People v. Guerra CA2/7

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Filed 10/7/25 P. v. Guerra CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B338095

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA288019)
v.

MARCO ANTONIO GUERRA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kevin Stennis, Judge. Affirmed.
Kieran D. Manjarrez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
Marco Antonio Guerra1 appeals from a postjudgment order
denying his Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6)2 petition with respect to his convictions for first
degree murder and attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder. Guerra contends the superior court erred
in denying his petition at the prima facie stage because the jury
could have convicted him based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. We reject his contention and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Evidence at Trial3
“On the evening of July 31, 2004, 16-year-old Juan Gomez
went into a market owned by his parents, while his friend, 14-
year-old Salvador Cruz waited outside. As Gomez was leaving
the market, both he and Cruz were struck by bullets fired from a
passing white Mitsubishi. Gomez died from his wounds.
“Days later, police stopped . . . Guerra, a known 18th Street
Gang member. Guerra was driving a white Mitsubishi with
damage and other distinctive markings matching those of the car
shown in the market’s surveillance video. Two other known 18th
Street Gang members were with Guerra in the car. After Guerra

1 The record also refers to defendant as Marcos Antonio
Guerra.
2 Statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to section 1172.6
with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
3 We derive the facts from the nonpublished opinion on
Guerra’s direct appeal (People v. Guerra (July 14, 2009, B205490)
[nonpub. opn.]), relying on them for background purposes only.
(See People v. Love (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1283, fn. 2.)

2
was arrested, he volunteered to police he was behind the wheel of
the white Mitsubishi at the time of the shooting, but he claimed
another gang member had forced him at gun point to drive the
car. In a later interview, Guerra again admitted to police he had
been driving the car when the shooting occurred.” (People v.
Guerra (July 14, 2009, B205490) [nonpub. opn.].)

B. Relevant Jury Instructions and the Prosecutor’s Closing
Argument
1. Instructions
The trial took place in 2006. As relevant here, the trial
court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 400 (aiding and
abetting: general principles), 401 (aiding and abetting: intended
crimes), 520 (murder with malice aforethought), 521 (murder:
degrees), 600 (attempted murder), and 601 (attempted murder:
deliberation and premeditation).
Former CALCRIM No. 400 (Mar. 2005) provided: “A
person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he may have
directly committed the crime. Two, he may have aided and
abetted someone else, who committed the crime. In these
instructions, I will call that other person the ‘perpetrator.’ A
person is equally guilty of the crime whether he committed it
personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed
it. [¶] Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence
establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also
be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the
commission of the first crime.”
CALCRIM No. 401 provided, in relevant part: “To prove
that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and
abetting that crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The

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perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that
the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or
during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to
aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND
[¶] 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet
the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and
abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact,
aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s
commission of that crime.”
Former CALCRIM No. 520 (Mar. 2005) provided, in
relevant part: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of [murder],
the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant committed an
act that caused the death of another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. When
the defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice
aforethought. [¶] There are two kinds of malice aforethought,
express malice and implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to
establish the state of mind required for murder. [¶] The
defendant acted with express malice if he unlawfully intended to
kill. [¶] The defendant acted with implied malice if: [¶] 1. He
intentionally committed an act; [¶] 2. The natural consequences
of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the time he
acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; [¶] AND [¶]
4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.”
CALCRIM No. 521 provided, in relevant part: “The
defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have
proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he intended to
kill. The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the
considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the

4
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with
premeditation if he decided to kill before committing the act that
caused death.”
CALCRIM No. 600 provided, in relevant part: “To prove
that the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the People
must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant took at least one direct but
ineffective step toward killing another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The
defendant intended to kill that person.”
CALCRIM No. 601 provided, in relevant part: “If you find
the defendant guilty of attempted murder . . . you must then
decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation
that the attempted murder was done willfully, and with
deliberation and premeditation. [¶] The defendant and/or a
principal acted willfully if he intended to kill when he acted. The
defendant/principal deliberated if he carefully weighed the
considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant/principal
premeditated if he decided to kill before acting. The attempted
murder was done willfully and with deliberation and
premeditation if either the defendant or a principal or both of
them acted with that state of mind.”
2. Closing argument
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued Guerra
was guilty of first degree murder and attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder as a direct aider and
abettor. The prosecutor focused on CALCRIM No. 401, the
instruction for aiding and abetting intended crimes. He argued
Guerra “knew the perpetrator[s] intended to commit the crime [in
that he] had to know that if he lent out his vehicle . . . what they
were going to do.” Guerra “intended to aid the perpetrators in

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committing the crime . . . [by] driv[ing] them to the location
where they might find rival enemies to shoot.” Further, Guerra
“did, in fact, aid and abet the perpetrators.” As the prosecutor
stated, “[W]e can infer what [Guerra said, which was:] ‘Let’s go.
I am down for the hood. What are we waiting for? Get your
guns. I will drive, you shoot, or you drive, I will take care of it.’ ”
The prosecutor also focused on Guerra’s mental state
during the commission of the offenses. As to the murder, the
prosecutor argued Guerra acted with express malice, stating, “No
matter who committed this murder . . . , there is no question in
[my] mind there was an intent to kill. . . . [¶] There was a driver.
There was a shooter. There was a vehicle involved. All those
must have joined in the intent to kill, including the defendant.”
As to the attempted murder, the prosecutor argued that “[t]he
same analysis” applied. Specifically, Guerra took a direct step
toward killing another person by “driving to the location.
Bringing those people to shoot. They intended to kill.”

C. Verdicts, Sentence, and Appeal
The jury found Guerra guilty of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and
first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). As to both counts, the jury
found true that a principal personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b), (e)(1)), a principal personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1)), a principal
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which
proximately caused great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53,
subds. (d), (e)(1)), and Guerra committed the offenses for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 1862.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)).
The trial court sentenced Guerra to a total prison term of

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50 years to life. We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Guerra,
supra, B205490.)

D. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On August 17, 2023, Guerra filed, pro se, a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as to his murder and
attempted murder convictions. The People opposed, and Guerra,
then represented by counsel, did not file any reply. At the prima
facie hearing, Guerra’s counsel “submit[ed] on the People’s
papers.”
The superior court denied the petition, finding that “[t]he
verdict forms and jury instructions show as a matter of law, [the
jury] was not instructed on [the] natural and probable
consequences doctrine, felony murder[,] or any other theory of
culpability that imputed malice to [Guerra].”
Guerra timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 1437) substantially modified the law governing accomplice
liability for murder. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558
(Patton).) While previously a defendant could be convicted of
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
simply by acting as an accomplice in an offense that foreseeably
resulted in the commission of a murder (even if the defendant did
not share the actual killer’s mens rea), SB 1437 eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder. (See Patton, at p. 558; People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984 (Reyes).) To convict a principal

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of murder, section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing
malice based solely on one’s participation in a crime and requires
proof the principal acted with malice, except under the revised
felony-murder rule in section 189, subdivision (e).4
To provide relief to those with existing murder convictions
based on now-invalid theories, the Legislature created a path to
resentencing codified in section 1172.6. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a);
Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1; see Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 558.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (SB 775) clarified that, in some circumstances, the same
relief available to persons convicted of murder is also available to
persons convicted of attempted murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see
People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 544 (Coley).) Under
section 1172.6, a person convicted of “murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime” or “attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine” may petition the superior
court to vacate the convictions and be resentenced on any
remaining counts if the petitioner could not now be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of the changes to sections

4 The revised felony-murder rule provides that a “participant
in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified
felony] in which a death occurs” can be liable for murder only if
“[t]he person was the actual killer”; “[t]he person was not the
actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree”;
or “[t]he person was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd.
(e)(1)-(3).)

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188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the court must hold a hearing to determine whether
the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner
is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 559.) If the petitioner makes that showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the attempted murder or murder
convictions and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(1); Patton, at p. 558.)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “ ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971; accord, Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 563.) “[T]he court may appropriately deny a
petition at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law.” (People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52; see Lewis, at p. 971.) The court may
consider the record of conviction, which will “necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see
Patton, at p. 563; Harden, at p. 56 [jury instructions and verdicts
“irrefutably establishe[d] as a matter of law” that defendant was
ineligible for resentencing].) “In reviewing any part of the record
of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972; accord, Patton, at

9
p. 563.)
“We review de novo whether the trial court conducted a
proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).” (People v.
Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; see People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 [denial at the prima facie stage “is
appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law,” which “is a
purely legal conclusion . . . we review de novo”].)

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying Guerra’s
Section 1172.6 Petition
Guerra contends the jury instructions show that the jury
was not foreclosed from returning guilty verdicts on the
attempted murder and murder counts based on a theory of
natural and probable consequences. We are not persuaded. The
trial court instructed the jury on only two theories of liability for
both attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and
first degree murder: (1) direct perpetrator (CALCRIM Nos. 520-
521, 600-601) and (2) direct aiding and abetting (CALCRIM Nos.
400-401). The court did not instruct the jury on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, felony murder, or any other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime. Guerra is thus ineligible
for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law because
the jury instructions and verdicts conclusively show that he was
convicted under still-valid theories of liability.
1. Guerra is ineligible for resentencing on his attempted
murder conviction
Section 1172.6 relief is available only for defendants whose
convictions for attempted murder could have been based on the

10
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)
[“A person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition”];
People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865 [“[f]ollowing
the passage of [SB] 775 in 2022, it is now clear that defendants
. . . convicted of attempted murder are potentially eligible for
relief under section 1172.6 if the conviction could have been
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine”];
Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [section 1172.6,
subdivision (a)(1), “applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”].) Guerra is not such a defendant because the trial
court did not instruct Guerra’s jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (See Coley, at p. 548 [“The jurors in this
case were not instructed on [the natural and probable
consequences] doctrine. . . . The court was not required to grant
resentencing on this [attempted murder] count.”]; People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599 [“if the jury did not receive an
instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
the jury could not have convicted the defendant on that basis,
and the petition should be summarily denied”].)
Guerra argues that CALCRIM No. 601, the instruction on
attempted murder with deliberation and premeditation, does not
foreclose the possibility “that the jury necessarily made a finding
of intentional and premeditated killing . . . without recourse to a
theory of natural and probable consequences.” He specifically
points to the language in the instruction that states, “The
defendant and/or a principal acted willfully if he intended to kill
when he acted. . . . The attempted murder was done willfully
and with deliberation and premeditation if either the defendant or

11
a principal or both of them acted with that state of mind.”
(CALCRIM No. 601, italics added.) He contends the language in
the instruction referring to “defendant or a principal” (CALCRM
No. 601) “did not require a specific [intent] finding as to [Guerra]
at all.”
Guerra is incorrect. CALCRIM No. 601 is not an
instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The California Supreme Court held in People v. Lee (2003)
31 Cal.4th 613 that to be guilty of attempted willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder, the only requirement is “that the
murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”
(Id. at p. 621.) There is no requirement that “the attempted
murderer personally must have acted willfully and with
deliberation and premeditation.” (Id. at p. 622.) The court in Lee
“made clear its holding was based on direct aiding and abetting,
not the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v.
Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816, 824; see Lee, at p. 624.)
Thus, Lee is still controlling despite SB 1437’s amendments to the
murder law. (Rodriguez, at p. 824.)
Although the jury was not required to find that Guerra
personally premeditated and deliberated the attempted murder,
to find Guerra guilty of attempted murder, the jury was required
to find, and did find, that Guerra intended to kill. CALCRIM
No. 600 instructed the jury it had to find that “[t]he defendant
intended to kill” in order to convict him of attempted murder.
(CALCRIM No. 600, italics added.) Guerra’s jury would not have
even reached the issue of deliberation and premeditation in
CALCRIM No. 601 unless it first determined Guerra was guilty
of attempted murder, i.e., it determined he intended to kill. The
superior court thus correctly denied Guerra’s petition as to his

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attempted murder count.
2. Guerra is ineligible for resentencing on his first degree
murder conviction
Guerra is likewise ineligible for relief as to his murder
conviction because the jury instructions and verdict finding him
guilty of first degree murder foreclose the possibility that the jury
convicted him of murder based on any theory of imputed malice.
As noted, the trial court instructed the jury on only two theories
of liability for first degree murder: (1) direct perpetrator
(CALCRIM Nos. 520-521) and (2) direct aiding and abetting
(CALCRIM Nos. 400-401).
CALCRIM No. 401, the instruction on aiding and abetting,
required the jury to find the aider and abettor “kn[ew] of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and [that] he . . . specifically
intend[ed] to, and d[id] in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage,
or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” When
an aiding and abetting instruction includes such language, the
jury necessarily finds that the aider and abettor shares the
perpetrator’s specific intent. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1111, 1118 [the aider and abettor shares the specific intent of the
perpetrator “ ‘when the accomplice “knows the full extent of the
perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement
with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s
commission of the crime” ’ ”].)
In any event, CALCRIM No. 521, the instruction on first
degree murder, required the jury to find “[t]he defendant”
harbored an “inten[t] to kill.” Thus, whether the jury found
Guerra guilty as the direct perpetrator or the aider and abettor,
it necessarily found he harbored an intent to kill. “Because the
changes in [SB] 1437 to the natural and probable consequences

13
doctrine do not apply to those who act with malice in aiding and
abetting, the trial court’s denial of [a defendant’s] petition [is]
appropriate” where the jury necessarily found that he harbored
an intent to kill. (People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941,
946 (Estrada); see also People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,
848 [SB 1437 “does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting
liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder
must possess malice aforethought”]; People v. Lopez (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1248 [“An accomplice who directly aids and
abets the perpetrator in committing murder is liable for murder
[following SB 1437] just as he or she was liable” before its
enactment].)
Guerra points to two jury instructions that he claims
permitted the jury to convict him “on a discredited theory of
natural and probable consequences”: former CALCRIM Nos. 520
and 400. Neither of these instructions, considered independently
or combined, permitted the jury to convict Guerra on a now-
invalid theory of liability.
Starting with former CALCRIM No. 520, the instruction on
murder with malice aforethought, Guerra contends the
instruction allowed the jury to convict him on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine because it failed to tell the jury
that to be guilty of implied malice murder, the danger to human
life must “involve[] a high degree of probability that it would
result in death.” Relevant here, former CALCRIM No. 520
instructed jurors that “[t]he defendant acted with implied malice
if . . . . [¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act were dangerous
to human life.” Guerra contends “the jury was left free to
conclude that [his] driving, without more, was an act the natural
and probable consequences of which were the shooting of Gomez.”

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Guerra relies exclusively on Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981,
to support his argument. In Reyes, the defendant was convicted
of second degree murder after the jury was instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at p. 984.) The
superior court later denied his section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing after an evidentiary hearing, finding that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of implied malice
murder. (Reyes, at p. 984.) The California Supreme Court
concluded, in relevant part, that the trial court erred in denying
his petition because there was no substantial evidence to support
a finding that the defendant was the direct perpetrator of the
implied malice murder. (Id. at p. 992.) It held that “[t]o suffice
for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely
be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must
‘ “involve[ ] a high degree of probability that it will result in
death.” ’ ”5 (Id. at p. 989.)
Guerra’s reliance on Reyes is misplaced. “Reyes’s holding
requiring a ‘high degree of probability’ of death applies only to
implied malice murder.” (People v. Fleming (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 390, 396 [holding Reyes was inapplicable to
voluntary manslaughter conviction].) Here, the jury convicted
Guerra of first degree murder, not implied malice murder. As

5 After the court’s decision in Reyes, the Judicial Council
modified CALCRIM No. 520 to state in relevant part: “The
natural and probable consequences of the (act/ [or] failure to act)
were dangerous to human life in that the (act/ [or] failure to act)
involved a high degree of probability that it would result in
death.” (CALCRIM No. 520, italics added; see People v. Collins
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 306, fn. 3.)

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discussed, CALCRIM No. 521, the instruction on first degree
murder, required the jury to find Guerra had the “inten[t] to kill,”
which, as explained in former CALCRIM No. 520, is the
definition of express malice. (Former CALCRIM No. 520 [“The
defendant acted with express malice if he unlawfully intended to
kill”]; CALCRIM No. 521.) Thus, even though the jury was
instructed on implied malice murder under CALCRIM No. 520,
by returning a guilty verdict on first degree murder, the jury
necessarily found Guerra harbored express malice. Reyes is thus
inapplicable.
Turning to former CALCRIM No. 400, the instruction on
the general principles of aiding and abetting, Guerra claims the
last paragraph of the instruction allowed the jury to convict him
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The last
paragraph stated, “Under some specific circumstances, if the
evidence establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person
may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the
commission of the first crime.” Guerra argues the jury
instruction allowed the jury to convict Guerra of murder by
finding he “aided and abetted . . . in some form of criminal
conduct,” such as “assault, threats, or disturbing the peace,” “the
natural and probable consequences of which was the resulting
murder of Gomez.” In Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 941, our
colleagues in Division Eight rejected the same argument. (See id.
at pp. 946-949; accord, People v. Rushing (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
1025, 1031-1032.)
In Estrada, the defendant appealed from an order denying
his section 1172.6 petition as to his first degree murder
conviction. (Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 943.) The trial
court instructed the jury with the same last paragraph in former

16
CALCRIM No. 400. (Estrada, at p. 946.) Estrada concluded that
language was not “sufficient to find that the jury was instructed
on a natural and probable consequences theory.” (Id. at p. 947.)
To reach its conclusion, Estrada reviewed the bench notes for the
instruction, which provided that the trial court “should . . .
instruct with the last . . . paragraph” “[i]f the prosecution is . . .
relying on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
(Former CALCRIM No. 400, bench notes; see Estrada, at p. 946.)
The bench notes state that if the prosecution’s theory relies on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “CALCRIM
No. 402 or 403 should also be given.”6 (Former CALCRIM
No. 400 bench notes; see Estrada, at p. 947.)
The trial court in Estrada did not instruct the jury on
CALCRIM Nos. 402 or 403. (Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 947.) Only CALCRIM No. 401, regarding aiding and abetting
liability, was given to the jury. (Estrada, at p. 947.) The
prosecutor also did not rely on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine during closing argument. (Id. at pp. 948-
949.) Instead, the prosecutor “argued that [the defendant]
intended to commit the charged offenses.” (Id. at p. 948.)
Therefore, “given that the jury instructions, taken as a whole,
required the jury to find that [the defendant] acted with intent to
kill in order to find him guilty of first degree murder, even under
an aider and abettor theory,” the Court of Appeal did “not find
that the bracketed language alone [wa]s sufficient to find that the

6 CALCRIM No. 402 instructs on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine when the target and non-target offenses
are charged. CALCRIM No. 403 instructs on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine when only the non-target offenses
are charged.

17
jury was instructed on a natural and probable consequences
theory.” (Id. at p. 947.)
Estrada is directly on point, and we agree with its holding.
As in Estrada, the trial court here did not instruct the jury with
CALCRIM Nos. 402 or 403. (See Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at p. 947.) Further, the prosecutor argued Guerra was guilty as a
direct aider and abettor who harbored an intent to kill. (See id.
at p. 948.) While the last paragraph in former CALCRIM No. 400
referred to “other crimes,” the only crimes charged were murder
and attempted murder, and, for those crimes, the defendant had
to have an “inten[t] to kill.” (CALCRIM Nos. 521, 600.) Nor did
the prosecutor argue at any point that Guerra intended to
commit a non-charged target offense. The jury would have had
no basis to believe that it could find Guerra guilty as an aider
and abettor based on his commission of some unspecified non-
charged offense. (See Estrada, at pp. 946-949; People v. Rushing,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1031-1032 [the last paragraph of
CALCRIM No. 400 “was not a self-contained instruction on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine”; although it
“informed the jury of the possibility that a person may be found
guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the
crime that he or she originally aided and abetted[,] it did not
discuss the specific circumstances under which this may occur”].)7

7 Guerra contends in one paragraph at the end of his opening
brief that the absence of a pinpoint instruction on duress further
demonstrates that the jury may have convicted him based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Guerra does not
explain the connection between the defense of duress and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine in his case, and we
fail to see any.

18
Therefore, the superior court properly determined Guerra was
ineligible as a matter of law for resentencing under section
1172.6.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Guerra’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

19

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