People v. Flores CA4/1

CourtListener 10692098CalctappOct 7, 2025

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Filed 10/7/25 P. v. Flores CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083204

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS322488)

OCTAVIO JESUS FLORES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Amalia Meza, Judge. Affirmed as modified; motion to constructively file
notice of appeal denied.

Galit Lipa, State Public Defender and Inga K. Nelson, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Robin Urbanski, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Anastasia
Sagorsky, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Octavio Jesus Flores appeals from a postjudgment victim restitution
order entered after he pleaded guilty to forgery for altering odometers of
vehicles sold to the victims, S.D. and H.O. Flores contends: (1) he was
denied his constitutional right to be present at the restitution hearings, and

his attorney improperly waived his presence under Penal Code,1 section 977;
(2) H.O. was not a direct victim of his criminal acts; (3) the court abused its
discretion in calculating H.O.’s restitution; and (4) S.D.’s restitution order
was appealable or, alternatively, this court should deem the notice of appeal
filed as applying constructively to S.D.’s restitution order. We find merit in
the third contention, and therefore affirm the judgment modified to reduce
H.O.’s restitution award as specified below. We deny Flores’s motion for
constructive filing of the notice of appeal as to S.D.’s restitution order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2019, S.D. purchased a vehicle from Flores. Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) investigators subsequently advised S.D. that the
vehicle’s odometer had been altered.
In July 2020, Flores sold D.B. a van with an odometer reading of
141,000 miles, despite the fact that when Flores had earlier bought the same
van in October 2019, its odometer reading was 273,000 miles.

In September 2020, D.B. sold the van to H.O. for $8,000.2
Flores’s Plea Agreement

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Section 977
subdivision (b)(1) provides: “[I]n all cases in which a felony is charged, the
accused shall be personally present [at all significant stages of the
prosecution] . . . unless they waive their right to be physically or remotely
present, with leave of court and with approval of defendant’s counsel.”

2 The record does not show that any restitution was awarded to D.B.
2
In January 2023, Flores pleaded guilty to one count of forgery (§ 470,

subdivision (d)3) and the court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the
remaining charges, including count 5 (§ 532, subd. (a)) relating to him using

false pretenses as to the D.B. sale.4 He waived certain rights under People v.
Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (Harvey). The court explained to Flores its
interpretation of his plea agreement form: “[It] tells me you wish to plead
guilty to count 1. . . . That’s forgery of documents and items. In exchange for
that plea, the People have agreed to dismiss the balance of the complaint

against you. They’ve agreed to a NOLT.[5] That means you’ll be placed on
felony probation. You will be responsible for paying restitution, and the
amount of that restitution will be determined at your sentencing date. After
one year of successful probation and full payment of restitution, and 50 hours
of voluntary community service, and if you do not engage in auto sales, unless
you have a license, then the People would have no objection to having the

3 Section 470, subdivision (d) provides: “Every person who, with the
intent to defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits, utters,
publishes, passes or attempts or offers to pass, as true and genuine, any of
the following items, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or
counterfeited, is guilty of forgery: . . . certificate of ownership or other
document evidencing ownership of a vehicle or undocumented vessel[.]”

4 The other dismissed charges against Flores were count 2, under Vehicle
Code section 12120, which prohibits sales of vehicles by someone who is not a
dealer or the registered owner, and count 12, under section 532, subdivision
(a), which punishes the use of false pretenses to obtain money. The
remaining charges in the complaint were committed by Flores’s brother and
codefendant, Christian Flores.

5 “NOLT” is an acronym for “No Opposition to Local Time,” which means
the People will allow the defense to offer sentencing alternatives to
incarceration without any opposition.
3
matter reduced to a misdemeanor, pursuant to [section 17, subdivision (b)].”
Flores confirmed he understood those terms. He initialed a section of the
plea form stating he agreed to be responsible for paying restitution of
between $300 and $10,000.
The February 13, 2023 probation report stated the victims reported
losses of $11,700 as follows: $3,200 by D.B; $2,500 by S.D.; and $6,000 by
H.O.
Flores’s Sentencing Hearing
The probation officer recommended probation to enable Flores to
remain gainfully employed and start making payments toward his restitution
as soon as possible.
At the February 16, 2023 sentencing hearing, Flores stated he
understood his probation conditions. He specifically requested the court
allow him to commute to Tijuana, Mexico “because I cross every day to go to
work.” The court granted that request: “[Flores] is permitted to travel to and
reside in Mexico providing that he’s in full compliance with his conditions of
probation and providing that he lets [the Probation Department] know the
exact address where he works and his work hours so [it] can check on him
periodically at his work.” The court sentenced Flores to two years formal
probation.
At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court inquired about
restitution. Flores’s counsel replied, “[W]e just got an updated number today
that I have not been able to corroborate with Mr. Flores. So we are
requesting a restitution review on March 30th for status.” The court granted
that request. It asked defense counsel if Flores was giving “a [section] 977
waiver for the restitution [hearing].” Counsel replied in the affirmative. The

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court did not further elaborate on the waiver or inquire about Flores’s
understanding of it.
Restitution Hearing in the S.D. Matter
At a June 26, 2023 restitution hearing, defense counsel stated he was
“appearing [according to section] 977 on behalf of [Flores].” The parties
stipulated Flores would pay S.D. $3,194.22 in restitution, starting August 1,
2023. The trial court stated it would sign an order to that effect. A minute
order for that hearing reflects a 20-cent difference in the restitution ordered,
which was in the amount of $3,194.42.
On October 19, 2023, the court signed an “Order for Victim Restitution”
and issued an “Abstract of Judgment—Restitution,” which both state the
restitution amount as $3,194.42. The latter document states: “Judgment
was entered on . . . June 26, 2023[.]”
Restitution Hearing in the H.O. Matter
At a November 9, 2023 restitution hearing on H.O.’s claims, Flores’s
same counsel again stated he was appearing “[according to section] 977 on his
behalf.”
A DMV investigator testified he used a database to assess the value of
H.O.’s van based on its year of manufacture, make, model and mileage. He
obtained different valuations depending on “whether the condition of the van
mileage, wear and tear as far as what the inside looks like. If it’s moderate, if
it’s clean . . . then the [vehicle’s] price either goes down or goes up.”
Specifically, the van’s rough trade-in value was $2,605; its average trade-in
value was $3,830; its clean trade-in value was $4,830; and its clean retail
value was $7,630.
The DMV investigator also testified D.B. and other victims reported
that Flores had advised them to claim a lower purchase price than they

5
actually paid for their vehicles in order to reduce their taxes and vehicle
registration fees. The certificate of title transferring the van to D.B.
indicated his purchase price was $1,000; and he paid a $277 registration fee.
H.O. paid $775 in registration fees.
H.O. testified that after she purchased the van, she incurred $4,220 for
repairs for alignment, window screens, headlights, and replacing a catalytic
converter (which she purchased for $2,892.49). By the time H.O. replaced the
catalytic converter, which occurred within one year before the restitution
hearing, she already knew the van’s true mileage. H.O. also paid $3,133.52
to build out the van by retrofitting it with flooring, ceiling panels, a bench, a
bed, and shelving units.
The prosecutor argued the court had broad discretion to order
restitution as a probation term under section 1203.1, subdivision (j). He also
argued section 1202.4 provided a separate basis for restitution. He sought
$11,298.77 in restitution for H.O. as follows: $3,170 (the van’s $8,000
purchase price minus its $4,830 clean trade-in value), $775 (vehicle
registration fee), $4,220.25 (automotive repair) and $3,133.52 (build-out
expenses).
Defense counsel opposed the prosecutor’s restitution calculations:
“[T]he $4,220.25, that, I believe, includes the catalytic converter . . . . That
was purchased in August of this year. Well over a year after it was known
the mileage of the vehicle. So the argument that these repairs would not
have been made if all of the facts were known I believe is incorrect . . . . And
then also for the difference between the purchase price and the clean trade-in
value. I don’t believe that it can be shown that this purchase price had
anything to do with [ ] Flores’s actions. This vehicle was purchased by [H.O.]
from [D.B.], who had bought the vehicle three months earlier, had sold it, had

6
committed a crime of lying on his paperwork. . . . I think there’s no way for
us to know what [ ] Flores got out of this. So even the difference between the
purchase price and the clean trade-in value, it’s also referenced in the fact
that [D.B.] got a windfall on his taxes, his registration fees. And then, of
course, I would also say that the build-out expenses are not . . . reasonable or
foreseeable.”
The Court’s Ruling and the Notice of Appeal
The court ruled from the bench: “[T]here is a nexus between the losses
incurred by [H.O.] in the amount of $8,165.23. That excludes the build-out.
Everything else [H.O. is] entitled to recover.” Immediately afterwards the
court stated the restitution amount as $8,165.25. It ruled Flores and his
codefendant were jointly and severally liable for the restitution. It added
that monthly payments were to begin January 1, 2024. The court’s minute
order does not specify a statutory basis for the restitution order. However, at
the close of the hearing the court requested that the People prepare an order.
The prosecutor immediately produced one. The court signed the order, which
stated that restitution was ordered “[p]ursuant to . . . [s]ection 1202.4[,
subdivision] (f).”
In November 2023, Flores filed a notice of appeal of only the H.O.
restitution order.
In July 2024, Flores filed a motion requesting that we construe the
notice of appeal as including the October 19, 2023 restitution order as to S.D.
We denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction because an appeal of that order
was untimely, but without prejudice to him filing a motion to have us deem
an appeal of the S.D. restitution order constructively filed. Flores
subsequently filed such a supplemental motion, arguing that as his
constitutional and statutory right to be present at the restitution hearings

7
was violated, his trial counsel had a proper basis to appeal the S.D. order;
however, his attorney provided ineffective assistance by not complying with
his request to appeal that order. We ordered Flores’s supplemental motion be
considered with this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Waiver of Flores’s Presence at the Restitution Hearings
Flores contends he had a constitutional right to attend the restitution
hearings, and his counsel’s waiver of his presence under section 977 was
invalid. He further contends he was prejudiced because if he had attended,
he could have corrected his counsel’s inaccurate representation to the court
that he was convicted of the dismissed count of selling the van to D.B. (count
5); clarified how much D.B. had paid for the van; and assisted his counsel
regarding the van’s valuation and, possibly, obtained a lower restitution
amount.
A. Applicable Law
A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be
present at critical stages of a prosecution, including the imposition of victim
restitution. (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 508 (Nieves); §§ 977,
subd. (b)(1), 1193.) This right may be waived if the waiver “ ‘is voluntary,
knowing and intelligent.’ ” (Nieves, supra, at p. 508, quoting People v. Davis
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531.) Defense counsel may waive the defendant’s
presence, “but only if there is evidence that the defendant consented to the
waiver. [Citations.] At a minimum, there must be some evidence that the
defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of
doing so.” (Davis, at p. 532.)
In People v. Cooks (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1127 (Cooks), the only
discussion of the defendant’s absence at the restitution hearing was the trial

8
court’s inquiry about the existence of a section 977 waiver, and defense
counsel’s affirmative response. (Id. at p. 1226.) On appeal, this court
concluded: “[Appellant] may have a point that the record does not
demonstrate he validly waived his right to be present at a future restitution
hearing. [Citations.] With no discussion of what a ‘[section] 977 waiver’ was,
it is hard to see how [appellant] impliedly waived his right to be present at a

future hearing.” (Cooks, supra, at p. 1126.)6
Nonetheless, courts addressing this type of claimed error typically
evaluate whether a defendant’s nonappearance following an invalid waiver
resulted in prejudice under the more stringent harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.
(See Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 508-509 [it was harmless error to hold a
victim restitution hearing outside defendant’s presence without a valid
waiver].)
B. Analysis
In light of Cooks, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127, the People concede
that Flores’s counsel’s claim of waiver likely was “similarly insufficient for
lack of evidence that it was intelligent, knowing, and voluntary.”
We assume without deciding that Flores did not properly waive his
presence at the restitution hearings. We therefore undertake a prejudice
analysis. Although defense counsel mistakenly told the court Flores was
convicted of a forgery charge relating to the van sale to D.B., that statement
did not prejudice Flores because under his Harvey waiver, the court could
take into account the facts surrounding that dismissed charge. “If restitution

6 This court did not have occasion to decide if the section 977 waiver was
valid because no restitution hearing had been held outside Cooks’s presence,
nor was it clear that one would ever occur. (Cooks, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1127.)
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is imposed which is attributable to a count dismissed pursuant to a plea
bargain, as described in this section, the court shall obtain a waiver pursuant
to [Harvey] from the defendant as to the dismissed count.” (§ 1192.3, subd.
(b).)
As stated, defense counsel informed the court at the February 16, 2023
sentencing hearing that he needed an opportunity “to corroborate with Mr.
Flores” certain recently-acquired information. The court therefore set a
restitution review for approximately six weeks later. However, H.O’s
restitution hearing took place nearly nine months later, in November 2023.
Accordingly, we may infer in favor of the court’s restitution order that
defense counsel “. . . ‘had ample opportunity to discuss . . . with defendant
and to seek [his] assistance . . . . Assuming [counsel] did so, defendant’s
presence at the hearing would have added little to [his] attorney[’s] ability to
argue’ the propriety of the victim restitution payments.” (Nieves, supra, 11
Cal.5th 404, 509.) Finally, as set forth above, defense counsel at H.O.’s
restitution hearing presented comprehensive and detailed objections to the
restitution amount. (Ibid. [finding “nothing in the record to indicate that
defendant would have added any significant information about her inability
to pay [restitution] beyond that presented by defense counsel”].) We
therefore conclude Flores was not prejudiced by his attorney’s waiver of his
presence at H.O.’s restitution hearing.
II. The H.O. Restitution Order
Flores contends the H.O. restitution order must be stricken because he
did not sell the van to H.O., but rather to D.B.; therefore, H.O. was not the
object of the count 1 forgery. Relying specifically on the court’s signed order,
Flores argues: “Mandatory victim restitution ordered pursuant to section

10
1202.4 is only authorized for persons who are direct victims, meaning the
object of the defendant’s criminal conduct.”
Flores alternatively contends the court abused its discretion by
ordering: “1. Restitution for the difference in value between what [H.O.] paid
and the clean trade-in value of the van based on actual mileage without
clearly articulating the method it used to calculate valuation and why
restitution was owed under that calculation; [¶] 2. [ ] Flores to pay the cost of
both repairs [H.O.] performed in the three years since she purchased the van
and the difference in value between [H.O.’s] purchase price and the clean
trade-in value based on the actual mileage; and [¶] 3. The full cost of [H.O.’s]
DMV registration.”
A. Applicable Law
We review restitution orders for an abuse of discretion. (In re
Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 852; People v. Giordano (2007) 42
Cal.4th 644, 663.) That standard “is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review.
The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the
facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.)
California crime victims have a constitutional right to full restitution
for economic losses suffered as a result of a defendant’s criminal conduct.
(Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (b)(13).) A victim’s right to restitution is to be
broadly and liberally construed. (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
1128, 1132.)
The scope of restitution depends on the type of sentence the trial court
imposes. When a defendant is ordered to pay restitution as a condition of

11
probation under section 1203.1, the defendant’s agreement gives courts
broader discretion to impose restitution, which they may do so as long as “the
restitution condition [is] reasonably related either to the crime of which the
defendant is convicted or to the goal of deterring future criminality.” (People
v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123 (Carbajal).) Courts may order
probationers to pay restitution for losses resulting from “related conduct not
resulting in a conviction,” as well as “conduct underlying dismissed and
uncharged counts.” (Id. at p. 1121.) This wider scope arises from the
rehabilitative purpose of probation and allows trial courts to order restitution
beyond what is permissible under section 1202.4, which applies when a
defendant receives a nonprobationary sentence. (People v. Martinez (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1093, 1101; see also People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 29
[“When section 1202.4 imposes its mandatory requirements in favor of a
victim’s right to restitution, the statute is explicit and narrow. When section
1203.1 provides the court with discretion to achieve a defendant’s
reformation, its ambit is necessarily broader”].)
“ ‘[E]ven though the trial court has broad discretion in making a
restitution award, that discretion is not unlimited. While it is not required to
make an order in keeping with the exact amount of loss, the trial court must
use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim
whole, and may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious.’ ” (People
v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) The goal of direct restitution is to
restore the victim to “the economic status quo.” (People v. Giordano, supra,
42 Cal.4th at pp. 658, 663-664.) “A restitution order is intended to
compensate the victim for its actual loss and is not intended to provide the
victim with a windfall.” (People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159,
1172.)

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B. Analysis
Flores’s arguments that section 1202.4 was the exclusive basis for the
restitution order and that H.O. was not a direct victim of his crimes are
unavailing because, by operation of law, section 1203.1, subdivision (j)
provided a valid basis for the court’s restitution order. In Carbajal, supra, 10
Cal.4th at p. 1122, the defendant argued that then section 1203.04,
subdivision (a)(1) (the predecessor statute to section 1202.4) limited the
permissible restitution to losses caused by the crime of which a defendant is
convicted. However, the court disagreed. It relied on the trial court’s broad
discretion to set probationary terms under section 1203.1, subdivision (j), and
specific statutory language in section 1203.04, subdivision (g) that declared
the legislative intent not to abrogate the trial court’s broad discretion to
fashion conditions of probation. (Carbajal, at p. 1122.)
Here, we acknowledge that the court’s signed order stated restitution
was ordered under section 1202.4; however, the court was aware of its
discretion to order restitution as a condition of probation. In fact, the
probation officer recommended Flores serve probation in order for him to
work and pay off his restitution. The People also advocated this position in
their moving papers and closing arguments. As stated, the same judge who
sentenced Flores to probation, including the term permitting him to continue
commuting to work in San Diego from Mexico, ordered H.O.’s restitution.
Nevertheless, we do agree with Flores’s specific argument that the
court abused its discretion because the restitution order “included both the
decreased value of the van based on actual mileage and the cost of repairs
that were already reflected in the decreased value of the van based on its
actual mileage, resulting in a windfall to [H.O.].” Flores relies on People v.
Sharpe (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 741, 743, in which the defendant rammed into

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the victim’s vehicle, disabling it. (Id. at p. 744.) The trial court in that case
ordered restitution both for the decrease in the fair market value of the truck
and the cost of repairing the truck. The Court of Appeal concluded that was
improper: “The trial court based its restitution order on the fair market
value method, but it abused its discretion by also awarding the cost to [the
victim] to repair the truck. . . . Having fully recovered the decrease in fair
market value, [the victim] was not entitled to also recover the cost of repair
because repairing the truck made it more valuable.” (Id. at p. 747.)
Similarly, the $3,170 that the court awarded for the trade-in value of
H.O.’s van represented the van’s fair market value. As the DMV investigator
testified, the database he consulted to calculate the van’s value took into
consideration “the condition of the van mileage [and] wear and tear as far as
what the inside looks like.” Therefore, by awarding H.O. an additional
$4,220.25 for repair expenses incurred (including for a $2,892.49 catalytic
converter she bought more than a year after purchasing the van), the court
abused its discretion by overcompensating her. Accordingly, the restitution
award should be reduced by the amount awarded for repairs.
Finally, Flores claims H.O. was not entitled to restitution for the full
$775 vehicle registration fee, which assertedly had no factual basis and
resulted in a windfall for her: “She retained the vehicle and would have had
to pay registration fees for it based on its actual value, which the prosecution
argued and the court impliedly found was $4,830. Thus, she would have had
to pay more in registration fees than the $277 [D.B.] paid based on a $1,000
value, but less than the amount she actually paid. Her actual loss was
therefore the difference between the registration fee she actually paid and
what she would have paid based on the actual value of the vehicle.” We
conclude this argument has merit. As H.O. would have had to pay a

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minimum of $277 to register the van (assuming its market value was at least
$1000), by deducting that amount from the $775 that she paid the DMV, her
new vehicle registration fee restitution award is $498.
In light of the above reductions from the amount the trial court
awarded ($8,165.23 minus $4,220.25 (repairs) minus $277 (vehicle
registration), H.O.’s total restitution amount is now $3,667.98.
III. Appealability of the S.D. Restitution Order
Flores contends that even if the trial court’s oral recitation of S.D.’s
restitution on June 26, 2023, was an appealable order, “the filing of the
written restitution order and abstract of judgment—on October 19, 2023—
constituted a subsequent court action regarding restitution that makes it the
controlling order, which is separately appealable.” He alternatively contends:
“Regardless of whether this court finds that the June 26, 2023 discussion or
the October 19, 2023 written order is the appealable restitution order
directing [him] to pay [S.D.] restitution, this court should find that it can be
challenged on appeal through the doctrine of constructive filing.”
Flores attached his declaration, dated August 2024, to his
supplemental motion for constructive filing, stating he was absent from the
S.D. restitution hearing and does not know how or why the restitution
amount was determined. Without specifying a date, he states, “After my trial
attorney . . . told me about the restitution orders, I told him I wanted to
appeal. I was unaware, because [my attorney] did not tell me, that each
order needed to be listed separated [sic] on a notice of appeal.” Flores adds:
“I have no legal training and my ability to read English is very limited. As a
result, I did not know that [my attorney’s] decision to cite only the November
9, 2023 order meant that I could not also challenge the October 19, 2023

15
restitution order for [S.D.]” Flores stated he asked his appellate attorney “to
correct this error.”
A. Applicable Law
A defendant is ordinarily required to file a timely notice of appeal
within 60 days of the challenged order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1);
In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 243, 246.) This is a jurisdictional deadline.
Normally, courts lack the power to extend it. (Estate of Hanley (1943) 23
Cal.2d 120, 122; see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.60(d), 8.104(b).) “ ‘Our
jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the
judgment or order appealed from.’ [Citation.] We have no jurisdiction over
an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222
Cal.App.4th 166, 170.)
The principle of constructive filing of a late notice of appeal should be
applied when a criminal defendant requests trial counsel to file a notice of
appeal on his behalf and counsel fails to do so in accordance with the law. (In
re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72, 87-88.) But “we will not indiscriminately
permit a defendant whose counsel has undertaken to file the notice of appeal,
to invoke the doctrine of constructive filing when the defendant has displayed
no diligence in seeing that his attorney has discharged this responsibility.”
(Id. at p. 89.)
Relief is also made available when trial counsel provides a criminal
defendant ineffective assistance of counsel, entitling him or her to the
constructive filing of a timely notice of appeal. (Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000)
528 U.S. 470.) In Roe, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
when trial counsel has been ineffective in failing to properly consult with his
or her client about the appeal process, and that “constitutionally deficient
performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have

16
taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.” (Id. at p. 484.)
B. Analysis
As stated, the parties stipulated to the S.D. restitution order on June
26, 2023. “A stipulation is an agreement between counsel respecting
business before the court.” (Palmer v. City of Long Beach (1948) 33 Cal.2d
134, 142.) Stipulations are binding on the parties. (Cooper v. Gordon (1899)
125 Cal. 296, 302.) The court’s oral pronouncement on that day constituted
the restitution judgment as to S.D.; therefore, Flores was required to appeal
within 60 days of that date. “Rendition of judgment is an oral
pronouncement.” (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471, superseded on
other grounds as stated in People v. Turner (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1258,
1268.)
We find unavailing Flores’s argument that the October, 19, 2023
judgment, which contained a 20-cent discrepancy between the amount stated
therein and the amount stated at the restitution hearing, amounted to a
modification that in effect reset the appeal date. (Accord, People v. Zackery
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [“[T]he abstract of judgment cannot add to,
or modify the judgment, but only purports to digest and summarize it”].)
Furthermore, “Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement
of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral
pronouncement controls.” (Zackery, [check spelling] at p.385; People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186; People v. Mesa, supra, 14 Cal.3d at
p. 471 [“a discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as
entered in the minutes is presumably the result of clerical error”].) In any
event, Flores’s notice of appeal failed to specify it was taken from the October
order.

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Flores claims we should deem an appeal constructively filed from the
October judgment. However, he has failed to demonstrate the diligence
required to satisfy the requirement of case law. (People v. Castillo (1969) 71
Cal.2d 692; In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 88-89 [“It is eminently clear
that petitioner Benoit was fully diligent in his repeated efforts within the 60-
day period to make sure his appeal was filed. He was thwarted by
circumstances beyond his control, and is entitled to a declaration that his
appeal is pending by virtue of the doctrine of constructive filing”].) In fact, it
is significant that by the time of the October 2023 order, Flores was already
obligated to start paying monthly installments on the S.D. restitution order
as of August 1, 2023. Therefore he had every motivation to diligently monitor
his appeal from that restitution order.
Flores’s declaration contains no facts regarding his communications
with defense counsel specifying when or how he learned of the restitution
orders. He merely states that when he learned from appellate counsel that
the “October 19” order was “not included in the notice of appeal,” he asked
appellate counsel to “correct this error.” Even if we deemed the October 2023
order as the operative one, Flores’s motion, filed approximately eight months
afterwards, fails to show diligence. Flores also provides no declaration from
his trial counsel relating to any of these alleged facts. The record is devoid of
a basis for deeming a notice of appeal constructively filed, particularly in
light of the parties’ stipulation to S.D.’s restitution order, and his probation
agreement that permitted him to reduce his felony conviction to a
misdemeanor by paying off his restitution within one year.
Flores also has not met his burden of showing ineffective assistance of
counsel. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) To establish
constitutionally inadequate representation, the defendant must show that (1)

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counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. (Ibid.) We defer to trial counsel’s reasonable tactical
decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v.
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925.) On direct appeal, defense counsel’s
“competency is presumed unless the record affirmatively excludes a rational
basis for the trial attorney’s choice.” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th
1216, 1260.) “If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or
failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an
explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.” (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 207.)
The record sheds no light on why Flores’s counsel failed to appeal the
S.D. restitution order. But a satisfactory explanation exists. Flores had
stipulated to that restitution order, which we must assume incorporated his
intent and his agreement to expeditiously resolve the S.D. matter, in order to
reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor as his plea agreement
provided. Accordingly, he lacked a basis for an appeal. “We interpret a
stipulation, including a stipulation entered as a court order, in accordance
with the ordinary rules of contract interpretation. [Citations.] [¶] ‘We
interpret a contract so as to give effect to the mutual intention of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was formed.’ ” (Dowling v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 685, 694.)
In light of the above, we deny Flores’s motion to deem constructively
filed an appeal as to the S.D. restitution order.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by reducing H.O.’s restitution award to
$3,667.98. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed
to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the modification and
to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. We deny Octavio Flores’s request to deem constructively filed
an appeal as to the S.D. restitution order.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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