People v. Pontarelli CA1/1

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Filed 9/10/25 P. v. Pontarelli CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170915
v.
GAGE HAROLD PONTARELLI, (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. FCR339277)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Gage Harold Pontarelli appeals from a judgment of
conviction after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1
§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court
sentenced him to 25 years to life. On appeal, Pontarelli challenges the denial
of his motion for new trial, claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to investigate and raise a mental health defense in
mitigation of his crime. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Pontarelli was charged by amended information with murder in
connection with the death of his girlfriend, Samantha J. (§§ 187, subd. (a),
12022.53, subd. (d).) The amended information alleged that he personally

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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used a firearm, that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
and that he caused great bodily injury and death to Samantha by personally
and intentionally discharging a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).)
At trial, the jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Pontarelli’s trial counsel, Jessica
Agnich, focused the defense on the theory that Pontarelli picked up a gun in
response to Samantha attacking him but did not intentionally shoot her;
rather, the gun discharged accidentally.
A. The Prosecution’s Case
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 22, 2018, Pontarelli and Samantha
were arguing in Pontarelli’s garage. The argument woke up Pontarelli’s
neighbors, one of whom testified that he heard Samantha say something like,
“Are you going to shoot me?” The neighbors then heard a gunshot, followed
by Pontarelli screaming, “Oh, no, oh, God, oh, God, oh, no.” The neighbors
called 911, and one of them rushed to Pontarelli’s garage, where he found
Samantha “slumped against a couch” with “a great deal of blood.”
As the neighbor performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation on
Samantha, he noticed a handgun lying on a chair about arm’s reach from the
couch.
Samantha was dead by the time paramedics arrived. Pontarelli was
“distraught” and crying. He had “a pink oval-shaped mark” on the inside of
his left arm and a small pink mark on his right hand.
Police officers searched Pontarelli’s garage and discovered three loaded
firearms, including a semiautomatic pistol, a duffel bag containing a bottle of
clonazepam that was prescribed to Pontarelli, an owner’s manual for the
pistol, two live rounds, and a “spent casing.”

2
The neighbor’s Nest camera captured audio of Pontarelli and
Samantha’s argument.2 Pontarelli could be heard saying, “You’re standing
on my car now, bitch.” At some point, Samantha asked him if he was going to
pull the trigger. Pontarelli then says either, “And that’s why I’m a real
gangster” or “And that’s why you’re still dangerous.”
The forensic pathologist who conducted Samantha’s autopsy found that
she had several bruises on her body and face. They appeared to be recent but
could have been inflicted hours or even a day before her death. There was a
bullet wound to the left side of her chest but no visible gunpowder stippling
around the entry wound, which would have indicated that she was shot
within a three-foot distance.
A firearms expert reviewed the Nest audio and testified that he heard
the “distinct sound . . . of a gun being racked,” meaning someone was pulling
the gun’s slide back to insert a round into the firing chamber. He
demonstrated for the jury the racking of the gun.
A video on Pontarelli’s phone showed him with a semiautomatic pistol,
which the expert believed was the same make and model as the gun used to
kill Samantha. After reviewing the video, the expert opined that Pontarelli
knew how to operate the firearm. The expert further opined that it would
take at least some force to fire the gun; Pontarelli could not “just brush”
against the trigger. The gun appeared to be functioning properly.

2 It does not appear from the record that the parties identified the Nest

audio exhibits in their notices of designation of the record. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.122(a)(3).) Thus, our discussion of the Nest audio is limited to
the portions of the trial transcript cited by the parties that refer to the
content of the audio.

3
B. The Defense’s Case
Pontarelli testified that on the night of the shooting, when him and
Samantha were arguing in his garage, she started hitting herself and
threatened to call the police on Pontarelli. Pontarelli grabbed Samantha’s
shirt and attempted to hug her, but she hit him in the face. As she physically
assaulted him, Pontarelli asked her to leave.
The fight continued, and Pontarelli picked up his gun in fear that
Samantha would use it against him or against herself. He held the gun with
both hands and pointed it toward the ground and away from Samantha. He
kept asking her to leave, but she kept attacking him. At some point, he
pulled her to the couch. She hit him with her purse, threw a glass bong at
him, and then bit his arm. The bite caused Pontarelli to flinch, and the gun
went off.
Pontarelli denied intentionally shooting Samantha or threatening her
with the gun. He testified that his finger “must have slipped” because he did
not have his finger on the trigger prior to flinching, and he did not pull the
trigger on purpose. He also denied racking the gun. He kept the gun loaded
for “personal safety.” He further denied saying anything “about being a
gangster.”
DNA samples collected from the oval-shaped mark on Pontarelli’s arm
matched Samantha’s DNA profile. The results were inconclusive as to
whether the DNA came from saliva.
A firearms expert opined that the evidence was consistent with
Pontarelli’s version of events. He explained that he found gunshot residue on
Samantha’s clothing, which indicated that she was within three feet from
Pontarelli when the gun fired. The expert believed that the large amount of
blood on Samantha’s clothing may have obscured the gunshot residue during

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her autopsy. He also pointed out that the trajectory of the bullet upon
entering Samantha indicated that the gun was pointing down at her or that
she had lunged forward. He further noted that a scientific study showed “a
high likelihood of an unintentional discharge of a firearm” where individuals
are struggling over the firearm, even if nobody has their finger on the trigger.
All this evidence combined, coupled with the fact that Pontarelli’s gun had no
safety, demonstrated that the likelihood of an unintentional discharge was
high in the situation described by Pontarelli.
According to Pontarelli, Samantha had threatened to hurt or kill
herself on previous occasions. She had also been violent toward Pontarelli in
the past, with Pontarelli estimating that she had hit him over 30 times prior
to that night. Pontarelli never hit her back and would instead talk to her or
hold her until she stopped hitting him.
Two friends of the couple recounted instances where they witnessed
Samantha hit Pontarelli or threaten him with serious injury or death.
Pontarelli never retaliated with violence or threats. Samantha’s sister
testified regarding multiple occasions where Samantha threatened to kill her
and their mother.
C. The Motion for a New Trial
After he was convicted of first degree murder, Pontarelli retained a
different lawyer in place of Agnich. New counsel filed a motion for new trial,
alleging in relevant part that Agnich rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to investigate any mental health defenses. Accompanying
the motion were the declaration of Pontarelli, a report from a forensic
psychiatrist, Dr. Omri Berger, and a “Preliminary Opinion Letter” from a
legal expert on effective assistance of counsel, John T. Philipsborn.

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Based on his review of the evidence and Pontarelli’s medical records,
Dr. Berger stated in his report that Pontarelli was likely suffering from
anxiety, depression, and a trauma-related disorder at the time of the
shooting. Dr. Berger opined that Pontarelli was likely “triggered” by the
physical and verbal confrontation with Samantha. As a result, he was likely
experiencing a “heightened emotional state” during the incident that likely
involved fear and anger, and he was susceptible to reacting to Samantha’s
physical assault “in an exaggerated and impulsive manner.” Dr. Berger
concluded that Pontarelli’s trauma-related disorder potentially caused
Pontarelli to shoot Samantha “in an impulsive and/or accidental manner.”
In its response to Pontarelli’s motion, the prosecution argued that
Agnich did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by focusing on a
defense theory that the shooting was an accident. Dr. Berger’s opinions
regarding how Pontarelli may have reacted to Samantha’s provocation were
inconsistent with the “multiple statements” Pontarelli had made to police
that the shooting was an accident.
Dr. Berger, Philipsborn, Agnich, and Pontarelli testified at the
evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, as summarized below.
1. Dr. Berger’s Testimony
Dr. Berger testified that, according to medical records, Pontarelli was
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 2014 and had been
receiving treatment for PTSD at the time of the shooting. Dr. Berger
explained that individuals with PTSD are more susceptible to being triggered
into a “fight-flight” response and to feeling threatened. They tend to react in
an “exaggerated or impulsive” manner “with little ability and time to consider
one’s actions to assess the situation.” “[T]he person’s behavior is much more
driven by their emotional state than by a . . . deliberative and conscious

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thought process.” If the person’s “triggered state” involves anger and
agitation, that person “is more likely to react violently and impulsively to a
perceived threat.” He said it was not uncommon for individuals with PTSD
to overestimate the degree of danger before them.
Dr. Berger concluded that during the incident, Pontarelli was
experiencing a “heightened emotional state” that made him susceptible to
reacting in an impulsive manner. This conclusion was supported by
Pontarelli’s behavior immediately after the shooting, as captured by the Nest
camera and the 911 call, which indicated that he was highly distressed. Dr.
Berger further concluded that Pontarelli’s claim that the gun fired
accidentally was consistent with the type of “reflexive or instinctual
response” that can happen with individuals experiencing a heightened
emotional state.
Dr. Berger acknowledged that he did not personally evaluate Pontarelli
or speak with any of his doctors. He said an evaluation of Pontarelli would
help identify Pontarelli’s “thought process” and the “specific emotions” he was
experiencing during the incident and could clarify whether he believed he
needed a gun to defend himself against Samantha. In making his opinions,
Dr. Berger did not consider whether Pontarelli “mistook” the danger that was
presented.
2. Agnich’s Testimony
Agnich testified that she was aware that Pontarelli may have had
depression, anxiety, and PTSD and admitted that she did not obtain
Pontarelli’s medical records or consult with a forensic mental health
consultant. She reasoned that a mental health defense would have been
inconsistent with a theory that the shooting was an accident, and the latter
theory “was the better defense” based on the evidence and Pontarelli’s prior

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statements. Pontarelli had “made a statement for hours to the police, as well
as to the 911 operator,” that the shooting was an accident. The accident
theory was also supported by the physical evidence, as demonstrated by the
defense expert’s testimony. Agnich said, “Presenting something inconsistent
with my argument . . . would have basically taken away from my credibility
with the jury,” and Pontarelli would have been impeached with his prior
statements.
Agnich said she talked at length with Pontarelli about a potential
mental health defense, but he never indicated that his mental health played
a role in the shooting or that he shot Samantha because he perceived her as a
threat. She was concerned that if she pursued a mental health defense, the
prosecution could have its own expert interview appellant, creating “a trial
within a trial that was not relevant in this case.” It was also noted that
Pontarelli’s PTSD may have been caused or exacerbated by him being robbed
at gunpoint when he was dealing drugs. Agnich said it was important to
exclude evidence of Pontarelli’s drug dealing because it could affect the jury’s
perception of him.
3. Philipsborn’s Testimony
Philipsborn testified that Agnich had a duty to investigate based on her
awareness of Pontarelli’s mental health conditions, and she could not reject a
mental health defense absent an adequate investigation. He said that the
expert evidence supporting an accident theory was not particularly strong
and therefore did not obviate Agnich’s duty to explore other possible defenses.
On cross-examination, Philipsborn agreed with the prosecution that a
theory of voluntary manslaughter was contrary to Pontarelli’s trial testimony
and his prior statements to the police. He further agreed that Agnich could
have concluded, based on her familiarity with Pontarelli and her knowledge

8
of the facts of the case, that pursuing a mental health defense would not be
an effective defense. He also agreed that it made sense to try to exclude
evidence of Pontarelli’s drug dealing, as it could have made him less
sympathetic to the jury.
4. Pontarelli’s Testimony
Pontarelli testified that he told Agnich early in the case that he had
PTSD. In considering whether to present a mental health defense, he
deferred to Agnich’s expertise and did not insist on a particular defense.
5. Trial Court’s Ruling
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court denied
Pontarelli’s new trial motion. The court concluded that Agnich made a
reasonable tactical choice to focus on one defense, and it “made a certain
amount of sense” that she would select the defense that was consistent with
Pontarelli’s “many statements” that the shooting was an accident. The court
therefore concluded that Agnich did not provide ineffective assistance of
counsel.
II. DISCUSSION
Pontarelli contends that, notwithstanding the trial court’s denial of his
motion for a new trial, he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
Agnich failed to investigate his history of PTSD and consult with a forensic
psychiatrist, thereby depriving him of a viable defense of imperfect self-
defense.
“Imperfect self-defense is the actual, but unreasonable, belief in the
need to resort to self-defense to protect oneself from imminent peril.”
(People v. Vasquez (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1178.) It implies the
intentional use of deadly force. (People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337,
1359.) Where the defense applies, it negates malice aforethought and

9
reduces a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at
pp. 1354–1355.)
A. The Law
Ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised in a motion for a new
trial, even though it is not one of the statutorily enumerated grounds.
(People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582.) “Defendant bears the
burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Jackson (1989)
49 Cal.3d 1170, 1188.) Under Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668 (Strickland), “a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s
representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s
representation subjected the defendant to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more
favorable to the defendant.” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845.)
Where, as here, a nonstatutory new trial motion is grounded in a
constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-step standard
of review applies. The first step requires the reviewing court to uphold the
trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports the findings.
(People v. Taylor (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 720, 724.) In the second step, the
reviewing court exercises its independent judgment on the legal issues:
whether counsel's performance was deficient and whether the defendant was
prejudiced as a result. (Id. at pp. 724–725.)
We review the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning, and may uphold it
on any basis presented by the record. (See People v. Camacho (2022)
14 Cal.5th 77, 123 [“we review the trial court’s ruling, ‘not the court’s
reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm’ ”]; People v.
Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976, superseded on other grounds by § 190.41.)

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B. Reasonableness of Counsel’s Performance
Pontarelli challenges Agnich’s decision to focus the defense on the
theory that the shooting was an accident. He argues that Agnich could not
have made an informed decision to forego a defense of imperfect self-defense
in favor of an accidental shooting theory absent examination of his mental
health records or an expert evaluation, and thus Agnich’s performance was
objectively unreasonable. We conclude that Agnich made a sufficiently
informed tactical decision to pursue a theory that the shooting was an
accident.
Agnich was not required to exhaustively investigate every potential
defense. “ ‘[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a
particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of
deference to counsel’s judgments.’ ” (In re Andrews (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1234,
1254, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 690–691.)
The reasonableness of Agnich’s decision to limit her investigation is
assessed according to the information available to her and her chosen defense
strategy. (In re Thomas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1249, 1264; see Turk v. White
(9th Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 1264, 1266–1267 [counsel’s failure to investigate an
insanity defense was not ineffective assistance where he investigated a
defense of self-defense, discovered evidence supporting that defense, and
chose to not pursue an insanity defense that would have conflicted with the
self-defense theory].)

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In this case, Agnich had a client who had repeatedly made statements
to the police that the shooting was an accident.3 Pontarelli said he had
picked up the gun because he was scared Samantha would use it against him
or against herself. He claimed that he pointed the gun at the ground, never
at Samantha, and he did not “rack” the gun. He denied pulling the trigger on
purpose and insisted that the gun accidentally went off when Samantha bit
him and he flinched.
Neither the physical evidence nor the audio recording of the shooting
conclusively refuted Pontarelli’s version of events. To the contrary, Agnich
had a firearms expert who could explain that the physical evidence presented
a “high likelihood of an unintentional discharge of a firearm” in the situation
described by Pontarelli. Moreover, in addition to his repeated denials that
the shooting was intentional, Pontarelli never indicated that he perceived
Samantha as a threat at the time of the shooting, despite discussing a
potential defense of self-defense with Agnich. Thus, the information known
to Agnich supported a reasonable tactical decision to focus the defense on the
theory of an accidental shooting. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691;
In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 182 [“a client’s comments certainly bear
on the appropriate scope and focus of counsel’s factual investigation”].)
On the other hand, a defense of imperfect self-defense would have faced
significant challenges. The defense would be difficult to establish absent
testimony from the defendant that he or she “actually believed” there was an
immediate threat of great bodily harm or death and intentionally used deadly
force to defend against the danger. (CALCRIM No. 571; see People v. Elmore
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 129–130, superseded on other grounds by § 188, subd.

3 Neither party has pointed us to the statements Pontarelli made to

police, but presumably they are similar in substance to his trial testimony.

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(a)(3); People v. Sotelo-Urena (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732, 745.) If the defendant
has a mental health condition, an expert may offer an opinion in response to
hypothetical questions on how a person with the defendant’s mental health
condition may perceive the situation, but the expert cannot say whether the
defendant in fact had an actual belief in the need for self-defense. (§ 29;
People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1085 [expert testimony relevant
to show how the defendant’s experiences affected her perception of danger
and its imminence].)
In this case, even assuming evidence was presented regarding
Pontarelli’s mental health conditions, Pontarelli’s version of events, as told to
the police, would likely negate any inference that he had, in fact,
intentionally shot Samantha because he believed she posed an imminent
threat of serious harm to him. This is not a situation where Pontarelli could
not recall the events immediately prior to the shooting, thereby leaving room
in his narrative for the possibility that he shot Samantha in self-defense.
Rather, Pontarelli stated unequivocally that the gun went off because of his
reflexive reaction to Samantha biting him, which had “surprised” him. Had
Pontarelli testified at trial as to a different version of events, the prosecution
could have impeached him with his prior statements.
Further, Agnich recognized that a mental health defense could open the
door to damaging evidence of Pontarelli’s drug dealing, as she had
information indicating that Pontarelli’s involvement in a “drug deal gone
bad” may have contributed to his PTSD.
Applying the Strickland standard, we cannot conclude that Agnich’s
failure to further investigate a defense of imperfect self-defense was
constitutionally deficient. When Agnich made her decision, she had
information that Pontarelli suffered from depression, anxiety, and PTSD at

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the time of the shooting, but she also knew that Pontarelli had repeatedly
denied intentionally shooting Samantha. It was reasonable for Agnich to
concentrate on the theory that was consistent with Pontarelli’s prior
statements and that had evidentiary support “rather than potentially
confusing the issues and detracting from [her] credibility with the jury by
making a nonpersuasive argument.” (People v. Palmer (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1159; see People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1138
[“The presentation of conflicting defenses is often tactically unwise because it
tends to weaken counsel’s credibility with the jury.”]; People v. Cunningham
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1007 [“counsel does not render ineffective assistance
by choosing one or several theories of defense over another”]; People v.
Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329 [concluding that the theory of
unreasonable self-defense was inconsistent with the defendant’s claim that
the shooting was an accident], overruled on another point in People v. Barton
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.)
This case thus falls within the principle that “valid strategic choices are
possible even without extensive investigative efforts.” (In re Andrews, supra,
28 Cal.4th at p. 1254.) This distinguishes the cases upon which Pontarelli
relies. (See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 196, 222–223
[counsel’s performance was deficient where he chose to not investigate a
diminished capacity defense based on a competency evaluation and the
defendant’s alleged confession, both of which said “little if anything about
defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing”]; In re Long (2020)
10 Cal.5th 764, 777 [counsel’s decision to focus on a third party culpability
defense without investigating the victim’s time of death was constitutionally
deficient; “the two lines of defense were potentially complementary, not
mutually exclusive”]; In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1049 [counsel’s

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failure to investigate was unreasonable where “a defense based upon
petitioner’s mental condition was in no way inconsistent with the defense
offered by counsel”], modified on another ground by People v. Duvall (1995) 9
Cal.4th 464, 479–486 & fn. 8.) Therefore, Pontarelli has not demonstrated
that Agnich’s performance was deficient.
Pontarelli clarified at oral argument that he intended to argue that
Agnich’s failure to investigate his mental health deprived him of a defense of
imperfect self-dense and of evidence that would have likely defeated the
prosecution’s theory of premeditation. While his appellate briefing and the
headings contained therein focused on the theory of imperfect self-defense,
we will address his latter argument since he briefly raised the issue in his
opening brief. Pontarelli argued that Dr. Berger’s opinions show that
Pontarelli’s PTSD likely caused him to act impulsively rather than with
premeditation. Pontarelli claimed that a theory that he acted impulsively in
shooting Samantha was not mutually exclusive with an accident theory,
because his characterization of the shooting as an accident was referring to
the fact that he did not mean to shoot Samantha, as opposed to the shooting
being a “physical[]” accident. For those reasons, he concluded that Agnich’s
failure to investigate his mental health was unreasonable. However, his
portrayal of the shooting as an impulsive act is inconsistent with his
testimony and his prior statements to the police, as discussed above. Thus,
Pontarelli’s argument regarding premeditation does not change our
conclusion that Agnich’s tactical decision to focus on the theory that was
consistent with Pontarelli’s version of events and the physical evidence and

15
that would avoid the potential admission of damaging evidence was
reasonable.4
C. Prejudice
Even if Agnich’s failure to investigate a defense of imperfect self-
defense constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, Pontarelli has not shown
any resulting prejudice. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that
“it is reasonably probable that a determination more favorable to defendant
would have resulted in the absence of counsel’s failings.” (People v. Phillips
(1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 60.) “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (People v. Ledesma, supra, 43
Cal.3d at p. 218, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693–694.) Stated
another way, “ ‘[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
factfinder would have a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, even if Agnich had investigated and presented a defense of
imperfect self-defense based on Pontarelli’s PTSD, Pontarelli’s version of
events would likely negate an inference that he shot Samantha in self-
defense, as discussed above. Pontarelli’s testimony also tends to establish
that Samantha did not present an imminent threat of serious injury or death
at the time of the shooting. (See People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 1082 [for imperfect self-defense, “[t]he defendant’s fear must be of
imminent danger to life or great bodily injury”].) Pontarelli was more than
twice Samantha’s size. There was no evidence that immediately prior to the

4 By separate order, we deny Pontarelli’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus premised on the same alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. (In re
Gage Harold Pontarelli (A174226).)

16
gun going off, Samantha had a weapon or had attempted to take the gun
from Pontarelli.
While imperfect self-defense only requires that the defendant actually
believe in the need for self-defense, and that perception can be affected by the
mental state of the defendant, there is no evidence here that Pontarelli
actually believed that Samantha posed an imminent threat of great bodily
injury or death. Dr. Berger’s opinions focused on how Pontarelli would likely
react but did not explain what Pontarelli was thinking when he reacted. The
doctor testified that by virtue of PTSD, Pontarelli was probably in a
heightened emotional state during the incident and would likely react
impulsively and without thinking, and he was more likely to react violently to
a “perceived threat.” Dr. Berger said Pontarelli’s behavior after the shooting
was “consistent with . . . an impulsive or accidental act.” These
characteristics do not indicate whether Pontarelli actually believed at the
time of the shooting that he was threatened with immediate death or serious
bodily injury. Although Dr. Berger stated that someone experiencing a
“fight-flight” reaction was more susceptible to feeling threatened, he stopped
short of offering an opinion indicating that someone with Pontarelli’s mental
health issues would perceive Samantha as an imminent threat of serious
injury or death. Indeed, he agreed with the prosecution that his opinions
were “preliminary” and that an evaluation of Pontarelli could help identify
Pontarelli’s thought process during the incident.
“In demonstrating prejudice, the appellant ‘must carry his burden of
proving prejudice as a “demonstrable reality,” not simply speculation as to
the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel.’ ” (People v. Montoya (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147, quoting People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883,
937.) On this record, there is no reasonable probability that Pontarelli would

17
have achieved a more favorable result had Agnich investigated his mental
health and presented a defense of imperfect self-defense.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Humes, P. J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

A170915/People v. Pontarelli

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