was transferred to the emergency room.
Tina did not go home that night and the two of them spent three
straight days together at the hospital tending to A.B. At no point
did Hakob harass or threaten Tina during the hospital stay, and
he was never asked by Tina to leave the area.
With respect to the March 2024 surgery, Hakob was
present at the hospital every day. He arrived in the morning and
sometimes stayed as late as 11:00 p.m. On each of the six days
A.B. was in the hospital, he spent several hours alone with Tina
in the hospital room. When A.B. was in surgery, Hakob went to
the cafeteria to purchase food. As he was walking with his lunch,
Tina invited him to sit at her table noting there was an open
chair, and he was “welcome to sit.”
C. The December 2023 Preschool Incident
Hakob’s encounter with Tina and A.B. was inadvertent as
Hakob was present to pay the tuition. He had a “friendly [and]
peaceful” conversation with Tina. Hakob was happy that Tina
agreed to extend his visitation with A.B. and asked if he could
8
give her a hug “to show [his] respect toward[] her.” When counsel
asked Hakob if he intended to offend Tina, Hakob responded, “Of
course not.”
D. Prior Threats/Abuse
Hakob acknowledged pre-DVRO abuse of Tina and the
threat to kill her depicted on a video. He believed his actions
were inappropriate and were legitimate grounds for the DVRO.
Following the issuance of the DVRO, he completed anger
management classes and a “batterers intervention” program.
Each curriculum was 52 weeks long, meaning he completed 104
weeks of classes. Hakob was amenable to a court order
prohibiting him from possessing a firearm “pending further court
order” in the event the DVRO was not renewed.
E. Hakob’s Professional/Personal Life
Hakob is an engineer at two different United States Air
Force bases. He is employed by the Defense Department with a
“very high classified clearance.” Although he has been eligible for
promotions, those opportunities were blocked by the existence of
the DVRO. At the time of his testimony, he was in a dating
relationship with a woman.
III. The Trial Court’s Decision
The trial court filed a five-page written decision. It
acknowledged the seriousness of the incidents supporting the
DVRO but found that “compelling and persuasive evidence was
presented at the [renewal] hearing that raised substantial doubt
regarding [Tina’s] continued apprehension of future abuse by
[Hakob].” The trial court pointed to A.B.’s hospital stays noting
9
that Tina allowed Hakob to keep her company in A.B.’s hospital
room and, in January 2023, she had several overnight stays with
Hakob in A.B.’s room. It characterized Hakob’s presence as
“discretionary” on Tina’s part writing that “there may well have
been workable alternatives that would have enabled [Hakob’s]
presence without necessarily being in the direct and protracted
presence of [Tina].”
The trial court also relied on the interaction between
Hakob and Tina at the preschool wherein Tina appeared
unphased by Hakob’s presence and agreed, not only to an early
custody exchange, but also an extra day of visitation. It
characterized Hakob as “overjoyed” by Tina’s concession and put
some weight on Hakob’s conduct after his request for a hug was
denied, i.e., he did not “push[] that request any further.”
In assessing Tina’s fear of Hakob, the trial wrote,
“considered in the aggregate and over the course of more than a
year between events (e.g., the 2023 and 2024 hospitalizations),
given [Tina] could have but did not insist on [Hakob’s] adherence
to the [DVRO], this court is persuaded [Tina’s] apprehension/fear,
while perhaps still present, is not objectively reasonable . . . .”
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
A trial court’s order denying a request for renewal of a
DVRO is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Navarro v. Cervera
(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 229, 238.) If it is necessary to review
factual findings, we refrain from reweighing evidence and
consider whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence. (In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th 292, 319 [reviewing
10
court prohibited from reweighing facts in assessing whether
substantial evidence exists]; Navarro v. Cervera, supra, 108
Cal.App.5th at p. 238 [factual findings in DVRO renewal
reviewed for substantial evidence]; M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145 [reviewing court declines to reweigh
evidence in determining propriety of DVRO].)
“‘A court abuses its discretion if it acts “in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner”’ [citation] or ‘when its
ruling “falls outside the bounds of reason”’ [citation].” (People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 399.) The California Supreme
Court has emphasized: “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its
decision for that of the trial court.”’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie
M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) Nevertheless, “[i]f the court’s
decision to deny a renewal request is influenced by an erroneous
understanding of the law, the court has not properly exercised its
discretion under the law. [Citations.]” (Michael M. v Robin J.
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 178 (Michael M).)
The Renewal Order
A protected party may apply for renewal of a DVRO “for
five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court.”
(Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) To warrant renewal, the protected
party must demonstrate “a reasonable person, in petitioner’s
circumstances, would fear repetition of the abuse if the order
expired.” (G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 413, 421.) There
must be a showing that “‘“it is more probable than not there is a
sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s
11
apprehension genuine and reasonable.”’ [Citation.]” (Navarro v.
Cervera, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 238.)
In its evaluation of whether the protected party’s fear of
future abuse is reasonable, the trial court is to consider the
“‘findings and facts’” related to the DVRO as well as “‘any
significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the events
justifying the initial protective order.’” (Michael M., supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 180, quoting Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290–1291 (Ritchie).) “‘Also relevant are the
seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it involves
potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order
imposes on the restrained person such as interference with job
opportunities.’ [Citation.]” (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at
p. 180; see also Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.)
The trial court was aware of the requirements for renewal.
It quoted the reasonable person test, relied on Ritchie, and
recounted the appropriate factors for consideration. The trial
court was not influenced by an erroneous understanding of the
law. (See Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 178.) We turn
to the relevant considerations.4
Although the record includes a minute order indicating a
previous judge issued the DVRO after a hearing, the parties
4 Although there was evidence regarding the burden the
restraining order placed on Hakob’s professional development,
the trial court did not specifically balance the burden versus risk
factor. However, by finding the apprehension that future abuse
would occur was not reasonable, it necessarily concluded the
“degree of risk” was minimal.
12
agree that they stipulated to the restraining order without a
hearing. Thus, the record does not reflect any factual findings
made by the trial court with respect to Tina’s allegations
supporting the DVRO. Having said that, Tina’s DVRO
declaration was attached as an exhibit to the request for renewal.
There is no question the trial court considered the allegations set
forth therein as its order specifies it reviewed the written request
for renewal (as well as the opposition) and states, “[Tina’s]
allegations of abuse supporting the issuance of her underlying
[DVRO] were very serious. The alleged abuse was physical,
verbal, and included death threats.” Indeed, the court recognized
Tina “was most certainly and justifiably terribly afraid of [Hakob]
given his egregious and abusive conduct,” but that “compelling
and persuasive evidence was presented at the [renewal] hearing .
. . raised substantial doubt regarding [Tina’s] continued
apprehension of future abuse by Hakob.” (Italics added.)
The next question for the trial court was whether there had
been a change in factual circumstances. It recognized, since the
issuance of the DVRO, Hakob had completed two therapy
programs and neither party sought to litigate violations of the
DVRO nor did they request a modification of the restraining
order or custody arrangement. The trial court reasonably relied
on Tina’s conduct during A.B.’s two hospital stints as it
suggested, at least from an objective perspective, Tina’s attitude
toward the restraining order had evolved. Indeed, the record
reflects Tina accepted Hakob’s presence in the hospital rooms
alone with her (and A.B.), even spending several nights together.
As the trial court pointed out, Tina (or a reasonable person in her
circumstances) could have asked Hakob to be present in shifts
13
with her in order to avoid exposure to abuse.5 But Tina elected to
not require Hakob’s adherence to the protective order and even
invited him to sit at her cafeteria table with his lunch.6
As the court recognized, the preschool exchange was also
meaningful. Tina could have told Hakob that he was improperly
near her before the scheduled visitation. However, she elected to
5 “Abuse” is broadly defined to include, among other things,
any behavior that could be enjoined pursuant to Family Code
section 6320, e.g., harassment or disturbing the peace of another.
(Fam. Code, §§ 6203, subd. (a)(4), 6320, subd. (a).)
6 Tina’s testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding
the cafeteria lunch was different from Hakob’s account of the
incident. In addition, Tina’s declaration regarding the January
2023 hospital visit includes allegations (not mentioned in her
testimony) of Hakob (a) squeezing her arm as she cried while
A.B. was being wheeled into surgery, and (b) denying her request
to move away from her. It is unclear from the record whether the
claim that Tina’s arm was grabbed concerns an attempt by
Hakob to console Tina or an act of aggression. Hakob’s testimony
makes no reference to grabbing Tina’s arm (nor was he
confronted with that allegation on cross-examination) and, the
allegation was somewhat contradicted by his testimony that he
did not harass her at the hospital and she never asked him to
leave. To the extent the evidence is at odds on these points, we
make the following observation. “‘Consistent with well-
established principles governing review for sufficiency of the
evidence, in making this assessment [we] must view the record in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ [Citation.]”
(Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 104.)
14
not only permit the close proximity but also extend Hakob’s
visitation time. Tina’s denial of a hug resulted in no hostility,
and the court could reasonably conclude, from an objective
perspective, this was an affable encounter devoid of any degree of
fear.
Tina’s approach to challenging the trial court’s thought
process can be divided into three parts. The initial claim is the
trial court discounted Tina’s subjective fear and had an improper
“fixation” on what Tina should have done rather than on Hakob’s
abuse and admitted violations of the DVRO. Second, the trial
court failed to recognize that each contact following the DVRO
was a violation of that order. Third, the trial court erred by
requiring Tina to provide corroborating evidence of her allegation
that Hakob made a throat-slitting gesture while looking at her.
We do not read the trial court’s order as a fixation on what
Tina should have done. Rather, the trial court repeatedly
referenced its duty to determine whether Tina’s fear of future
abuse was objectively reasonable with primary consideration
given to the seriousness of the allegations supporting the DVRO,
the number of occasions that Tina permitted Hakob to be in close
proximity to her since the issuance of the DVRO, the nature of
their contacts, and Hakob’s completion of extensive therapy.7
7 Tina expresses concern that the trial court “required abuse
survivors to pursue formal enforcement at the risk of forfeiting
their ability to seek renewal of a DVRO.” It is true that the trial
court noted “[no] contempt actions [were] filed alleging violations
of the [DVRO].” But in no sense did it require a party seeking
renewal of a DVRO to have filed contempt actions associated with
alleged violations in order to secure a renewal. Rather, the trial
15
With respect to the OFW messages, it is clear the court
considered them, but it did not make any explicit finding on
whether they constituted a violation of the DVRO. What it did do
was to recognize they were “inappropriate and misguided” but
minimized their significance to its ruling “given the parties’ back
and forth with each other.”8 Hakob’s statement to Tina and her
father while they walked away from the August 29, 2022 custody
exchange is similarly situated; the trial court found it
“questionable” whether it violated the DVRO or constituted a
threat and, apparently for that reason, determined it was not
entitled to significant weight; indeed, the comment lacked clarity.
In sum, given Tina’s permissive interactions with Hakob and his
completion of two therapy programs, the trial court reasonably
concluded the contacts/comments were not adequate to establish
a reasonable apprehension of abuse. It is not our role to
rebalance the evidence presented and reach a different result.
(M.S. v. A.S., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.)
court’s comment constituted an observation that had some
bearing on whether a reasonable person would fear repetition of
the abuse if the order expired. It stands to reason that, from an
objective standpoint, a protected party who files contempt actions
alleging violations of a DVRO may, depending on the
circumstances, harbor a more reasonable fear of future abuse
than a protected party who acquiesces to said violations.
8 Many of the messages involved a back-and-forth
conversation regarding the treatment of, and visitation with, A.B.
For example, the January 15, 2023 exchange began with a
message from Tina inquiring about the condition of A.B.’s knee
and included commentary about how to care for the injury.
16
Tina’s argument that the court improperly required
corroboration of the throat-slitting gesture lacks merit. The only
evidence supporting the incident was Tina’s declaration and her
testimony on cross-examination that she was unable to videotape
the incident. Hakob denied making such a gesture. It is true
that “the testimony of one witness, if believed, may be sufficient
for the proof of any fact. (Evid. Code, § 411).” (People v.
Rasmuson (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1508, italics added.) In
this respect, the trial court wrote, “Apart from [Tina’s] allegation,
no proof was presented that [Hakob] did that,” i.e., gestured as if
he were slitting his throat. In other words, the trial court found
Tina was not credible on this point (and/or Hakob was credible); a
determination that we are not at liberty to disturb (Sabbah v.
Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 823). Contrary to Tina’s
claim, the trial court imposed no requirement that those seeking
a DVRO corroborate their allegations.
Conclusion
By and large, Tina’s arguments for reversal of the order
require a rebalancing and/or reassessment of the facts presented
to the trial court. We are precluded from taking such an
approach. (M.S. v. A.S., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.)
Having identified substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
findings underlying its determination that there was no
reasonable apprehension of future abuse, “it is of no consequence”
that other evidence or inferences drawn from the evidence might
have supported a contrary ruling. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984)
150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874, italics omitted.) Similarly, in assessing
whether the trial court’s decision exceeded the bounds of reason,
we adhere to the rule that, although two or more inferences can
be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to
17
substitute its decision for that of the trial court. (In re Stephanie
M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318–319.) Tina has not demonstrated
the trial court’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or exceeded the
bounds of reason. There was no abuse of discretion.
18
DISPOSITION
The order denying renewal of the domestic violence
restraining order is affirmed. Hakob is to recover costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KUMAR, J.*
I Concur:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court (retired),
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
19
Hakob B. v. Tina S.
B339456
KIM (D.), J., Concurring
I concur in the result but write separately to emphasize
that my concurrence is based on the well-established standards
governing our review. If I were deciding this matter de novo, I
would not necessarily draw some of the same inferences from
specific instances of Tina’s conduct. For instance, I would not
conclude that Tina’s conduct toward Hakob during the hospital
stays “suggested” that Tina’s attitude toward the restraining
order had changed. Nor would I find that Tina’s denial of
Hakob’s request for a hug demonstrated that their interaction
was “affable.” But I need not make these individual findings
because, as the majority notes, we do not reweigh the evidence on
appeal but instead determine whether substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s findings (including its implied findings)
and, consequently, its ultimate finding that a reasonable person,
in Tina’s circumstances, would not fear repetition of the abuse if
the order expired. On this record, I agree that sufficient evidence
supported that finding and that the court therefore did not abuse
its discretion.
KIM (D.), J.
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