People v. Carlson CA1/5

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Filed 9/17/25 P. v. Carlson CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172130
v.
JESSICAH CARLSON, (Del Norte County
Super. Ct. No. CF249185)
Defendant and Appellant.

After defendant and appellant Jessicah Carlson pled no contest to a
single felony count for resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69, subd.
(a)), 1 the trial court placed her on probation. Under the terms and conditions
of her probation, Carlson had to “[t]otally refrain” from using marijuana,
alcohol, illegal substances, or controlled substances that had not been
prescribed to her by a doctor. To ensure that she refrained from doing so,
Carlson had to submit to testing “for intoxicating or controlled substances on
demand . . . .” If the “results” of those tests were not “clean,” then she would
violate her probation. On appeal, Carlson contends that the requirement
that her test results be “clean” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
We disagree and therefore affirm.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTS
On July 11, 2024, the People filed an information charging Carlson
with two felonies: resisting an executive officer (§ 69, subd. (a); count 1) and
battery with injury on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2); count 2). Carlson
pled no contest to count 1 (resisting an executive officer). As the factual basis
for the plea, the prosecutor stated that Carlson grabbed an officer’s vest,
threatened to hit that officer with a shoe, and kicked the officer in the face.
Carlson later moved to withdraw her plea but the trial court denied her
motion.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court placed Carlson on “two years
of formal probation” and imposed certain terms and conditions. Conditions
21 to 23 are the three conditions that are relevant to this appeal.
Under condition 21, Carlson must “[t]otally refrain from the possession
or consumption of alcohol and marijuana, and stay out of places where
alcohol and/or marijuana is the chief item of sale, including but not limited to
dispensaries, breweries, and liquor stores.” Under condition 22, Carlson
must “[t]otally refrain from the use or possession, and not be under the
influence of any illegal substance or any controlled substances that are not
prescribed by a medical doctor or physician, and shall not use or possess
controlled substance paraphernalia including but not limited to pipes,
hypodermic needles, and bongs.” Finally, under condition 23, Carlson must
“[s]ubmit to blood, breath, urine, field sobriety, and other chemical testing for
intoxicating or controlled substances on demand of any Probation or Peace
Officer. Submit clean test results. For any pre-scheduled test, the results
must be undiluted.”
During discussions about these three conditions at the sentencing
hearing, the probation officer stated that Carlson “reported that she uses

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marijuana daily” and that, at the time of the incident, she “was under the
influence of alcohol” and on her way to get a battery for her “cannabis vape.”
The prosecutor stated that Carlson appeared to be “under the influence of
something” at the time of the incident and “ha[d] a history of using alcohol
and resisting officers.” In imposing conditions 21 to 23, the trial court
explained that Carlson would get “a mental health assessment” and that
“[a]lmost all substances like marijuana, methamphetamine, [and] alcohol
interfere with mental health drugs. And that’s a problem.” The court then
found that Carlson’s “substance abuse is clearly an issue” and is “causing
interference with proper social behavior.”
Carlson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Under condition 23 of her probation, Carlson must “[s]ubmit to . . .
testing for intoxicating or controlled substances on demand,” and the
“results” of those tests must be “clean.” According to Carlson, the term
“clean” as used in that condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
As a threshold matter, the People contend that Carlson forfeited these
constitutional challenges by failing to object below. (See In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 (Sheena K) [failure to object to probation condition
at sentencing forfeits claim that cannot “ ‘ “be resolved without reference to
the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court” ’ ”].) Carlson
counters that she did not forfeit her constitutional challenges because they
are facial challenges that can be resolved without reference to the record.
(Ibid.) We need not, however, resolve the forfeiture issue because we reject
Carlson’s challenges on their merits. Exercising de novo review (People v.
Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723), we find that condition 23 is

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neither vague nor overbroad because it only prohibits Carlson from using the
substances identified in conditions 21 and 22.
To survive a vagueness challenge, a probation condition must provide
“fair warning” to a probationer. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
This means that the condition “ ‘must be sufficiently precise for the
probationer to know what is required of [her], and for the court to determine
whether the condition has been violated.’ ” (Ibid.)
To survive an overbreadth challenge, “[a] probation condition that
imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor
those limitations to the purpose of the condition . . . .” (Sheena K., supra, 40
Cal.4th at p. 890.) “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the
closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the
burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind,
of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical
necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1149, 1153.)
When construing probation conditions, “we consider their context and
we use common sense.” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902
(Smith).) And “[w]here the trial court has made oral or written comments
clarifying the probation condition, we may consider those comments in
determining whether a challenged condition is unconstitutionally vague” or
overbroad. (Ibid.)
Because the term “clean” as used in condition 23 is not expressly
defined, Carlson contends that she may violate that condition by testing
positive for a “properly prescribed narcotic” like “fentanyl.” She therefore
contends that the requirement that her test results be “clean” is both vague
and overbroad. Carlson, however, largely ignores conditions 21 and 22—

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which do not include properly prescribed medications among the substances
that she may not use. When considered in light of those two conditions,
condition 23 is neither vague nor overbroad.
Conditions 21 and 22 identify all of the “intoxicating or controlled
substances” that Carlson must “[t]otally refrain” from using. Those
substances consist of “alcohol,” “marijuana,” “any illegal substance,” and “any
controlled substances that are not prescribed by a medical doctor or
physician.” Those substances do not include any controlled substances that
have been prescribed to Carlson by a doctor. Thus, conditions 21 and 22, by
their terms, do not prohibit Carlson from using any properly prescribed
medications. Considering condition 23 in this “context” and using our
“common sense,” we conclude that a test result is not “clean” under that
condition only if Carlson tests positive for a substance that she must “[t]otally
refrain” from using under conditions 21 and 22—i.e., alcohol, marijuana, an
illegal substance, or a controlled substance that has not been prescribed to
her. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) Stated in the inverse, a test
result is still “clean” under condition 23 if Carlson tests positive for a
substance that she is not prohibited from using by conditions 21 and 22—i.e.,
any controlled substance that has been properly prescribed to her. Because
Carlson “can reasonably understand how to” comply with condition 23 under
this commonsense interpretation, the condition is not vague. (People v.
Holzmann (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1245.) Similarly, condition 23 is not
overbroad because it does not prevent Carlson from using properly prescribed
medications that she needs for her own health and well-being.
Finally, even without conditions 21 and 22, we would reject Carlson’s
constitutional challenges based on the trial court’s comments during the
sentencing hearing. (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) During that

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hearing, the court observed that Carlson’s “substance abuse” interfered with
her ability to exhibit “proper social behavior.” The court also explained that
any use of substances like “marijuana,” “alcohol,” or “methamphetamine” was
a “problem” because it “interfere[d] with mental health drugs” that would
presumably be prescribed to Carlson by a doctor after her mental health
assessment. Thus, the court adequately clarified at the sentencing hearing
that Carlson could use prescribed medications like “mental health drugs.”
And from this clarification, it is sufficiently clear that Carlson’s test results
would be “clean” under condition 23 if she only tested positive for a properly
prescribed medication.
Accordingly, we reject Carlson’s vagueness and overbreadth challenges.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR.

SIMONS, Acting P. J.
BURNS, J.

A172130/ People v. Carlson

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