CourtListener 10692096•People v. Rodriguez CA2/7
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Filed 10/7/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337890
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA143381)
v.
ANTHONY LAWRENCE
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven M. Vasil, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kristen Inberg and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Anthony Lawrence Rodriguez appeals from a judgment
after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder, attempted
deliberate and premeditated murder, possession of a firearm by a
felon, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. The trial court
sentenced him as a second strike offender to a total prison term
of 89 years to life under the “Three Strikes” law. Rodriguez does
not challenge his convictions; instead, he challenges his
sentencing, contending the court abused its discretion by denying
his motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and
Penal Code1 section 1385. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial and the Jury Verdicts
On June 10, 2016, Rodriguez, a member of the Florencia 13
gang, rode on the back of a motorbike to rival gang territory. He
stopped in front of a house where people were gathered outside
for a birthday party. Rodriguez fired three shots into the crowd.
One bullet struck Eddie Hernandez in the forehead, killing him.
Another bullet struck Carlos D.2 in the upper leg.
A jury found Rodriguez guilty of first degree murder of
Hernandez (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), attempted deliberate and
premeditated murder of Carlos (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2),
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3),
and shooting at an occupied dwelling (§ 264; count 4). As to
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We refer to the surviving victim by his first name and last
initial to protect his privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
counts 1, 2, and 4, the jury found true several firearm
enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). As to counts 3 and 4,
the jury found true that Rodriguez engaged in violent conduct
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1)).
Rodriguez waived his right to a jury trial on a prior
conviction allegation, and the court found true that Rodriguez
was convicted of first degree burglary in 2012. The court
concluded this prior conviction constituted a prior “strike,” i.e., a
serious or violent felony subject to the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
B. Rodriguez’s Romero Motion and Sentencing
Before sentencing, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss his
prior strike conviction under Romero and section 1385. He
argued the court should treat him as though he had not
previously been convicted of a prior strike because his present
offenses were “not an act of violence against the general public,”
“none of [his] prior convictions involve[d] acts of violence,” and he
“c[ame] from [a] difficult background.” He attached a
psychological evaluation, which reported Rodriguez “was raised
in a dysfunctional home environment” and “was involved with
[the Department of Child and Family Services] from a young
age.” The psychologist concluded that Rodriguez’s “dysfunctional
background negatively affected his upbringing” and should “be
taken into consideration.”
According to the probation report, Rodriguez had a
sustained juvenile petition for vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594) in
2003. He also had the following prior convictions in addition to
the 2012 burglary: felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594) in 2009;
felony possession of a controlled substance while armed with a
3
firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)) in 2010; three
convictions for misdemeanor contempt of court (Pen. Code, § 166)
in 2012, 2013, and 2016; misdemeanor receiving stolen property
(Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)) in 2016; and misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377, subd. (a)) in 2016.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the court
to consider that Rodriguez “was 25 [years old] at the time of this
offense,” “[a]lmost all of his prior convictions were
misdemeanors,” and “[h]e had an awful childhood.” The People
argued that “while [Rodriguez] was 25 years old, his prior
criminal history shows an escalating tendency towards violence,”
and his current offenses showed a “likelihood of re-offending and
the dangerousness to society.”
The court denied Rodriguez’s Romero motion, stating that
it considered that “[Rodriguez’s] home life was . . . to some extent,
tragic.” The court also considered that Rodriguez committed the
strike prior in 2012, “four years before he committed [the present
offenses].” The court found the time between Rodriguez’s strike
prior and present offenses to be “a very short period of time,”
which indicated Rodriguez “did not learn and instead escalated
his crime.”
The court ultimately ruled as follows: “I recognize that I do
have the discretion to strike the prior, and I have considered
whether or not it would be in the interest of justice to strike the
prior. I find that . . . dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety. At this time, I do not strike the strike
prior that is alleged.”
The court sentenced Rodriguez to a total prison term of 89
years to life. For count 1, the court imposed 25 years to life,
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doubled to 50 years to life under the Three Strikes law
(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), plus 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). For count
2, the court imposed a consecutive term of life, with a minimum
parole eligibility of seven years, doubled to 14 years under the
Three Strikes law (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). For counts 3 and 4,
the court imposed and stayed, under section 654, the middle
terms of two and five years, respectively.3
Rodriguez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Legal Principles
“A trial court’s authority under section 1385, subdivision
(a), to dismiss ‘an action’ includes the authority to dismiss
allegations of prior serious or violent convictions (i.e., prior
strikes) in the furtherance of justice, considering ‘ “ ‘both . . . the
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society
represented by the People . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ortiz (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1093; see People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 158 (Williams); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 530.) To determine whether to strike a prior conviction, the
trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
3 The court also stayed the remaining firearm enhancements
and struck a prior serious felony enhancement under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1).
5
the [Three Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence
should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Williams, at
p. 161; accord, People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 257.)
“[A] court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction
allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
374 (Carmony); accord, Dain, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 257-258.)
“ ‘ “ ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ”
(Carmony, at pp. 376-377.) Because the Three Strikes law
“creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to
[the law’s] sentencing norms is both rational and proper,” a trial
court will only abuse its discretion in limited circumstances, such
as where the court is unaware of its discretion to strike a prior
conviction, considers impermissible factors, or imposition of a
Three Strikes sentence would produce an arbitrary or absurd
result. (Id. at p. 378; see People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
1134, 1140-1141.) We may find such abuse of discretion only in
“extraordinary” circumstances. (Carmony, at p. 378; see People v.
Finney (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1040.)
B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining To
Strike Rodriguez’s Prior Strike Conviction
Rodriguez contends the court misunderstood the scope of
its discretion in ruling on the Romero motion and otherwise
abused its discretion in various ways. We reject his arguments.4
4 Even though Rodriguez raises arguments that his trial
counsel failed to raise at sentencing, we exercise our discretion to
6
Rodriguez has failed to meet his heavy burden of showing the
trial court’s denial of his Romero motion was “so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.”
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
Rodriguez argues the court misunderstood its discretion
because it mistakenly referred to the strike as an “enhancement.”
The court indeed misspoke when it stated, “I find that . . .
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
(Italics added.) “It is . . . well established that the Three Strikes
law is not an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing
scheme for the current offense.” (People v. Burke (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243.) However, the court’s single “use of less
than artful language cannot be equated with having applied the
wrong standard.” (People v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1272,
1276.)
Rodriguez also fails to demonstrate that the court was
unaware of its discretion to strike his prior strike offense. The
court explicitly acknowledged that Rodriguez presented it with “a
Romero motion to strike the strike” under “section 1385.” The
court also properly “recognize[d]” that it had “the discretion to
strike the prior . . . in the interest of justice.” (See Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th at pp. 530-531 [court has power to dismiss prior strike
“in furtherance of justice”].) Further, the court declined to “strike
the strike prior” after considering several permissible factors,
including Rodriguez’s “home life,” the time between Rodriguez’s
strike and present offenses, and public safety concerns. (See
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161 [court must consider
consider the merits of his contentions and thus need not discuss
Rodriguez’s associated claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
(See People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1014.)
7
defendant’s “background” and “circumstances of his present
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions”].)
Nothing in the record suggests that the court misunderstood its
discretion.5
Rodriguez contends the court’s finding that dismissal of the
strike prior would “endanger public safety” was not supported by
substantial evidence because there is “no evidence” Rodriguez
will continue to pose a danger in the future. We disagree.
Rodriguez’s present offenses were especially violent: he fired
three shots into a crowd of people, killing one person and
seriously injuring another. The court was entitled to conclude
that Rodriguez’s commission of such wanton and indiscriminate
acts suggested a grave risk to the public warranting imposition of
a Three Strikes sentence. (See In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524,
560 [“a trial court’s factual determinations with regard to the
nature and circumstances of a defendant’s triggering [i.e.,
present] offense may play a significant role in determining the
sentence that is actually imposed upon the defendant under the
Three Strikes law”].)
Besides the violent nature of his current offenses,
Rodriguez’s steady engagement in criminal activity, commencing
as a juvenile, also supported the denial of his motion to strike.
(See Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [defendant’s
5 Rodriguez also contends the court misunderstood its
discretion because it focused solely on public safety “to the
exclusion of other factors.” That is not our view of the record. As
noted, the court considered multiple factors. The fact that the
court mentioned public safety concerns in its ruling does not
mean that it considered only that factor.
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continuous criminal history showed he “ ‘had failed or refused to
learn his lesson’ ”].) And, as the trial court correctly noted,
Rodriguez committed his prior strike for first degree burglary
only a few years before his present offenses, indicating Rodriguez
“did not learn and instead escalated his crime.” Rodriguez’s
criminal history thus demonstrated he was “ ‘an exemplar of the
“revolving door” career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is
addressed.’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 379.)6
We are also unpersuaded by Rodriguez’s remaining
argument that the court failed to consider his youth. At
sentencing, Rodriguez’s defense counsel asked the court to
consider that he was 25 years old at the time he committed the
present offenses. On appeal, Rodriguez also asserts the court
should have considered that he was only 21 when he committed
the prior strike offense. Rodriguez relies on People v. Avila,
6 Rodriguez also contends that substantial evidence did not
support the court’s public safety finding because if the court
dismissed the strike, Rodriguez would have been entitled to a
parole hearing after serving 25 years and “would only be granted
parole if he persuaded both the Board of Parole Hearings and the
governor that he did not present a risk of danger to society.”
While “a defendant’s sentence is . . . a relevant consideration
when deciding whether to strike a prior conviction allegation” in
order to avoid unjust sentences (People v. Garcia (1999)
20 Cal.4th 490, 500), the fact that Rodriguez, as he argues, will
“only be released on parole if he establishe[s] he [does] not pose a
risk of danger to society,” is not dispositive. The trial court must
make its own determination as to whether striking a prior
serious and/or violent felony conviction is in furtherance of
justice. (See Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) It is not
permitted to delegate its judgment to the Board of Parole
Hearings or the governor.
9
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at page 1142, in which the court held a
defendant’s “age when he committed his strikes, even if not
dispositive, is plainly relevant to the nature and circumstances of
the strikes and could be a mitigating factor.” Avila is
distinguishable because there the trial court “mistakenly believed
that it could not consider” the defendant’s youth at the time of
the prior strike (id. at p. 1142), while the trial court here in no
way suggested it did not believe it had discretion to consider
Rodriguez’s age.
Although the trial court here did not explicitly consider
Rodriguez’s age, “ ‘[e]rror may not be presumed from a silent
record. [Citation.] “ ‘[A] trial court is presumed to have been
aware of and followed the applicable law.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Czirban
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1097; accord, Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378 [“Where the record is silent” in a case
involving a Romero motion, the court is presumed to have
correctly applied the law]; see In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538,
550 [“While a court must explain its reasons for striking a prior
[citations], no similar requirement applies when a court declines
to strike a prior.”].) Nothing in the record suggests that the court
failed to consider Rodriguez’s youth or denied his Romero motion
upon some mistaken view of the relevant facts. Therefore, the
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike
Rodriguez’s prior strike conviction.
///
///
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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