People v. Gardiner CA2/2

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Filed 9/23/25 P. v. Gardiner CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B336024

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. BA347305)

DAVID GARDINER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Renee Korn, Judge. Affirmed.

Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant David Gardiner (appellant)
appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95)1
following an evidentiary hearing. Because substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
appellant was a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
The La Brea Collective (dispensary) was a medical
marijuana dispensary. The exterior metal door was locked
during business hours. To gain entry, a patron would ring the
doorbell and, through a slot in the metal door, hand a security
guard his or her identification and doctor’s recommendation. The
security guard would then walk the patron into a “mantrap”
between the exterior metal door and an interior door leading to
the lobby of the dispensary. Security cameras monitored the
premises.
On October 1, 2008, owner Daniel Sosa (Sosa), bartenders

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code

unless otherwise indicated.

Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no substantive change. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its
new numbering.
2 The facts summarized in this section are drawn from the

evidence presented at the section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3)
evidentiary hearing.

2
Martin Chavero (Chavero) and “Matthew,” and security guard
Noe Gonzalez (Gonzalez) were working at the dispensary. At
approximately 3:30 p.m., the doorbell rang. Sosa ran towards the
back of the dispensary. On a security monitor, Chavero saw two
men—appellant and Brandon Daniels (Daniels)—each pointing a
gun at Gonzalez’s head. Gonzalez said, “trucha,” meaning “heads
up” in Spanish. Another man, Leon Banks (Banks), kicked the
door open and ran into the dispensary, carrying a gun.
Chavero ran into the back office and locked the safe.
Feeling someone grab his shoulder, Chavero turned around and
saw Banks pointing a gun at his face. Banks said, “Don’t look at
me. I’m going to kill you.” Banks walked Chavero to the front of
the dispensary, threw him on the ground, and started to restrain
him with zip ties.
Meanwhile, appellant had been left alone with Gonzalez.
The men engaged in a “tussle[]” outside the dispensary, during
which appellant’s gun discharged. Appellant ran back inside the
dispensary, where Banks and Daniels had remained.
Hearing the gunshot, Banks said, “We got to go. We got to
go.” Daniels, who had been upstairs, ran downstairs and both
Banks and Daniels continued towards the front of the dispensary.
From the outside, Gonzalez held the dispensary’s metal
door closed to prevent the appellant, Banks, and Daniels from
escaping. Shots were fired from inside the dispensary through
the slot in the metal door. Banks shot through the glass near the
door, hitting Gonzalez. The men pushed the door open and fled.
Gonzalez died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds.
Appellant was arrested on July 27, 2009, and interviewed
at the police station. When asked what had happened, appellant
responded: “I don’t know, I guess it just, it just started off as a

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robbery. We’d go in there to get some weed I guess and just
leave, that’s all it was.” Appellant admitted that the robbery was
“planned[,]” but claimed that he did not “know nothing about
nothing really[.]” When he fled the scene, appellant “was scared”
that Gonzalez would die. Appellant described the incident as
“just a robbery gone bad.” DNA collected from zip ties found
inside the dispensary and a glove found on the nearby sidewalk
matched appellant’s DNA profile.
II. Conviction
On April 15, 2013, appellant pleaded no contest to the first
degree murder of Gonzalez (§ 187, subd. (a)) and admitted that a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)). On April 30, 2013, the trial court
sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 45 years to life in
state prison.
III. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On March 25, 2019, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. (People v. Gardiner
(Aug. 24, 2021, B303948) [nonpub. opn.], 2021 WL 3732184, at
p. *2.) The trial court denied the petition without holding an
evidentiary hearing, and appellant appealed. (Id. at pp. *1–*2.)
Concluding that the record of conviction did not establish that
appellant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law, this court
reversed. (Id. at p.*4.)
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d), during which the
People called six witnesses and appellant called one witness. On
November 29, 2023, the court denied the petition. The court
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was a major
participant in the attempted robbery who acted with reckless

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indifference to human life. The court rejected the notion that the
crime was “just a garden-variety armed robbery” and found
appellant’s statements while in custody to be “certainly self-
serving and in part unbelievable.”
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
I. Background Legal Principles
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to
“eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[] and limit[] the scope
of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Under the amended statutes, “[a]
felony-murder conviction may no longer rest on the mere
commission of and intent to commit an underlying felony.”
(People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 875 (Emanuel).) Now,
“[a] person who did not kill or act with the intent to kill can be
liable for murder under the felony-murder doctrine only if he or
she ‘was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 880.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added what is now section 1172.6,
which provides a procedural mechanism for defendants who could
not be convicted of murder under the amended laws to petition
for retroactive relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) Upon
the filing of a properly pleaded petition for resentencing, the trial
court must conduct a prima facie analysis to determine the
defendant’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3) & (c);
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708; Lewis, at pp. 957,
960.) If the court determines that the requisite prima facie

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showing has been made, it must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Wilson
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.)
“At the evidentiary hearing following issuance of an order
to show cause, the superior court acts as an independent fact
finder, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under
California law following Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendments.
[Citations.] The petitioner and the prosecutor may offer new or
additional evidence, and the court may consider evidence
‘previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,’ including witness testimony.
[Citations.]” (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1065–
1066.)
II. Standard of Review
On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition
following an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s
findings for substantial evidence. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 885.) “Under this standard, ‘we review the record “ ‘ “in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact” ’ ” ’ could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
[appellant] acted with reckless indifference. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Findings
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was a major
participant in the attempted robbery and that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life.

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A. Major participant
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803 (Banks), the
California Supreme Court identified the following factors that
“may be weighed in determining the ultimate question, whether
[a] defendant’s participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry
a grave risk of death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be
considered ‘major’ [citations]:” (1) the defendant’s role “in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths;”
(2) his role “in supplying or using lethal weapons;” (3) his
awareness “of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants;” (4) his presence “at the scene of the killing” and
thus whether he was “in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder;” and (5) his actions after the use of lethal force.
“No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of
them necessarily sufficient.” (Ibid.)
1. Planning
Appellant admitted that he was aware of the plan to rob
the dispensary. Appellant’s coordinated efforts with his
confederates, his possession and use of a firearm, and the
presence of his DNA on zip ties and a glove found at the scene
further indicate that he was involved in the planning and
intended to subdue the dispensary’s employees with force or
threat of force. (See In re White (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 18, 30,
affd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455 [substantial evidence may consist of
inferences if they are the product of logic and reason and rest on
the evidence].)
2. Supplying or using lethal weapons
While no evidence was introduced that appellant supplied
the firearms used by the group, he “was not a mere bystander

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when it came to the deadly weapons used during the [attempted]
robbery.” (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 461 (Harper);
see also In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1011 [even in
the absence of evidence that the defendant supplied the murder
weapon, the fact that he “was himself armed with, and
brandished, a deadly or dangerous weapon” weighed in favor of
major participant finding].) Appellant entered the dispensary
armed and used his loaded gun to subdue Gonzalez, the
dispensary’s security guard, by pointing the lethal weapon
directly at his head. Appellant also engaged in a physical
altercation with Gonzalez, during which appellant’s firearm
discharged.
3. Awareness of dangers posed by the crime
At the outset of the attempted robbery, appellant knew that
he, Daniels, and Banks were all armed. (See People v. Montanez
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 281 [“Because [the defendant] was
present at the scene and in close proximity to his cohorts, a fact
finder could reasonably infer he was aware of both weapons”].)
Appellant pointed his loaded gun directly at the head of the
eventual murder victim, while Daniels did the same. Appellant
would have become increasingly aware of the dangers posed by
the attempted robbery when Gonzalez subsequently fought back
and appellant’s gun discharged. (See Harper, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 461 [the defendant “was clearly aware of the
risk of death once the robbery was underway” based, in part, on
the victim struggling].)
4. Proximity to the killing
Appellant was present at the time of the fatal shooting of
Gonzalez. He failed to do anything to restrain his accomplices
and instead actively facilitated the murder. As Gonzalez held the

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dispensary’s metal door closed to prevent the men from escaping,
appellant and his companions worked together to push the door
open. During this collective effort, Banks shot Gonzalez.
5. Actions after the killing
In his post-arrest interview, appellant stated that he had
been “scared” that Gonzalez would die. The reasonable inference
is that appellant knew Gonzalez had been gravely wounded but
was not yet deceased. Despite this knowledge, appellant failed to
render any aid and instead fled.
6. Totality of the circumstances
Viewed together, this substantial evidence amply supports
the finding that appellant was a major participant in the
attempted robbery, including in the particularly violent aspects of
the crime.
B. Reckless indifference to human life
A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life
when he “ ‘ “knowingly engag[es] in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death.” ’ [Citations.]” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 801.) “[R]eckless indifference to human life
‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing)
to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’
[Citation.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 883.)
In People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618–623 (Clark),
the California Supreme Court set forth a nonexhaustive list of
considerations relevant to determining whether a defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life, “ ‘including use of
or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical
presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or
aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat

9
the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize
risks.’ [Citations.]” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 884–885.)
A defendant’s youth may also be a relevant factor. (See id. at
p. 885, fn. 6.) Each of these considerations is neither necessary
nor sufficient to a finding of reckless indifference. (Id. at p. 885.)
1. Use or awareness of weapons
Appellant was personally armed and knew that his two
accomplices were also armed. (See People v. Bradley (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1033 [evidence that defendants themselves
possessed firearms and were aware that their accomplice was
also armed supported reckless indifference finding].) Appellant
thus knew that his confederates represented a deadly threat to
any occupant of the dispensary, particularly its security guard.
2. Presence at the crime; opportunity to intervene
Appellant was present when Gonzalez was fatally shot yet
failed to intervene to prevent it or to render subsequent aid. (See
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619 [underscoring the particular
significance of proximity to the murder].)
3. Duration of the crime
The crime was of sufficient length to allow the assailants to
overcome the dispensary’s security measures, for appellant to
engage in a struggle with Gonzalez outside the dispensary during
which appellant’s gun discharged, for appellant to reenter the
dispensary, and for a deadly struggle to occur as appellant and
his associates attempted to escape. Even if this sequence of
events occurred rapidly, the crime was violent throughout its
duration, increasing the risk that it would culminate in murder.
4. Efforts to minimize risk
Appellant’s actions increased rather than minimized the
risk of violence. Appellant was armed and knew that his two

10
accomplices were also armed. Together, the three men attempted
to rob a marijuana dispensary with a dedicated security guard in
the middle of the afternoon, when it was foreseeable that patients
and numerous employees would be present. (See McDowell,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013 [“it was foreseeable that
customers or others could be present [at home invasion robbery of
a drug dealer], even early in the morning, and that either the
dealer himself or his customers might be armed or high and thus
more likely to resist”].)
From the outset of the crime, appellant was “willingly
involved in the violent manner in which the [attempted] robbery
took place.” (People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077,
1089.) He pointed his loaded gun at Gonzalez’s head to effectuate
his compliance. Following a struggle with Gonzalez outside of
the dispensary, appellant’s gun discharged. Rather than running
away, appellant reentered the dispensary to continue assisting
his accomplices with a robbery in which the grave risk of death
was readily apparent.
5. Appellant’s age
Appellant was almost 21 years old when the crime
occurred. Although his youth may have contributed to increased
impulsivity, an expert witness testified at the evidentiary
hearing that she would expect a person around 20 or 21 years old
to understand that a gun could kill someone and to appreciate
the risk posed by holding a gun to a person’s head.
6. Totality of the circumstances
Each of the factors discussed above supports the finding
that appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

GOORVITCH, J.*

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

CHAVEZ, J.

* Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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