CourtListener 10701304•Gevargeza v. Walgreens Co. CA2/7
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Filed 10/13/25 Gevargeza v. Walgreens Co. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
SHARLIN GEVARGEZA, B330795
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC708167)
v.
WALGREENS CO. et al.
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard E. Rico and Jon R. Takasugi,
Judges. Reversed with directions.
Law Offices of Michael D. Finley and Michael D. Finley for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Jack S.
Sholkoff and Leslie H. Helmer for Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Sharlin Gevargeza worked as pharmacy manager at a
Walgreens store. Gevargeza’s supervisors praised her for her
excellent customer service, but criticized her for not meeting
Walgreens’ productivity expectations. After Gevargeza’s
supervisors pressured her to resign, Gevargeza went on medical
leave. A few months later Walgreens replaced Gevargeza and,
according to Gevargeza, did not offer her a comparable position.
Gevargeza filed this action against Walgreens and one of
her supervisors, Jose Vargas, for discrimination and retaliation
in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code,
§ 12900 et seq. (FEHA)), wrongful termination in violation of
public policy, retaliation in violation of Labor Code
section 1102.5, and related causes of action. Walgreens and
Vargas filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative
for summary adjudication on all causes of action, making two
primary arguments: (1) Gevargeza did not suffer an adverse
employment action and (2) Walgreens took any adverse
employment action for legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and
nonretaliatory reasons. The trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment.
We conclude the trial court erred in ruling there was no
triable issue of fact regarding whether Gevargeza suffered an
adverse employment action. We conclude, however, that
Walgreens articulated legitimate reasons for its actions and that
Gevargeza did not create a triable issue of material fact
regarding whether Walgreens’ stated reasons were a pretext for
discrimination. Therefore, Walgreens was entitled to summary
adjudication on Gevargeza’s causes of action under FEHA.
However, because Walgreens moved for summary adjudication on
2
Gevargeza’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation
of public policy on the ground she did not suffer an adverse
employment action, Walgreens was not entitled to summary
adjudication on that cause of action. Nor was Walgreens entitled
to summary adjudication on Gevargeza’s cause of action for
retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5: Walgreens
did not show it would have taken the same actions against
Gevargeza had she not engaged in the alleged whistleblower
activities. Therefore, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Gevargeza Takes a Leave of Absence, and Walgreens
Replaces Her with a New Pharmacy Manager
Gevargeza began working for Walgreens in 2007 as an
intern pharmacist. In 2009 she became a “floater pharmacist,”
and in 2010 became the pharmacy manager at a Walgreens store.
Gevargeza’s supervisors were Penah Dadayan, the district
manager for retail and pharmacy operations, and Jose Vargas,
the store manager. Gevargeza received mixed performance
reviews. On the one hand, in Gevargeza’s annual reviews Vargas
said Gevargeza was “achieving” or “exceeding” expectations. In
particular, Vargas consistently gave Gevargeza excellent reviews
for customer service. Gevargeza received the highest customer
feedback score in her district and one of the highest scores in the
area, and Walgreens gave her an award in 2015 “for providing
extraordinary customer care.”
On the other hand, Vargas and Dadayan repeatedly told
Gevargeza that her pharmacy was not meeting two of Walgreens’
productivity metrics: the target percentage of “waiting
prescriptions” (where the customer was “physically waiting in the
3
pharmacy to pick up the prescription”) and the percentage of
prescriptions “verified by promise time” (ready for pickup at the
time promised). Gevargeza, in turn, frequently complained to
Dadayan and Vargas that she could not meet the metrics because
the pharmacy was understaffed.
In March 2017 Dadayan and Vargas sent Gevargeza to
learn “some good practices” by working temporarily at a nearby
Walgreens store that was outperforming Gevargeza’s store. After
working there for a week Gevargeza left on a medical leave of
absence. In July 2017 Dadayan called Gevargeza and told her
that Walgreens had replaced her with a new pharmacy manager.
Gevargeza did not return to work for Walgreens.
B. Gevargeza Sues Walgreens and Vargas
Gevargeza filed this action against Walgreens and Vargas,
asserting causes of action against Walgreens under FEHA for
gender discrimination, disability discrimination, failure to
accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process,
retaliation, harassment, and failure to prevent harassment and
discrimination. She also asserted causes of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.
Gevargeza asserted causes of action against Vargas for gender
and disability harassment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Gevargeza alleged that, when Vargas became store
manager, he “began a constant and unrelenting campaign of
discriminatory and oppressive treatment.” Gevargeza alleged
that she “routinely complained that she was short staffed, and
therefore, not fully able to complete all of her essential work
functions” and that “being short-staffed was a threat to patient
4
safety.” Vargas, however, allegedly “refused to provide
[Gevargeza] with adequate staffing,” “became unjustifiably
critical” of Gevargeza for failing to meet Walgreens’ productivity
expectations, and “repeatedly used demeaning, aggressive, and
intimidating language” he did not use with male employees.
Gevargeza also alleged that, due to Vargas’s “oppressive,
discriminatory and hostile tirades, and refusals to provide
adequate staffing,” she sought “medical treatment for the
symptoms of stress and anxiety” and “went out on a stress leave
at the recommendation of her doctor.” Gevargeza alleged her
employment was “terminated . . . and/or constructively
terminated.”
C. Walgreens and Vargas File a Motion for Summary
Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary
Adjudication
Walgreens and Vargas moved for summary judgment or, in
the alternative, for summary adjudication on each cause of action
and on Gevargeza’s claim for punitive damages. First, Walgreens
and Vargas argued the undisputed facts showed Gevargeza did
not suffer an adverse employment action. Walgreens and Vargas
submitted a declaration from Dadayan, who stated that
Gevargeza “has never been terminated,” that Walgreens “has
never demoted . . . Gevargeza nor reduced her pay,” and that
Gevargeza was “still an employee of Walgreens.” Dadayan stated
that she “had to fill the pharmacy manager position” at
Gevargeza’s store after Gevargeza was on leave for a few months,
but that she told Gevargeza she would find another position for
her “whenever she was ready to return.”
Second, Walgreens and Vargas argued that, even if
Gevargeza suffered an adverse employment action, Walgreens
5
had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions; namely,
Walgreens wanted to run its pharmacy “with high productivity
and within budget.” Walgreens and Vargas submitted the
deposition testimony of Gevargeza, who admitted that between
December 2016 and March 2017 Dadayan and Jennifer Brown (a
supervisor who temporarily filled in for Vargas while he was on
leave) constantly reprimanded Gevargeza for not meeting
Walgreens’ targets for waiting prescriptions and prescriptions
verified by promised time. Walgreens and Vargas also
submitted Dadayan’s deposition testimony that she reviewed
Walgreens’ budget for staff hours at Gevargeza’s store and
determined the staffing at Gevargeza’s store was correct for the
pharmacy volume. Dadayan testified that, after Gevargeza
exhausted her medical leave, Dadayan replaced Gevargeza with a
new pharmacy manager “to have a smooth operation at a
pharmacy.” Dadayan stated that, as of September 2019, the new
pharmacy manager (also a woman) was filling more prescriptions
with fewer staff than Gevargeza had.
D. Gevargeza Opposes the Motion
In opposition to the motion Gevargeza argued there were
triable issues of material fact regarding whether she suffered an
adverse employment action. She argued there was evidence from
which a jury could find that Walgreens attempted to demote her
or that Walgreens terminated her employment. Gevargeza
submitted her deposition testimony that, shortly before she took
her medical leave in March 2017, Dadayan asked her to “step
down” from her position as pharmacy manager and to take a
pharmacist position, which would have been a demotion.
Gevargeza submitted a corroborating email from Vargas to
Dadayan, where Vargas stated that, during a meeting with
6
Gevargeza, he “asked [Gevargeza] about her decision to step
down” and that Gevargeza “responded that she will communicate
her decision” to Dadayan. Gevargeza further testified that, when
Dadayan asked her to consider “stepping down,” she asked
Dadayan whether she could be an “assistant pharmacist”—a
position Gevargeza described as the “second pharmacist” after
the pharmacy manager—at a nearby store, and Dadayan said,
“No.”
Gevargeza also disputed Dadayan’s characterization of the
conversation they had after Gevargeza went on leave. Gevargeza
testified that Dadayan said she “had been replaced,” that
Walgreens “had no position available for [her],” and that, if
Gevargeza “ever decid[ed] to come back, they may be able to
accommodate [her]; they may . . . not.” When counsel for
Walgreens and Vargas asked Gevargeza whether Dadayan told
Gevargeza that, when Gevargeza was “able to return to work,”
she “would have a position” as a pharmacist “but maybe at a
different location,” Gevargeza said, “No.” Gevargeza also
submitted a text message she received from Dadayan a few days
after their conversation where Dadayan asked Gevargeza to
return her keys to the pharmacy. Finally, Gevargeza submitted a
letter she received from Walgreens a few weeks after receiving
Dadayan’s text message. The letter stated that Gevargeza’s “paid
disability leave [had] expired” and that if she did not submit,
within two weeks, either a form showing she was under a doctor’s
care or a request for an additional leave of absence, her
“employment will be considered terminated as of the day [her]
paid benefits were exhausted.” Gevargeza stated in her
declaration that, when she received the letter, she believed
Walgreens had “already terminated” her employment and that
she took no action in response to the letter.
7
In response to Walgreens’ contention any adverse
employment actions were for legitimate business reasons,
Gevargeza asserted that running a pharmacy with high
productivity and within a certain budget was “not a legitimate,
non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory reason.” Gevargeza also
argued that Walgreens’ purported reasons for terminating her
employment were pretextual and that Gevargeza’s protected
activity—raising concerns about patient health and safety—was
a substantial motivating factor in Walgreens’ decision to
terminate her. Gevargeza submitted her deposition testimony
that, during her March 2017 meeting with Vargas (when he
asked her whether she would resign as pharmacy manager), she
told Vargas that two new pharmacy technicians who did not have
adequate training were making medical mistakes and
jeopardizing patient health. Vargas told Gevargeza not to
discuss her concerns with anyone except management.
Gevargeza also complained to Dadayan and to Dadayan’s
supervisor that some employees were inappropriately giving
medical advice to patients.
Finally, Gevargeza contended Walgreens’ decision to
terminate her employment was “directly related to Gevargeza’s
disability.” Gevargeza cited her deposition testimony that,
because of the “long understaffing for years, and all the
harassment and discrimination” by Vargas, she “started having
SVTs again.”1 Citing a 2013 incident when Gevargeza collapsed
1 SVT stands for supraventricular tachycardia, which is an
“abnormally elevated heartrate.” (Hardaway v. Chater (C.D. Cal.
1996) 21 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1142, fn. 10; see Cordoba v. Dillard’s,
Inc. (11th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 1169, 1173; Methodist Medical
8
at work and an ambulance took her to the hospital, Gevargeza
contended Dadayan and Vargas knew about her disability.
E. The Trial Court Grants the Motion
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment.
For each cause of action at issue in this appeal,2 the court ruled
Gevargeza failed to “raise a triable issue as to whether [her]
employment was actually terminated by Walgreens” because
“informing a person on extended medical leave that another
employee is taking their prior position does not, without more,
amount to a termination of employment.” The court also found
the letter Walgreens sent Gevargeza “only stated a condition
under which [Gevargeza]’s employment might be terminated in
the future,” but “[a]bsent any additional correspondence
indicating termination, there are not enough facts from which a
Center of Illinois v. American Medical Security Inc. (7th Cir.
1994) 38 F.3d 316, 317, fn. 2.)
2 Gevargeza also asserted causes of action for failure to
accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and harassment. The
trial court granted summary adjudication on each of these causes
of action, and Gevargeza does not discuss these rulings or argue
the court erred in making them, thus forfeiting any challenge to
the order granting the motion for summary adjudication on these
causes of action. (See Potter v. Alliance United Ins. Co. (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 894, 911; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) Because Gevargeza named
Vargas only in her causes of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and harassment, he is entitled to summary
judgment on the complaint.
9
reasonable trier of fact could infer that there was an actual
termination.”
The court further ruled Gevargeza failed to create a triable
issue of material fact regarding whether she suffered any other
adverse employment action. The court found “Walgreens did not
force [Gevargeza] to take a lower position as a condition of her
continued employment,” but the court did not acknowledge
Gevargeza’s evidence Dadayan and Vargas asked Gevargeza to
resign from her position as pharmacy manager before she went
on leave or Gevargeza’s description of her conversations with
Dadayan after Walgreens replaced her. Instead, the court cited
Dadayan’s statement in her declaration that in July 2019—
nearly two years after Walgreens filled Gevargeza’s former
position as pharmacy manager—Walgreens offered Gevargeza a
position as a pharmacist after Walgreens’ third-party
administrator for workers’ compensation claims informed
Walgreens that Gevargeza could not return to work as a
pharmacy manager. (Gevargeza did not accept the offer.) The
court ruled Walgreens’ offer of a “lower-ranked position” was
“part of Walgreens’ effort to accommodate [Gevargeza’s]
disability,” not an adverse employment action.3 The court
entered judgment in favor of Walgreens and Vargas, and
Gevargeza timely appealed.4
3 Because the trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment, the court did not rule on the motion for summary
adjudication on Gevargeza’s claim for punitive damages.
4 Gevargeza initially filed a notice of appeal from the court’s
order granting the motion for summary judgment, which is not
an appealable order. (See Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024)
10
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The court may grant a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication when “‘“all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”’”
(Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1151,
1161; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of University
of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
“A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial
burden of presenting evidence that a cause of action lacks merit
because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of
action or there is a complete defense.” (Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil
Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1068; see Code Civ. Proc.
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)
“Where, as here, the defendant moves for summary
judgment on the grounds that one or more elements of the
plaintiff’s [cause of action] cannot be established, the defendant
must present evidence that either ‘conclusively negate[s] an
element of the plaintiff’s cause of action’ or ‘show[s] that the
plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,’
evidence needed to establish an element . . . .” (White v. Smule,
Inc. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 346, 354; see Aguilar, supra,
16 Cal.5th 643, 655; Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v.
Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 223.) We directed counsel for
Gevargeza to file an appealable judgment and, when counsel did
not do so, we dismissed the appeal. After we dismissed the
appeal, the trial court entered judgment, and Gevargeza filed a
notice of appeal from the judgment.
11
25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 668.) “‘Only after the
defendant carries that initial burden does the burden shift to the
plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more material
facts exists as to the cause of action . . . .”’” (Fajardo v. Dailey
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 221, 225-226; see Code Civ. Proc. § 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at pp. 849-850.) “There is a triable issue of
material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof.” (Aguilar, at p. 850; see Lemm v. Ecolab Inc.
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 159, 169.)
“‘“‘“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering
all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers
except that to which objections were made and sustained.”’
[Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.”’” (Hampton v. County of
San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347; see Wawrzenski v. United
Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663, 684 (Wawrzenski).)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion
for Summary Adjudication on Gevargeza’s FEHA
Causes of Action
1. Applicable Law
FEHA makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge [a]
person from employment . . . or to discriminate against the
person . . . in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
because of the person’s race, gender, or disability. (Gov. Code,
§ 12940, subd. (a).) FEHA also makes it unlawful for an
12
employer “to discharge . . . or otherwise discriminate against a
person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden
under” FEHA. (Id., § 12940, subd. (h).) “‘In evaluating claims of
discrimination under FEHA, California courts apply the burden-
shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
(1973) 411 U.S. 792’” (McDonnell Douglas). (Wawrzenski, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 684; see Harris v. City of Santa Monica
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 214; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz).) Courts also apply the McDonnell
Douglas approach in evaluating claims of retaliation under
FEHA. (See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th
1028, 1042 (Yanowitz); Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists,
Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 63; Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 942.)
Under the McDonnell Douglas approach the plaintiff has
the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination or retaliation. (See Harris v. City of Santa
Monica, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 214; Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th
at p. 1042.) “To state a prima facie case of discrimination under
FEHA, the plaintiff must show (1) she was a member of a
protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she sought
or was performing competently in the position she held; (3) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) some other
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Wawrzenski,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 684; see Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 355.) “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
FEHA, an employee must show that (1) she engaged in a
‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected her to an adverse
employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the
protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Bailey v.
San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 636;
13
see Yanowitz, at p. 1042; Zamora v. Security Industry Specialties,
Inc., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 63.)
“A prima facie case establishes a presumption of
discrimination [or retaliation]. The employer may rebut the
presumption by producing evidence that its action was taken for
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory [and nonretaliatory] reason. If
the employer discharges this burden, the presumption of
discrimination [or retaliation] disappears. The plaintiff must
then show that the employer’s proffered . . . reason was actually a
pretext for discrimination [or retaliation], and the plaintiff may
offer any other evidence of discriminatory [or retaliatory] motive.”
(Harris v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 214-215;
see Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042.)
“‘An employer may meet its initial burden in moving for
summary judgment by presenting evidence that one or more
elements of a prima facie case are lacking, or the employer acted
for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory [and nonretaliatory] reason.’”
(Wawrzenski, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 685; see Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 357 [employer satisfied its initial burden on
summary judgment where the employer “set forth competent,
admissible evidence [citations] of its reasons, unrelated to
[prohibited] bias,” for its employment decisions]; Zamora v.
Security Industry Specialists, Inc., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 32.) If the employer makes either showing, “‘“the employer will
be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces
admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact material
to the defendant’s showing.”’” (Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 327, 344, italics omitted; see Zamora, at p. 32.)
14
2. Gevargeza Created a Triable Issue of Material
Fact Regarding Whether She Suffered an
Adverse Employment Action
For “both discrimination and retaliation claims, an adverse
employment action is one that ‘materially affects the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.’” (Bailey v.
San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 637;
see Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1051; Light v. Department
of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 91 (Light);
Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1161-1162.) To show Gevargeza
could not prove Walgreens subjected her to an adverse
employment action, Walgreens and Vargas relied primarily on
Dadayan’s statements in her declaration that Walgreens never
demoted Gevargeza or reduced her pay and that Gevargeza was
still an employee of Walgreens. Gevargeza contends there was a
triable issue of material fact regarding whether she suffered an
adverse employment action—particularly because Walgreens
sent her a letter stating the company considered her employment
terminated the day her leave benefits expired. We agree with
Gevargeza the evidence she submitted would allow a reasonable
trier of fact to find Walgreens adversely and materially affected
the terms and conditions of her employment.5
The “phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment
must be interpreted liberally and with reasonable appreciation of
the realities of the workplace in order to afford employees the
appropriate and generous protection against employment
discrimination that the FEHA was intended to provide.”
5 We assume, without deciding, that Walgreens met its
initial burden on summary adjudication.
15
(Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1054; see Bailey v.
San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 637;
Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1162.) Thus, an adverse employment
action includes not only “so-called ultimate employment actions
such as termination or demotion, but also the entire spectrum of
employment actions that are reasonably likely to adversely and
materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity
for advancement in his or her career.” (Yanowitz, at
pp. 1053-1054; see Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 56, 65; Light, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 91-92.) Determining what type of treatment constitutes an
adverse employment action “is not, by its nature, susceptible to a
mathematically precise test, and the significance of particular
types of adverse actions must be evaluated by taking into account
the legitimate interests of both the employer and the employee.
Minor or relatively trivial adverse actions or conduct by
employers or fellow employees that, from an objective
perspective, are reasonably likely to do no more than anger or
upset an employee cannot properly be viewed as materially
affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and
are not actionable, but adverse treatment that is reasonably
likely to impair a reasonable employee’s job performance or
prospects for advancement or promotion falls within the reach” of
FEHA. (Yanowitz, at pp. 1054-1055; see Light, at pp. 91-92.)
“[W]e consider the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the plaintiff has suffered an adverse employment
action.” (Light, at p. 92; see Yanowitz, at p. 1036.)
A reasonable trier of fact could find that, notwithstanding
Dadayan’s statements, Walgreens conditioned Gevargeza’s
continued employment on a demotion. (See Guz, supra,
16
24 Cal.4th at p. 355 [adverse employment action includes
demotion]; Thomas v. Department of Corrections (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 507, 511 [a “materially adverse change might be
indicated by . . . a demotion”].) Viewed in the light most
favorable to Gevargeza (see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 844),
the evidence would allow a jury to find Dadayan and Vargas
pressured Gevargeza to resign from her pharmacy manager
position after criticizing her for not meeting Walgreens’
productivity expectations and temporarily reassigned her to a
different position. When Gevargeza asked whether she could
work as the assistant pharmacist in a different store—the
“second” pharmacist after pharmacy manager—Dadayan told her
she could not. While Gevargeza was on leave, Dadayan replaced
her with a new pharmacy manager, told Gevargeza that
Walgreens did not have a position for her, and said Walgreens
“may” have a position for her if she wanted to continue her
employment.
Walgreens may not have explicitly told Gevargeza that it
was demoting her from pharmacy manager to a lesser position,
but a factfinder could easily conclude Walgreens required
Gevargeza to accept a demotion if she wanted to remain
employed. (See Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1058
[“a retaliatory course of conduct rather than a discrete act of
retaliation . . . may constitute an ‘adverse employment action’
even if some or all of the component acts might not be
individually actionable”]; Light, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 92
[“when a plaintiff alleges a series of actions that comprise a
course of conduct, we [do] not examine each individually,” but
“consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
the plaintiff has suffered an adverse employment action”].)
17
Under Gevargeza’s version of the events, she held the
pharmacy manager position for many years, was asked to resign,
was transferred temporarily to a position with less responsibility,
lost her position, and did not receive an offer of a comparable
position. (See Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC
(2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1248, 1279-1280 [employee’s reassignment
from columnist to reporter was an adverse employment action
because it entailed ‘“a change in status [and] a less distinguished
title,’” as well as a “‘significant change in job responsibilities’”];
Thomas v. Department of Corrections, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at
p. 511 [a demotion may be “evidenced by a . . . less distinguished
title” or “significantly diminished material responsibilities”];
Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 374 [“[r]eduction in authority and
negative performance reviews . . . constitute adverse employment
action”].) Indeed, there was no evidence Walgreens ever offered
Gevargeza a position comparable to pharmacy manager after she
took her leave of absence. (Cf. McRae v. Department of
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377, 393 [“A
transfer is not an adverse employment action when it is into a
comparable position that does not result in substantial and
tangible harm.”].)
The trial court ruled Walgreens did not demote Gevargeza
because it offered her a “lower-ranked position” as a pharmacist
“as part of Walgreens’ effort to accommodate [Gevargeza’s]
disability.” The company’s decision to remove Gevargeza from
her position and not offer her a comparable one, however, was
“reasonably likely to impair” Gevargeza’s “job performance and
prospects for advancement or promotion.” (Yanowitz, supra,
36 Cal.4th at pp. 1054-1055.) That was all Gevargeza had to
show on the adverse employment action element. (See Light,
18
supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 93 [employer’s contention that
reducing the employee’s scheduled hours to zero “was a normal
seasonal occurrence” was “irrelevant to the issue of whether it
was an adverse employment action”].)
Second, Walgreens did not offer Gevargeza a pharmacist
position until 2019—nearly two years after it replaced her as
pharmacy manager. Even if, as the trial court ruled, Walgreens
did not demote Gevargeza in 2019 by offering her a “lower-ranked
position,” that does not mean Walgreens did not effectively
demote her two years earlier. According to Gevargeza, Dadayan
did not offer or guarantee her any position when Dadayan
removed her in 2017, and Dadayan had previously rejected her
request for an assistant pharmacist position. A reasonable trier
of fact could find Walgreens materially affected the terms and
conditions of Gevargeza’s employment for at least the two years
before Walgreens offered her a new position. (See Light, supra,
14 Cal.App.5th at p. 93 [while an employee’s continued
employment and subsequent “promotions and pay raises . . . may
ultimately be relevant to the issue of damages,” they “do not
mean [the employee’s] employment was not materially and
adversely affected by the [the employer’s] earlier actions”].)
A reasonable trier of fact could also find Walgreens
terminated Gevargeza’s employment. (See Arteaga v. Brink’s,
Inc., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 356 [termination of
employment is an adverse employment action].) “The test of
whether or not an employee has been discharged depends upon
‘the reasonable inference that the employee[ ] could draw from
the language used by [or conduct of] the employer.’” (Superior
Farming Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984)
151 Cal.App.3d 100, 114; see N.L.R.B. v. Champ Corp. (9th Cir.
1990) 933 F.2d 688, 692.) “‘No set words are necessary to
19
constitute a discharge; words or conduct, which would logically
lead an employee to believe his tenure had been terminated, are
in themselves sufficient.’” (Champ Corp., at p. 692; see Percival
v. National Drama Corp. (1919) 181 Cal. 631, 637; Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc. v. Bumgarner (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 331, 353; see
also Reich v. State Credit Inc. (N.D. Ohio 1995) 897 F.Supp. 1014,
1016 [despite a supervisor’s statement he “could not fire” the
employee, there were “unresolved issues of material fact”
regarding whether the employee believed “she had been
discharged,” where the supervisor called the employee “a ‘dirty
double-crossing liar’” and told her “to leave, to clear out her desk,
and to try and find another job”].)
After Dadayan removed Gevargeza from her position, she
asked Gevargeza to return her keys. (See Pinder v. John
Marshall Law School, LLC (N.D.Ga. 2014) 11 F.Supp.3d 1208,
1223 [plaintiffs demonstrated a triable issue of material fact
regarding whether they were terminated with evidence their
employer required them to leave their offices and return their
keys].) Walgreens later sent Gevargeza a letter stating her
employment would be “considered terminated” the date her paid
benefits expired if she did not, within two weeks, request
additional leave time or submit certification she was under a
doctor’s care. A reasonable trier of fact could find Walgreens’
words and conduct led Gevargeza to believe that, two weeks after
she received the letter, she was no longer employed.
The trial court ruled that the letter merely stated
conditions “under which [Gevargeza’s] employment might be
terminated in the future” and that a reasonable trier of fact could
not find Walgreens terminated Gevargeza’s employment
“[a]bsent any additional correspondence indicating termination.”
But the letter did not say Gevargeza’s employment “might” be
20
terminated if certain conditions occurred; it stated her
employment would be “considered terminated.” And it was
undisputed those conditions existed. Gevargeza stated in her
declaration she took no action after receiving the letter, and
Walgreens submitted no evidence she either requested additional
leave time or submitted a doctor’s certification by the deadline
stated in the letter. Moreover, because the letter did not give
Gevargeza the option to return to work, Gevargeza could
reasonably have believed that (consistent with what she says
Dadayan told her) there was no longer a position for her at
Walgreens and that, two weeks after she received the letter, she
would no longer have a job at Walgreens.
3. Gevargeza Did Not Create a Triable Issue of
Material Fact Regarding Whether Walgreens’
Reasons for Its Employment Actions Were
Legitimate or Pretextual
Walgreens argues that, even if Walgreens subjected
Gevargeza to an adverse employment action, the trial court
properly granted its motion for summary adjudication on
Gevargeza’s FEHA causes of action on Walgreens’ alternative
ground; namely, Walgreens had legitimate business reasons for
its employment decisions. Walgreens is correct on this point.
“‘If the employer puts forth a legitimate basis for the
adverse employment action, the burden of production shifts to the
plaintiff to present evidence creating a triable issue of fact
showing the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for unlawful
animus in order to avoid summary judgment.’” (Wawrzenski,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 685; see Ortiz v. Dameron Assn.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 577-578; Soria v. Univision Radio
Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 591.) The plaintiff
21
need not show “‘that discriminatory animus was a “but for” cause
of an adverse action, only that it was a “substantial motivating
factor.”’” (Wawrzenski, at p. 685; see Lin v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 712, 722.) But an “‘employer is
entitled to summary judgment if, considering the employer’s
innocent explanation for its actions, the evidence as a whole is
insufficient to permit a rational inference that the employer’s
actual motive was discriminatory’” or retaliatory. (Wawrzenski,
at p. 685; see Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 361.)
a. Walgreens Showed a Legitimate Reason
for Its Employment Decisions
Walgreens argues it had a legitimate reason for any
adverse employment action: Walgreens’ “legitimate business
interest in enforcing pharmacy performance expectations to
ensure prescriptions are processed and filled timely.” “A reason
is ‘“legitimate”’ if it is ‘facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and
which if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination [or
retaliation].’” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 520,
fn. 2, italics omitted; see Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358;
Wawrzenski, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 685.) The employer’s
“reasons for termination, if nondiscriminatory, need not be wise
or correct.” (Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412,
425; see Guz, at p. 358.)
Dadayan testified she suggested Gevargeza pursue a
position other than retail pharmacy manager because Gevargeza
was complaining she could not meet Walgreens’ productivity
22
expectations without additional staff.6 Dadayan similarly stated
she sent Gevargeza to work in a different Walgreens store
temporarily because Gevargeza’s store was not meeting
Walgreens’ productivity expectations. Dadayan said she wanted
Gevargeza to learn better management practices from a store
that, according to Dadayan, filled a similar number of
prescriptions as Gevargeza’s store, but had a more appropriate
number of waiting prescriptions and prescriptions verified by
promised time. Dadayan also testified she removed Gevargeza
from her position as pharmacy manager after Gevargeza’s leave
benefits expired so the pharmacy would run smoothly.
Walgreens’ purported reasons for its employment decisions were
facially unrelated to discrimination or retaliation, and therefore
were legitimate under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. (See
Zamora v. Security Industry Specialties, Inc., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 56 [employee’s “failure to meet performance
standards” is a legitimate reason for an adverse employment
action]; Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1149 [that an employee’s “job performance
did not meet [employer’s] demanding standards” was a legitimate
business reason to terminate the employee’s employment];
Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th
954, 966 [that an employee “continued to perform below
expectations” was legitimate business reason for an adverse
employment action].)
6 Dadayan denied attempting to demote Gevargeza. She said
she suggested Gevargeza work in a Walgreens “specialty
pharmacy,” which would better suit Gevargeza’s customer service
skills and “actually [would be] a promotion.”
23
b. Gevargeza Did Not Present Sufficient
Evidence of Pretext
“[G]enerally, ‘pretext may be demonstrated by showing
“‘the [employer’s] proffered reason had no basis in fact, the
proffered reason did not actually motivate the discharge, or, the
proffered reason was insufficient to motivate discharge.’”’”
(Zamora v. Security Industry Specialties, Inc., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 56; see Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles,
Inc., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 594.) “‘“Pretext may also be
inferred from the timing of the company’s termination decision,
by the identity of the person making the decision, and by the
terminated employee’s job performance before [the]
termination.”’” (Zamora, at pp. 56-57; see Soria, at p. 594.)
However, it “is not sufficient for an employee to make a bare
prima facie showing or to simply deny the credibility of the
employer’s witnesses or to speculate as to discriminatory motive.”
(Zamora, at p. 56; see Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 830, 862.) “‘Circumstantial evidence of
“‘pretense’ must be ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ in order to create a
triable issue with respect to whether the employer intended to
discriminate” on an improper basis.’” (Zamora, at p. 34; see
Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th
1168, 1182.)
In the trial court Gevargeza argued Walgreens sought to
force her to resign and terminated her employment because of
her disability. The problem for Gevargeza is that she did not
present any evidence Walgreens knew she suffered from a
disability or medical condition before she went on medical leave.
“‘An adverse employment decision cannot be made “because of” a
disability, when the disability is not known to the employer.
Thus, in order to prove [a discrimination] claim, a plaintiff must
24
prove the employer had knowledge of the employee’s disability
when the adverse employment decision was made.’” (Scotch v.
Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1008;
accord, Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1237, 1247; see Soria, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 590-591 [to
show “discriminatory animus was a substantial cause of the
adverse employment action, an employee must show that the
employer had knowledge of the employee’s protected
characteristic”].)
Gevargeza contended Dadayan and Vargas were “aware of
[Gevargeza’s] medical issues,” but she did not submit admissible
evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to make that
finding. Dadayan and Vargas testified that Gevargeza never told
them she had a medical condition and that they did not learn
Gevargeza had any kind of medical condition before she went on
leave. Gevargeza did not submit any conflicting evidence (for
example, that she told them she suffered from SVTs).
The only evidence Gevargeza submitted was testimony by
Dadayan and Gevargeza that they were aware of the 2013
incident where Gevargeza went to the hospital in an ambulance.
Evidence Gevargeza went to the hospital once during the
nine years she worked at Walgreens did not meet Gevargeza’s
burden to show Walgreens knew she had a disability and
discriminated against her because of it. (See Avila v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249 [“Informing [the
employer] merely that plaintiff had been hospitalized was not
sufficient to put [the employer] on notice that plaintiff was
suffering from a qualifying disability.”]; see also Scotch v. Art
Institute of California, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 [“‘While
knowledge of the disability can be inferred from the
circumstances, knowledge will only be imputed to the employer
25
when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of
the known facts.’”].) Moreover, there was no dispute that, after
the 2013 incident, Dadayan told Gevargeza that she could take
time off, but that Gevargeza chose not to, and that Gevargeza
returned and worked for Walgreens for several years before
Dadayan and Vargas began pressuring her to resign from her
position as pharmacy manager. Gevargeza’s assertion Walgreens
was motivated to remove her because Gevargeza had to go to the
hospital one time several years earlier is speculative and not a
reasonable inference. (See Apex Solutions, Inc. v. Falls Lake
National Ins. Co. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1257 [“because
speculation is not evidence,” it “‘cannot create a triable issue of
material fact’”]; Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 226 [“‘[r]esponsive evidence that
“gives rise to no more than mere speculation” is not sufficient to
establish a triable issue of material fact’”].)
Dadayan knew Gevargeza had a medical condition when
she decided to remove Gevargeza from her position a few months
after Gevargeza went on medical leave. However, “temporal
proximity alone is not sufficient to raise a triable issue as to
pretext once the employer has offered evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.” (Arteaga v.
Brink’s, Inc., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 353; see Diego v.
Pilgrim United Church of Christ (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 913,
932.) “This is especially so where the employer raised questions
about the employee’s performance before he [or she] disclosed his
[or her] symptoms, and the subsequent termination was based on
those performance issues.” (Arteaga, at p. 353.) According to
Gevargeza, Dadayan and Vargas had already criticized her for
poor productivity, asked her to resign from her position, and at
least temporarily transferred her before she went on leave.
26
Dadayan also waited to replace Gevargeza until after her leave
benefits expired. Standing alone, the proximity between when
Gevargeza went on her leave of absence and when Walgreens
removed her from her position did not create a triable issue of
material fact on the issue of pretext. (See id. at p. 354 [that the
employer discharged the employee one week after the employee
disclosed a physical disability was insufficient evidence of
pretext, where the employee’s “performance had long been the
subject of criticism, he had been suspended on one occasion, and
. . . [a]fter the disclosure, no one made any negative remarks
about his condition”].)7
Gevargeza also argues Walgreens’ stated reasons for its
actions were a pretext for gender discrimination. She contends
Vargas repeatedly “insulted and mistreated” her, “often with
specific reference to her being female.” She also contends that
Vargas “was harder on female employees than he was on male
employees and that he made many misogynistic comments.”
Gevargeza did not, however, submit sufficient evidence to create
a triable issue of material fact. Gevargeza testified about only
one incident: In 2014 she fell in the pharmacy and injured
herself. When Vargas drove her to a clinic, he said, “Women,
they’re just so fragile. They’re just crying babies, you know. A
little thing, they start crying. And where I’m from real men, they
wreck their arms, and they just wrap it up, and they go back to
work.” Gevargeza also submitted the declaration of a coworker,
7 Because Gevargeza failed to create a triable issue of
material fact regarding whether Walgreens’ motive for its
employment decisions was discriminatory, Walgreens was
entitled to summary adjudication on Gevargeza’s causes of action
for discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination under
FEHA.
27
Katherine Bui, who described Vargas as “belittling and
demeaning” and “abrupt and abrasive during stressful times.”
Bui stated that she saw “other employees crying after having
meetings with” Vargas, that he “mostly treated his shift Leads
poorly,” that “[m]ost all of the shift Leads were female,” and that
“most of them were in tears on many occasions.” Bui’s
declaration may show that Vargas treated employees (most of
whom were female) poorly, but it does not show Vargas treated
female employees less favorably than male employees. (Cf.
Gupta v. Trustees of California State University (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 510, 519 [“Evidence that an employer treated
‘similarly situated’ employees outside the plaintiff’s protected
class ‘“‘more favorably’”’ is probative of the employer’s
discriminatory or retaliatory intent.”].)
Other evidence undermined any inference Walgreens’
adverse employment actions were motivated by Gevargeza’s
gender. Though Vargas and Dadayan criticized Gevargeza for
not meeting productivity goals, they otherwise rewarded her job
performance. Vargas nominated her for Walgreens’ highest
employee award in 2015. Dadayan (a woman) recruited and
promoted Gevargeza, and she later replaced Gevargeza with
another woman. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 243, 272 [where “‘“‘the same actor is responsible
for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and
both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong
inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive’”’”]; see
also Doe v. Software ONE, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 98, 104
[“‘same actor evidence will often generate an inference of
nondiscrimination’”]; Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co. LLC.
(9th Cir. 2005) 413 F.3d 1090, 1098 [the same-actor inference “is
a ‘strong inference’ that a court must take into account on a
28
summary judgment motion”]; see also Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 366 [where “an age-protected worker is directly replaced by a
person not significantly younger, there may be no basis to suspect
a motive of prohibited bias”].) Because the evidence was
insufficient to permit a rational inference Walgreens’ actual
motive was gender discrimination (see Guz, at p. 361), Gevargeza
did not meet her burden to create a triable issue of fact regarding
pretext.
Gevargeza also argued in the trial court that Walgreens’
purported reasons for terminating her were a pretext for
retaliation. In particular, she contended Vargas and Dadayan
began pressuring her to resign from her position as pharmacy
manager after Gevargeza complained that the pharmacy was
understaffed, that employees were committing “medical errors,”
and that some employees were giving medical advice. But even if
Walgreens wanted to demote her or terminate her employment
because she raised concerns about patient safety, such evidence
would not support a retaliation cause of action under FEHA.
FEHA’s retaliation provision makes it an unlawful
employment practice “‘“to discharge, expel, or otherwise
discriminate against any person because the person has opposed
any practices forbidden under”’” FEHA. (Wawrzenski, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 699; see Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h);
Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 368, 381 [“‘For protection under the “opposition
clause,” an employee must have opposed an employment practice
made unlawful by the statute.’”].) As the Supreme Court
explained in Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1028, “an employee’s
conduct may constitute protected activity for purposes of the
antiretaliation provision of the FEHA not only when the
employee opposes conduct that ultimately is determined to be
29
unlawfully discriminatory under the FEHA, but also when the
employee opposes conduct that the employee reasonably and in
good faith believes to be discriminatory.” (Yanowitz, at p. 1043;
see Lewis v. City of Benicia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1535
[“to show he engaged in protected activity,” the employee had to
show he “‘oppose[d] conduct’ he ‘reasonably and in good faith
believe[d] to be discriminatory’”].) Opposing practices an
employee “view[s] as unwise or even improper . . . is not enough
to make his [or her] opposition a protected activity” for purposes
of FEHA. (Dinslage, at p. 382.)
Gevargeza may have been opposing conduct she believed
was improper or unlawful (and her conduct may have been
protected under other laws—an issue we need not decide). But
she was not opposing or objecting to conduct that was unlawful
under FEHA or that she reasonably could have believed was a
discriminatory employment practice. (See Dinslage v. City and
County of San Francisco, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 383
[employee’s “advocacy for the disabled community and opposition
to elimination of programs that might benefit that community”
were not protected activities under FEHA because
“discrimination by an employer against members of the general
public is not a prohibited employment practice under the
FEHA”].) Therefore, Gevargeza failed to create a triable issue of
material fact regarding whether Walgreens’ purported reasons
for its employment decisions—even if not the only reasons for its
decisions—were a pretext for retaliating against her for opposing
conduct she believed was discriminatory. (See Arnold v. Dignity
Health, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 426 [“‘disbelief of an
Employer’s stated reason for a termination gives rise to a
compelling inference that the Employer had a different, unstated
motivation, but it does not, without more, reasonably give rise to
30
an inference that the motivation was a prohibited one’” under
FEHA]; McGrory v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc. (2013)
212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1532 [same].)
C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for
Summary Adjudication on Gevargeza’s Cause of
Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation of
Public Policy
The trial court granted the motion for summary
adjudication on Gevargeza’s cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy on the ground Walgreens
did not terminate Gevargeza’s employment. This was error. As
discussed, there were triable issues of material fact regarding
whether Walgreens terminated Gevargeza’s employment.
Because Walgreens did not move for summary adjudication on
this cause of action on another ground, Walgreens was not
entitled to summary adjudication.
Walgreens argues we may nonetheless affirm the trial
court’s order granting summary adjudication on this cause of
action because it is “derivative” of Gevargeza’s FEHA causes of
action. Because Walgreens did not make this argument in the
trial court, however, it is forfeited. (See Doe v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Los Angeles, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 672
[defendant forfeits arguments on appeal by not making them “in
its motion for summary judgment”]; Jackpot Harvesting Co., Inc.
v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 125, 155 [“arguments not
raised in summary judgment proceedings” are forfeited].)
31
D. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion for
Summary Adjudication on Gevargeza’s Cause of
Action for Violation of Labor Code section 1102.5
Because the trial court erred in ruling there was no triable
issue of material fact regarding whether Walgreens subjected
Gevargeza to an adverse employment action, the court also erred
in granting the motion for summary adjudication on Gevargeza’s
cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5 for this reason.
(See Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino (2017)
17 Cal.App.5th 352, 366 [in “determining whether a plaintiff
suffered an adverse employment action” under Labor Code
section 1102.5, “we employ the same standard of materiality that
the California Supreme Court held should be applied to
employment retaliation claims made under” FEHA]; see, e.g.,
Francis v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 532,
540-541.) Walgreens appears to argue it was entitled to
summary adjudication on Gevargeza’s Labor Code section 1102.5
cause of action for the same reasons it was entitled to summary
adjudication on her FEHA causes of action: Walgreens had
legitimate reasons for its employment decisions, and Gevargeza
cannot “carry her burden of showing pretext.” For Gevargeza’s
cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5 cause of action,
however, Walgreens did not meet its burden on summary
adjudication.
Labor Code section 1102.5 “provides whistleblower
protections to employees who disclose wrongdoing to authorities.”
(Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th
703, 709 (Lawson).) In particular, Labor Code section 1102.5,
subdivision (b), “prohibits an employer from retaliating against
an employee for sharing information the employee ‘has
reasonable cause to believe . . . discloses a violation of state or
32
federal statute’ or of ‘a local, state, or federal rule or regulation’
with . . . a person with authority over the employee, or with
another employee who has authority to investigate or correct the
violation.” (Lawson, at p. 709; see Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)
As the Supreme Court held in Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th
703, it is Labor Code section 1102.6, “not McDonnell Douglas,”
that “supplies the applicable framework for litigating and
adjudicating section 1102.5 whistleblower claims.” (Lawson, at
p. 712.) Under section 1102.6, the plaintiff must first
“‘demonstrate[ ] by a preponderance of the evidence’ that the
employee’s protected whistleblowing was a ‘contributing factor’ to
an adverse employment action. [Citation.] Then, once the
employee has made that necessary threshold showing, the
employer bears ‘the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence’ that the alleged adverse employment action
would have occurred ‘for legitimate, independent reasons’ even if
the employee had not engaged in protected whistleblowing
activities.” (Lawson, at p. 712.)
In explaining why a plaintiff need not satisfy the
requirements set forth in McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court
stated: “Under section 1102.6, a plaintiff does not need to show
that the employer’s nonretaliatory reason was pretextual. Even
if the employer had a genuine, nonretaliatory reason for its
adverse action, the plaintiff still carries the burden assigned by
statute if it is shown that the employer also had at least one
retaliatory reason that was a contributing factor in the action.
There is, then, no reason why whistleblower plaintiffs should be
required to satisfy the three-part McDonnell Douglas inquiry—
and prove that the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons were
pretextual—in order to prove that retaliation was a contributing
factor under section 1102.6.” (Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
33
pp. 715-716.) The Supreme Court also explained McDonnell
Douglas does not “govern at summary judgment for purposes of
determining whether the plaintiff can meet the statutorily
assigned burden of demonstrating that retaliation was a
contributing factor in an adverse employment decision”; instead,
“the parties’ burdens of proof at summary judgment generally
depend on their burdens of proof at trial.” (Lawson, at p. 717.)
Walgreens attempted to meet its burden by arguing
Walgreens’ employment actions were “based on legitimate
business reasons, such as budget and operational needs, and
Gevargeza [had] no evidence to the contrary”—essentially
following the second step of the McDonnell Douglas approach.
That was not enough. Walgreens had to show not only that
Walgreens’ actions were “based on legitimate business reasons,”
but also that it would have taken the same actions for those
reasons even if Gevargeza “had not engaged in” the alleged
whistleblower activities. (Lab. Code, § 1102.6; see Lawson,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 713-714 [“plaintiffs may satisfy their
burden of proving unlawful retaliation” under Labor Code
section 1102.5 “even when other, legitimate factors also
contributed to the adverse action”].) Moreover, because
Walgreens would have the burden at trial to prove that fact by
clear and convincing evidence, Walgreens had to “present
evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact” (Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 851) to find it “highly probable”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 996) the company
would have taken the same actions regardless of Gevargeza’s
alleged whistleblower activities. (See Aguilar, at p. 851 [“how the
parties moving for, and opposing, summary judgment may each
carry their burden of persuasion and/or production depends on
which would bear what burden of proof at trial”]; Spinks v.
34
Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
1004, 1053 [“‘where the . . . ultimate burden of proof will be by
clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard of proof must
be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication’”].)
Walgreens did not merely fail to explain how the evidence
it submitted in support of its motion satisfied the applicable
burden under section 1102.6; Walgreens failed to discuss any of
the evidence that, according to Gevargeza, showed Walgreens
retaliated against her for whistleblowing activities. Therefore,
Walgreens was not entitled to summary adjudication. (See
Scheer v. Regents of the University of California (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 904, 915 [“Because the [employers’] moving
papers in the trial court failed to apply the Labor Code
section 1102.6 framework, they failed to meet their threshold
burden.”].)
35
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to
vacate its order granting the motion by Walgreens and Vargas for
summary adjudication on each of Gevargeza’s causes of action
and for summary judgment. The trial court is directed to enter a
new order (1) denying Walgreens’ motion for summary
adjudication on the causes of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy and for violation of Labor Code
section 1102.5; (2) granting Walgreens’ motion for summary
adjudication on the remaining causes of action; (3) denying
Walgreens’ motion for summary judgment; and (4) granting
Vargas’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court is also
directed to rule on Walgreens’ motion for summary adjudication
on Gevargeza’s claim for punitive damages and to enter judgment
in favor of Vargas on the complaint. Walgreens’ request for
judicial notice is denied. Vargas is to recover his costs on appeal.
Walgreens and Gevargeza are to bear their costs on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
36
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