People v. Carnes CA2/1

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Filed 10/7/25 P. v. Carnes CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B338217

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XSCTA027413)
v.

VINCENT LANCE CARNES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Affirmed.
Diane E. Berley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Vincent Lance
Carnes of nine offenses he committed at age 17: one count of first
degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, three counts of
second degree robbery, and three counts of attempted second
degree robbery. In 1995, the trial court sentenced Carnes to a
total prison term of 44 years 8 months to life. In May 2024, the
trial court denied Carnes’s petition for recall and resentencing
under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d).1 The statute
provides in relevant part: “When a defendant who was under
18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for
which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life
without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least
15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a
petition for recall and resentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).)
On appeal from the order denying his petition, Carnes
borrows from case law discussing the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments to argue he is
entitled to relief under section 1170, subdivision (d) because he
has been sentenced to the functional equivalent of a prison term
of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Second, Carnes
argues that if we interpret section 1170, subdivision (d) to
provide relief only to defendants actually sentenced to LWOP,
then the statute violates his constitutional right to equal
protection. We disagree.
First, the statutory language does not support Carnes’s
argument; it expressly affords relief only to juvenile offenders
sentenced to LWOP. Second, Carnes’s equal protection challenge
fails because the Legislature could have rationally limited relief

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
to a class of juvenile offenders who will be incarcerated until they
die regardless of whether they have been rehabilitated. Although
Carnes contends his age upon serving 44 years 8 months of his
sentence exceeds certain averages for inmate life expectancy, he
fails to demonstrate the Legislature lacked a rational basis for
excluding him from resentencing relief. We thus affirm the order
denying Carnes’s petition for recall and resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition
of this appeal.
In June 1994, a jury convicted Carnes of (a) one count of
first degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, and three
counts of attempted second degree robbery arising from an
incident that occurred on September 14, 1993, and (b) three
counts of second degree robbery Carnes perpetrated on
September 16, 1993. (See People v. Carnes (Sept. 25, 1996,
B094031) [nonpub. opn.] at pp. 2–4 (Carnes) [discussing the facts
underlying Carnes’s convictions].)3 The jury also found true

2 We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in
part from admissions made by the parties in their appellate
briefing. (See Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d
666, 674 [“ ‘An express concession or assertion in a brief is
frequently treated as an admission of a legal or factual point,
controlling in the disposition of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and argument . . . are
reliable indications of a party’s position on the facts as well as the
law, and a reviewing court may make use of statements therein
as admissions against the party.’ ”].)
3 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of our prior opinion
affirming the judgment. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

3
certain personal firearm use and armed principal allegations.
(See Carnes, at pp. 2, 4 [referring to these allegations].) Carnes
was 17 years old when he committed the offenses in question.
On May 16, 1995, the trial court sentenced Carnes to an
aggregate term of 44 years 8 months to life in prison.4 The court
found Carnes was entitled to 910 days of presentence custody
credit, consisting of 607 actual days of confinement and 303 local
conduct credits. Because Carnes’s presentence custody credits
amounted to nearly two and a half years of his aggregate prison
term, Carnes would be eligible for parole at approximately age 61
(that is, approximately 42 years and 2 months after he was
sentenced at age 19) under his original sentence, even without

4 Although the minute order for the May 16, 1995 hearing
and the abstract of judgment provide that Carnes was sentenced
to “a total determinate term of 14 years, 8 months and a total
indeterminate term of 30 years to life, plus two life terms” (italics
added), the parties do not dispute that the trial court either
stayed the two additional life terms or ordered Carnes to serve
them concurrently with his indeterminate prison term of 30 years
to life.

4
accounting for other credits potentially accrued during his
incarceration.5
In 1996, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (Carnes,
supra, B094031, at pp. 1, 12.)
On December 8, 2023, Carnes filed, in pro. per., a petition
for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (d), wherein he asserted, inter alia, that he had
“performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the
potential for rehabilitation . . . .” The trial court appointed him
counsel, and the prosecution filed an opposition. On May 8, 2024,
the trial court denied Carnes’s petition, reasoning that Carnes
had not been sentenced to a prison term that was the functional
equivalent of LWOP.6 Carnes timely appealed.
On September 5, 2025, Carnes was granted parole at a
youth offender parole suitability hearing.7 On

5 At certain points in his opening brief, Carnes concedes
that as originally sentenced, he would be eligible for parole at
age 61. Yet, Carnes elsewhere asserts in the opening brief,
without any supporting analysis, that he would instead be
eligible for parole at age 62 or 64.
Additionally, Carnes’s probation report indicates that at
the time the police apprehended him for the instant crimes, he
was on youth authority parole for one or more prior offenses,
which parole was set to expire on March 20, 1997. Neither side
claims that Carnes’s unexpired youth authority parole has any
impact on the calculation of Carnes’s parole eligibility date for
the offenses he committed in this case.
6 The judicial officer who denied Carnes’s petition was not
the trial judge who had sentenced him.
7 On September 8, 2025, this court took judicial notice of a
page from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s

5
September 8, 2025, we requested supplemental briefing from the
parties on the following question: Does the fact that Carnes was
granted parole on September 5, 2025 moot this appeal? The
parties thereafter submitted their supplemental briefing.

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Section 1170, Subdivision (d)
In September 2012, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 9, which added subdivision (d)(2) to section 1170 and became
effective on January 1, 2013. (Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 1 (2011–
2012 Reg. Sess.) [filed with Sec’y of State on Sept. 30, 2012]; see
People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 988 (Baldwin)
[identifying the effective date for the new provision].) The
original version of this provision stated in pertinent part: “When
a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has
served at least 15 years of that sentence, the defendant may
submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and
resentencing.” (Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 1 [§ 1170, former
subd. (d)(2)(A)(i)].)
“Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (d)(2)
was renumbered as subdivision (d)(1).” (Baldwin, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 989, fn. 5, citing Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
Much like section 1170, former subdivision (d)(2)(A)(i), the
current version of the statute provides: “When a defendant who
was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the

website that showed Carnes was granted parole on
September 5, 2025.

6
offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment
for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for
at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing
court a petition for recall and resentencing.” (§ 1170,
subd. (d)(1)(A).) In turn, subdivision (d)(5) provides in pertinent
part, “If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
one or more of the statements specified in [subdivisions (d)(2)(A)
to (d)(2)(D)] is true, the court shall recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and hold a hearing to resentence
the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not
previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if
any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (See id.,
subd. (d)(5).) Of note, subdivision (d)(2)(D) applies when “[t]he
defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation
or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to,
availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational
programs, . . . using self-study for self-improvement, or showing
evidence of remorse.” (See id. subd. (d)(2)(D).)

B. Standard of Review
Insofar as the facts underlying a constitutional claim are
undisputed, we review that purely legal question de novo. (See
People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1338 [“[T]he
instant constitutional question involved mixed questions of law
and fact that are predominantly legal, if not purely legal
questions, which are subject to de novo review.”].) We
independently review questions of statutory interpretation. (See
In re Lugo (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1535.)
Even on de novo review, “the judgment [or order]
challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the
appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (See

7
People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573; see also
Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555 [“ ‘Even when our review on appeal
“is de novo, it is limited to issues which have been adequately
raised and supported in [the appellant’s opening] brief. . . .” ’
[Citation.]” . . . “ ‘It is the appellant who bears the burden of
overcoming th[e] presumption [that an appealed judgment or
order is correct].’ ”].)
To overcome the presumption of correctness, an appellant
must supply the reviewing court with cogent argument supported
by legal analysis and citation to the record. (See People v.
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [“ ‘[E]very brief should contain
a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made.
If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it
as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ”]; People v. Flint
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 983, 1006, fn. 17 [noting that an appellate
court may “ ‘decline to consider any factual assertion
unsupported by record citation at the point where it is
asserted[,]’ ” and that “ ‘[a]n appellate court “will not develop the
appellants’ arguments for them” ’ ”].)
Additionally, “we review the trial court’s ruling, ‘not the
court’s reasoning and, if the [trial court’s] ruling was correct on
any ground, we affirm.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Camacho (2022)
14 Cal.5th 77, 123–124.)

DISCUSSION
Carnes argues that he may petition for relief under
section 1170, subdivision (d) because, under our high court’s
decision in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, his
aggregate prison term of 44 years 8 months to life is the
“functional equivalent of” LWOP. In support of this argument,

8
Carnes maintains Contreras stands for the proposition that “the
line for what term of years imposed on a juvenile is the functional
equivalent of LWOP is somewhere below 50 years, and may be as
low as 40.” Carnes further argues if section 1170, subdivision (d)
excludes juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent
of LWOP, the statute “violates constitutional equal protection
guarantees.” (Citing, inter alia, People v. Heard (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 608, 631 (Heard).)
As a matter of statutory construction, we hold that
section 1170, subdivision (d) does not apply to juvenile offenders
sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP, although
juvenile offenders with such sentences may still challenge their
exclusion from relief under this statute as a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. (Discussion, part C,
post.) As for Carnes’s constitutional claim, we note “[t]he Courts
of Appeal are presently split on whether Contreras’s Eighth
Amendment formulation of functional equivalency applies to
equal protection challenges to section 1170[, subdivision ](d) . . . .”
(Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 984–985 [collecting
cases]). We agree with our colleagues in the Fifth District and
Division Three of the Second District that “an equal protection
[challenge] to section 1170[, subdivision ](d) requires ‘an equal
protection specific’ analysis that is not centered on [the] Eighth
Amendment concerns” at issue in Contreras. (See Baldwin, at
pp. 984–985 [Fifth District], citing, inter alia, People v. Thompson
(2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1073 (Thompson) [Second District,
Division Three]; Discussion, parts D.1–D.2, post.)8 Upon

8 On September 24, 2025, the Supreme Court granted
review in Thompson but deferred further action “pending
consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v.

9
conducting that equal protection specific analysis, we conclude
Carnes has not shown a constitutional violation under the
applicable rational basis standard. (Discussion, part D.3, post.)9
Before reaching these issues, we address whether Carnes’s
appeal is moot. (Discussion, part A, post.) Because we conclude
the appeal is not moot, we thereafter summarize the Contreras

Munoz, S290828.” (See California Courts – Appellate Court Case
Information for case no. S292540
<https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?d
ist=0&doc_id=3139010&doc_no=S292540&request_token=NiIwL
SEnTkw2W1BdSCJNVEpIQFQ0UDxTKiI%2BUz5TMCAgCg%3
D%3D> [as of Oct. 2, 2025], archived at <https://perma.cc/67HR-
UFRB>.)
In People v. Munoz (June 25, 2025, S290828) 569 P.3d
1140, our Supreme Court granted review to decide the following
issue: “Is a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to
life in prison entitled to recall and resentencing under Penal
Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) on the ground that the
sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment
without parole?” (See California Courts – Appellate Court Case
Information for case no. S290828
<https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScr
een.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=3130877&doc_no=S290828&request_toke
n=NiIwLSEnTkw2WzAtSSFdUEpJUFw0UDxTKiJeJzhRMCAgC
g%3D%3D> [as of Oct. 2, 2025], archived at
<https://perma.cc/WWX9-S8QV>.) The Supreme Court has yet to
hear oral argument and issue a final decision in Munoz. (See
ibid.)
9 We arrive at this conclusion without addressing whether
Carnes’s eligibility for youth offender parole prior to having
served 44 years 8 months in prison undermines his assertion the
trial court sentenced him to the functional equivalent of LWOP.

10
decision, an opinion the parties discuss at length in their briefing.
(Discussion, part B, post.)

A. The Decision of a Parole Panel To Grant Carnes
Parole Does Not Moot This Appeal
“ ‘[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no
practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Armas (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 350, 353.)
“For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First,
the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the
harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the
outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
276.) If “ ‘ “all the questions [on appeal] have become moot by
subsequent acts or events[,]” ’ ” the reviewing court may dismiss
the appeal. (See Armas, at p. 353.)
Carnes was granted parole at a youth offender parole
suitability hearing held on September 5, 2025. (Factual &
Procedural Background, ante.) Carnes correctly notes in his
supplemental brief, however, that the decision to grant him
parole is not yet final. Specifically, within 120 days of a parole
panel’s decision that an inmate is “suitable for parole,” the board
of parole hearings, sitting en banc, may review the decision and
refer the matter for a rehearing. (See § 3041, subds. (b)(2)–(b)(3);
see also § 3051, subd. (d) [providing in pertinent part that
§ 3041’s procedures apply to youth offender parole hearings].)10

10 The CDCR’s website does not clarify whether a parole
panel or the board of parole hearings, sitting en banc, granted
Carnes parole on September 5, 2025. A parole panel appears to
have made the decision, given that the governing statutes
indicate the board of parole hearings renders parole decisions
en banc only after a parole panel has determined whether an

11
Additionally, the Governor is authorized to “reverse or modify a
parole decision of the board” “[d]uring the 30 days following the
granting . . . by the board of the parole of an inmate sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term based upon a conviction of
murder . . . .” (See § 3041.2, subds. (a)–(b).)
Because the board of parole hearings’ and the Governor’s
respective review periods have not yet expired, the parole panel’s
decision to grant parole to Carnes does not prevent us from
granting him effective appellate relief, thus precluding a finding
of mootness.

B. Contreras Considered an Eighth Amendment
Challenge to Lengthy Prison Terms Imposed on
Juvenile Offenders
In Contreras, two defendants were convicted in a joint trial
of kidnapping and sexual offenses they committed at the age of
16. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 356.) The trial court
sentenced one of the defendants to a prison term of 50 years to
life and the other to a term of 58 years to life in prison. (See id.
at pp. 356, 368.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the defendants’
convictions but reversed their sentences, reasoning the terms
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. (See id. at pp. 356, 358, 371, 379.) On
review, our Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s
judgment. (Id. at pp. 358–359, 379, 383.)

inmate is suitable for parole. (See § 3041, subd. (a)(3) [providing
for en banc review of a tie vote of the parole panel]; id.,
subd. (b)(2)–(b)(3) [authorizing en banc review of “any decision of
the parole panel finding an inmate suitable for parole”].)

12
In determining whether the defendants’ lengthy prison
terms “violate[d] the Eighth Amendment under the standards
articulated in Graham[ v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48],” the
Contreras court observed: “Under Graham, juvenile nonhomicide
offenders must be given ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’
[Citations.]” (See Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 364, 379,
quoting Graham, at p. 75.) Contreras acknowledged that
Graham “did not define the maximum length of incarceration
before parole eligibility that would be permissible . . . .”
(Contreras, at p. 367.) Contreras concluded that Graham “made
clear the nature of its concerns: A lawful sentence must
recognize ‘a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change
and limited moral culpability[ ]’ [citation,] . . . offer ‘hope of
restoration’ [citation], ‘a chance to demonstrate maturity and
reform’ [citation], a ‘chance for fulfillment outside prison
walls,’ . . . a ‘chance for reconciliation with society’ [citation,] . . .
‘the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-
recognition of human worth and potential[ ]’ [citation,] . . . [and]
an ‘incentive to become a responsible individual.’ [Citation.]”
(See Contreras, at p. 367, quoting Graham, at pp. 70, 74, 79.)
Contreras held that the defendants’ sentences were
“functionally equivalent” to LWOP because their lengthy terms
did not provide the opportunities Graham requires. (See
Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 367–369.) In particular, the
Contreras court remarked, “[T]he language of Graham suggests
that the high court envisioned more than the mere act of release
or a de minimis quantum of time outside of prison.” (Id. at
p. 368.) Contreras further observed, “Confinement with no

13
possibility of release until age 66 or age 74 seems unlikely to
allow for the reintegration that Graham contemplates.” (Ibid.)
In addition, the Contreras court explained that in reviewing
a federal habeas corpus petition, the United States Supreme
Court “recognized there is a reasonable argument that . . .
incarcerating a juvenile nonhomicide offender for 40 years or
more without parole eligibility is simply too long under Graham.”
(See Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 377–378, citing Virginia v.
LeBlanc (2017) 582 U.S. 91, 94–95.) Contreras noted that
LeBlanc arguably supported the defendants’ contention the
potential availability of “elderly parole . . . after 44 years in
prison” did not defeat their Eighth Amendment challenges to
their prison sentences. (See Contreras, at pp. 373–374, 377–378.)
Our Supreme Court, however, “decline[d] to resolve . . . whether
the availability of an elderly parole hearing at age 60 for a
juvenile nonhomicide offender satisfies the Eighth Amendment
concerns set forth in Graham,” and instead left that issue “for the
lower courts to address in the first instance.” (See id. at pp. 374,
378.)

C. By Its Terms, Section 1170, Subdivision (d) Does Not
Apply to Carnes’s Prison Sentence of 44 Years
8 Months to Life
Carnes contends that although “Contreras . . . is an Eighth
Amendment case,” its “holding controls here” “because the Eighth
Amendment concerns in Contreras and the Legislature’s
objectives behind enacting section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) are
inextricably linked.” Citing certain aspects of section 1170,
subdivision (d)’s legislative history, Carnes maintains, “Both the
Eighth Amendment challenge in Contreras and section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) address concerns about a juvenile offender’s

14
ability to have a meaningful opportunity for release as discussed
in Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48.” Carnes thus argues,
“[I]t makes no sense to reject the High Court[’s] insights on
juvenile offender de facto LWOP from the Contreras case when
evaluating whether somebody should get the benefit of a law
specifically enacted to broadly remediate harm to juveniles . . . .”
Although Carnes’s contention is not entirely clear, he
seems to be arguing we should construe section 1170,
subdivision (d) as authorizing petitions for recall and
resentencing by defendants who were sentenced to the functional
equivalent of LWOP for purposes of Contreras. Indeed, in the
standard of review section of his opening brief, Carnes states this
appeal concerns the proper “interpretation and application of the
statute.”
By its express terms, section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)
applies to “a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole . . . .” Thus, the statutory text is not reasonably
susceptible to Carnes’s expansive interpretation.11 For that
reason, we reject his interpretation without addressing the
statute’s legislative history. (See People v. Watie (2002)

11 (See Dignity Health v. Local Initiative Health Care
Authority of Los Angeles County (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 144, 154
[holding that a statutory term “ ‘must be given a reasonable and
commonsense interpretation’ ”]; see also People v. Ortega (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1263 [holding that the plain language of
§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A) “ ‘limits eligibility . . . to juvenile offenders
sentenced to an explicitly designated life without parole term’ ”],
review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070.)

15
100 Cal.App.4th 866, 884 [“ ‘When the words [of a statute] are
clear and unambiguous, there is no need for statutory
construction or resort to other indicia of legislative intent, such as
legislative history.’ ”].)12
Further, Carnes seems to argue that the Legislature’s
failure to make certain amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (d) after Division One of the Fourth District decided
Heard in 2022 supports his interpretation of the statute.
In Heard, the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate
prison term of 103 years to life upon being convicted of two
counts of attempted murder committed at age 15 and one count of
voluntary manslaughter committed at 16. (See Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 612, 629.) The trial court denied the
defendant’s petition for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)
on the ground “he was not sentenced to an explicitly designated
term of life without the possibility of parole.” (Heard, at p. 612.)
On appeal, the reviewing court rejected the defendant’s assertion
that subdivision (d) of section 1170 “should be interpreted to
apply . . . to a juvenile offender . . . who has been sentenced to
multiple terms that are the functional equivalent of life without
parole,” reasoning the statute “limits eligibility . . . to juvenile
offenders sentenced to an explicitly designated life without parole
term.” (See Heard, at pp. 612, 622, 626.)
Next, the appellate court ruled the statute’s exclusion of
the defendant from eligibility for resentencing relief violated his
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. (See Heard,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 612, 622.) Heard reasoned the

12 We discuss section 1170, subdivision (d)’s legislative
history in assessing Carnes’s equal protection claim. (Discussion,
part D.3, post.)

16
defendant had received a “de facto” LWOP sentence, and the
reviewing court was “unable to identify a rational basis for
making juveniles sentenced to an explicitly designated life
without parole term, but not juveniles sentenced to the functional
equivalent of life without parole, eligible to petition for
resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).” (See Heard,
at pp. 629, 633.) To remedy this constitutional violation, the
Heard court reversed the denial order and instructed the trial
court on remand to reconsider the defendant’s petition. (See id.
at p. 634.)13
Carnes argues, “Since Heard was decided in 2022, the
Legislature has continued to amend section 1170 but has not
prohibited juvenile offenders with de facto LWOP from relief
under the statute.” Carnes thus appears to be contending
(1) Heard interpreted section 1170, subdivision (d) to afford relief
to juvenile offenders with sentences functionally equivalent to
LWOP, and (2) the Legislature tacitly agreed with Heard’s
interpretation by failing to amend the statute to prohibit such
juvenile offenders from petitioning for relief.
Admittedly, “[i]f the Legislature amends or reenacts the
statute without changing the interpretation placed on that
statute by the courts, ‘ “the Legislature is presumed to have been
aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that
statute. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Brown (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1436.) Yet, Heard found “section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A)[ ] cannot plausibly be interpreted to apply to
juvenile offenders who were not sentenced to an explicitly

13 In our Discussion, part D.3, post, we explain why
Heard’s equal protection holding does not apply here.

17
designated life without parole term.” (See Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 634, fn. 17.) The Legislature cannot be
deemed to have acquiesced in an interpretation of the statute
that Heard never adopted.
Similarly, Carnes claims the following passage from People
v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 establishes that in
amending section 1170 after Heard, the Legislature expressed its
intent to allow defendants with sentences functionally equivalent
to LWOP to seek resentencing: “[W]e have additional evidence of
legislative intent in the Legislature’s response to Heard. Since
2022, when Heard was decided, the Legislature has continued to
amend section 1170. [Citations.] Had the Legislature preferred
for the equal protection violation we identified in Heard to be
remedied by striking subdivision (d)(1)(A) from section 1170, it
could have accomplished that result itself. Instead, it has left the
provision intact. We take this as further evidence it does not
prefer for the provision to be stricken.” (Bagsby, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1063.) Carnes takes these observations out
of the context in which Bagsby made them.
Bagsby made these remarks to address the Attorney
General’s argument that the proper remedy for the equal
protection violation identified in Heard was to strike
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) and deny all juvenile offenders
resentencing relief under the statute, instead of affording
sentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to a prison term
functionally equivalent to LWOP. (See Bagsby, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1054, 1062–1063.) Bagsby rejected that
argument, reasoning if the Legislature had preferred to deny
resentencing relief to all juvenile offenders, it would have
repealed the statute. (See id. at pp. 1062–1063.) The Bagsby

18
court did not find the Legislature intended the statute to apply to
juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of
LWOP. (See ibid.)
In sum, because the trial court sentenced Carnes to a
prison term of 44 years 8 months to life instead of LWOP,
section 1170, subdivision (d) does not authorize Carnes to petition
for recall and resentencing.

D. Carnes Fails To Show That Section 1170,
Subdivision (d) Violates His Right to Equal
Protection Because the Legislature Could Rationally
Provide Relief Only to Juvenile Offenders Certain To
Face Imprisonment for the Rest of Their Lives
We reject Carnes’s argument that in analyzing his equal
protection claim, we should employ Contreras’s standard for
determining whether a term of imprisonment is functionally
equivalent to an LWOP sentence. (Discussion, part D.1, post.)
Further, rational basis review governs Carnes’s equal protection
claim. (Discussion, part D.2, post.) Carnes has failed to establish
a constitutional violation under that deferential standard.
(Discussion, part D.3, post.)

1. Contreras’s standard for determining whether a
prison sentence is the functional equivalent of
LWOP does not apply to equal protection claims
We acknowledge the Contreras court made passing
references to equal protection in its decision. Specifically, in
rejecting the Attorney General’s argument that the high court
should determine whether a prison sentence is the functional
equivalent of LWOP using life expectancy data, Contreras
observed this “actuarial approach gives rise to a tangle of legal

19
and empirical difficulties,” including whether accounting for
differences in race and gender to ascertain life expectancy “would
pass constitutional muster.” (See Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
pp. 360–362.) Contreras also noted, but “decline[d] to resolve,”
the defendants’ argument that the youth offender parole statute’s
exclusion of so-called “One Strike offenders” from parole
eligibility “violates principles of equal protection . . . .” (See id. at
p. 382.)14
Contreras, however, did not hold that a prison sentence of
50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP for the
purposes of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Indeed, the Contreras court framed the issue on appeal as
follows: Whether the “term-of-years sentence[s before it] function
like LWOP with respect to the Eighth Amendment concerns that
constrain lawful punishment for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders . . . .” (See Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364.) We
agree with our colleagues in the Fifth District and in Division
Three of this District that this language from Contreras
“specifically tether[s] the functional equivalence question before
Contreras to the Eighth Amendment . . . .” (See Baldwin, supra,
113 Cal.App.5th at p. 996, citing Thompson, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072.)

14 “Section 667.61, often called the ‘One Strike’ law, was
enacted to ensure that serious sexual offenders receive long
prison sentences regardless [of] whether they have any prior
criminal convictions.” (People v. Luna (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
460, 465.) The Supreme Court later rejected a One Strike
offender’s equal protection challenge to the youth offender parole
statute. (See People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 110, 137
(Williams).)

20
This conclusion is reinforced by our colleagues’ observation
that the high court made “statements in [People v.] Hardin
[(2024) 15 Cal.5th 834] and Williams ‘rejecting attempts to
collapse the separate Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
analyses into one.’ [Citation.]” (Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at p. 996, quoting Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073.)
Specifically, in the course of rejecting an equal protection
challenge to the youth offender parole statute leveled by a
defendant sentenced to LWOP for committing a special
circumstance murder at age 25, Hardin stated, “[The defendant]
notes that we have described an aggregate sentence that fixes
parole eligibility outside of an offender’s life expectancy as the
‘functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence.’
[Citation.] But we have employed that description in the context
of identifying the category of juvenile offenders to whom the
Eighth Amendment limitations on life without parole sentences
apply; for that purpose, what matters is only whether the
sentence, by its nature, forecloses any realistic chance for a
juvenile offender to rejoin society. [Citation.] We have not held
that a lengthy term-of-years sentence is necessarily equivalent to
a life without parole sentence for all purposes.” (See Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 838–839, 863, citing, inter alia,
Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 368.)
In Williams, the high court rejected a One Strike offender’s
equal protection challenge to the youth offender parole statute.
(Fn. 14, ante.) The defendant had argued, inter alia, “[I]t is
irrational to exclude One Strike offenders but not those convicted
of murder from early parole consideration because the high court
deemed murder not only fundamentally different ‘in a moral
sense’ from other serious offenses, but also incomparable in terms

21
of its ‘ “ ‘severity and irrevocability.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Williams,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 130–131, quoting Graham, supra,
560 U.S. at p. 69.) The Williams court responded, “This
argument based on the comparative seriousness of crimes,
however, is premised on concerns relevant in the context of
Eighth Amendment challenges to the death penalty and other
severe criminal penalties, such as juvenile LWOP; such concerns
do not necessarily establish whether a Legislature’s classification
violates equal protection under a rational basis standard. . . .
[T]his equal protection analysis of [the youth offender parole
statute] should not be conflated with principles governing the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment and its focus on punishment and proportionality in
capital and juvenile LWOP sentencing.” (See id. at p. 131.)
In sum, Contreras, Hardin, and Williams establish that
Contreras’s discussion of functional equivalence is limited to the
Eighth Amendment context. We acknowledge that we are
parting ways with our colleagues in Division Five in People v.
Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650. There, Division Five
accepted the Attorney General’s concession that because
Contreras “ ‘held that a 50-year-to-life sentence is the functional
equivalent of an LWOP term . . . , [the defendant in Cabrera],
who received the same sentence, should be entitled to seek
resentencing relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).’ ” (See
Cabrera, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 653, citing Contreras,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 369.) The Cabrera court did not explain
why Contreras governs a defendant’s eligibility for relief under
section 1170, subdivision (d). (See Cabrera, at pp. 653–654.)
Also, in contrast to Cabrera, the Attorney General does not

22
concede here that Contreras applies to Carnes’s equal protection
claim. Accordingly, Cabrera is not instructive.

2. Carnes’s equal protection challenge is subject to
rational basis review
“The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that no state may
‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.’ . . . [Citation.]” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847,
citing U.S. Const., 14th Amend, fn. omitted.)15 “ ‘[T]he
requirement of equal protection ensures that the government
does not treat a group of people unequally without some
justification.’ [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 122.)
“The degree of justification required to satisfy equal
protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue.
Courts apply heightened scrutiny when a challenged statute or
other regulation involves a suspect classification such as race, or
a fundamental right such as the right to vote, and accordingly

15 Although “[t]he California Constitution also guarantees
equal protection of the law” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847,
fn. 2, citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)), Carnes does not
make any arguments specific to the equal protection clause of our
state constitution. In light of Carnes’s failure to raise any equal
protection argument under our state constitution, “we see ‘ “no
reason to suppose” that federal equal protection analysis would
yield a result different from what would emerge from analysis of
the state Constitution.’ [Citation.]” (See Hardin, at p. 847, fn. 2;
ibid. [proceeding under the assumption that the federal and state
equal protection provisions would yield the same result after the
defendant failed to raise any arguments specific to the state
Constitution].)

23
will demand greater justification for the differential treatment.
[Citations.] But when a statute involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.’ [Citations.] A court applying this
[rational basis] standard finds ‘a denial of equal protection only if
there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment
and some legitimate government purpose.’ [Citation.]” (See
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 847–848; ibid. [referring to the
latter test as “rational basis review”].) Carnes concedes in his
opening brief that the rational basis standard governs his equal
protection claim.
“Under this deferential standard, we presume that a given
statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger shows that
no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
conceivable.’ [Citation.] The underlying rationale for a statutory
classification need not have been ‘ever actually articulated’ by
lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’ [Citation.]
Evaluating potential justifications for disparate treatment, a
court reviewing a statute under this standard must ‘treat the
statute’s potential logic and assumptions far more permissively
than with other standards of constitutional or regulatory review.’
[Citation.] . . . ‘[T]he logic behind a potential justification need
[not] be persuasive or sensible—rather than simply rational.’
[Citation.]” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.)
Our high court has “cautioned[, however,] that ‘ “the
realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored.” ’
[Citations.] The statutory classification must be rationally
related to ‘ “realistically conceivable legislative purpose[s],” ’ and

24
may not be based on ‘invented fictitious purposes that could not
have been within the contemplation of the Legislature.’
[Citations.]” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 125.) In
undertaking rational basis review of a statute, we may “focus[ ]
on the apparent motivations underlying the challenged
classification, as revealed in the statutory text and history . . . .”
(See Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852, fn. 3.)
As for whether the statutory classification is rationally
related to a realistically conceivable legislative purpose, “ ‘ “we
must accept any gross generalizations and rough
accommodations that the Legislature seems to have made.”
[Citation.] “A classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply
because there is an ‘ “imperfect fit between means and ends” ’
[citations], or “because it may be ‘to some extent both
underinclusive and overinclusive.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Nothing
compels the state “to choose between attacking every aspect of a
problem or not attacking the problem at all[.]” ’ [Citation.] Far
from having to “solve all related ills at once” [citation], the
Legislature has “broad discretion” to proceed in an incremental
and uneven manner without necessarily engaging in arbitrary
and unlawful discrimination.’ [Citation.]” (Williams, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pp. 124–125.)

3. Carnes does not demonstrate that section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A)’s eligibility limitation
lacks a rational basis
Our colleagues in the Fifth District and Division Three of
this District conducted a detailed analysis of section 1170,
subdivision (d)’s legislative history, including committee reports
concerning the legislation that added the recall and resentencing
provisions, i.e., Senate Bill No. 9. (See Baldwin, supra,

25
113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 988–989, 997, 1002–1005, citing,
inter alia, Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1075–1077.)
We agree with our colleagues that “although Senate Bill [No.] 9’s
legislative history indicates Graham violations and cruel or
disproportionate sentences imposed on juveniles were among the
Legislature’s general considerations in enacting section 1170[,
subdivision ](d), ‘it was expressly concerned about juveniles being
sentenced to die in prison.’ [Citation.]” (Baldwin, at p. 997,
quoting Thompson, at p. 1075; see also Baldwin, at p. 1005
[noting that Sen. Bill No. 9 was “described by supporters as a
‘ “modest and narrowly focused piece of legislation” ’ given the
limited number of inmates the bill was anticipated to affect”].)
The next question is whether the challenged
classification—the statutory text authorizing only defendants
sentenced to “imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole” to petition for relief (see § 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A)), “ ‘bears a
rational relationship to [the] legitimate state purpose’ ” at issue
(see Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 848), that is, “ ‘provid[ing] an
opportunity for [resentencing to] juvenile offenders whose
sentences ensured they would die in prison’ ” (see Baldwin,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1004, quoting Thompson, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076). We conclude that as a general
matter, the statutory restriction on eligibility is rationally related
to this legislative purpose.
As our colleagues in the Fifth District persuasively
explained, “The Legislature could rationally determine that
‘providing the relatively small number of juvenile offenders
otherwise certain to die in prison an opportunity to obtain a
lesser sentence was the most pressing priority.’ [Citation.] While
this excludes juveniles with lengthy term-of-years sentences that

26
do not guarantee their death in prison, the Legislature is ‘entitled
to proceed incrementally, so long as it proceeds rationally, in
“walking [the] tightrope” of the political process.’ [Citation.]
‘ “Nothing compels the state ‘to choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all[.]’
[Citation.] Far from having to ‘solve all related ills at once’
[citation], the Legislature has ‘broad discretion’ to proceed in an
incremental and uneven manner without necessarily engaging in
arbitrary and unlawful discrimination.” ’ [Citation.]” (Baldwin,
113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005, quoting Thompson, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1077, Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 866,
& Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 125.)
We acknowledge Carnes could, and apparently does, make
an as applied equal protection challenge to section 1170,
subdivision (d). (See Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 120–121
[discussing the differences between facial and as applied
constitutional claims].) As our high court observed in Williams, a
litigant can prevail on a facial challenge to a statute only if he or
she shows the legislation is unconstitutional “ ‘in “at least ‘ “the
generality” ’ [citation] or ‘vast majority’ ” of cases[.]’ ” (See id. at
p. 121.) Such a claim focuses on the text of the statute, and not
on its specific application to an individual or class of persons.
(See id. at pp. 120–121.) Because the Legislature could
legitimately have as its objective providing resentencing relief to
rehabilitated juvenile offenders certain to die in prison, limiting
relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP is rationally
related to that objective. Accordingly, as we explained earlier in
this section, the statute is facially constitutional.
In contrast, an as applied challenge “seeks ‘relief from a
specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an

27
individual or class of individuals . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See Williams,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 120, italics omitted.) By claiming the
statute violates his equal protection rights because he has the
functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence, Carnes appears to be
asserting the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. To
prevail on such a challenge, Carnes must demonstrate there is no
rational relationship between (1) the Legislature’s objective of
providing resentencing relief to rehabilitated juvenile offenders
certain to die in prison; and (2) Carnes’s statutory ineligibility for
resentencing relief. (See Discussion, part D.2, ante [describing
the rational basis standard].)
Carnes argues certain data, including “data collected by the
California Correctional Health Care System,” show that an
inmate’s average life expectancy ranges from ages 50.5 to 65. He
uses this data to argue he is likely—but not certain—to die in
prison. He thus is not like the youthful offender with an LWOP
sentence, who is certain to die in prison and who was the subject
of the Legislature’s concern in enacting section 1170, subdivision
(d) in the first place.16 As we have explained above, the
Legislature does not violate the equal protection guarantee by
proceeding “incremental[ly].” (See Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 124; see also Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005

16 (See Factual & Procedural Background, ante [noting
Carnes will be age 61 upon serving 44 years 8 months of his
sentence]; Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 364 [observing that
“[i]n a normal distribution, about half of a population reaches or
exceeds its life expectancy, while the other half does not,” thereby
suggesting that a release date exceeding an inmate’s life
expectancy does not necessarily condemn him or her to death in
prison].)

28
[same].) Because Carnes does not demonstrate the Legislature
lacked a rational basis for excluding him from the class of
inmates who may petition for relief under section 1170,
subdivision (d), his as applied challenge necessarily fails. (See
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852 [noting that the party
challenging a statutory classification bears the burden of showing
it lacks a rational basis].)
Lastly, we note Carnes argues that Heard, People v. Sorto
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, and Bagsby support his equal
protection challenge to section 1170, subdivision (d). As Baldwin
explained, those decisions are inapposite because they concerned
“sentence[s] that guarantee[ ] death in prison . . . .” (See
Baldwin, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1004.) Heard involved a
prison “sentence[ ] of 103 years to life,” the defendant in Sorto
was sentenced to “140 years to life” in prison, and the offender in
Bagsby suffered a prison term of “107 years to life.” (See
Baldwin, at p. 1004, citing Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 629, Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 439–440, & Bagsby,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1046–1047.) Assuming arguendo
the Legislature could not rationally exclude from resentencing
relief defendants sentenced to such lengthy prison terms that are
clearly beyond their natural life expectancies, the same cannot be
said for Carnes, who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
44 years 8 months to life. (Cf. Baldwin, at pp. 985, 1006
[rejecting an equal protection claim to § 1170, subd. (d) raised by
a “juvenile nonhomicide offender[ ] sentenced to 44 years to life”
in prison].)
In sum, Carnes fails to show that section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A)’s eligibility limitation violates his
constitutional right to equal protection.

29
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s May 8, 2024 order denying
defendant Vincent Lance Carnes’s petition for recall and
resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

30

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