CourtListener 10691528•In re Cheyenne P. CA2/3
Full text
Filed 10/6/25 In re Cheyenne P. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re CHEYENNE P., et al., Persons B344182
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No. 24LJJP00309A-
FAMILY SERVICES, B)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MELISSA P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Donald A. Buddle, Judge. Affirmed.
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Melissa P. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders
sustaining the allegations of a dependency petition, removing
mother’s children from her custody, and denying mother’s request
for unmonitored visitation. Mother contends the trial court erred
by entering the challenged orders because by the time of the
jurisdiction and disposition hearings, mother had fully alleviated
the conditions that brought the family before the juvenile court,
and the children were not at risk of harm. We find no error, and
thus we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Investigation and detention.
Mother and Robert B. (father) are the parents of Cheyenne
P. (born in November 2018) and Sierra P. (born in November
2019). Mother has a lengthy criminal history, including four
convictions in 2019 and 2020 for possession of controlled
substances, and a 2024 conviction for possession of a stolen
vehicle. Father also has a lengthy criminal history, including for
possession of controlled substances and spousal battery, and he
was incarcerated when this case began. The family has been
reported many times to the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS), including in 2018 and
2019, when DCFS received two reports that mother’s home was
unsanitary and unsafe.
2
In July 2024,1 DCFS received a report that mother used
drugs and left drugs and drug paraphernalia in the children’s
reach. A social worker attempted three times to visit the home,
but the home was inaccessible because it was surrounded by a
gate and debris. The social worker tried to reach mother by
telephone and sent her a certified letter, to which mother did not
respond. On the social worker’s fourth visit to the home on
August 6, the social worker was able to speak to mother and the
children outside of the home, but mother would not allow a home
assessment that day and refused to drug test. Mother asked the
social worker to come back to assess the home on August 23. On
August 23, mother called the social worker and asked to
reschedule the home assessment for August 27, and on
August 27, mother called the social worker to say that she was
not home and needed to reschedule the home assessment again.
The social worker told mother she was trying to work with her,
but that if mother did not cooperate voluntarily, DCFS would
obtain a court order to search the house.
The social worker visited the home again on September 5
and 17 but did not see mother or gain entrance to the home, and
she attempted unsuccessfully to reach mother by phone and text
on September 13. Mother finally responded to the social worker’s
text on September 18, stating that she would not allow a home
assessment because the social worker was “being not flexible and
[was] inconsiderate of my life.”
The social worker obtained an investigative search
warrant, and law enforcement and two social workers executed
the warrant on September 26. The social workers reported that
1 All subsequent dates are in 2024 unless otherwise
indicated.
3
three adults were in the home when the warrant was executed,
including a woman who said she rented a room from mother.
One of the women had a warrant for her arrest, but said she
provided childcare for mother. There were three dogs in the
home, and what appeared to be animal feces were smeared on the
home’s front door and on the stairs. In the children’s bedroom,
there were fresh animal feces on the children’s clothes, as well as
feces and urine on the floor next to the children’s clothes and
shoes. In another bedroom, there was a syringe on a nightstand
and circular saws with the blades exposed on the floor. The
bathroom closest to the children’s bedroom was gutted and filled
with hazardous tools, and another bathroom was also gutted,
with wood and drywall exposed. The home’s den contained drug
paraphernalia, including cut straws, single burner stoves, and
spoons, and it smelled of fresh smoke. There was marijuana and
alcohol near the garage in areas accessible to the children.
DCFS filed a juvenile dependency petition in September
alleging that the family home was unsanitary and hazardous
(count b-1), and that mother left drugs and drug paraphernalia
within the children’s reach (count b-2). On October 1, the
juvenile court ordered the children detained from mother, issued
an arrest warrant for mother, and issued protective custody
warrants for the children. The children were detained at school
on October 3 and placed in foster care.
Cheyenne’s teacher said Cheyenne had been coming to
school disheveled and dirty. The children’s bus driver reported
that the children were dropped off and picked up by different
people each day.
On October 15, mother’s counsel requested that mother’s
home be reassessed and the children be released to mother.
4
Alternatively, counsel requested that mother be permitted
unmonitored visits with the children in a public place. Counsel
reported that the animal feces referenced in the detention report
were from a roommate’s dogs, which were no longer in the home,
and that mother had cleaned up the home and yard. Counsel for
the children and for DCFS asked that the children remain
detained and mother’s visits with the children be monitored
based on the home’s inhabitability and the presence of drug
paraphernalia.
The court ordered the children detained from both parents
and placed in foster care. Mother was permitted monitored
visits.
DCFS conducted a subsequent assessment of the home on
October 17. The social worker observed that the home was much
less hazardous than it had been during the initial walkthrough:
The children’s room was clean and free of obvious hazards;
mother had begun removing unnecessary objects from the yard;
the home’s entrance was unobstructed; and mother reported that
her roommates had moved out. However, there were still many
inoperable cars and appliances in the front yard, only one
bathroom was operable, and two dogs were lounging in front of
the home.
On November 13, DCFS filed a first amended petition
adding allegations that father had failed to protect the children
from mother (counts b-1 and b-2), had lengthy criminal and drug
histories (count b-3), and had engaged in domestic violence with
mother (count b-4).
On November 15, the juvenile court ordered the children
placed with the paternal grandmother.
5
II. Jurisdiction and disposition hearings.
At the jurisdiction hearing on January 8, 2025, mother’s
counsel asked the court to strike the b-1 and b-2 counts because
mother had cleaned and decluttered the home, and to strike the
b-4 count because mother and father had ended their relationship
and mother had obtained a protective order. DCFS asked the
court to sustain the petition as pled; while DCFS conceded that
mother had made progress in alleviating some of the concerns
alleged in the petition, it noted that it had previously received
reports that mother was not maintaining a safe home for the
children, and “these are really symptoms of a larger issue that
still needs to be addressed.” The children’s counsel asked the
court to sustain the b-1, b-2, and b-3 counts.
After hearing argument, the court sustained counts b-1
(unsanitary home)2 and b-3 (father’s criminal and substance
abuse history), and it dismissed counts b-2 (drug paraphernalia
accessible to children) and b-4 (domestic violence between
parents). The court then continued the disposition hearing to the
following month.
On January 31, 2025, DCFS reported that mother had been
arrested for an unspecified felony charge on January 4, 2025, and
had tested positive for methamphetamines on January 14, 2025.
Mother had visited the children inconsistently, frequently failing
to show up to visits without any prior notice. DCFS thus
recommended that mother be required to complete an outpatient
drug program, drug test on demand, and complete a parenting
2 The court struck the allegations that father had failed to
protect the children from the unsanitary home.
6
class, a support group for domestic violence victims, and
individual counseling.
At the February 2025 disposition hearing, mother
requested that the children be released to her or that she be
allowed unmonitored visits. She further requested that she not
be required to enroll in drug and parenting programs, but instead
be allowed to address drug and parenting issues through
individual counseling. Mother contended that she had tested
negative for drugs many times and had tested positive for
methamphetamines only because she had taken prescription
pseudoephedrine to treat a cold. DCFS disagreed, urging that
the issues that brought the case to its attention had not been
resolved. DCFS argued: “The circumstances in which the minors
were living were a symptom and not the actual problem
necessarily. . . . The condition of the home as well as what was
contained in the home, certainly lent itself to the idea that there
is a drug issue . . . within this family. [¶] [Further,] mother’s
explanation for her dirty test results [is not supported by] any
evidence . . . . It wasn’t provided to the Department at the time
of her results. And given the sustained petition, it’s not
surprising that we have these continued results. And what’s
probably even more concerning is that we have them during the
supervision of this case and the pendency of the disposition.”
The children’s counsel joined DCFS’s recommendations.
Counsel noted that the children were very young, and he urged
that while DCFS should have discretion to liberalize mother’s
visits, he believed visits should remain monitored at the present.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence
that there was a substantial danger to the children’s safety in the
parents’ care, and there were no reasonable means to protect
7
them without removal. The court therefore ordered the children
removed from both parents and ordered mother to complete a full
drug program, a domestic violence support group for victims,
individual counseling, and a parenting class. Mother was
granted nine hours of monitored visits with the children weekly.
Mother timely appealed from the jurisdiction and
disposition orders.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, mother contends that substantial evidence did
not support the finding that she maintained an unsanitary home,
and the juvenile court abused its discretion by removing the
children from her custody and restricting her to monitored visits.
Mother’s contentions lack merit, as we discuss.
I. The jurisdictional findings regarding mother’s
unsanitary home were supported by substantial
evidence.
Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(A) provides that a child is within the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction if, among other things, “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he failure or
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child.”
In deciding whether there is a substantial risk of serious
physical harm within the meaning of section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), courts evaluate the risk at the time of the
3 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
8
jurisdiction hearing. “ ‘The basic question under section 300 is
whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the
minor to the defined risk of harm.’ ” (In re J.N. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) Jurisdiction may not be based on
past endangering conduct in the absence of evidence that such
conduct is likely to reoccur. (In re C.V. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
566, 572.) However, “the court need not wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction” and may
“consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs
the court’s protection.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591,
602.) A parent’s “ ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current
conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will
continue.’ ” (Ibid.; see also In re Ma.V. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11,
23 [there must be some reason to believe acts creating a risk of
harm to the child will continue in the future]; In re J.N. (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775 [there must be “a nexus between the
parent’s past conduct and the current risk of harm”].)
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. “ ‘ “In making this determination, we draw
all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record
in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
We note as an initial matter that although mother has not
challenged all of the jurisdictional findings, her challenge to the
juvenile court’s true finding as to count b-2 of the petition is
9
justiciable. An appeal of one of several jurisdictional findings is
justiciable if it “affects parental custody rights [citation], curtails
a parent’s contact with his or her child [citation], or ‘has resulted
in [dispositional] orders which continue to adversely affect’ a
parent.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 278.) Here, mother’s
challenge to the juvenile court’s finding that the condition of the
home placed the children at risk of harm is justiciable because it
was the basis for the juvenile court’s disposition order removing
the children from mother’s custody and denying mother’s request
for unmonitored visitation.
On the merits, mother contends that the juvenile court
erred by sustaining count b-1 of the petition because although the
family home admittedly had been unsanitary and unsafe prior to
DCFS’s intervention, mother had rectified the problems by the
time of the January 2025 disposition hearing. Not so. While the
home unquestionably was far less hazardous by the time of the
jurisdiction hearing, the home’s condition was not the only issue
relevant to the jurisdictional finding. Instead, the court was
permitted to consider whether the unsafe home was a symptom of
underlying issues that continued to put the children at risk of
harm even after the specific dangers in the home had been
addressed.
Below, counsel for the children and for DCFS argued, and
the court apparently agreed, that the deplorable condition of the
home was a “symptom[ ] of a larger issue that still needs to be
addressed”—namely, that mother was using illicit drugs. This
conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. Mother had a
long criminal history, including four recent convictions for
possession of controlled substances. The administrative search
warrant found evidence of recent drug use in mother’s home,
10
including drug paraphernalia in the den, a syringe in one of the
bedrooms, and marijuana near the garage, and the smell of fresh
smoke in the den. Further, mother tested positive for
methamphetamines on January 14, 2025, just weeks before the
disposition hearing. On this record, the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude that the unsanitary home conditions were
symptomatic of a drug problem that mother had neither
acknowledged nor addressed, and which continued to impair
mother’s judgment and place the children at substantial risk of
serious physical harm. The juvenile court therefore did not err by
sustaining count b-1 of the petition.
II. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
removal finding.
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides that a child shall
not be taken from the parents’ physical custody unless the
juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here
is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the
minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical
custody.”
We review a dispositional order removing a child from a
parent for substantial evidence, “ ‘ “keeping in mind that the trial
court was required to make its order based on the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence.” ’ (In re I.R. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.)” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944,
960.) In applying this standard of review, “ ‘the question before
the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
11
have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.]
We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Ibid.)
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by
removing the children from her custody because there was no
clear and convincing evidence that the children would be in
substantial danger if they were returned home. Instead, mother
urges, the juvenile court could have adequately protected the
children by offering mother preservation services, family therapy,
or wraparound services. We disagree. As we have discussed, the
juvenile court was well within its discretion in concluding that
mother had a drug problem that had not been ameliorated and
continued to place the children at risk of harm. Moreover, there
was good reason to believe that in-home services would not be
sufficient to keep the children safe. The reports before the
juvenile court documented that mother had repeatedly resisted
letting DCFS case workers into her home: On August 6, mother
refused to permit a home inspection and asked the social worker
to return on August 23; on August 23, mother rescheduled the
home inspection for August 27; on August 27, mother said she
was not home and would need to reschedule the inspection; and
on September 17, mother said she had changed her mind and
would not allow a home inspection. In other words, mother put
off the social worker for approximately six weeks before
ultimately refusing to allow DCFS workers inside her home. The
juvenile court thus could reasonably have concluded that mother
would not allow DCFS regular access to the children and the
12
family home in the future. Further, although the children had
not yet suffered harm in mother’s custody, the record
demonstrated that mother repeatedly had made reckless and
unsafe choices, including allowing drug users to live in the home,
leaving drugs, needles, and saws within the children’s reach,
permitting a woman with an outstanding arrest warrant to
babysit the children, and engaging in criminal conduct. On this
record, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding that the children could not safely remain in mother’s
custody.
III. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
restricting mother to monitored visits.
The juvenile court has broad discretion in ordering
visitation between dependent children and their parents. (In re
S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557; Heidi S. v. David H.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1162–1163.) In making visitation
orders, the court is guided by the principle that “[v]isitation shall
be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the
child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A); In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138.) Equally important, however, is the
statutory dictate that “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the
safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Thus, visitation
orders necessarily involve “a balancing of the interests of the
parent in visitation with the best interests of the child. In
balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial
discretion should determine whether there should be any right to
visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation. The
court may, of course, impose any other conditions or
requirements to further define the right to visitation in light of
the particular circumstances of the case before it.” (In re
13
Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) We review an order
setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion, and we will not
disturb the order unless the trial court made an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re Brittany C.
(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.)
As discussed above, mother had made a series of dangerous
choices that endangered the children, including using illegal
drugs, leaving the children in the care of a woman with an
outstanding arrest warrant, leaving saws, drugs, and needles
accessible to the children, allowing drug users to live in the home,
and engaging in criminal conduct. On this record, the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing mother to visit the
children only in a monitored setting.
14
DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P.J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
ADAMS, J.
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