People v. Leonard CA3

CourtListener 10669441CalctappSep 10, 2025

Full text

Filed 9/10/25 P. v. Leonard CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C095999

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 19FE014579)

v.

MICHAEL JOHN LEONARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Michael John Leonard was convicted of 41 sexual offenses and
sentenced pursuant to the “One Strike” law (Pen. Code,1 § 667.61) for 36 of those
convictions. In total, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve 770 years to life, plus
five years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have ordered a
competency evaluation, the prosecution provided insufficient notice of the One Strike

1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

1
allegation attached to 36 of his convictions, and insufficient evidence supported the
aggravating circumstances attached to count one.2 We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I
Underlying Facts
Defendant committed sexual offenses against numerous girls between the ages of
six and 13 years old. The facts underlying most of defendant’s convictions are not
relevant to his appeal, except to the extent they provide context for his defense. Among
defendant’s victims were his daughter and several of her friends. Some of these victims
testified defendant would photograph them nude or in provocative clothing, and often
together. Many of these victims also testified defendant painted their bodies and gave
them massages. These victims further testified to a variety of sex acts defendant
performed on them. Other victims were girls defendant encountered as an artist
promoting his book Ryvah: Plight of the Fairies. In this regard, defendant told them to
wear provocative clothing and planned to record them affectionately dancing with each
other and with the understanding they were recording a trailer to promote the book.
Relevant to this appeal, defendant was convicted in count one of annoying and
molesting Justine Doe, Emily Doe, June Doe, and Juliet Doe. The jury also found
defendant’s crime indicated planning or sophistication and he took advantage of a
position of trust. The jury found not true that defendant’s victims were particularly
vulnerable.
All four girls testified to the facts underlying this event. It occurred when the girls
were members of a book club and between 13 and 14 years old. The girls would meet at
Justine’s house to talk about books and perform creative writing exercises. Juliet had met

2 Defendant also argues in his opening brief that insufficient evidence supports
count fourteen. He withdraws this argument in reply.

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defendant when responding to a casting advertisement he posted requesting dancers for a
trailer to promote his book. Because defendant was a local author, Juliet and her father
thought it would be a good idea to invite defendant to the book club to speak to the girls
about the process of writing and promoting a book. When defendant came to the book
club meeting, he spoke to the girls alone, with two young boys playing video games
nearby.
After defendant talked about his book for over a half hour and gave each one of
the girls a copy of the manuscript, he asked the younger boys to leave the room. Once
the boys left, defendant asked the girls whether they knew what oral sex was. Defendant
then told them that if their boyfriends ever asked for oral sex from them, they should
perform the act but not swallow their boyfriends’ ejaculate. Instead, defendant said, they
should give their boyfriends a big, wet, sloppy kiss to discourage them from ever asking
for oral sex in the future. Defendant also told the girls that, if their boyfriends ever asked
to have anal sex with them, they should present a dildo to their boyfriends to perform
anal sex on the boyfriends. According to defendant, this would disgust the girls’
boyfriends into not asking for anal sex again. The girls testified they were made
uncomfortable by the comments. After the comments, defendant gave each girl his
business card and told them to contact him if they wanted to talk more.
II
Competency Proceedings
Multiple doctors examined defendant for competency from 2016 until 2021 when
the issue went to a jury. Two experts testified to their opinions—made in 2016, 2018,
and 2019—that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. The findings were based on a
diagnosis that defendant suffered from psychotic delusions that he was chosen by God to
pass laws reducing the age of consent and the government was conspiring against this
effort by bringing the current charges against him.

3
The experts described defendant’s delusions as rigid and fixed, and occupying his
thoughts such that he could not carry an organized conversation focused on his criminal
case. For example, when asked about his future if found guilty, defendant said the
charges were bogus or he was not going to be found guilty because he was doing God’s
work. He also wanted to invite media to the trial to educate the public about the laws
God wanted him to pass. While defendant demonstrated an understanding of the legal
system, it was these experts’ opinions that defendant’s delusions prevented him from
being able to understand his legal situation in a rational manner and consult with his
counsel in a rational way.
Two additional experts testified to their opinions at defendant’s competency jury
trial—made in 2019 and 2021—that defendant was competent to stand trial. The experts
explained a criminal defendant needed to be diagnosed with a qualifying mental health
disorder to be found incompetent. The experts did not believe defendant’s delusions
were a product of psychosis, and instead believed they were fixed and rigid beliefs
resulting from a personality disorder, which does not qualify as a mental health disorder.
The experts who believed defendant was competent based their opinions on defendant’s
organized conversations with them, lack of verifiable delusions or hallucinations,
consistent behavior despite antipsychotic medications, and exaggeration of his symptoms.
Defendant further demonstrated no impairment in his memory or thinking and showed
legal planning and strategy. Further, defendant did not cite to the laws he believed God
wanted him to pass as being part of his defense strategy, even though he thoroughly
discussed the book he wrote.
Defendant also testified to his belief that he “is real. [He]’s not a fraud. [He is]
who [he] say[s he is]. And that is the Messiah.” He further testified he would save all
humanity and did not need a defense strategy because God showed him the future and the
jury was going to find him not guilty. Defendant testified extensively about his book and
the laws written in it he wanted passed, which included laws reducing the age of consent.

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The jury found defendant competent to stand trial.
III
Trial Proceedings
Soon after being found competent to stand trial, defendant elected to represent
himself. In early February 2022, the prosecution filed an amended information alleging
43 counts. At the conclusion of the amended information, it “further alleged . . .
defendant . . . has been convicted in the present case or cases of committing an offense
specified in subdivision (c) against more than one victim, within the meaning of Penal
Code [s]ections 667.61[, subdivision ](e)(4) and 667.61[, subdivision ](j)(2).” The
information was later amended to conform to proof presented at trial and included the
same sentencing allegation under section 667.61.
Before trial, defendant filed motions in limine requesting dismissal of the case
based on speedy trial and discovery violations, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel
during the competency stage of his case. Defendant also proffered the testimony of
proposed witnesses and some of his proposed questions. The court addressed defendant’s
motions and his discovery concerns at the in limine motion hearing, including the
evidence defendant wanted to introduce at trial.
Defendant explained his defense during the motions in limine hearing, stating, “I
have written a book called Ryvah: Plight of the Fairies, and within this novel, I present
15 laws that I wish to pass. [I]t’s not just one book. It’s not a minor thing, but it’s
something that consumes my entire life and being and soul and everything. [¶] The laws
of Ryvah -- there’s 13 books in total. I actually have the covers of seven of them to
provide so that I can show, ‘Look at all these books’. There’s 72 laws in total. [I h]ave
all of that. [¶] And these laws of Ryvah are designed to reinforce our constitutional
rights, defend the nation of the United States of America, our prosperity, our liberties,
protect people. I think they are beautiful. I think God has given me these laws to pass to

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save humanity, and I have shown them to many people, and the people I’ve shown them
to are profoundly affected by them.
“I believe that I am the Messiah of God and that my mission is to come and pass
these laws, and all this is just part of the plan to reach that goal. [¶] Now, [my former
attorney] . . . decided that I may not be competent to stand trial based on my beliefs and
the idea that I had no fear of conviction because I am doing the will of God . . . [but] I
have been consistently doing this for my entire life, not just the last seven years. [¶] . . .
[¶] Now, I know that I am being targeted to -- to the Illuminati, the secret governments
of the world. They don’t want these laws. If I pass my laws, I will shut them down. I
will destroy the Illuminati. The secret governments cannot survive with these laws on the
books, absolutely not.”
Later during the motions in limine hearing, defendant expressed doubt in his own
competence based on his former attorney’s performance at his competency hearing. He
argued that he believed his attorney had acted ineffectively for a variety of reasons,
which to defendant would mean his competency trial was unreliable when determining he
was legitimately the Messiah. The trial court clarified for defendant that his competency
hearing was not conducted for the purpose of determining whether defendant was
actually who he believed he was. The court found, “And I will indicate to you that even
though you’re referencing your belief that you’re the Messiah and so forth, you have said
and done nothing in this court that suggests to me that you’re not competent or that
you’re not able to represent yourself. The issue of whether you are or [are] not the
Messiah is not what that turns on.”
At trial, defendant delivered an opening statement. In it, defendant argued that the
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution were “slipping away.” He stated,
“Look around. Okay. We are almost there. Our world is in trouble, and my laws of
Ryvah will fix it. The laws of Ryvah are at the very core of this case in every way, shape
and form.” Defendant further explained, “In 2006[,] I had the realization -- I talked to

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God and he said: [¶] [‘]You’re not allowed to [give up]. You are a father now. You
have two beautiful children, and I don’t care if you have to sacrifice your life, you must
protect them.[’] [¶] I became Ryvah. I wrote Ryvah: Plight of the Fairies, and I wrote it
very, very carefully. Thousands and thousands of hours poured into that book alone, of
which there are 13 novels. I wanted to sculpt the social issues that I wanted our society
to deal with, and I wanted to camouflage it just enough so that people would see it, talk
about it and debate it. [¶] The book is sensual, lightweight erotica. There are no cuss
words in the book. The book is designed to be read by a child, a 13-year-old. The book
is designed to open up conversation. [¶] Within this book are the laws of Ryvah, 15 laws
that I crafted with the inspiration of God, that will rid corruption out of our world. It will
shut down the Illuminati, the people who sponsored the Twin Towers, all three World
Trade Center skyscrapers that fell in free-fall, the people who sponsored Pearl Harbor and
COVID-19.”
At trial, defendant cross-examined witnesses concerning their credibility and bias,
as well as the circumstances leading to and during their interactions. Defendant also
referenced his past conversations with his victims about Ryvah and his efforts to educate
them about the laws promoted in his book.
Defendant called four witnesses in his defense. This included Juliet’s father, who
testified about his meetings with defendant when deciding whether to allow Juliet to
work on the trailer for defendant’s book. This also included an expert in memory recall
who testified about the brain’s ability to recall memories and whether memories can be
influenced by outside forces. Defendant also called a former girlfriend who testified
about his character and the times defendant photographed and painted her body. Finally,
defendant called a fellow inmate he met while incarcerated pending trial to testify about
his character, the laws of Ryvah, and defendant’s efforts to reform government.
Defendant delivered a closing argument wherein he argued he gained consent
from his victims before and during his interactions with them. He argued all the victims

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and witnesses were coerced into lying about the interactions or exaggerating his conduct.
He pointed to aspects of their testimony he believed showed inconsistencies. Defendant
admitted he photographed nude children, painted children’s bodies, engaged in “bonding”
by touching them all over their bodies, and gave advice about sex to minors. Defendant
argued, “The Illuminati wishes to enslave the world and remove freedom and love. I, as
Ryvah, have a powerful tool that manifests in incredible love called bonding.”
According to defendant, Ryvah is “a state of mind, where your life ceases to have value,
except to become a tool of fate, [your] only purpose is to fight for and, if need be, die for
the absolute unconditional right to freedom and love.” To defendant, the conduct he was
alleged to have committed was either done with the victim’s consent or the product of
manipulation by outside influences that sought to destroy the laws of Ryvah.
While the jury found defendant guilty of all 42 counts, the trial court dismissed
count eleven in the interest of justice. Based on the jury’s true findings as to the One
Strike special circumstance and the aggravating circumstances attached to count one, the
court sentenced defendant to a total of 770 years to life, plus five years in prison.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
The Record Does Not Indicate Defendant Was Incompetent During Trial
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to order a competency
examination during trial when defendant relied on his delusions as a defense to the crimes
charged. We disagree.
“The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court from trying or
convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent to stand trial.” (People v.
Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 230.) Section 1367, subdivision (a) incorporates this
constitutional standard by stating, “A defendant is mentally incompetent . . . if, as a result
of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to

8
understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a
defense in a rational manner.”
A trial court’s “duty to assess competence is a continuing one.” (People v. Rodas,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 235, fn. 5.) “A trial court’s duty to conduct a competency hearing
may arise at any time before entry of judgment. [Citation.] However, after a defendant is
found competent, the court need not conduct a second competency hearing unless
presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence casting a
serious doubt on the validity of the earlier finding.” (People v. Tejeda (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.) “The evidentiary standard by which the trial court evaluates”
this “showing is substantial evidence.” (People v. Easter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 226,
242.)
“ ‘The decision whether to order a competency hearing rests within the trial
court’s discretion, and may be disturbed upon appeal “only where a doubt as to [mental
competence] may be said to appear as a matter of law or where there is an abuse of
discretion.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[A]bsent a showing of “incompetence” that is “substantial” as
a matter of law, the trial judge’s decision not to order a competency hearing is entitled to
great deference, because the trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant
during trial.’ ” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 29.)
Defendant relies on Murdoch, where doctors concluded the defendant was
competent, but were concerned he would not remain competent given his refusal to take
his prescribed medication. (People v. Murdoch (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 230, 232-233.)
The trial court found the defendant was not incompetent. (Ibid.) About two months later,
the defendant was permitted to represent himself at trial. (Id. at pp. 233-234.) Prior to
opening statements, the defendant informed the trial court his defense was that the
alleged victim was not a human being. (Id. at pp. 234-235.) To prove this, he wanted to
introduce pages from the Bible and demonstrate the victim did not have shoulder blades,
which he believed was “ ‘symbolic of angelic beings.’ ” (Ibid.) The sole question he

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asked of a witness was whether the victim could shrug his shoulders. (Id. at p. 235.) The
Court of Appeal held that the defendant’s bizarre statements, “taken together” with the
expert reports (id. at p. 238) detailing the “defendant’s fragile competence and its evident
dependence upon continued medication” (id. at p. 237), “provide[d] the substantial
evidence necessary to demonstrate a reasonable doubt as to whether [the defendant] had
in fact decompensated and become incompetent as the experts had warned” (id. at
p. 238).
Defendant argues his case is like Murdoch because an expert’s finding of
competency was conditioned on a fact that was not true at trial. For Murdoch, that was
the defendant’s decompensation and failure to medicate. (People v. Murdoch, supra,
194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 237-238.) For defendant, it was the prosecution experts’
testimony he would not rely on his delusions as a defense at trial, which he did rely on.
We disagree with defendant’s reading of the experts’ testimony. The experts did not
condition their opinion regarding defendant’s competence on his failure to rely on his
delusions as a defense. Instead, both prosecution experts testified defendant’s delusions
were not the product of a mental health disorder. They believed this because defendant
presented with organized thoughts, did not experience verifiable delusions or
hallucinations, demonstrated no impairment in his memory, and showed legal planning
and strategy. Indeed, experts on both sides agreed defendant held fixed and irrational
beliefs that he was the Messiah, could talk to God, and the government was conspiring to
silence him.
At trial, defendant maintained his fixed beliefs, yet he presented an organized
defense, impeached witnesses, emphasized evidence of consent and lack of sexual intent
for the more innocent touchings, and presented expert testimony about influences on
memory to explain testimony about the more sexualized conduct. Defendant presented
clear argument to the trial court and to the jury and was intellectually capable of
following the evidence and rebutting it through cross-examination. At no point did

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defendant speak to figures or people who were not present in the courtroom. While
defendant claimed he was chosen by God and the government conspired against him,
defendant focused his arguments on the facts of the case. He clearly argued and
introduced evidence to support that the alleged conduct was committed with the victim’s
consent or the product of manipulation by outside influences.
At bottom, defendant’s conduct at trial was consistent with his conduct at the
competency hearing and the prosecution’s experts’ testimony. Accordingly, it was not
error for the trial court not to order a competency examination during trial.
II
Defendant Had Adequate Notice The Prosecution
Sought To Have Him Sentenced Under The One Strike Law
Defendant contends he did not have adequate notice he would be sentenced
pursuant to the One Strike law. (§ 667.61) We disagree.
To be subjected to any of the penalties under the One Strike law, due process
requires a defendant receive sufficient notice. “[I]n addition to the statutory requirements
that enhancement provisions be pleaded and proven, a defendant has a cognizable due
process right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be
invoked to increase punishment for [the defendant’s] crimes.” (People v. Mancebo
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 747.) “This goes for sentence enhancements as well as
substantive offenses.” (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 953.) “To satisfy due
process, it is sufficient for an accusatory pleading to provide the defendant fair notice of
the particular One Strike sentence the prosecution is seeking and of which facts it intends
to prove to support that sentence.” (In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 720, citing
Mancebo, at pp. 753-754.)
In Vaquera, our Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds an enhanced
25-year-to-life sentence imposed under the One Strike law on the basis that the pleading
alleged the defendant was subject only to the statute’s general 15-year-to-life sentence.

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(In re Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 715, 724, 728.) It concluded the information
failed to provide the defendant fair notice of the prosecution’s intent to seek the more
stringent 25-year-to-life sentence and the factual basis on which it sought that sentence.
(Id. at pp. 723-725.) In identifying the applicable due process principles, our Supreme
Court relied on Mancebo for the proposition that, “to satisfy due process, an accusatory
pleading must inform the defendant that the prosecution is relying on specific facts to
support imposition of a particular One Strike sentence.” (Vaquera, at p. 719, citing
Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 746-747.)
Here, the information’s One Strike allegations did not identify the law’s
application to specific counts. Instead, it generally alleged defendant had been convicted
of crimes specified in section 667.61, subdivision (c) against more than one victim
pursuant to subdivision (e)(4) and that the prosecution was seeking to sentence defendant
under subdivision (j)(2). Read in conjunction with the statutory language, this triggered
application of the 25-year-to-life One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2)) based on
defendant’s commission of a crime under subdivision (c) against multiple victims
(§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)) under the age of 14 years old (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2)). In
defendant’s case this meant all of his convictions for section 288, subdivision (a), as
those are his only convictions listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c). (See § 667.61,
subd. (c)(8).)
Defendant disagrees relying on Anderson for the proposition that the prosecution
was required to allege the One Strike allegation on every count for which it sought the
allegation to apply or at least specify in the general allegation which counts it sought the
allegation to enhance. (People v. Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th 946.) We disagree.
Anderson dealt with the notice required before the prosecution could use a conduct
enhancement to enhance the sentence of a particular conviction. (Id. at pp. 949-950.) In
addition to potentially affecting trial strategy, our Supreme Court held that the
prosecution’s failure to allege enhancements to each conviction it sought to enhance

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denied the defendant notice of the potential total sentence because it was reasonable to
assume the prosecution had exercised its discretion to limit the defendant’s potential
sentence to what was pled. (Id. at pp. 956, 964.)
On the other hand, the One Strike allegation is a sentencing scheme applicable to
defendants who have committed specified conduct. (People v. Carbajal (2013)
56 Cal.4th 521, 534.) To that end, “to satisfy due process, an accusatory pleading must
inform the defendant that the prosecution is relying on specific facts to support
imposition of a particular One Strike sentence.” (In re Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 719.) Here, the prosecution adequately informed defendant it was seeking to sentence
him to 25 years to life under the One Strike sentencing scheme for each qualifying
conviction by alleging defendant’s crimes had been committed against multiple victims
under the age of 14 years old and citing the relevant statutory provisions. Under
Vaquera, due process was satisfied.
Defendant also argues the prosecution failed to particularize which of the
qualifying convictions were subject to the 25-year-to-life sentence and which ones were
subject to the 15-year-to-life sentence. The trial court was precluded from sentencing
defendant to 25 years to life for some of his section 288, subdivision (a) convictions
because the conduct underlying the convictions occurred before the operative date of
section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2). (People v. Betts (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 295, 299.) We
conclude there was no due process violation under these facts. The information informs
defendant the prosecution was seeking 25-year-to-life sentences for all convictions of
section 288, subdivision (a). The fact defendant was sentenced to 15 years to life on the
same factual showing the prosecution needed to make to secure 25 years to life does not
result in improper notice. The purpose of the pleading requirement is “to give sufficient
notice to permit the defense to make informed decisions about the case, including
whether to plead guilty, how to allocate investigatory resources, and what strategy to
deploy at trial.” (People v. Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 964.) The selection of

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shorter sentences than noticed for some of defendant’s convictions did not reduce
defendant’s sentence in a way that would affect defendant’s plea negotiations or his trial
strategy. Thus, defendant cannot demonstrate a due process violation.
Accordingly, defendant was provided sufficient notice of the One Strike sentences
the prosecution sought.
III
Substantial Evidence Supports The Aggravating
Circumstances Attached To Count One
Defendant contends the evidence does not support the aggravating circumstances
that defendant was in a position of trust and acted with sophistication or planning for
purposes of imposing the upper term for count one. We disagree.
“ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court ‘presumes in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v.
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715, italics omitted.)
“An aggravating circumstance is a fact that makes the offense ‘distinctively worse
than the ordinary.’ [Citations.] Aggravating circumstances include those listed in the
sentencing rules, as well as any facts ‘statutorily declared to be circumstances in
aggravation’ [citation] and any other facts that are ‘reasonably related to the decision
being made.’ ” (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817, overruled on other grounds
in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1085.) California Rules of Court,

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rule 4.421(a)(11) states that a circumstance in aggravation occurs when “[t]he defendant
took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense.”
Relying on People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1695, disapproved on
other grounds in People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1123, defendant argues the
position of trust or confidence factor requires a special relationship between himself and
his victims. Not so. The California Rules of Court simply state that a circumstance in
aggravation exists when “[t]he defendant took advantage of a position of trust or
confidence to commit the offense,” with no requirement of a special relationship between
the defendant and the victim specified. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11).) Dancer
did not specifically hold that a special relationship between the defendant and the victim
is required for this aggravating circumstance to be found true. Instead, accepting the
defendant’s argument that a special status was required, the Dancer court held that such a
status was demonstrated on the facts of that case. (Dancer, at pp. 1694-1695.) A
defendant may often need to establish a relationship with the victim to create a position
of trust. As a result, cases involving this aggravating circumstance typically note the
status the defendant had in relation to the victim that placed the defendant in a position of
trust or confidence. (See, e.g., People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 155 [the
defendant approached a child walking home alone from school and represented himself to
be a teacher, “prey[ing] on her naivete and natural deference to a teacher’s position of
authority”]; People v. Baughman (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1323 [single parent of
victim]; People v. Dominguez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 858, 869 [employee with
unsupervised access to victim’s car]; People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 331,
337-338 [adult caring for young victim]; People v. Clark (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 663, 666
[stepfather entrusted with victim’s care]; People v. Simon (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 761,
764 [treasurer of soccer league].) None of these decisions, however, state that a special
relationship between the defendant and the victim is necessary to prove the aggravating

15
circumstance that the defendant took advantage of a position of trust to commit the
offenses.
Here, sufficient evidence demonstrates defendant took advantage of a position of
trust. Defendant relied on one of the girls in the book club and an adult in the girls’ lives
to introduce him, giving the impression to the girls that their friend and an adult had
vouched for defendant’s trustworthiness. Defendant also relied on his status as a local
author who held special and specific knowledge valued by the group to speak to the girls
without adult supervision. Taken together, sufficient evidence demonstrates defendant
took advantage of a position of trust when committing count one.
Defendant further argues insufficient evidence demonstrated he acted with
planning and sophistication (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8)) when making lewd
comments to the book club because there is no indication the comments were anything
more than made off the cuff. Again, we disagree. One of the girls testified that, before
making his comments, defendant asked the two younger boys present in the room to
leave. This shows an effort on behalf of defendant to avoid detection. Further, it was
after discussing the process of writing and promoting his book for over a half hour that
defendant made his offensive comments, demonstrating a plan to ingratiate himself with
the girls so they would be more likely to accept his comments as appropriate banter.
Finally, following his offensive comments, defendant distributed his contact information
for the girls to use if they wanted to meet with him again, demonstrating a plan to further
the inappropriate interactions. Together, defendant’s planning activity rendered his
annoying and molesting conviction distinctively worse than the ordinary. (See People v.
Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 817.)
Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported the aggravating factors attached to
count one.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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