CourtListener 10679532•People v. Khatoonian CA3
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Filed 9/29/25 P. v. Khatoonian CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C100695
v. (Super. Ct. No. 17FE010114)
MICHAEL ALAN KHATOONIAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Michael Alan Khatoonian of several sex offenses
committed against a 10-year-old child. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that
defendant had previously been convicted of two strike offenses within the meaning of the
three strikes law. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate determinate prison
term of 30 years consecutive to an indeterminate term of 115 years to life.
In a prior appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions but vacated his
sentence, concluding that the trial court erred by (1) admitting evidence outside the
record of conviction to prove one of the prior strike convictions, and (2) staying two
counts at sentencing without imposing a sentence on those counts. This court remanded
1
the matter for further proceedings and a new sentencing hearing. (People v. Khatoonian
(Dec. 6, 2022, C091970) [nonpub. opn.] (Khatoonian).) On remand, after the People
conceded that the second strike conviction had not been proven, the trial court sentenced
defendant to a new determinate prison term of 31 years consecutive to an indeterminate
term of 60 years to life.
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court’s finding, as to two aggravating
circumstances, that defendant’s convictions are of increasing seriousness and that he
served a prior prison term, violated Penal Code1 section 1170 and the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, resulting in prejudice; (2) the trial court’s use of
defendant’s remaining strike conviction to impose upper term sentences amounted to an
improper dual use of that conviction; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it
declined to dismiss the serious felony enhancements.
Given the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Wiley (2025)
17 Cal.5th 1069 (Wiley), we conclude the trial court violated section 1170 and the Sixth
Amendment by finding that defendant had served a prior prison term and that his
convictions are of increasing seriousness. We also conclude the error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we will vacate defendant’s sentence, remand
the matter for a full resentencing, and otherwise affirm the judgment. Because there will
be a full resentencing, we do not address defendant’s remaining contentions.
BACKGROUND
The victim, who was 10 years old, accompanied her mother on a date with
defendant. At defendant’s house, while sitting between the child and her mother on his
couch watching a movie, defendant reached into the child’s pants and forcibly penetrated
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
her vagina. Later, the child was sitting in a chair when her mother went to the bathroom;
defendant again forcibly penetrated her vagina.
Defendant absconded during trial and the trial court finished the trial in his
absence. The jury found defendant guilty on two counts of sexual penetration of a child
10 years of age or younger (counts 1 and 5), two counts of forcible lewd or lascivious
conduct with a child under 14 years of age (counts 2 and 6), and one count of lewd or
lascivious conduct with a child under 14 years of age (count 4). The jury also found that
defendant had previously been convicted of two strike offenses. Those prior strikes were
a 2006 conviction for arson of an inhabited structure and a 2000 conviction for battery
causing serious bodily injury. The latter conviction is only a strike if defendant
personally caused great bodily injury to someone other than an accomplice. (§§ 667.5,
subd. (c)(8); 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The jury so found.
Officials located defendant and returned him for sentencing. The trial court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate determinate prison term of 30 years consecutive to
an indeterminate term of 115 years to life. On appeal from that judgment, this court
concluded that the trial court erred by admitting evidence outside the record of conviction
to prove that the prior battery conviction was a strike. In addition, this court concluded
the trial court erred by staying counts 2 and 6 without imposing a sentence on those
counts. This court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded the matter for further
proceedings and a new sentencing hearing to be conducted in accordance with various
recently amended sentencing laws. (Khatoonian, supra, C091970.)
On remand, defendant submitted a new sentencing memorandum asking the trial
court to dismiss the remaining strike offense, dismiss the serious felony enhancements,
and sentence him to a determinate prison term of either 16 or 22 years, depending on
which offense it designated as the principal term. The People also submitted a new
sentencing memorandum asking the trial court to reimpose the original sentence. The
People argued the record of conviction demonstrated that the battery offense was a strike.
3
But if the trial court disagreed with that position, the People argued for an aggregate
determinate term of 31 years consecutive to an indeterminate term of 60 years to life.
The determinate portion of that requested sentence was based, in part, on imposing an
upper term sentence of eight years for count 4, doubled to 16 years for the prior strike.2
In support of their request to impose the upper term, the People acknowledged that
newly-amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) limited the trial court’s ability to exceed
the middle term, but argued the trial court could impose an upper term sentence based on,
among other things, “defendant’s other convictions that are not the basis of his
enhancements.”
After a hearing addressing the validity of the jury’s strike finding based on the
battery conviction, the prosecutor ultimately conceded that the strike had not been
proved. Turning to sentencing, the prosecutor reiterated the People’s position that
defendant should be sentenced to a term of 31 years plus 60 years to life. In response,
defense counsel reiterated defendant’s request to dismiss the remaining strike conviction,
dismiss the serious felony enhancements, and sentence defendant to a middle-term
determinate sentence. With respect to the People’s request to impose an upper term
sentence, defense counsel argued “the only way that you can get to an upper term is based
on the fact of a prior conviction proven by a certified record of conviction.” Defense
counsel conceded defendant’s arson and battery convictions were so proven, but argued
no other convictions could be used to impose an upper term. In response to the trial
court’s suggestion that it could impose an upper term based on defendant having “served
a prior prison term” and “that his crimes are [of] increasing seriousness,” defense counsel
objected “to anything other than [the] fact of the prior conviction[s] being used as an
2 The People also requested upper term sentences for counts 2 and 6, to be stayed under
section 654.
4
aggravating factor,” arguing that the trial court could not additionally find that defendant
served a prior prison term or that his crimes were of increasing seriousness.
The trial court denied defendant’s request to dismiss the prior strike conviction.
It noted defendant’s significant criminal history, including the arson, which the trial court
described as “a road rage-type incident and he ended up following the guy to his house
and trying to burn his house down, which is pretty horrendous, factually.” With respect
to the assault, the trial court stated that defendant “engaged in choking of the person he
was in a dating relationship with.” The trial court also noted that defendant was
convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and fleeing a pursuing officer the
following year. Then, within two years of being paroled, defendant “already re-offended
with this current case, which was, really, no other way to put it other than a deplorable act
with a young child.” The trial court described it as predatorial. Pointing out that
defendant had absconded during the underlying trial, the trial court stated: “So he has a
pretty . . . horrendous life of criminality up to the point of sentencing.” The trial court
added, “He’s . . . engaged in horrible crimes. His Static-99 [risk assessment] that was
done at this time has him at a medium to high risk of re-offense.” The trial court
concluded that defendant was within the spirit of the three strikes law for the purposes of
increasing his sentence because of the strike.
The trial court also declined to dismiss the serious felony enhancements,
saying it had given great weight to the mitigating factors set forth in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), but ultimately concluded that dismissal would not be in the interest of
justice. The trial court also determined that dismissal of the enhancements would
endanger public safety, explaining: “I think the defendant is clearly a predator and would
do this again, especially when you look at his [risk assessment], where they say he’s a
medium to high risk, and nothing in his life or background would suggest that he’d be
anything other than a danger to public safety. So I think if he were to get out, I think
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there’s a likelihood that others would be in serious danger, based on his level of
dangerousness.”
In support of the imposition of an upper term sentence, the trial court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had served a prior prison term and that his
crimes are of increasing seriousness. As to the latter finding, the trial court explained:
“[A]lthough I don’t think the [flight from a pursuing officer] and the DUI can be
considered of increasing seriousness, we go from [the battery and arson convictions]
where he served a prison term, to the [present sex offenses], which really show a clear
pattern to the Court that . . . his crimes are of an increasing seriousness.” The trial court
concluded: “Based on these aggravating circumstances, I do find that the aggravating
circumstances far outweigh any mitigating circumstances in this case.”
Defense counsel objected to the trial court using any convictions other than the
arson and battery convictions to impose an upper term. Defense counsel also objected to
the trial court imposing an upper term based on defendant’s criminal history because that
history was used to double his sentence under the three strikes law and to impose the
serious felony enhancements.
The trial court ultimately imposed a determinate prison term of 31 years
consecutive to an indeterminate term of 60 years to life. The sentence consisted of the
following: an indeterminate term of 30 years to life (15 years to life, doubled) on counts
1 and 5; a determinate term of 16 years (the upper term of eight years, doubled) on count
4; plus 15 years (5 years per count) for the serious felony enhancements. The trial court
also imposed upper term sentences on counts 2 and 6, but stayed them pursuant to
section 654. The trial court said it was imposing “the maximum possible
sentence . . . because of all the reasons that we’ve already talked about.”
6
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court’s findings that his convictions are of increasing
seriousness, and that he served a prior prison term, violated section 1170 and the Sixth
Amendment, resulting in prejudice.
A
As of January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170 to provide: “When
a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible
terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed
the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1);
Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 2.) Paragraph (2) provides in relevant part: “The court may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only where there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by
the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Paragraph (3) goes on to provide,
in relevant part: “Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of
conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
Under these statutory provisions, except for the trial court’s ability to consider
prior convictions based on a certified record of conviction, the facts underlying any
aggravating circumstance used to justify an upper term sentence must be found true
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, unless the defendant stipulates to those facts or
waives a jury trial and opts for a court trial, in which case the facts must be found true
beyond a reasonable doubt by the judge. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 760
(Lynch) [“Absent stipulation or waiver, that factfinding role now resides solely with the
jury.”].)
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This statutory jury trial right is coextensive with the federal constitutional right to
jury trial articulated by the United States Supreme Court. Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, “any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be
found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by
a preponderance of the evidence.” (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281
[166 L.Ed.2d 856]; see Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1078 [“this jury trial right is not
merely a state law entitlement, but is constitutionally required for all aggravating facts,
other than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an upper term sentence”]; see also
Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 760.) “The exception to the jury trial right for ‘the fact of a
prior conviction’ has long been recognized in the high court’s precedent,” beginning with
Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224 [140 L.Ed.2d 350] (Almendarez-
Torres). (Wiley, at p. 1079.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3)’s codification of that
exception is also “coextensive with high court dictates” regarding the scope of that
exception. (Wiley, at p. 1086.)
Here, the trial court found two aggravating circumstances to be true without
submitting them to a jury: (1) defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing
seriousness; and (2) defendant served a prior term in prison. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(2), (3).) At the time that it did so, two decisions from the California
Supreme Court allowed it to make those findings without running afoul of the federal
constitutional right to jury trial. (See People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 79 (Towne)
[“the federal constitutional right to a jury trial . . . on aggravating circumstances does not
extend to the circumstance that a defendant . . . has served a prior prison term”]; People v.
Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 819-820 (Black) [the Almendarez-Torres exception applies
not only to “the fact that a prior conviction occurred, but also other related issues that
may be determined by examining the records of the prior convictions,” such as “whether
those convictions are ‘numerous or of increasing seriousness’ ”].)
8
However, in Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 [219 L.Ed.2d 451]
(Erlinger), the United States Supreme Court held that the Almendarez-Torres exception
allows “judges to find only ‘the fact of a prior conviction.’ [Citation.] Under that
exception, a judge may ‘do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than
determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.’ [Citation.]”
(Id. at p. 838.) There, the district court sentenced the defendant under a federal statute
that increased his sentence from “up to 10 years” to “a minimum of 15 years and a
maximum of life” based on a finding that the defendant had three prior convictions
for violent felonies or serious drug offenses committed on different occasions. (Id. at
p. 825.) Rather than submit that determination to a jury, the district court found for itself
that the defendant’s qualifying prior offenses were committed on different occasions. (Id.
at pp. 826-827.) The high court concluded that “the district court had to do more than
identify [the defendant’s] previous convictions and the legal elements required to sustain
them. It had to find that those offenses occurred on at least three separate occasions.
And, in doing so, the court did more than Almendarez-Torres allows.” (Id. at pp. 838-
839.)
In Wiley, the California Supreme Court concluded that the reasoning in Erlinger
required it to overturn its prior decisions in Towne and Black. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 1084.) The trial court in Wiley had imposed an upper term sentence based on two
aggravating circumstances found true by the trial court: that the convictions were of
increasing seriousness, and the defendant had performed poorly on probation. (Id. at
p. 1077.) The California Supreme Court held that the aggravating circumstance findings
violated section 1170 and the defendant’s federal constitutional right to have a jury
determine any fact that exposed him to greater punishment. With respect to the trial
court’s finding that his convictions were of increasing seriousness, the court explained:
“Under current case law, the determination that a defendant’s prior convictions are of
increasing seriousness may be made by ‘reference to the range of punishment provided
9
by statute for each offense.’ [Citation.] Or it may be determined by ‘a comparison of the
offenses’ respective elements.’ [Citation.] By either measure, the inquiry requires a
comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and
a determination as to their relative seriousness. As a result, it involves something more
than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what elements were
required to prove them. Erlinger makes clear that, under its interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, that narrow finding is as much, and all, the Almendarez-Torres exception
allows.” (Id. at pp. 1082-1083, fn. omitted.) Just as the finding at issue in Erlinger
implicated the jury trial right because it required a qualitative assessment of the offenses,
the court concluded “a similar conclusion follows here with respect to the factual finding
that a defendant’s offenses are increasing in seriousness.” (Id. at p. 1083.)
Although authorized at the time, Wiley now establishes that the trial court’s
aggravating circumstance findings violated section 1170 and the federal constitutional
right to jury trial. The finding that defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing
seriousness required a comparative assessment. And although the trial court’s separate
finding that defendant had served a prior prison term does not involve the same kind of
assessment, it nevertheless required the trial court to “do more than identify [defendant’s]
previous convictions and the legal elements required to sustain them.” (Erlinger, supra,
602 U.S. at p. 838.) As the California Supreme Court made clear in Wiley, “a defendant
is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior
conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more
serious than the statutorily provided midterm.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086, fn.
omitted.)
B
Turning to the question of prejudice, “[w]hen a defendant is deprived of a jury trial
on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing
10
court must apply the Chapman standard of review.[3] [Citations.] Under that standard,
‘a sentence imposed under . . . section 1170[, subdivision ](b) must be reversed and
remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury,
applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon
which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were
otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.’ [Citations.] Lack of a jury
trial is not harmless under Chapman if ‘the record contains evidence that could rationally
lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact at issue. [Citations.]”
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087; see Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.)
In Wiley, the court concluded the failure to afford the defendant a jury trial on
whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness was prejudicial under the
Chapman standard. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.) After setting forth the
defendant’s extensive rap sheet, the court acknowledged that it “may be” true, as the
People argued, “that the progression of [the defendant’s] offenses over time from
misdemeanors to felonies demonstrates a clear trend from less serious offenses towards
more serious ones.” (Id. at p. 1089.) However, the court concluded, “a rational juror
may not have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt by that fact alone. Given that
[the defendant’s] criminal record began as a young adult and spanned two decades, we
cannot discount the possibility that, in making the determination as to increasing
seriousness, a rational juror could have either placed greater emphasis on his felony
offenses, or on his more recent criminal history.” (Ibid.) With respect to the felony
offenses, the court explained that “none is strikingly more serious than the others,
either by reference to the nature of the offense or the punishment” and concluded:
3 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705].
11
“A jury . . . could have disagreed as to whether [these offenses] demonstrated criminal
conduct of increasing seriousness.” (Ibid.)
Finally, the court rejected the People’s argument that the defendant’s most recent
offense, making a criminal threat, “was his most serious offense . . . because it is
classified as a serious felony,” and that this classification should outweigh the fact that a
previous conviction for transporting a controlled substance had “a longer sentencing
potential.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1089-1090.) The court explained that “the
designation of an offense as a serious felony is . . . simply one factor the jury could have
considered when evaluating whether [the defendant’s] crimes were of increasing
seriousness” and concluded: “These realities make it ‘ “ ‘difficult for a reviewing court
to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would
have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 1090.) Thus, although “the evidence may have been sufficient to support a finding of
increasing seriousness,” reversal was required because “[a] rational juror could have
reached the opposite conclusion.” (Ibid.)
Here, defendant has the following felony convictions: (1) battery causing serious
bodily injury in violation of section 243, subdivision (d), committed in 2000; (2) arson of
an inhabited structure in violation of section 451, subdivision (b), committed in 2001; and
(3) the current offenses, committed in 2017: two counts of sexual penetration of a child
10 years of age or younger in violation of section 288.7, subdivision (b); two counts of
forcible lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under 14 years of age, in violation of
section 288, subdivision (b)(1); and one count of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child
under 14 years of age, in violation of section 288, subdivision (a).
The first of the offenses, battery causing serious bodily injury, has the following
elements: “(1) a person used physical force or violence against another person; (2) the
use of force or violence was willful and unlawful; and (3) the use of force or violence
inflicted serious bodily injury on the other person.” (People v. Lewis (2004) 120
12
Cal.App.4th 882, 887.) The offense “is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two,
three, or four years.” (§ 243, subd. (d).)
The second offense, arson of an inhabited structure, has the following elements:
(1) a person set fire to, burned, caused to be burned, or aided, counseled, or procured the
burning of a structure; (2) the fire was willfully and maliciously set; and (3) the structure
was inhabited at the time the fire was set. (§ 451, subd. (b); People v. Buckner (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 724, 728.) The offense “is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for three, five, or eight years.” (§ 451, subd. (b).)
As for defendant’s current offenses, the violation of section 288.7, subdivision (b)
required proof that: (1) defendant was 18 years of age or older; (2) he caused the
penetration, however slight, of the victim’s genital opening by any foreign object; (3) he
did so for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse; (4) the act was
accomplished against the victim’s will by force or other means of coercion; and (5) the
victim was 10 years of age or younger. (§§ 288.7, subd. (b), 289, subds. (a), (k)(1).) The
offense “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to
life.” (§ 288.7, subd. (b).) Defendant’s violations of section 288, subdivision (b)(1)
required proof that: (1) defendant touched the body of a child who was under the age of
14 years; (2) he did so for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification; and (3) the act
was accomplished by force or other means of coercion. (§ 288, subds. (a), (b)(1); People
v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 443-444.) The offense “shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 10 years.” (§ 288, subd. (b)(1).) Defendant
was also convicted of one non-forcible lewd conduct count, punishable “by imprisonment
in the state prison for three, six, or eight years.” (§ 288, subd. (a).)
As in Wiley, we decline to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any rational
juror would have come to the same conclusion as the trial court with respect to whether
defendant’s convictions are of increasing seriousness. In making such a determination,
13
we understand the applicable caselaw to permit a jury to evaluate the relative seriousness
of prior offenses from aspects of the record, in addition to the respective ranges of
punishment. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1082, fn. 6; People v. Quiles (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 612, 622; Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th 799.) A jury might consider any relevant
and admissible evidence bearing on the question of increasing seriousness.
A jury could find support for a determination that the offenses are of increasing
seriousness. For example, the violation of section 288.7, subdivision (b) carries a much
longer potential sentence than the arson, which in turn has a longer potential sentence
than the battery. Moreover, with respect to the nature of the current offenses compared to
the prior arson and battery, the Legislature has indicated that sex crimes committed
against children are some of “ ‘ “the most serious and heinous” ’ ” offenses that can be
committed. (People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 120; see People v. Zandrino (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 74, 81.)
Nevertheless, in comparing the elements of arson of an inhabited structure with
the elements of battery causing serious bodily injury, a jury might conclude that whether
the arson is more serious than the battery depends in part on how the offenses were
committed. For example, “ ‘[s]erious bodily injury’ means a serious impairment of
physical condition,” the gravity of which may range from “loss of consciousness” to
“serious disfigurement.” (§ 243, subd. (f)(4).) If an arson of an inhabited structure
resulted in minor damage and no injuries, but a battery causing serious bodily injury
resulted in serious disfigurement, a jury might conclude the battery was more serious than
the arson notwithstanding the potential punishment. The record in this case is sparse as
to how defendant committed the prior offenses.
We decline to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found
that defendant’s convictions are of increasing seriousness. Accordingly, the lack of a jury
trial as to that aggravating circumstance is not harmless and reversal is required. (See
Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087; Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) This conclusion
14
makes it unnecessary to determine whether any rational juror would have come to the
same conclusion as the trial court with respect to whether defendant served a prior prison
term, and we express no opinion on that matter. And because there will be a full
resentencing, we do not address defendant’s remaining contentions.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
/S/
FEINBERG, J.
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