In re J.J. CA2/8

CourtListener 10699767CalctappOct 9, 2025

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Filed 10/9/25 In re J.J. CA2/8
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re J.J., a Person Coming B344967
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP02437)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
B.J. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights at the permanency planning
hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends she
demonstrated the elements of the parental benefit exception
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), and the juvenile court abused its
discretion in choosing adoption as the permanent plan and
freeing her infant son J.J. to be adopted.
We conclude mother has not shown the juvenile court
abused its discretion and therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) detained one-month-old
J.J. because Mother’s substance abuse and mental illness
interfered with her ability to care for J.J. and placed him at
substantial risk of serious physical injury. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 300, subds. (b) & (j).) At the time of his birth, J.J.’s older
brother and sister were dependents of the juvenile court, having
been detained from Mother in May 2021. In connection with that
dependency proceeding, Mother had multiple positive tests for
cocaine and/or marijuana in the weeks after J.J.’s birth.
A referral was therefore made to DCFS regarding J.J.
In November 2024, while these proceedings were pending,
the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to J.J.’s
brother and sister, and this court affirmed that order on appeal.
(In re E.M. et al., (Jun. 30, 2025, B342050) [nonpub.opn.].)
Mother’s parental rights were also terminated in 2016 to an older
half sibling, who was adopted in 2019.
During the reunification period, Mother was mostly
consistent with visitation and generally had positive interactions
with J.J. However, Mother could not parent J.J. She did not

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take direction well on J.J.’s needs as an infant. In one instance,
Mother was offered written materials describing appropriate food
for babies 6 to 12 months old, but Mother rejected it saying she
would continue to feed her children as she saw fit. Mother also
continued to have positive drug tests for marijuana and
amphetamines.
The juvenile court terminated reunification services for
Mother on September 23, 2024.
In the permanency planning report, DCFS reported that
Mother had twice-weekly monitored visits with J.J. and that she
was consistent with her visitation. The visits generally went
well, with Mother engaging in appropriate activities with J.J.,
praising him and showing him physical affection. J.J. in turn
showed excitement at seeing Mother during visits and often
“cling[ed]” to her side. They appeared to have an emotional bond.
However, Mother could also be moody, was not good at taking
direction, and refused to provide age-appropriate food for J.J.
She would give him fast food and even chicken wings, letting him
chew on the bones, despite his young age. The caregivers raised
concerns to the social worker that J.J. had diarrhea or
constipation after visits with Mother because of the improper
food she gave to him.
DCFS also reported ongoing concerns with Mother because
she did not follow medical directions. J.J. had some
developmental delays and was a regional center client. In
addition, several months after his birth, J.J.’s doctors determined
he needed to wear an infant helmet although he was cleared to
stop wearing it in July 2024. Despite being present “when the
doctor explained the purpose and details behind the helmet,”

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Mother routinely took the helmet off and downplayed its
importance.
On one occasion, Mother failed to secure J.J. in his stroller,
and he started to climb out of it. “HSA staff were able to catch
[J.J.] before he hit the floor. Mother laughed about the incident.”
Just a month later, Mother again took off J.J.’s helmet and failed
to secure him in the stroller. This time, J.J. fell to the floor.
Mother became angry and tried to shift the blame onto the
monitor for J.J.’s fall. The social worker also expressed concern
that Mother arrived at some visits with an odor of marijuana and
slapped J.J.’s sister in the face in his presence during a joint
visitation.
DCFS reported J.J. was thriving in the home of his
caregivers and prospective adoptive parents, Mr. and Mrs. F. J.J.
was placed with the couple in September 2023, when he was just
one month old. He was regularly observed showing affection,
seeking attention and happily interacting with Mr. and Mrs. F.,
as well as his two siblings who DCFS placed in the couple’s home.
DCFS reported that Mr. and Mrs. F. had developed a “loving
parent to child relationship” with J.J. and wanted to adopt him
and maintain his sibling relationship with his brother and sister
who they were in the process of adopting. DCFS emphasized that
J.J. only lived with Mother for the first month of his life, and had
only ever known Mr. and Mrs. F. as his caregivers. Mr. and
Mrs. F. told the social worker they were willing to allow all three
children to continue to have contact with Mother “as long as
contact does not negatively affect the familial system.”
DCFS recommended the juvenile court terminate parental
rights for Mother and the unidentified father.

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The permanency planning hearing was held on January 21,
2025. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)
Mother testified that J.J. expressed happiness to see her at
their visits, was very talkative with her, called her “momma,”
and appeared to not want visits with her to end. Mother said it
was difficult to not have more time with him, but even in their
limited time together, she knew they had a bond because he is
her child and she understands him. Counsel for Mother argued
the Department admitted in the .26 report that J.J. often “clings”
to Mother and appears to have a bond. Counsel said terminating
the relationship would be detrimental and Mother should be
allowed to remain a presence in J.J.’s life.
Counsel for J.J. acknowledged that Mother is someone he
cares about and enjoys spending time with, but that the home he
has with Mr. and Mrs. F. was the only home he had known, and
Mother could not show the type of relationship that outweighed
the benefits J.J. will obtain from being adopted.
Counsel for DCFS conceded that Mother had maintained
regular visitation and had an emotional connection with J.J. But
counsel emphasized that J.J. had medical and developmental
issues that Mother routinely minimized. Counsel said the
stability and security of being raised in an adoptive home with
his siblings far outweighed any negative consequences from
terminating his relationship with Mother.
The juvenile court acknowledged Mother’s regular
visitation with J.J. and the efforts she made to form a
relationship with him. The minute order from the hearing
erroneously states the court did not find Mother had made
regular visitation, but the court stated otherwise on the record.

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However, the court expressed concern about the negative
aspects of Mother’s visits with J.J. For instance, the court said
that while J.J. no longer needed his medically prescribed helmet,
Mother’s difficulties with that issue during the reunification
period showed she was “not able to put the child’s medical needs
over her own desires.” The court explained Mother had not
shown evidence demonstrating that J.J. would suffer detriment if
their relationship was severed, nor evidence the positive aspects
of their relationship outweighed the stability and benefits J.J.
would receive from living in an adoptive home with his siblings.
The court found Mother had not met her burden of establishing
the parental benefit exception to adoption. The court found by
clear and convincing evidence that J.J. was adoptable,
terminated parental rights, and transferred custody to DCFS
pending adoptive placement.
Mother filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Where, as here, a dependency proceeding has reached the
permanency planning hearing, “the question before the court is
decidedly not whether the parent may resume custody of the
child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).)
Indeed, at this stage, reunification services have been
terminated, and the court is tasked with selecting the permanent
plan that best serves the child’s interest. (Ibid.; see also Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 366.26.)
Under the statutory scheme, adoption is the preferred
permanent plan when a child is deemed likely to be adopted.
As our Supreme Court has explained, “adoption is the norm.”
(In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) “ ‘Adoption is the
Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best

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chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible
caretaker.’ ” (Ibid.) Once reunification efforts have failed, “ ‘it
becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden
efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home.’
[Citation.] The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in
exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other
than the norm, which remains adoption.” (Ibid.)
In asserting the parental benefit exception to adoption, it
was Mother’s burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and
(2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629,
631.)
The Department conceded, and the juvenile court found,
that Mother maintained regular visitation.
With respect to the second and third elements of the
exception, Mother argues the court abused its discretion in
finding J.J. would not suffer detriment if his relationship with
her was severed. Mother says she raised J.J. for the first month
of his life and maintained regular visitation during these
proceedings, which has resulted in a strong emotional bond
between them. Mother says a plan of legal guardianship would
allow J.J. to have a stable home in the care of Mr. and Mrs. F.
but would allow him the benefit of maintaining his relationship
with Mother. We are not persuaded.
Our review of the court’s findings on the second element of
the exception are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) As to the third element, we

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review the court’s order under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard. (Id. at p. 640.)
Caden C. instructs that the parental benefit exception is
“limited in scope.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
“When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child
that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh
its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the
child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Id. at pp. 633–
634.) In assessing each element, the focus must always remain
on the best interests of the dependent children. (Id. at pp. 632–
633.) A parent’s continued struggles with the issues that led to
dependency are relevant to the extent they inform the court’s
assessment of whether the children would “benefit from
continuing the relationship and be harmed, on balance, by losing
it[.]” (Id. at p. 638.)
The record here contains ample evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s factual findings, and its exercise of discretion.
The court concluded that while J.J. enjoyed his time with Mother
and had an emotional connection, their bond was not so
substantial that it outweighed the benefits J.J. would obtain
through adoption in the home of his caregivers with two of his
siblings. J.J. had never lived with Mother, with the exception of
a brief period of approximately a month after his birth. In
addition, J.J.’s interactions with Mother, while positive, also
consistently had negative features that could impact his physical
and emotional development. Nothing in the record supports a
conclusion the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that
Mother had failed to establish the parental benefit exception.
(In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53 [statutory exceptions

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apply in “exceptional circumstances” to permit a juvenile court to
choose a permanent plan other than adoption].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental
rights to J.J. is affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

WILEY, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.


Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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