Ahn v. Parisotto

CourtListener 10676985CalctappSep 24, 2025

Full text

Filed 9/5/25; Certified for Publication 9/24/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

DUKE AHN, B337936

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCP00051)
v.

GEORGE PARISOTTO et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
Lexint Law Group, Robert Hsu for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ken Lau, Chief Counsel, William J. Murphy, Assistant
Chief Counsel, Henry A. Park, for Defendant and Respondent
Department of Industrial Relations.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Duke Ahn, M.D., pled guilty to a misdemeanor
violation of Business and Professions Code section 650, relating
to illegal kickbacks for medical referrals; he was ordered to serve
a term of probation. After paying the ordered restitution and
other fees, Ahn successfully moved to have the matter dismissed
under Penal Code section 1385.
Under Labor Code section 139.21, a medical provider who
has been convicted of certain crimes relating to fraud of the
workers’ compensation program shall be suspended from that
program. Ahn’s crime met this definition, so the Department of
Industrial Relations (DIR) suspended him from the workers’
compensation program. Ahn challenged that finding through an
administrative proceeding, which upheld the suspension. Ahn
challenged that ruling with a petition for writ of mandate in the
superior court. Ahn argued that because his misdemeanor case
had been dismissed, he did not meet the definition of “convicted”
in Labor Code section 139.21. The superior court denied the
petition, and Ahn appealed.
We affirm. The plain language of Labor Code section
139.21, subdivision (a)(4)(C) defines “convicted” to include any
circumstance in which a guilty plea has been accepted by a court.
The statute does not include an exception for cases that are later
dismissed. Ahn’s suspension was therefore supported by law.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and dismissal
Ahn is a licensed physician. In May 2019, he pled guilty to
a misdemeanor violation of Business and Professions Code
section 650, which bars consideration as compensation for patient
referrals. As the factual basis for the plea, Ahn admitted that he

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was a “licensed physician in the state of California and [he had]
received consideration as compensation or inducement for
referring patients” for certain services. The plea agreement
provided that additional counts would be dismissed, Ahn would
pay $80,114 in restitution and $8,000 to the victim witness
emergency fund, and Ahn could move for dismissal in May 2022
at the completion of his three-year probation period.
At a hearing in August 2020, before the end of his
probation period, Ahn provided the court with proof that his
ordered restitution and emergency fund amounts had been paid.
He orally moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Penal Code
section 1385. Over the People’s objection, the court granted the
motion and dismissed the matter in “furtherance of justice.”
B. Suspension from workers’ compensation system
In August 2022, the Administrative Director of the DIR
Division of Workers’ Compensation sent Ahn a notice that he was
being suspended from participation in California’s workers’
compensation system because of his conviction. The DIR cited
Labor Code section 139.21, subdivision (a)(1)(A), which states
that the agency “shall suspend . . . any physician” who has been
convicted of certain crimes. The letter stated that Ahn could
request a hearing “limited to whether or not Labor Code section
139.21(a)(1) is applicable to you.”
Ahn requested a hearing. He argued that his case had
been dismissed under Penal Code section 1385, thereby nullifying
the conviction so that Labor Code section 139.21 did not apply to
him. A hearing was scheduled for September 2022.
The DIR filed a hearing brief. It noted that Labor Code
section 139.21, subdivision (a)(1)(A) states that a physician shall
be suspended from the workers’ compensation system if that

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physician has been convicted of a crime that “involves fraud or
abuse of . . . the workers’ compensation system, or fraud or abuse
of any patient” (subd. (a)(1)(A)(i)), “relates to the conduct of the
individual’s medical practice as it pertains to patient care” (subd.
(a)(1)(A)(ii)), “is a financial crime that relates to . . . the workers’
compensation system” (subd. (a)(1)(A)(iii)), or “is otherwise
substantially related to the qualifications, functions, or duties of
a provider of services” (subd. (a)(1)(A)(iv)). DIR argued that
Ahn’s conviction arose out of a scheme involving “multiple
doctors, a multiple pharmacies [sic], manufacturing, marketing
and billing companies to allegedly defraud at least 8 different
insurance companies from 2013 to 2015 by submitting bills for
unnecessary and/or overpriced creams, treatments and tests
prescribed for workers’ compensation patients, without disclosing
that doctors were getting paid for the referrals.” The DIR argued
that Ahn’s conviction therefore fell under multiple categories in
Labor Code section 139.21, subdivision (a)(1)(A).
The DIR further noted that Labor Code section 139.21,
subdivision (a)(4) states that “an individual or entity is
considered to have been convicted of a crime if any of the
following applies: (A) A judgment of conviction has been entered
by a federal, state, or local court, regardless of whether there is
an appeal pending or whether the judgment of conviction or other
record relating to criminal conduct has been expunged. (B)
There has been a verdict or finding of guilt by a federal, state, or
local court. (C) A plea of guilty has been accepted by a federal,
state, or local court.” The DIR argued that the dismissal under
Penal Code section 1385 did not erase Ahn’s guilty plea or his
factual admissions about the nature of his crime, and therefore
Labor Code section 139.21 still applied.

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Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
issued a written ruling. The ruling noted that the “Violation of
B&P Code 650 is a violation that involved definition of [sic] fraud,
is a financial crime, relates to qualifications, functions and duty
of the provider, pertains to patient care, and places the patient in
danger.” The ruling summarized the parties’ arguments, and
noted that the count against Ahn was dismissed after “there was
already substantial compliance with the imposed sentence,”
including Ahn’s payment of over $80,000 in restitution. The
ruling stated, “If the criminal charge was completely wiped away,
it logically stand[s] that the event never occurred and [Ahn]
would be entitled to reimbursement of the restitution amount, at
least. This was not sought, nor provided for in the Superior
Court Judge’s dismissal of Count 7.” The ALJ recommended that
Ahn’s suspension proceed.
On September 30, 2022, the DIR suspended Ahn from the
workers’ compensation system.
C. Petition for writ of mandate
On January 9, 2023, Ahn filed a petition for writ of
mandate in superior court under Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5, asking that “the administrative order be vacated and set
aside and to require the reinstatement [of Ahn] to participate in
workers’ compensation system.” Ahn argued that the dismissal
of his conviction under Penal Code section 1385 nullified his
guilty plea, and the ALJ’s ruling contradicted that statute. The
trial court set a briefing schedule, and the parties submitted
briefs echoing their previous arguments.
The superior court issued a written ruling on December 6,
2023 denying Ahn’s petition. It noted that Ahn did not challenge
any of the agency’s factual findings. The court stated that Ahn’s

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“conviction for illegal kickbacks” fit the definition of fraud or
abuse of the workers’ compensation system in Labor Code section
139.21, subdivision (a)(1)(A)(i), which Ahn did not dispute. The
court stated, “Accordingly, unless Penal Code section 1385
overrides Labor Code section 139.21, [DIR] was required to
‘promptly suspend’ [Ahn] from California’s workers’
compensation system.”
The court noted that Labor Code section 139.21,
subdivision (a)(4)(C) states that a person has been “convicted” if a
guilty plea has been accepted by a court. The court therefore
found that Ahn’s “guilty plea is statutorily defined as a
‘conviction’ within the meaning of Labor Code section 139.21,
subdivisions (a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(4)(C),” and as a result, DIR was
required to suspend him.
The court stated that it “need go no further.” But it also
rejected Ahn’s argument that Penal Code section 1385 served to
“wipe the slate clean” as if no conviction had ever occurred,
because such an interpretation would “effectively nullify Labor
Code section 139.21.” The court noted that Labor Code section
139.21 was a “more specific and later-enacted provision,” and
“any inconsistencies with . . . Penal Code section 1385 must be
resolved in favor of” Labor Code section 139.21. The court
further found that it was “clear” that the Legislature intended
Labor Code section 139.21 to “apply broadly” under the
circumstances. Thus, the “agency’s decision is supported by the
weight of the evidence, substantial evidence, and the law.”
The court entered judgment on January 22, 2024. Ahn
timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
As below, Ahn argues on appeal that “Labor Code section
139.21 does not apply to Mr. Ahn [sic], because the dismissal of
his case under Penal Code section 1385 operates as if he was
never convicted.” Respondent DIR asserts that Ahn’s guilty plea
meets the definition of Labor Code section 139.21, despite the
dismissal.
In reviewing an administrative adjudicatory decision under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, a court’s inquiry is limited
to “whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess
of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there
was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) “Abuse of discretion is established if the
respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the
order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings
are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.) Because Ahn presents
only a question of law and there are no disputed issues of fact, we
consider the issue de novo on appeal. (See, e.g., Citizens for East
Shore Parks v. State Lands Com. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549,
573; Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152,
1169-1170.) We find no error.
Ahn does not dispute that the crime at issue meets the
definitions of Labor Code section 139.21, subdivision (a)(1)(A).
He also does not dispute that such a conviction would require
suspension from the workers’ compensation program. Thus, the
only question on appeal is whether Ahn meets the definition of a
person who has been “convicted” under Labor Code section 139.21
following the dismissal of his case pursuant to Penal Code section
1385.

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As noted above, Labor Code section 139.21, subdivision
(a)(4) states that an individual “is considered to have been
convicted of a crime if any of the following applies: (A) A
judgment of conviction has been entered by a federal, state, or
local court, regardless of whether there is an appeal pending or
whether the judgment of conviction or other record relating to
criminal conduct has been expunged. (B) There has been a verdict
or finding of guilt by a federal, state, or local court. (C) A plea of
guilty has been accepted by a federal, state, or local court.”
There is no dispute that Ahn entered a plea of guilty, which
was accepted by the superior court. This fact alone warrants
affirmance. The plain language of Labor Code section 139.21,
subdivision (a)(4)(C) states that a guilty plea constitutes a
conviction for purposes of the statute; the statute does not
include any caveats or exceptions for cases that are later
dismissed. When construing a statute, our role is “not to insert
what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1858.) We assume the Legislature, when adding the
definition of “convicted” to Labor Code section 139.21 in 2018,1
knew how to create such an exception if it wished to do so. (See
DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983,
992.)
Notably, Labor Code section 139.21, subdivision (a)(4)(C)
requires only a guilty plea—not a judgment, which is addressed
in subdivision (a)(4)(A). In a case such as Ahn’s, when a

1 Labor Code section 139.21 was enacted by Assembly Bill
No. 1244 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) § 1, effective January 1, 2017.
The definitions of “convicted” in subdivision (a)(4) were added
shortly thereafter by Assembly Bill No. 1422 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.), § 1, effective Jan. 1, 2018.

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defendant pleads guilty and is placed on probation, a judgment of
conviction may never be entered. As the Supreme Court
explained in People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 781 (Chavez
II), a “grant of probation is not a final judgment.” Rather, “In a
case where a court suspends imposition of sentence, it pronounces
no judgment at all, and a defendant is placed on probation with
‘no judgment pending against [him].’” (Ibid.) The court stated,
“[I]n the case of a successful probationer, final judgment is never
pronounced, and after the expiration of probation, may never be
pronounced.” (Id. at p. 777.) Such a “criminal proceeding ends . .
. once probation ends if no judgment has issued in the case.”
(People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 47.)
In general, we presume the Legislature was aware of
existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time it enacted
a statute, and intended to maintain a consistent body of rules.
(Kalpoe v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 206, 211.) In
addition to that general presumption, the Legislature’s
understanding is reflected in Labor Code section 139.21 itself,
which defines “convicted” to include a judgment of conviction
despite any later expungement (subdivision (a)(4)(A)), and a
guilty plea without reference to any judgment or later dismissal
(subdivision (a)(4)(C)).
Ahn argues that the dismissal under Penal Code section
1385 nullified the guilty plea. He cites People v. Chavez (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 110 (Chavez I), the Court of Appeal case affirmed in
Chavez II, supra. Ahn focuses on language in Chavez I, quoted
from People v. Barro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 62, 67 (Barro), that
“the effect of a dismissal under section 1385 is to wipe the slate
clean as if the defendant never suffered the prior conviction in
the initial instance. In other words, ‘[t]he defendant stands as if

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he had never been prosecuted for the charged offense.’” (See
Chavez I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 116-117.) This may be true
for circumstances such as those in Barro, which involved
sentencing under the Three Strikes law. The Barro court held
that a “dismissal under [Penal Code] section 1385 of the charge
underlying a prior conviction which would otherwise qualify as a
strike precludes the use of that prior conviction as a strike under
the Three Strikes law.” (Barro, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.)
Here, however, we are not addressing criminal sentencing.
Nor are we considering the issue addressed in Chavez I and
Chavez II: which Penal Code statute applies for dismissal of a
conviction after probation has already terminated. Thus, the
reasoning of these cases is of little import. (See, e.g., Cal. Bldg.
Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4
Cal.5th 1032, 1043 [“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority
for propositions that are not considered”].)
Moreover, as the DIR correctly points out, the Court of
Appeal in Chavez I cited and relied on People v. Tanner (1979) 24
Cal.3d 514 (Tanner). (See Chavez I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp.
117-118.) Tanner addressed a potential conflict between Penal
Code section 1385 and Penal Code section 1203.6, which provides
that probation may not be granted under certain circumstances.
The court stated, “[W]hereas section 1385 is general in nature,
relating to the broad scope of dismissal, section 1203.06 is
specific, relating to the limited power of dismissal for purposes of
probation[,] the very matter at issue. Section 1203.06 is the later
enactment, adopted by the Legislature in response to the
particular problem at hand. A specific provision relating to a
particular subject will govern a general provision, even though
the general provision standing alone would be broad enough to

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include the subject to which the specific provision relates.”
(Tanner, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 521.)
Here, similarly, Labor Code section 139.21, enacted in
2016, is a later statute specific to the issue in question (whether
Ahn’s suspension was supported by his guilty plea), while Penal
Code section 1385, enacted in 1872, is an older, more general
statute. Thus, even if there were a conflict between the two
statutes, Labor Code section 139.21 would control.
Under the plain language of Labor Code section 139.21,
subdivision (a)(4)(C), Ahn is a person who “has been convicted” of
a crime. There is no dispute that the crime met the definitions of
Labor Code section 139.21, subdivision (a)(1)(A). Ahn’s
suspension was therefore supported by law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent DIR is entitled to
recover its costs on appeal.

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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Filed 9/24/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

DUKE AHN, B337936

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCP00051)
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR
GEORGE PARISOTTO et al., PUBLICATION

Defendants and
Respondents.

THE COURT ⃰

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on September 5, 2025 was not
certified for publication in the Official Reports. Upon application of an interested party
and for good cause appearing, it is ordered that the opinion shall be published in the
Official Reports.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b), this opinion is certified for
publication.

_______________________________________________________________________
ZUKIN, P. J. ⃰ COLLINS, J. TAMZARIAN, J.

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