People v. K.F. CA2/8

CourtListener 10675487CalctappSep 22, 2025

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Filed 9/22/25 P. v. K.F. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B336655

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. YJ40917-031422

K.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, J. Christopher Smith, Judge. Affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
K.F. appeals the juvenile court’s order committing him to a
secure youth treatment facility (“Facility”) and choosing the
maximum possible term and maximum baseline term of
confinement under section 875 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code and Rule 5.806 of the Rules of Court. We affirm.
Unspecified statutory citations refer to the Welfare and
Institutions Code and rule references are to the Rules of Court.
I
Using a gun, K.F. tried to rob Luis Calles-Martinez, but
Calles-Martinez fought back. K.F. shot him to death, but in the
struggle also shot his own hand.
On March 10, 2022, at around 7:24 p.m., Los Angeles Police
Department Officers Ethan Vernon and Jaime Corona got a call
about a shooting. They drove to a shopping center on the
intersection of Vermont and Slauson Avenues. There, they found
Calles-Martinez, moaning in pain, in a parked Camry. Calles-
Martinez said he was at the shopping center to buy a birthday
present for his son. When getting into his car, he noticed a
person whom he described as wearing a black hoodie sweatshirt
and surgical mask. When Calles-Martinez got out of his car, the
person in the black sweatshirt shot him. Calles-Martinez died in
the hospital.
Video footage showed a person matching the description
Calles-Martinez provided to the officers. This person was K.F.,
then fifteen years old. Calles-Martinez walked to his car and
K.F. approached. Calles-Martinez sat in his driver’s seat. K.F.
appeared to start a conversation with Calles-Martinez, who got
out of his car. Then K.F. shot Calles-Martinez in the chest.
Calles-Martinez got back in his car, sat for a few seconds, and
K.F. advanced with an outstretched gun. Calles-Martinez got out
and tried to grab K.F.’s gun, swinging his arms as he lunged

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forward. K.F. pistol-whipped Calles-Martinez and shot him
again. The whole interaction was about ninety seconds.
Corona broadcast a description of the suspect at around
8:00 p.m. About twenty minutes later, Officer Edward Gonzalez
called to say someone matched the description. Gonzalez sent
Corona a photograph of a young man. The picture matched the
video.
Shortly after Gonzalez and his partner Cesar Arambula
had heard Corona’s crime broadcast, they got radio orders to
report to a place about three and one-half miles away from the
shooting scene. The call was about a shooting. Gonzalez and
Arambula went to the address. Tia Phillips, K.F.’s mother,
answered the door.
Phillips told the officers her son had been shot and asked
the officers to call an ambulance. Her son, K.F., had a gunshot
wound on his hand.
K.F. said he had been shot at Slauson and Vermont. A car
pulled up, K.F. claimed, and someone “just started shooting” at
him.
After hearing K.F. say he was around Vermont and
Slauson, it occurred to Gonzalez that K.F. might have something
to do with the recent shooting broadcast. Gonzalez sent Corona
K.F.’s picture, who confirmed K.F. was the suspect. Police
arrested K.F. A search found a backpack, gun, and mobile phone
with location data. All three items linked K.F. to the shooting.
On March 14, 2022, the prosecutor filed a petition under
section 602 charging K.F. with the first-degree murder of Calles-
Martinez, in violation of Penal Code section 187(a). K.F. denied
the allegation.

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The next day, the court ordered the probation department
to provide a report that lays out “what services are offered to
developmentally disabled youth who get [Facility] commitments,”
including housing and programs.
The probation department submitted this report on April 6,
2022. The report noted that, based on the evidence, the
detectives had “formed the opinion that [K.F.] tricked [Calles-
Martinez] into getting out of his car with the intent to rob him.
[K.F.] then shot [Calles-Martinez] when he did not comply [with
K.F.]’s demands, causing his untimely demise.” It further noted
the police had identified K.F. as a Rollin 30’s Crips gang member.
The report recommended the court commit K.F. to the Facility
because he “would benefit from a highly structured environment
that could provide him with daily routines, mental health
services . . . psychological counseling, and educational [services].”
A less restrictive placement was not appropriate for K.F. because
he had shown “a deliberate disregard for the safety of the
community and its residents” and “a lack of concern for human
life and compassion.”
Later that same month, K.F. moved the court to appoint a
mental health expert under Evidence Code section 730 to
examine him for competency. In the declaration supporting this
motion, K.F.’s attorney averred K.F. had not attended school in
many months, was “often confused by [her] explanation of the
court process,” and “asks questions and makes observations that
do not coincide with the gravity of his circumstances.”
The court appointed Dr. Emin Gharibian to examine K.F.
Gharibian opined K.F. was competent to stand trial.

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In August 2022, the court appointed Dr. Katy Gaines to
conduct a second mental health evaluation of K.F. Gaines spent
about eight hours interviewing K.F.
In December 2022, Gaines submitted her report. Gaines
opined K.F. “suffers from significant intellectual and cognitive
deficits, poor verbal communication skills, and [attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder]” and “emotional and behavioral
disturbances as a result of the manner in which he was raised by
his parents, including neglect.” She posited K.F.’s mental
disorders “were a significant factor in the commission of [the]
charged offense,” noting that “[w]ithout the appropriate
treatment for his constellation of mental health problems, [K.F.]
was left vulnerable to fend for himself” and could be “exploited by
harmful individuals.”
Beginning in May 2022, the probation department
submitted periodic reports detailing K.F.’s behavior in custody.
The negative case notes in K.F.'s reports far outnumbered the
positive ones. Probation officers consistently found K.F. to be
insubordinate, disruptive, and disrespectful. Nearly every report
included at least one instance of K.F. verbally or physically
assaulting another inmate or facility staff. Several times, K.F.
threw gang signs or announced his Rollin’ 30s affiliation. He
repeatedly called officers “stupid,” “bitch,” or “weird ass,” and
threatened to “fuck [them] up.”
In April 2023, staff found contraband in K.F.’s room,
including “two metal pieces that could be used to cut something
or someone and a shank made from a screw and gloves for the
handle.”
In May 2023, K.F. disrupted an educational program by
slamming the windows while shouting gang-related obscenities.

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An officer instructed K.F. to stop disrupting the class, as the
other inmates were completing their school assignments. The
officer told K.F. that they would document his behavior and let
the court know, to which K.F. responded: “Fuck the write up!
Fuck my judge cuh! I don’t give a fuck about court! They aint
doing shit! You a stupid bitch I’ll fuck you up!”
Over four days in October 2023, the court held an
adjudication hearing on the section 602 petition. Law
enforcement personnel testified for the prosecution; K.F. offered
no evidence in his defense. The court found there was
“overwhelming evidence that [K.F.] is the individual who
committed this offense” and that the petition’s allegations against
K.F. were true beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the disposition hearing, the prosecutor asked the court
to send K.F. to a Facility, citing the evidence in the record and
arguing K.F.’s act of shooting Calles-Martinez was “a murder
that occurred [] because [K.F.] didn’t know when to disengage
once his plan of robbing someone at gunpoint didn’t go as
planned.”
In response, K.F. asked for an 18-month placement at
Dorothy Kirby Center or a 9-month camp commitment. He
pointed out his intellectual disabilities and argued he never had
the intent to kill Calles-Martinez.
After acknowledging K.F.’s disabilities, the court ordered
K.F. to a Facility, which is the most secure juvenile placement.
Each California county has at least one.
On the record, the court considered the factors listed in
section 875(a)(3) and the reports from the probation department.
The court found a less restrictive alternative disposition would be

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unsuitable because Dorothy Kirby Center or camp would not be
able to meet K.F.’s “extensive” needs.
The court set K.F.’s baseline term of confinement to be
seven years, and the maximum term of confinement to be 15
years to life. In doing so, the court noted: “The baseline term of
confinement represents the time in custody necessary to meet the
developmental and treatment needs of the youth, and to prepare
the youth for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the
community. And the maximum confinement time [for] an adult
with this offense would be 15 years to life in prison.”
II
On appeal, K.F. makes two attacks on the juvenile court’s
ruling. One is about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the placement at the Facility. The other is about the court’s
compliance with the rules pertaining to Facility commitments,
which became effective July 1, 2023. (See In re Tony R. (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 395, 415 (Tony R.).) Both arguments lack merit.
We review a juvenile court’s commitment decision for abuse
of discretion. We examine whether the ruling falls outside the
bounds of reason. (See Tony R., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.)
Under this standard, we make all reasonable inferences to
support the decision of the juvenile court and do not disturb
findings supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
A
K.F.’s first argument relies on In re Carlos J. (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 1 (Carlos J.), which clarified the requirements to
commit a minor to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (Division).
Before the Legislature passed juvenile justice realignment
legislation through Senate Bill 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2020, ch. 337) in 2020, the Division was “the state’s most

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restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders . . . ”
(See In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 902.) The
juvenile justice realignment bill “does not change section 202,
which recognizes punishment as a potential rehabilitative tool,
[but] the new scheme implicitly places less weight on punishment
by prioritizing treatment and restricting commitment avenues.”
(Id. at p. 907.)
Citing Carlos J., K.F. argues there is no substantial
evidence supporting the court’s decision to commit him to a
Facility, especially in light of the rehabilitative goal of the
juvenile justice realignment legislation. He points out the
evidence in the record is general and lacks the specificity
required under section 875 for a Facility commitment: “[w]hile
the probation officer stated the [Facility] would provide suitable
education and treatment to [K.F.], the report speaks only in
general terms about the services the [Facility] could provide.”
The probation department’s report stated: “While under
the care and supervision of the [Facility], [K.F.] will have the
opportunity to participate in education, mental health and
substance abuse services. In addition, religious, arts and writing
services are available to continually engage [K.F.] while also
maintaining public safety.”
Carlos J. is distinguishable.
Carlos J. concerned a minor with no significant earlier
criminal record who admitted to committing assault with a
firearm along with a criminal street gang enhancement. (Carlos
J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 4, 7.) The juvenile court
committed the minor to the Division, citing the seriousness of the
crime, the minor’s gang affiliation, and public safety. (Id. at p. 9.)
The court stated “that the mental and physical condition and

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qualifications of this [minor] render it probable that the youth
will benefit from the reformatory, discipline or other treatment
provided by the [Division]” but made no specific findings about
what specific programs at the Division would benefit the minor.
(Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a Division
placement “requires some concrete evidence in the record about
relevant programs at the [Division].” (Carlos J., supra, 22
Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) It further held: “[w]here a minor has
particular needs, the probation department should also include
brief descriptions of the relevant programs to address those
needs.” (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings.
The court found that a less restrictive placement would not
have met K.F.’s rehabilitation needs. Nor would it have
protected community safety.
The probation department recommended a Facility
commitment for K.F. because he “would benefit from a highly
structured environment that could provide him with daily
routines, mental health services to include individual, family
counseling, psychological counseling, and educational service[s].”
It further noted “the community [would] be protected from
further criminal activity by [K.F.] while he is committed to the
[Facility].”
This evidence suffices. Section 875 “governs the
commitment of juvenile wards to the secure youth treatment
facilities ... .” (Tony R., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.) It
instructs that a court may commit a ward to the Facility if “[t]he
court has made a finding on the record that a less restrictive,
alternative disposition for the ward is unsuitable.” (§ 875, subd.

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(a)(3).) “In determining this, the court shall consider all relevant
and material evidence, including the recommendations of
counsel, the probation department, and any other agency or
individual designated by the court to advise on the appropriate
disposition of the case.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, the court must
“additionally make its determination based on all of the following
criteria:
(A) The severity of the offense or offenses for which the
ward has been most recently adjudicated, including
the ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior,
and harm done to victims.
(B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including the
adequacy and success of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward.
(C) Whether the programming, treatment, and education
offered and provided in a secure youth treatment
facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and
security needs of the ward.
(D) Whether the goals of rehabilitation and community
safety can be met by assigning the ward to an
alternative, less restrictive disposition that is
available to the court.
(E) The ward's age, developmental maturity, mental and
emotional health, sexual orientation, gender identity
and expression, and any disabilities or special needs
affecting the safety or suitability of committing the
ward to a term of confinement in a secure youth
treatment facility.”
(Ibid.)

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This juvenile court complied with the statute’s
requirements. It considered the probation department’s April
2022 report and periodic detention observation reports, noting
K.F.’s problematic behavior in custody. And it went through each
of the five criteria listed in section 875(a)(3) on the record. In
contrast to the vague description of Division services the Carlos
J. juvenile court provided, the court here specifically found that a
less restrictive placement would be insufficient to meet K.F.’s
“extensive” needs and that the Facility placement would give K.F.
“an individual rehabilitation plan” to help him “get on track and
hopefully get the tools [he needs] to progress and mature and
become a responsible adult.” And here, the probation
department’s report was more detailed than the one in Carlos J.,
as it specifically mentioned “a highly structured environment,”
family, individual, and psychological counseling, and educational
services. Substantial evidence supports the court’s decision to
commit K.F. to the Facility.
B
K.F.’s second contention is that the court abused its
discretion in setting the maximum and baseline terms of
confinement without explicitly referencing the factors listed in
Rule 5.806. He points out that Rule 5.806, titled “Secure youth
treatment facility baseline term,” provides: “[i]n its selection of
the individual baseline term, the court must review and consider
each of the criteria listed in paragraphs (1) through (4) . . . The
court must state on the record its reasons for selecting a
particular term, referencing each of the criteria and any factors
the court deemed relevant.” These criteria are: (1) the
circumstances and gravity of the commitment offense; (2) the
youth’s prior history in the juvenile justice system; (3) the

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confinement time considered reasonable and necessary to achieve
the rehabilitation of the youth; and (4) the youth’s developmental
history. (Rule 5.806, subd. (b).)
The juvenile court complied with the legal requirements for
its decision on K.F.’s terms of confinement. Rule 5.806,
subdivision (b)’s criteria for selecting a baseline term of
confinement overlap significantly with section 875, subdivision
(a)(3)’s criteria for committing a minor to a Facility. Both sets of
criteria ask the court to consider the nature of the minor’s
offense, the minor’s history in the juvenile justice system, and the
youth’s personal characteristics in light of the juvenile justice
realignment legislation’s goal of rehabilitation. (See Rule 5.806,
subd. (b); § 875, subd. (a)(3).) As discussed above, the juvenile
court considered all of these criteria when it decided to commit
K.F. to a Facility. It stated its reasons on the record. The court
tied its commitment decision to these criteria, noting it had
“considered the individual facts and circumstances of the case.”
The juvenile court adequately considered Rule 5.806’s
criteria. Substantial evidence supports its decision, which was
not an abuse of discretion. (See Tony R., 98 Cal.App.5th at p.
414.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

WILEY, J.
We concur:

STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.

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