Sanchez v. Candyland Amusements CA2/8

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Filed 10/7/25 Sanchez v. Candyland Amusements CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

OSCAR REYES SANCHEZ, B330505

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV20583
v.

CANDYLAND AMUSEMENTS,
Inc., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Intervener and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Kerry Bensinger, Judge. Reversed.
Gusdorff Law, Janet Gusdorff; Sottile Baltaxe, Michael F.
Baltaxe, Timothy B. Sottile, Nicole C. Burgos Romero; Law Offices of
Steven Wolfson and Steve Wolfson for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Clark Hill, David L. Brandon, Penelope M. Deihl, and Sania
Sharma for Defendants and Respondents and Intervener and
Respondent.
_______________________
INTRODUCTION
Oscar Reyes Sanchez broke his arm while riding down a
slide with his children at a church fair. Sanchez sued Candyland
Amusements, Inc., Resurrection Catholic Church, the
Archdiocese of Los Angeles and Archbishop Jose Horacio Gomez
for injuries he sustained on the ride. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants. We find a triable
issue of material fact on the issue of causation and reverse the
judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Oscar Reyes Sanchez has two children with Maria Luiza
Perez. On June 1, 2018, Sanchez and his family attended a
carnival at Resurrection Catholic Church. One of the attractions
at the carnival was a Super Slide. The Super Slide was not
owned or operated by Resurrection Catholic Church or the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles. It was operated by
Candyland Amusements, Inc. Participants rode down the Super
Slide on burlap sacks placed by an operator.
Sanchez rode the Super Slide with his two children, Jocelyn
and Emanuel. Perez watched from the ground. The operator
placed a mat for Jocelyn in the middle lane and one for Sanchez
in the right lane. The mat was similar to a gunnysack made of
hemp or jute fabric. Sanchez sat down, and the operator placed
2-year-old son Emanuel on Sanchez’s lap. Jocelyn went down the
slide. Sanchez followed, sliding down “pretty fast.” At a little
past the midpoint of the ride, “I just remember that my—the
sack got caught, and it got stuck. And my feet were tangled up,
and I fell.” Sanchez was holding on to his son with his arms
wrapped around him. When asked how he knew the mat was

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“stuck,” Sanchez replied, “I just felt it. I felt it get stuck, and it
tangled my feet up.” Sanchez and his son were propelled forward
while still seated. At the bottom of the slide, Sanchez landed on
his side and broke his arm. He does not remember how he fell.
He was given no instructions by the operators about the mat or
the slide before the incident occurred.
Sanchez underwent elbow surgery and participated in
physical therapy for over a year. He has five screws and a metal
plate in his right arm. He does not have full range of motion in
the right arm at the elbow. Future orthopedic surgery on the
right elbow is possible. He lost over $93,000 in wages from his
two jobs as cook and waiter. He was off work for 18 months. He
can now work only part time because he cannot use his right arm
for more than four hours without experiencing pain.
Sanchez does not know what the mat stuck on, if anything.
Sanchez did not inspect the slide or mat after he fell. Perez did
not see the actual event and does not know what caused him to
fall. Her son scraped his forehead and knee in the fall and was
crying loudly.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sanchez and Perez, filed an action asserting general
negligence, premises liability, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The action was filed against four parties:
1) Candyland Amusements, Inc. (Candyland), the operator of the
slide; 2) Resurrection Catholic Church (Resurrection), the host of
the fair; 3) the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles
(RCALA), erroneously sued as Archdiocese of Los Angeles; and
4) Archbishop Jose Horacio Gomez. Archbishop Gomez was later
dismissed from the case. Ace American Insurance Company

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(Ace), which provides insurance for Candyland, intervened on
behalf defendant Candyland in the action.
Defendants Ace, Resurrection, and RCALA filed a motion
for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, summary
adjudication. They argued Sanchez failed to prove causation, and
his claims were barred by primary assumption of risk. They also
asserted that Perez’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress was barred because she and Sanchez were not married at
the time of the injury.
On November 26, 2022, the trial court found defendants
had not carried their burden to establish their affirmative
defense of primary assumption of the risk.
Relying on Buehler v. Alpha Beta Co. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d
729 (Buehler), the trial court also held Sanchez cannot establish
causation because he does not know what caused his fall. The
trial court found his claim of causation speculative. Sanchez
failed to establish a connection between the mat becoming stuck
and the speed of descent. Further, Sanchez did not show that
defendants’ failure to post a height restriction caused his injury.
Sanchez did not provide evidence supporting his contention that
he would have been able to slow his descent with his hands if his
son had not been in his lap.
Finally, the trial court granted summary adjudication in
favor of defendants as to Perez’s claim of bystander negligent
infliction of emotional distress because Sanchez and Perez were
not married at the time of the injury. On appeal Sanchez does
not contest this last ground for granting summary judgment.

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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review
the trial court’s decision de novo, liberally construing the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and
resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) We
affirm on any ground supported by the record regardless of the
grounds relied upon by the trial court. (Becerra v. County of
Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.) A motion for
summary judgment or summary adjudication must be granted “if
all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (c).)
“We therefore ‘take the facts from the record that was before the
trial court when it ruled on that motion.’ ” (Gonzalez v. Mathis
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39.) To prevail on a motion for summary
judgment, a moving defendant may prove an affirmative defense,
disprove at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of
action or show that an element of the cause of action cannot be
established. (Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996)
47 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1465.)
Causation is ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be
resolved by summary judgment. The issue of causation may be
decided as a question of law only if, under undisputed facts, there
is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion. (Kurinij v.
Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 864.) As the trial
court pointed out, causation must be established by
nonspeculative evidence. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001)
25 Cal.4th 763, 774.)

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The elements of a cause of action for negligence and
premises liability are the same. A plaintiff must prove a legal
duty to use care, breach of that legal duty, and a breach that is a
proximate cause of injury. (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
1200, 1207.) The parties dispute whether Sanchez demonstrated
a triable issue of material fact as to causation. Generally, the
burden falls on the plaintiff to establish causation. (Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588, 597.) The plaintiff
must establish causation by showing defendants’ negligence is a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury. (Rutherford v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968–969.)
II. A Triable Issue of Material Fact As to Causation
Sanchez argues the condition of the mat led to it getting
stuck and causing his fall. He claims a jury would find
defendants’ negligence proximately caused his injuries based on
the poor condition of the mat and his own testimony that he felt
the mat snag.
Sanchez explained the mat was in “poor condition,” and
contends this condition caused the injury. In his response to
Resurrection’s interrogatories, he said, “[t]he so-called ‘mat’ was
not much of a ‘mat’ at all, but rather similar to a gunnysack made
of hemp or jute fabric.” Sanchez further stated the mat was
“worn-out.” Lay witnesses are allowed to offer opinions based on
their perceptions if they are helpful to a clear understanding of
the testimony. (Evid. Code § 800, subd. (b); Kaney v. Custance
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 217 (Kaney) [if causation presents a
question that is within the common knowledge of persons of
ordinary education, then expert testimony is not required].)
Sanchez described the incident in his deposition: “Q. Okay.
And then can you describe how the accident took place? [¶] A. My

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daughter went first, and I followed. I was protecting my son.
And we were sliding down pretty fast. And I just remember that
my—the sack got caught, and it got stuck. And my feet were
tangled up, and I fell.” Sanchez stated he felt a snag and argues
a mat in safe condition for passage would not snag unless there
was an issue with the mat or with the slide. In his deposition,
Sanchez admitted he did not look at the mat after falling: “Q. Did
you ever look at the mat to see if it was ripped or torn from being
stuck on something? [¶] A. No.” Sanchez does not dispute that he
does not know what the mat stuck on. He also does not dispute
that he did not inspect the slide or mat after he fell.
Causation may be inferred. “[T]he plaintiff may use
circumstantial evidence to satisfy his or her burden [and] the
plaintiff need not prove causation with absolute certainty.
Rather, the plaintiff need only ‘ “introduce evidence which affords
a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than
not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the
result.” ’ ” (Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1242–1243.)
Sanchez felt the mat snag. This is a reasonable basis to conclude
there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the
condition of the mat and/or the slide itself caused the snag which
resulted in Sanchez’s fall. That Sanchez does not remember more
about the fall does not mean that he lacked nonspeculative
evidence of causation. “A slip-and-fall plaintiff need not
remember [the] fall to recover damages provided the evidence
gives rise to a reasonable and probable inference that the
defendant’s negligence was a substantial contributing factor.”
(Kaney, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 217.)

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Sanchez correctly distinguishes Buehler, where the plaintiff
fell in a grocery store and could not point to anything that may
have caused the fall, although she alleged the floor may have
been too slippery or improperly waxed. (Buehler, supra,
224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 733–734) But the plaintiff failed to offer
evidence other than her speculation. (Ibid.) Indeed, she had no
idea what caused her to fall. There was no foreign debris of any
type on the floor prior to her fall, and the plaintiff candidly
admitted that just before the fall she had not slipped or had any
difficulty keeping her footing. The court found it was pure
“conjecture” that the floor might have been too slippery at the
location where the plaintiff fell. (Id. at p. 734.) It therefore
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the grocery store.
(Id. at p. 735; see also Peralta v. The Vons Companies, Inc. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1035 [summary judgment for defendant
affirmed where plaintiff unequivocally stated she did not see
anything on the floor prior to or after her fall].)
Unlike in Buehler, Sanchez does not contend that he looked
at the slide and did not see anything. Instead, Sanchez offered
nonspeculative evidence: he testified that he felt the mat snag—a
physical sensation—and that testimony is sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact about what caused the fall and subsequent
injury.1

1 Sanchez’s second contention establishing causation is based
on the lack of height restrictions displayed near the slide. The
trial court refused to take judicial notice of photographs from
Candyland’s website showing a 42-inch height requirement.
Sanchez does not appeal the court’s evidentiary ruling.
Therefore, there is no admissible evidence in this record about a

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On a final causation note, Sanchez asks us to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the accident and injuries he
suffered. “The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three conditions:
‘(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by
an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” (Ybarra v.
Spangard (1944) 25 Cal.2d 486, 489.)
The trial court made no ruling as to whether res ipsa
loquitur applies to the alleged facts and we see no reason to do so
now. Our holding that a triable issue of material fact exists as to
the cause of the accident also makes it unnecessary for us to
reach the issue.
III. Primary Assumption of the Risk Doctrine
Respondents argue that they were protected by the primary
assumption of the risk doctrine and that the trial court erred in
rejecting that defense. “The primary assumption of risk doctrine
rests on a straightforward policy foundation: the need to avoid
chilling vigorous participation in or sponsorship of recreational
activities by imposing a tort duty to eliminate or reduce the risks
of harm inherent in those activities.” (Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P.
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 1148, 1156.) Where the doctrine applies to a
recreational activity, operators, instructors and participants in
the activity owe other participants the duty not to act so as to
increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity. (Id.

height requirement or about Sanchez’s own height. Thus, he fails
to establish evidence of causation on the height issue.

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at p. 1154.) However, “owners and operators of sports venues
and other recreational activities have an additional duty to
undertake reasonable steps or measures to protect their
customers’ or spectators’ safety—if they can do so without
altering the nature of the sport of the activity. (Mayes v. La
Sierra University (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 686, 698.) “As a general
rule, where an operator can take a measure that would increase
safety and minimize the risks of the activity without altering the
nature of the activity, the operator is required to do so.” (Grotheer
v. Escape Adventures, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1283, 1300.)
Here, the trial court found that respondents had proffered
no evidence whatsoever to show that there were no reasonable
steps that could have minimized the risk of falling forward and
off the slide. Instead, respondents’ position was (and is) that the
height and speed of the ride cannot be altered without
eliminating its thrill. As the trial court found, this “misconstrues
[Sanchez’s] injury which was sustained when he fell forward on
the slide after being caught on something midway and becoming
tangled up.” We agree with the trial court that for purposes of
summary judgment respondents failed to carry their burden of
showing there were no reasonable steps available to protect
against the risk of entanglement and resulting injury while
riding the slide.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Appellant shall recover his costs
on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

VIRAMONTES, J.

RUBIN, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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