People v. Snell CA1/2

CourtListener 10669276CalctappSep 10, 2025

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PUBLIC—REDACTED
Filed 9/10/25 P. v. Snell CA1/2
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171772
v.
LEMELL BENJAMIN SNELL, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 042401494)
Defendant and Appellant.
PUBLIC–REDACTED
VERSION.*

Defendant Lemell Benjamin Snell was found mentally incompetent to
stand trial on charges of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(1))1 and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)). The trial court, relying on reports from mental health
experts, later committed defendant to the California Department of State
Hospitals (Department) and authorized it to involuntarily administer

* This case involves material from a sealed record. In accordance with
California Rules of Court, rules 8.45, 8.46(g)(1) and (2), we have concurrently
filed public (redacted) and sealed (unredacted) versions of this opinion. We
hereby order the unredacted version of this opinion sealed. Omissions in the
public (redacted) version are indicated with the notation “[REDACTED].”
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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antipsychotic medication pursuant to section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)
(section 1370(a)(2)(B)). Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court
misinterpreted section 1370(a)(2)(B) and violated his rights to due process
and equal protection when it issued the involuntary medication order without
first affording him an evidentiary hearing. We disagree, and therefore
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Charges
On July 25, 2024, the district attorney filed a complaint charging
defendant with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1)
and assault by means likely to great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count
2). The complaint also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great
bodily injury in committing both counts, and that he used a deadly weapon (a
knife) in committing count 2 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
The Competency Proceedings
On July 26, defense counsel declared a doubt about defendant’s
competency to stand trial, and the criminal proceedings were suspended.
(§ 1368.)
On July 30, the court appointed one psychologist and one psychiatrist
to evaluate defendant and address among other issues whether he was
competent to stand trial; it was medically appropriate to treat him with
antipsychotic medication; he had the capacity to make decisions about such
medications; and he presented a danger of inflicting harm on others. (See
§§ 1369, 1370(a)(2)(B)(i).)
Evaluators’ Reports
[REDACTED]
September 17, 2024 Hearing

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At a hearing on September 17, the court noted it had received the
mental health experts’ reports and that “[b]oth opin[ed] that [defendant] is
not competent to stand trial.” The court then asked, “Do the parties submit
on the reports?” Both the prosecutor and defense counsel replied, “Yes.” The
court next asked, “Do the parties stipulate that the reports may be deemed in
evidence?” And again both counsel answered, “Yes.”
The court found, based on the reports, that defendant was not
competent to stand trial. The court directed the Contra Costa Conditional
Release Program (CONREP) to provide a recommendation regarding an
appropriate placement.
After noting the next hearing date was October 15, the court stated
[REDACTED]
CONREP Report
[REDACTED]
October 15, 2024 Hearing
At the October 15 hearing, defense counsel objected to CONREP’s
recommendation. Over that objection, the court committed defendant to the
Department for a term of two years.
On the issue of involuntary medication, defense counsel “object[ed] to
the Court issuing an involuntary medication order” and stated her belief that
defendant has “an equal protection and due process right to have an
evidentiary hearing.” Counsel noted [REDACTED] and re-asserted that
defendant was “entitled to an evidentiary hearing.”
After the prosecutor submitted on the reports, the court stated, “It is
my ongoing belief that the hearing is intended for today on the doctor reports,
and I’m unaware of any contrary authority.” The court declined to hold an
evidentiary hearing and authorized the Department to involuntarily

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administer antipsychotic medication to defendant.
That same day, the court issued a written order consistent with its oral
rulings. The order stated: “Based on the report of Dr. Horan, the court finds
that defendant lacks capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic
medication, the defendant’s mental disorder requires medical treatment with
antipsychotic medication, and, if the defendant’s mental disorder is not
treated with antipsychotic medication, it is probable that serious harm to the
physical or mental health of the defendant will result. Additionally, based on
the reports of Dr. Kokubun and Dr. Horan, the court finds that the defendant
is a danger to others. The court therefore authorizes the administration of
antipsychotic medication as needed, including on an involuntary basis, to be
administered under the direction and supervision of a licensed psychiatrist.”
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In the two main argument headings of his opening brief, defendant
asserts that the trial court violated (1) “his procedural due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment” and (2) his “right to equal protection of
law” when it refused to provide him with an adversarial evidentiary hearing
that included the right to cross-examine the competency evaluators and any
hearsay declarants on whose statements the evaluators relied.
(Capitalization and boldface omitted.)
Preliminary Issues
At the outset, we address several preliminary issues. First, we clarify
defendant’s claims on appeal. Although defendant’s headings in his opening
brief frame the issues solely as constitutional challenges, it appears that
within his discussion of the due process issue, he questions whether the trial
court properly construed section 1370(a)(2)(B) as a matter of statutory

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interpretation. Thus, as we understand it, defendant raises three arguments:
that the trial court, in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing, incorrectly
interpreted section 1370(a)(2)(B), violated his right to procedural due process,
and denied him equal protection under the law.
Next, we consider the People’s argument that defendant invited the
errors he now complains of. “ ‘The doctrine of invited error is designed to
prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error
made by the trial court at his behest. If defense counsel intentionally caused
the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal.’ ”
(People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740, 753.) The People argue the doctrine
applies here because at the September 17, 2024 hearing, defense counsel
“submitted on the doctors’ reports” and “stipulated to the admission of both
[evaluators’] reports into evidence.”
Defendant counters in his reply brief that the stipulation did not
preclude him from later requesting an evidentiary hearing on the involuntary
medication issue. He argues that “his trial counsel stipulated that the
competency evaluators’ reports could be ‘deemed in evidence[,]’ which was
distinct from stipulating that all the information in the reports was true, so
[defendant] was not barred from challenging the reports and an involuntary
medication order.” Defendant thus asserts that “after stipulating to the
reports’ admissibility, [he] still retained the right to challenge the reliability,
credibility, and persuasiveness of the facts and opinions in the reports . . . .”
We agree with defendant that he did not invite the asserted errors
when his counsel stipulated that the evaluators’ reports “may be deemed in
evidence.” In entering into that stipulation, counsel agreed to the
admissibility of the reports. But a stipulation that evidence is admissible is
not equivalent to a stipulation regarding the weight of the evidence, which

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addresses how valuable, credible, or reliable the evidence is. (See People v.
Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 143 [“questions regarding the validity or the
credibility of an expert’s knowledge go to the weight of such testimony, not its
admissibility”].) Nor was defendant’s stipulation a concession “that all the
information in the reports was true.” (See In re Marriage of McLain (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 262, 274 [“A stipulation that evidence is admissible does not
equate with the concession of an issue. . . . For example, parties can stipulate
to the admission of a toxicology report without conceding that the test subject
was drunk or sober.”].) Thus, we disagree with the People that the invited
error doctrine applies here.
That said, the record arguably demonstrates that defendant forfeited
his ability to present live testimony and to cross-examine witnesses, which is
the gravamen of his appellate claims. Defendant did not ask to call or cross-
examine the competency evaluators or anyone else in the trial court, much
less indicate why such examination was necessary or warranted. Rather, his
attorney made a general request for an evidentiary hearing without
specifying the evidence she wished to adduce or the method by which to do so.
To the extent defendant now claims he was deprived of an opportunity to
cross-examine the competency evaluators or any other witnesses, such claim
is arguably forfeited on appeal. (See People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107,
1114 [“ ‘an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have
been—but were not—raised in the trial court.’ ”]; cf. In re Marriage of Hearn
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 391 [party arguably forfeited right to live
testimony by not asking to testify or cross-examine witnesses, even though he
requested an evidentiary hearing].)
But assuming that defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing
encompassed a request to cross-examine witnesses, we would reject his

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appellate claims on the merits for the reasons discussed below.
Merits
As mentioned above, defendant apparently raises three arguments:
that the trial court, in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing,
misinterpreted section 1370(a)(2)(B), violated his right to procedural due
process, and denied him equal protection under the law—each of which
presents a question of law we review de novo. (See People v. Gonzalez (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141 [statutory interpretation]; People v. Marrero (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 896, 911 [due process claim]; People v. Laird (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 458, 469 [equal protection claim].)
Recently, in People v. Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078 (Lewis)
(review denied September 3, 2025), we considered and rejected virtually
identical claims. Like defendant here, the defendant in Lewis was found
incompetent to stand trial and sought an evidentiary hearing on whether the
court should authorize the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication under section 1370(a)(2)(B). The trial court (the Honorable Julia
Campins, the same judge who presided over the proceedings in this case)
denied the request. The defendant appealed, arguing he was deprived of due
process and equal protection when the court issued its involuntary
medication order without affording him an evidentiary hearing. He also
apparently raised a statutory interpretation challenge. We rejected all of
those claims.
Notably, the opening brief in Lewis contains almost identical
arguments and authorities as in defendant’s opening brief in this case. We
see no reason to depart from our analysis in Lewis and thus apply it to this
case, leading us to also reject defendant’s claims. We therefore will quote
Lewis here at length.

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Before addressing defendant’s arguments, we give an overview of the
applicable law.
General Legal Background
“[A]n individual has a ‘significant’ constitutionally protected ‘liberty
interest’ in ‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.’ ”
(Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166, 178 (Sell), quoting Washington v.
Harper (1990) 494 U.S. 210, 221 (Harper).) The right is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment (Sell, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 178) and by the
California Constitution and common law. (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1,
14.)
This right, however, is a qualified one. State prison inmates may
exercise this right unless “the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” (Harper, supra, 494 U.S.
210, 227.) Pretrial detainees are entitled to at least the same protection.
(Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 504 U.S. 127, 135.) Further, the government is
permitted to administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily “to a mentally ill
defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of
the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary
significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.” (Sell,
supra, 539 U.S. at p. 179.)
In 2004, the California Legislature amended section 1370 to meet the
constitutional standards set forth in Sell and added subdivisions (a)(2)(B) and
(a)(2)(C), which govern the administration of antipsychotic medication to
defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST defendants). (See People v.
Lameed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 381, 396 (Lameed).)

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Section 1370(a)(2)(B) currently provides that “[p]rior to making the
order directing that the defendant be committed to the State Department of
State Hospitals or other treatment facility or placed on outpatient status, . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] . . . [t]he court shall hear and determine whether the defendant
lacks the capacity to make decisions regarding the administration of
antipsychotic medication. The court shall consider opinions in the reports
prepared pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1369,2 as applicable to the
issue of whether the defendant lacks the capacity to make decisions
regarding the administration of antipsychotic medication, and shall proceed
as follows.” (§ 1370(a)(2)(B), italics added.) Section 1370(a)(2)(B)(i) then
provides that “[t]he court shall hear and determine” whether any of the three
conditions in subclauses (I) to (III) is true. (Italics added.) In this case, the
court found true the first and second conditions, which are as follows:
Under section 1370(a)(2)(B)(i)(I), the court must determine, “[b]ased
upon the opinion of the psychiatrist or licensed psychologist offered to the
court . . . , the defendant lacks the capacity to make decisions regarding
antipsychotic medication, the defendant’s mental disorder requires medical
treatment with antipsychotic medication, and, if the defendant’s mental
disorder is not treated with antipsychotic medication, it is probable that
serious harm to the physical or mental health of the [patient] will result.”
Under section 1370(a)(2)(B)(i)(II)), the court must determine, “[b]ased

2 Section 1369 sets for the procedures for determining a defendant’s
mental competence and in subdivision (b) states in relevant part: “A licensed
psychologist or psychiatrist shall evaluate the defendant and submit a
written report to the court. The report shall include the opinion of the expert
regarding all of the following matters[,]” including “whether treatment with
antipsychotic medication . . . is appropriate for the defendant.” (§ 1369,
subds. (b)(1), (b)(2)(A).)

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upon the opinion of the psychiatrist or licensed psychologist offered to the
court . . . , the defendant is a danger to others, in that the defendant . . . has
inflicted, attempted to inflict, or made a serious threat of inflicting
substantial physical harm on another that resulted in the defendant being
taken into custody, and the defendant presents, as a result of mental disorder
or mental defect, a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical
harm on others.”
The third subclause of section 1370(a)(2)(B)(i) essentially tracks the
Sell factors, and requires the court to determine whether involuntary
medication is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial. (§ 1370(a)(2)(B)(i)(III); Lameed, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 397.)
Where, as here, the court finds any of the conditions in section
1370(a)(2)(B)(i) to be true, the court “shall issue” an order authorizing the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication for a period of no
more than one year. (§ 1370, subds. (a)(2)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), (a)(2)(B)(iii),
(a)(7)(a); Lameed, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 396–397.)
Section 1370(a)(2)(B) Does Not Require an Evidentiary
Hearing
We start with defendant’s apparent statutory interpretation argument,
which is that “the trial court relied on an overly narrow . . . interpretation of
[section 1370(a)(2)(B)].” Defendant does not directly analyze the language of
section 1370(a)(2)(B), but asserts that it should be interpreted in a manner
similar to other statutes in other contexts—that is, as mandating an
evidentiary hearing.
“ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental
task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them
a plain and commonsense meaning.” ’ ” (People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th

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1415, 1421.)
As recited above, section 1370(a)(2)(B) states that “[t]he court shall
hear and determine whether the defendant lacks the capacity to make
decisions regarding the administration of antipsychotic medication.” And
section 1370(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that “[t]he court shall hear and determine”
whether any of the three conditions permitting involuntary medication in
subclauses (I) to (III) is true. The trial court apparently interpreted these
provisions as requiring it to conduct a hearing that included the presentation
of oral arguments and consideration of the reports of the appointed mental
health experts, but not one that required the presentation of live testimony.
This interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the statute. It
uses the words “hear and determine” and does not suggest that the court
must hold a formal evidentiary hearing, accompanied by the rights to present
live testimony and to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
As our Supreme Court explained, “when the Legislature intends to
require a formal evidentiary hearing, it knows how to say so.” (Today’s Fresh
Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197,
228 (Today’s Fresh Start); see, e.g., § 1473, subd. (e) [stating that where a
petitioner who makes a prima facie showing of habeas relief based on the
introduction of false scientific or medical evidence at trial or discovery of such
evidence, the court shall issue an order to show cause “and hold an
evidentiary hearing, unless the state declines to show cause”]; § 1275.1
[providing that bail should not be accepted until a magistrate or judge “at an
evidentiary hearing” determines the source of bail funds believed to be
feloniously obtained]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5326.7, subd. (f) [“If either the
attending physician or the attorney believes that the patient does not have
the capacity to give a written informed consent [to convulsive treatment] then

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a petition shall be filed in superior court to determine the patient’s capacity
to give written informed consent” and “[t]he court shall hold an evidentiary
hearing . . . .”].) The Legislature did not choose similar language here.
Nor does the legislative history, which we have examined, offer any
indication that the Legislature intended, when requiring the court to “hear
and determine” the criteria in section 1370(a)(2)(B), to mandate a formal
evidentiary hearing. (See Stats. 2004, ch. 486, Senate Bill No. 1794 (2003–
2004 Reg. Sess.).)
Accordingly, we conclude that section 1370(a)(2)(B) does not require
courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to issuing an involuntary
medication order. (Cf. Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 228
[holding that language in Ed. Code, § 47607, former subd. (e) that “the
chartering authority shall hold a public hearing” did not mandate a formal
evidentiary hearing].)
Perhaps recognizing that the plain language of section 1370(a)(2)(B)
does not require an evidentiary hearing, defendant asks us to “look by
analogy” to section 1203.2 (governing probation revocation proceedings) and
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602 (governing proceedings to
determine if there is probable cause that an individual is a sexually violent
predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA; Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)).3 Defendant argues that courts have construed

3 Section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1) provides in relevant part: “The court
in the county in which the person is supervised has jurisdiction to hear the
motion or petition [to revoke probation] . . . . After the receipt of a written
report from the probation or parole officer, the court shall read and consider
the report and either its motion or the petition and may modify, revoke, or
terminate the supervision of the supervised person upon the grounds set
forth in subdivision (a) if the interests of justice so require.” (Italics added.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602, subdivision (a) provides that at a

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these statutes to require an evidentiary hearing, despite the statutes being
silent on the specific procedural requirements governing the presentation and
admission of evidence. Defendant adds that, with respect to section 1203.2,
such a construction was required in order to comport with due process.
Assuming defendant’s descriptions of the interpretations of section
1203.2 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602 are correct, his claim
lacks merit. We previously rejected the very same arguments in Lewis.
(Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1091–1093.) There, we explained: “If
the Legislature intended for procedures in the supervision revocation or
SVPA context to apply to section 1370(a)(2)(B), it knows how to say so. (See,
e.g., § 1026, subd. (c) [providing that the court, at a hearing in determining
the propriety of a transfer of a defendant found not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGI) between the Department and a public or private treatment
facility, ‘shall use the same procedures and standards of proof as used in
conducting probation revocation hearings pursuant to Section 1203.2.’].) It
did not use similar language in section 1370(a)(2)(B).” (Lewis, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.)
Furthermore, “[t]o the extent defendant attempts to invoke the rule of
statutory interpretation that courts should construe statutes to avoid
constitutional infirmities, such rule is inapplicable. (See Gilbert v. City of
Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1285.) That rule does not come into
play unless the statutory language is reasonably susceptible of two
interpretations, one of which raises constitutional doubts. (Ibid., citing

probable cause hearing the court “shall review the petition and shall
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual
named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory
criminal behavior upon his or her release.” (Italics added.)

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People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1146, superseded on other grounds
as stated in People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 408–409; accord, Johnson v.
Arteaga-Martinez (2022) 596 U.S. 573, 580 [‘ “[t]he canon of constitutional
avoidance ‘comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary
textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one
construction.’ ” ’].) But as discussed, defendant fails to establish that the text
of section 1370(a)(2)(B) is reasonably susceptible to his interpretation.”
(Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1093.)
Therefore, we conclude section 1370(a)(2)(B) does not require an
evidentiary hearing prior to authorizing the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication in all cases. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p.
1093.)
We turn to whether due process principles require such a hearing.
Defendant Cannot Demonstrate a Due Process Violation
Due process principles
“The due process clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions
forbid the state from depriving individuals of their liberty without due
process of law. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd.
(a).)” (Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 379.) An individual
bringing a due process claim must demonstrate: (1) a protected liberty or
property interest and; (2) a lack of adequate procedural protections. (Today’s
Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 214.) Here, there is no dispute that
defendant “has a ‘significant’ constitutionally protected ‘liberty interest’ in
‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.’ ” (Sell, supra,
539 U.S. at p. 178, quoting Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 221.) “ ‘ “[T]he

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question remains what process is due.” ’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57
Cal.4th at p. 214.)
“ ‘[D]ue process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.’ ” (Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of
Los Angeles (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 85, 91.) However, “[t]here is no
presumption in favor of” holding an evidentiary hearing; the “ ‘judicial model
of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective,
method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 228, citing Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319,
348 (Mathews); Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20
Cal.4th 371, 392 [“ ‘[P]rocedural due process does not require a trial-type
hearing in every instance.’ ”].
“The procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause must
be determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake in the
particular case.” (Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at 229.) “[D]ue process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands. . . . [N]ot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kind of procedure.” (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481
(Morrissey).) “[T]he extent to which due process relief will be available
depends on a careful and clearly articulated balancing of the interests at
stake in each context.” (People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268.)
More specifically, to determine what process is due, courts apply the
balancing test in Mathews, which weighs three factors: (1) the private
interest that will be affected by the government action; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and
(3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal

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and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 334–335;
accord, People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 269.)
Analysis
Defendant contends that due process required the trial court to provide
him with “the hearing procedures articulated . . . in Harper and
Morrissey . . . .”
In Harper, the State of Washington confined Harper, a convicted felon,
to a facility housing prisoners with serious mental illnesses and treated him
with antipsychotic drugs against his will. (Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 214.)
The high court held that Washington’s procedures for authorizing the
involuntary medication of inmates satisfied due process. (Id. at p. 228.)
Those procedures included: notice; a hearing; a neutral and detached trier of
fact, namely a hearing committee that included a non-treating psychiatrist, a
psychologist, and a superintendent of the center at which inmates were
treated for mental disorders; the inmate’s right to be present at the
adversarial hearing; the inmate’s right to cross-examine witnesses; and the
right to appeal. (Id. at pp. 228, 231, 235.) With respect to the hearing
committee, the court rejected Harper’s assertion that forcible medication
decisions had to be made by judges rather than medical professionals. (Id. at
pp. 229–231.) The court explained, “The risks associated with antipsychotic
drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by medical
professionals.” (Id. at p. 233.) “A State may conclude with good reason that a
judicial hearing will not be as effective, as continuous, or as probing as
administrative review using medical decisionmakers.” (Ibid.)
Defendant contends “[t]hese rights are similar to the ‘minimum
requirements of due process’ that must be granted to parolees facing a loss of

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liberty at revocation proceedings,” going on to cite Morrissey. In Morrissey,
the high court held that due process required the following procedures at a
final parole revocation proceeding: “(a) written notice of the claimed
violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c)
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary
evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and
(f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole.” (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489.)
Defendant asserts in his opening brief that “[a]s will be demonstrated
below, the rights and interests at stake when the state seeks to involuntarily
medicate a person require at least the same minimum due process safeguards
provided to parolees facing revocation of their conditional liberty interest.”
He adds, “the trial court incorrectly concluded it had the authority to issue an
involuntary medication order based on the competency evaluation reports
without providing [him] with all the hearing rights articulated in Harper and
Morrissey, particularly the opportunity to present and cross-examine
witnesses.” Later in his brief, defendant analyzes the Mathews factors.
Thus, as we understand it, defendant’s argument is that based on his
evaluation of the Mathews factors, due process entitled him to a Morrissey or
Harper-type of hearing that included the right to cross-examine witnesses.
We considered and rejected that very same argument in Lewis,
concluding that the balance of the Mathews factors weighs against requiring
an evidentiary hearing prior to a determination under section 1370(a)(2)(B)
in all cases. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1095–1100.) We apply

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that analysis here.
“As to the first Mathews factor—the private interest affected—there is
no dispute that defendant’s liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic medication is ‘significant.’ (Harper, supra,
494 U.S. at p. 221.)” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.)
Under the second factor, we consider the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of this interest through the procedures used by the trial court,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards. (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 334.) Here, the trial court’s
procedures prior to authorizing treatment with antipsychotic medication
included, as required under section 1370(a)(2)(B), the consideration of the
reports prepared by a licensed psychologist and/or psychiatrist pursuant to
section 1369, subdivision (a). The defendant is also afforded a hearing, the
right to be present at the hearing, the right to counsel, and the right to have
counsel present oral argument on his behalf. The court, however, is not
required to provide a formal evidentiary hearing with confrontation and
cross-examination in every case. Under these procedures, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of an IST defendant’s protected interest, as well as the
probable value of the additional procedure of an evidentiary hearing, was
minimal. (See Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1096–1098.)
In Lewis, we found guidance in Mathews and observed that the
appropriateness of involuntarily administering antipsychotics is within the
purview only of an expert whose opinion is likely to be one of objective
assessment that does not regularly implicate credibility or veracity issues,
and that such assessments are better suited to written rather than oral
presentation. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1096–1097.) Specifically,
we explained:

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“[In Mathews], the United States Supreme Court held due process did
not require an evidentiary hearing prior to an administrative decision
whether to terminate Social Security Disability Benefits and held that the
administrative procedure in place was constitutionally sufficient. (Mathews,
supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 340–347.) Mathews explained that ‘[t]he decision
whether to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon
“routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists.” ’
(Id. at p. 344.) Mathews noted that the high court has ‘recognized the
“reliability and probative worth of written medical reports” emphasizing that
while there may be “professional disagreement with the medical conclusions”
the “specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not present.” ’ (Id. at
pp. 344–345.) Further, where the proof is more amenable to written than
oral presentation, such as proof derived from medical sources, the risk of
error without oral testimony is diminished. (Id. at p. 345 [‘the information
critical to the entitlement decision usually is derived from medical sources,
such as the treating physician. Such sources are likely to be able to
communicate more effectively through written documents . . . ’].)
“These principles also apply to the decision whether to issue
involuntary medication under section 1370(a)(2)(B). That decision, as the
trial court noted, must be based on a consideration of a written report by a
qualified mental health expert. (§ 1370(a)(2)(B).) The competency statutes
envision a careful diagnostic evaluation by a licensed psychologist or
psychiatrist and the submission of a report of that evaluation prior to a
decision to order involuntary medication. (See §§ 1370(a)(2)(B), 1369, subd.
(b).) To the extent such reports are based on the experts’ professional
conclusions and personal examination of the defendant, as in Mathews, the
‘ “specter of credibility and veracity is not present.” ’ (Mathews, supra, 424

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U.S. at pp. 344–345.) Further, similar to the physician reports in Mathews,
the conclusions and recommendations of the mental health experts on the
appropriateness of antipsychotic medication are likely more amenable to
written than oral presentation. (Id. at p. 345.)
“This is not to suggest that the competency evaluators’ opinions are
infallible and impervious to attacks on grounds of credibility or veracity. But
as Mathews noted, while ‘credibility and veracity may be a factor in the
ultimate . . . assessment in some cases[,] . . . procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.’ (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at
p. 344.)
“Additionally, here, as in Mathews, ‘further safeguard[s] against
mistake’ include the trial court’s procedure of granting the defendant and/or
his or her attorney ‘full access to all information relied upon the state
agency.’ (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 346.) . . . Moreover, as in Mathews,
‘[o]pportunity is then afforded the [defendant] to submit additional evidence
or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly the accuracy of information
in his file as well as the correctness of the [psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s]
conclusions.’ (Ibid.)” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1096―1097, fn.
omitted.)
Further, where there are disputed issues of fact that hinge on
credibility and weight of the evidence, the trial court may in its discretion
allow for the presentation of live testimony. Such discretion is not “total” or
unfettered, as defendant suggests. “[W]hile the court retains the discretion to
conduct an evidentiary hearing for the parties to adduce live testimony or
cross-examine witnesses where it finds such hearing warranted, such
discretion, of course, must be reasoned and must reside within the confines of

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the applicable law. (See People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605–606
[‘ “ ‘ “[T]he scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being
applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles governing the subject of [the]
action . . . .’ ” ’ ” ’].)” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097.)
Considering all of the above factors, we conclude that the risk of an
arbitrary or erroneous deprivation of defendant’s protected interest through
the trial court’s procedures, and the probable value of additional procedures,
is slight. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.)
Defendant nonetheless insists that “[t]he procedures used in this case
were insufficient to mitigate the risk of error because they limited [him] to
argument by counsel and did not include the right to present or cross-
examine witnesses . . . .” Defendant selectively quotes from Vitek v. Jones
(1980) 445 U.S. 480, 483–484 (Vitek)—which addressed due process
requirements before transferring a prisoner to a mental health facility as well
as retaining the prisoner there indefinitely—the following: “The medical
nature of the inquiry . . . does not justify dispensing with due process
requirements. It is precisely ‘[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric
diagnoses’ that justify the requirement of adversary hearings.” Defendant
then contends: “Although the competency evaluators are appointed by the
court rather than called by the government as witnesses, they are still
dealing with complex medical inquires with ‘subtleties and nuances,’ and
these evaluators are not omniscient or infallible. . . . Thus, when an
incompetent defendant is limited to argument by counsel, who likely does not
have the medical training or expertise to identify all potential errors in the
competency evaluators’ reports, this opportunity to be heard does not
adequately reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”
This argument is puzzling. If counsel lacks “the medical training or

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expertise to identify all potential errors in the competency evaluators’
reports,” then, under defendant’s logic, counsel could not be reasonably
expected to also identify potential errors to explore in cross-examination of
those evaluators. Thus, defendant’s argument undermines, rather than
supports, his broader claim that requiring cross-examination would minimize
the risk of erroneous deprivation of an IST defendant’s protected interest.
Defendant also recites general legal principles underlying the right of
confrontation stated in cases such as “[i]n the Morrissey supervision
revocation context.” (See People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193,
1199 [“ ‘the opportunity of the accused to observe an adverse witness, while
that witness testifies, is a significant aspect of the right of confrontation that
may not be dispensed with lightly. [Citations.] Indeed, ‘the absence of proper
confrontation at trial calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-
finding process.’ ”].) However, he provides no meaningful legal analysis
explaining how these principles apply to the specific context here. “ ‘[A]n
appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp.
v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146.) “Mere
suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than
general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate
review.” (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) We decline to
develop defendant’s arguments for him. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 539, 546 [“[I]t is not this court’s function to serve as [the
appellant’s] backup appellate counsel.”].)
Turning to the final Mathews factor, we consider the public interest,

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including the fiscal and administrative burdens and societal costs that would
be associated with requiring an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases
prior to the authorization of involuntary medication. (Mathews, supra, 424
U.S. at p. 347.) In Lewis, we concluded this factor, too, weighs against a
mandatory evidentiary hearing, explaining:
“ ‘[M]andating additional procedures like live witness testimony subject
to cross-examination in every case’ would impose significant burdens. The
most visible burden would be the delays associated with requiring an
evidentiary invariably in all cases. The logistics of holding an evidentiary
hearing—including among other things subpoenaing documents and
witnesses and addressing legal or evidentiary issues in advance of and during
the hearing itself—would require a considerable amount of time to
accomplish.” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.)
In addition, “the delays associated with requiring an evidentiary
hearing in all cases would in turn have potentially significant, adverse
consequences. ‘The primary purpose of the pretrial confinement of
incompetent defendants is neither punishment nor rehabilitation, but the
restoration of that specific mental state without which the criminal process
cannot proceed.’ (People v. G.H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1560.) ‘IST
defendants’ treatment must begin within a constitutionally reasonable period
of time.’ (Stiavetti v. Clendenin (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 691, 713 [(Stiavetti)],
citing Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 738.) Moreover, the
government has a ‘substantial interest in timely prosecution’ of IST
defendants. (Sell, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 180.) Requiring an evidentiary
hearing upon demand in all cases prior to a determination under section
1370(a)(2)(B) runs the risk of violating an IST defendant’s constitutional
interest in timely treatment and evaluation, as well [undermining] the

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government’s interest in timely prosecution.” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1099.)
“Further, the delays associated with an evidentiary hearing
requirement ‘not only risk potential harm to the IST defendant individually,
but also risk potential harm to other patients.’ . . . ‘The longer an IST
individual remains untreated, the longer he may pose a threat to others at
the hospital, or occupy a bed which could be opened for another defendant
upon successful treatment. The delays caused by requiring evidentiary
hearings may also lead to defendants spending more time in custody pre-
commitment, given that § 1370(a)(2) requires the involuntary medication
issue to be considered before the commitment order is made.’ . . . ‘Delay in
treatment—especially where the only effective treatment is medication—is
against the public interest.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.)
On top of all that, it cannot “be ignored that the additional procedures
would cause the parties, the courts, and witnesses to expend considerable
resources.” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1100.)
Defendant, however, asserts that the burdens imposed by requiring an
evidentiary hearing are “significantly reduced by modern technology for
remote testimony,” as witnesses “can testify . . . by phone or video call. . . .”
We agree that requiring testimony to be conducted remotely would eliminate
the need for witnesses and parties to travel to court, thus reducing some time
in completing the evidentiary hearing. However, defendant’s assertion does
not account for the numerous other burdens imposed by a mandatory
evidentiary hearing that we have just described.
Defendant also contends that he “is not arguing that all the rules of
evidence must apply at an involuntary medication hearing, which Harper
held was not required . . . , so the more flexible rules would decrease the

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length of this hearing and the associated burden on witnesses.” This
argument is unavailing. As discussed, Harper held that due process did not
require a judicial hearing prior to ordering treatment of antipsychotic
medication to a mentally ill inmate deemed dangerous because it considered
such matters best assessed by medical professionals. (See Harper, supra, 494
U.S. at pp. 231–233.) However, proceedings under section 1370(a)(2)(B) are
judicial, not administrative like the proceedings in Harper. Administrative
proceedings are not subject to all the formal rules of evidence, notice, and
timing that apply in a judicial proceeding. (See Mohilef v. Janovici (1996)
51 Cal.App.4th 267, 291; see also Evid. Code, § 300 [the Evidence Code
“applies in every action before the Supreme Court or a court of appeal or
superior court . . . .”].)
Defendant next argues that “[t]here is historical evidence that granting
incompetent defendants the right to an evidentiary hearing before an
involuntary medication order would not present too great of a fiscal or
administrative burden.” Citing three cases as examples, defendant argues
that “[i]n many published opinions over the past two decades examining the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of an involuntary medication order, the
defendant was afforded an adversarial evidentiary hearing at which the
competency evaluator testified.” We rejected this very same argument in
Lewis, explaining: “The fact that there have been several cases in which
evidentiary hearings had been conducted hardly constitutes ‘historical
evidence’ to support the notion that requiring evidentiary hearings in all
cases ‘would not present too great of a fiscal or administrative burden.’ ”
(Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1100.) We apply that reasoning here.
In sum, we conclude that the Mathews factors weigh against requiring
a full evidentiary hearing prior to authorizing the involuntary administration

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of antipsychotic medication to IST defendants in all cases. Allowing for, but
not mandating, an evidentiary hearing permits trial courts to balance the
burdens that a full evidentiary hearing imposes while protecting IST
defendants from an erroneous deprivation of their protected interests.
Defendant’s attempts to analogize to cases in other contexts do not
compel a different conclusion. For example, defendant relies on Morrissey,
which, as noted, held that the due process required certain procedures at a
parole revocation hearing, including “the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses” unless good cause for not allowing confrontation is found.
(See Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 486–489.) However, we do not find
Morrissey on point, as important differences exist between defendant and a
parolee. As explained above, the State has a significant interest in acting
quickly to treat an IST defendant (Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 713)
and to prosecute his or her case. (Sell, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 180.) No
comparable interest exists in the supervision revocation context. (See In re
Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 106 [“In the parole situation a delay, while highly
undesirable since it may subject one innocent of the alleged violation to
prolonged and unnecessary incarceration, does not present a serious threat to
the destruction of that degree of rehabilitation which had been achieved prior
to the alleged violation.”].)
For similar reasons, defendant’s reliance on Vitek is also misplaced. As
noted, Vitek addressed a statute authorizing not only the transfer of a
prisoner to a mental health facility for evaluation, but also the prisoner’s
indefinite commitment in the facility. (Vitek, supra, 445 U.S. at pp. 483–484;
see United States v. Jones (1987) 811 F.2d 444, 448 [“Vitek . . . addresses a
statute providing for the indefinite commitment of a prisoner, not merely a
transfer for a psychological evaluation”].) And the appropriate procedures

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included a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker, which did not need to
be a judge, and “an opportunity . . . to present testimony of witnesses by the
defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the state”
except for good cause shown otherwise. (Id. at pp. 494–495.) To the extent
Vitek addressed the circumstance of indefinite commitment and treatment of
a mentally ill prison inmate, it is distinguishable from the present case. As
explained above, in IST proceedings timing is a critical factor. (See Stiavetti,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; Sell, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 180.) Moreover, as
a bill analysis of a 2012 amendment to section 1370 explains: “mentally ill
prison inmates are in very different circumstances than IST defendants.
Mentally ill inmates are serving sentences that may be decades long. Many
suffer chronic mental illnesses that require long-term medication, even where
the need for involuntary medication may arise from a crisis. In contrast, the
main purpose for treating IST defendants is to restore them to competency
for trial. . . . Ideally, the defendant will be returned to competency through
short-term treatment.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 366 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.), p. 11.)
We next address defendant’s argument that “granting incompetent
defendants an evidentiary hearing would further the fourth factor under the
California Constitution regarding ‘the dignitary interest . . . in enabling them
to present their side of the story before a responsible government
official[.]’ . . .” By “fourth factor,” defendant means that in addition to the
three factors in Mathews, California courts “consider a fourth factor, ‘ “the
dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and
consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the
story before a responsible governmental official.” ’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 213; see Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139

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Cal.App.4th 604, 611.) Defendant contends, without further discussion or
argument, that “he did not have the chance to fully present his side of the
story.” In any event, we disagree. Although defendant was not granted an
evidentiary hearing, as explained above, the court’s procedures provided him
with a meaningful opportunity to present any arguments challenging the
evaluators’ reports regarding the appropriateness of antipsychotic
medication.
Further, defendant’s argument that he could not “fully present his side
of the story” rings hollow, considering that he did not even present any
arguments challenging any specific aspects of the evaluators’ reports.4 And
although his counsel made a general request for an evidentiary hearing, she
made no specific proffer as to the facts she proposed to adduce, and by what
witnesses. Nor was there any specific proffer as to particular lines of cross-
examination that required exploration at an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the
record shows that defendant was given “the chance to fully present his side of
the story,” but simply did not avail himself of it.5

4 At the October 15, 2024 hearing, defense counsel pointed out the
following: “I would also note that Dr. Kokubun indicated in her report that
[REDACTED].” However, counsel did not accompany this statement with
any argument. Thus, it is unclear what argument, if any, counsel was
attempting to make.
5 Defendant also invokes in passing Probate Code section 4650,
subdivision (a), a provision in the “Health Care Decisions Law” (Prob. Code,
§ 4600 et seq.) that states this finding by the Legislature: “ ‘In recognition of
the dignity and privacy a person has a right to expect, the law recognizes that
an adult has the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to his or
her own health care . . . .’ ” But defendant never relied on this provision
below. Thus, to the extent defendant argues he was denied the right to
control his health care decisions under Probate Code section 4650, he has
forfeited the argument. (See People v. Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114.)

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In sum, defendant has failed to demonstrate the trial court violated due
process in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant Cannot Demonstrate an Equal Protection
Violation
Defendant next asserts that section 1370(a)(2)(B) violates his right to
equal protection because it denies him the right to an evidentiary hearing
prior to authorization of involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication that is afforded other IST defendants subject to subparagraphs
(C) and (D) of section 1370(a)(2) (section 1370(a)(2)(C) and (D)). We
considered and rejected an identical argument in Lewis. (Lewis, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1101, 1104–1106, 1110–1111.) We do so here as well.
Equal Protection Principles
Both the federal and California Constitutions guarantee that no person
shall be “den[ied] . . . the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) “Equal protection of the laws means that
similarly situated persons shall be treated similarly unless there is a
sufficiently good reason to treat them differently.” (People v. Castel (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 1321, 1326 (Castel), citing People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th
399, 408; Engquist v. Oregon Depart. of Agriculture (2008) 553 U.S. 591, 602;
Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.)
The first step in evaluating any equal protection claim is determining
whether there are two groups of individuals who are “ ‘ “similarly situated
with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law” ’ ” but are being treated
differently. (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1107 (Barrett).) “If the
two groups are not similarly situated or are not being treated differently,
then there can be no equal protection violation.” (Castel, supra, 12
Cal.App.5th at p. 1326.) But “if these threshold requirements are met, a
court must ascertain whether the Legislature has a constitutionally sufficient

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reason to treat the groups differently.” (Ibid.)
Analysis
Looking to the first step of the equal protection analysis, defendant
argues he is similarly situated to other IST defendants facing involuntary
medication under section 1370(a)(2)(C) and (D).
Section 1370(a)(2)(C) provides in pertinent part: “If the defendant
consented to antipsychotic medication . . . , but subsequently withdraws their
consent, or, if involuntary antipsychotic medication was not ordered pursuant
to clause (v) of subparagraph (B), and the treating psychiatrist determines
that antipsychotic medication has become medically necessary and
appropriate, the treating psychiatrist shall make efforts to obtain informed
consent from the defendant for antipsychotic medication. If informed consent
is not obtained from the defendant, and the treating psychiatrist is of the
opinion that the defendant lacks the capacity to make decisions regarding
antipsychotic medication . . . , the treating psychiatrist shall certify whether
the lack of capacity and any applicable conditions described above exist. . . .”
Section 1370(a)(2)(D) provides in relevant part: “(i) If the treating
psychiatrist certifies that antipsychotic medication has become medically
necessary and appropriate pursuant to subparagraph (C), antipsychotic
medication may be administered to the defendant for not more than 21 days,
provided, however, that, within 72 hours of the certification, the defendant is
provided a medication review hearing before an administrative law judge to
be conducted at the facility where the defendant is receiving treatment. The
treating psychiatrist shall present the case for the certification for
involuntary treatment and the defendant shall be represented by an attorney
or a patients’ rights advocate. . . . The defendant shall also have the
following rights with respect to the medication review hearing: [¶] (I) To be

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given timely access to the defendant’s records. [¶] (II) To be present at the
hearing, unless the defendant waives that right. [¶] (III) To present evidence
at the hearing. [¶] (IV) To question persons presenting evidence supporting
involuntary medication. [¶] (V) To make reasonable requests for attendance
of witnesses on the defendant’s behalf. [¶] (VI) To a hearing conducted in an
impartial and informal manner.”
“If the administrative law judge determines that the defendant either
meets the criteria specified in subclause (I) of clause (i) of subparagraph (B),
or meets the criteria specified in subclause (II) of clause (i) of subparagraph
(B), antipsychotic medication may continue to be administered to the
defendant for the 21-day certification period.” (§ 1370(a)(2)(D)(ii).) If the
administrative law judge disagrees with the certification, “medication may
not be administered involuntarily until the court determines that
antipsychotic medication should be administered pursuant to this section.”
(§ 1370(a)(2)(D)(iii).) Section 1370(a)(2)(D)(iv) then directs that “the court
shall provide notice . . . and shall hold a hearing, no later than 18 days from
the date of the certification, to determine whether antipsychotic medication
should be ordered beyond the certification period.”
Here, as we did in Lewis, we assume without deciding that individuals
subject to involuntary medication under section 1370(a)(2)(B), like defendant,
are similarly situated to, and are treated in an unequal manner from
individuals subject to section 1370(a)(2)(C) and (D). (Lewis, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at p. 1106.)6 Nonetheless, defendant cannot show an equal

6 In Lewis, we noted: “ ‘[T]here is nothing in § 1370(a)(2)(D) that
mandates a full evidentiary hearing in front of a superior court judge. At the
first step, an administrative law judge conducts an impartial and informal
hearing . . . . § 1370(a)(2)(D)(i). That is followed by a ‘hearing’ in superior
court. [(§ 1370(a)(2)(D)(iv).)] At no stage of this process does the statute give

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protection violation since we conclude there is a constitutionally sufficient
justification for the difference in treatment. (Id. at pp. 1110–1111.)
Initially, we decide what standard applies to determining whether a
constitutionally sufficient reason exists for the different treatment.
Defendant contends the “strict scrutiny” standard applies, because a
fundamental liberty is at stake. We previously rejected the same argument
in Lewis, concluding that the “rational basis” test applies. (See Lewis, supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1107–1109.) We conclude the same here.
It is true that “California courts have historically used strict scrutiny in
evaluating equal protection challenges based on differences among civil
commitment schemes.” (People v. Morrison (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 702, 715,
review granted June 25, 2025, S291041 (Morrison).) “But simply asserting
that a classification affects a ‘liberty’ interest proves too much. The
California Supreme Court has cautioned against the application of strict
scrutiny based solely on the rationale that ‘ “personal liberty is a
fundamental interest.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 716, quoting People v. Williams (2024) 17
Cal.5th 99, 123.) Morrison went on to describe more recent case law
considering the applicable standard of scrutiny to various equal protections
challenges in the civil commitment context. (Morrison, at pp. 717–718.)
In 2010, People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202 (McKee)

the defendant the right to a formal evidentiary hearing, nor does the statute
provide any sort of evidentiary hearing right in superior court.’ ” (Lewis,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113.) We continued: “If IST defendants subject
to section 1370(a)(2)(C) and (D) do not have the right to a hearing before a
superior court judge, then, arguably, individuals subject to section
1370(a)(2)(B) like defendant are not being treated differently. However, we
will assume for purposes of the appeal that the right at issue here is the right
to an evidentiary hearing before a judge in general and regardless of the
application of formal rules of evidence.” (Lewis, at p. 1106, fn. 9.)

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considered a challenge by an SVP to his indefinite commitment. The
Supreme Court seems to have applied what purported to be a form of
“heightened scrutiny” that appears to be less rigorous than strict scrutiny but
more onerous than rational basis scrutiny. (McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp.
1206–1207, 1210–1211 & fns. 13 & 14.) McKee explained that it was not
applying the “usual judicial deference to legislative findings” consonant with
rational basis scrutiny (id. at p. 1206,), while simultaneously insisting that it
was also not applying strict scrutiny (id. at p. 1210, fn. 13). Although McKee
ultimately remanded for the trial court to “apply[ ] the equal protection
principles articulated in [In re] Moye [(1978) 22 Cal.3d 457 (Moye)] and
related cases discussed in the present opinion” (McKee, at p. 1209)—and Moye
applied strict scrutiny (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 465)—Moye’s application
of that standard rested on a concession (ibid.) and, as noted, McKee’s
discussion of related cases was not clear regarding which level of scrutiny to
apply.
More recently, the Supreme Court in Barrett applied rational basis
scrutiny to conclude that disparate treatment as to jury trial advisements for
persons subject to commitment proceedings under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 5300 et seq. (advisement required) and persons subject to LPS
proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 et seq.
(advisement not required) did not violate equal protection. (Barrett, supra,
54 Cal.4th at pp. 1109–1111, fn. 21.) The court reasoned that “an equal
protection violation does not occur merely because different statutory
procedures have been included in different civil commitment schemes.
[Citation.] Nothing compels the state ‘to choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.’ [Citation.] Far from
having to ‘solve all related ills at once’ [citation], the Legislature has ‘broad

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discretion’ to proceed in an incremental and uneven manner without
necessarily engaging in arbitrary and unlawful discrimination.” (Barrett, at
p. 1110.)
We explained in Lewis that “appellate courts have reached different
conclusions on the appropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating claims of
disparate treatment in civil commitments.” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1108, fn. 10.) As of the time of our decision in Lewis: “In deciding what
level of scrutiny to apply to equal protection claims involving nuanced details
of civil commitment procedures, recent decisions of the Courts of Appeal have
followed Barrett and applied rational basis review.” (Morrison, supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 718; see e.g., People v. Nolasco (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 209,
226 (Nolasco) [examining timing renewals for individuals declared dangerous
because of a “ ‘developmental disability’ ” or “ ‘mental disease, defect, or
disorder’ ”]; People v. Magana (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 310, 324 (Magana)
[following Barrett and concluding rational basis applied to challenge based on
the SVPA’s failure to require a personal jury trial advisement and waiver,
unlike statutes governing trials for other civil commitments]; Morrison, at p.
718 [“We agree with [Nolasco’s and Magana’s] application of the California
Supreme Court precedent” and “decide rational basis review applies to
Morrison’s assertion that his equal protection rights were violated by the
SVPA’s failure to require a personal jury trial advisement and waiver”];
People v. Cannon (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 786, 798–799 [following Nolasco and
Magana in concluding rational basis review applied in determining whether
the SVPA violates equal protection by not requiring a personal waiver of a
jury trial right, as other civil commitment statutes require], review granted

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Feb. 15, 2023, S277995 (Cannon).)7
In Lewis, we found Magana instructive. (See Lewis, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.) Magana is one of the recent cases noted above that
have considered equal protection challenges to civil commitment statutes
relating, as here, to secondary or ancillary trial procedures that do not
necessarily impact the individual’s fundamental rights and, therefore, have
applied rational basis review. (Magana, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 324
[“Although the indefinite commitment of an alleged SVP affects the
individual’s fundamental right to liberty, ensuring an alleged SVP has
meaningful access to the statutory right to a jury trial, while essential to the
exercise of that right, does not affect a fundamental right”].) In Lewis, the
People argued, and we agreed, that “the same reasoning” of Magana “holds
true for [defendant’s] claim about hearing procedures for involuntary
medication orders. It involves a challenge to the process surrounding the
right to refuse, not the fundamental right to refuse medication itself.” (Lewis,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.) “For that reason, as well as the fact that
‘Barrett is the more recent pronouncement by our Supreme Court as to the
pertinent level of scrutiny to apply when comparing divergent civil
commitment procedures’ (Nolasco, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 225), we also

7 In Cannon, the Supreme Court granted review on the following issue:
“What level of scrutiny applies in determining whether the Sexually Violent
Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) violates equal protection
because it does not require an advisement or personal waiver of a jury trial as
afforded in other civil commitment statutes.” Shortly after we issued our
decision in Lewis, the Supreme Court granted review in other appellate court
cases addressing the same issue in Cannon. Among these cases are
Morrison, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 702, review granted June 25, 2025,
S291041, and People v. Magana (Mar. 19, 2025, B327869) [nonpub. opn],
review granted June 18, 2025, S290583, an unpublished decision in the
appeal following issuance of a remand in Magana, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 310.

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‘choose to follow Barrett—and hence to apply rational basis scrutiny.’
(Nolasco, at p. 225.)” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
Over two months following our decision in Lewis, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Cannon. (People v. Cannon (Aug. 18, 2025, S277995)
___ Cal.5th ___.) It held, consistent with Barrett, that the proper standard of
scrutiny for the equal protection challenge presented there is rational basis
review. (Id. at p. ___.)
In light of this holding, we see no basis to depart from Lewis’s analysis
and conclusion above. We thus continue to be of the view that rational basis
scrutiny should apply to the equal protection challenge here based on the
availability of an evidentiary hearing to the two different groups of IST
defendants prior to a determination of whether to issue involuntary
medication.
As to how to apply that standard, our Supreme Court has explained
that the rational basis test “sets a high bar” for litigants challenging
legislative enactments. (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 289.)
Under the rational basis test, “the legislation survives constitutional scrutiny
as long as there is ‘ “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.” ’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55
Cal.4th 62, 74.) “[A] court may engage in ‘ “rational speculation” ’ as to the
justifications for the legislative choice. [Citation.] It is immaterial for
rational basis review ‘whether or not’ any such speculation has “a foundation
in the record.” (Id. at p. 75.) “Nor does the logic behind a potential
justification need to be persuasive or sensible—rather than simply rational.”
(People v. Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289.) The challenger bears the
burden to “ ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the
disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice, supra, 60

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Cal.4th at p. 881.)
Defendant cannot meet this high bar. As explained in Lewis, we can
“discern a rational basis for the difference in treatment between IST
defendants subject to section 1370(a)(2)(B) and IST defendants subject to
section 1370(a)(2)(C) and (D).” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110.) To
recap, the differences in the procedures between the two groups are as
follows: “ ‘All IST defendants receive a hearing under § 1370(a)(2)(B); the
outcome of that determination separates the two groups. Some will be found
incapable of consent and qualify for IVM orders under the conditions
specified; the others will not have IVM orders issued, either because the court
found they retained the capacity to consent to medication, medication is
inappropriate, or the court was unable to reach a determination on the
reports provided. Only the latter group will potentially be subject to a
§ 1370(a)(2)(C)-(D) hearing, and only where there has either been a change in
circumstances (such as the defendant withdrawing consent, or a change in
the psychiatrist’s recommendation) or the determination was too unclear to
be made based on the § 1369 reports. The additional hearing procedures
under § 1370(a)(2)(C)-(D) are based on the fact that those IST defendants
were already subject to a § 1370(a)(2)(B) determination, and originally found
not to qualify for the IVM order . . . .’ ” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p.
1110.)
In Lewis, the defendant argued there was “ ‘no reason’ ” for the
additional procedures in section 1370(a)(2)(C) and (D) “ ‘simply because the
individual’s mental health deteriorated, medication has become appropriate,
the reports in the first hearing were inadequate, or the individual decided to
withdraw consent to medication.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p.
1110.) “But the People maintain[ed] that the emergence of those different or

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new circumstances following the initial proceedings under section
1370(a)(2)(B) are the point—they assert that ‘[a]lthough section 1370,
subdivision (a)(2)(C)-(D) allows for an administrative hearing followed by
superior court review when an involuntary medication decision needs to be
revisited, it is rational for the Legislature to reserve those additional
procedures for situations where circumstances have changed and there is a
specific need to reevaluate an initial determination.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 1110.)
We agreed with the People’s assertion and therefore concluded that the
Legislature had a rational basis for the difference in hearing procedures
between IST defendants subject to section 1370(a)(2)(B) on one hand, and IST
defendants subject to section 1370(a)(2)(C) and (D) on the other hand.
(Lewis, at pp. 1110–1111.) We adopt that analysis here.
For all of the above reasons, we hold that defendant has failed to
demonstrate an equal protection violation.
Any Error Was Harmless
Assuming for argument’s sake the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing, we would conclude any such
error was harmless.
Preliminarily, defendant argues that the purported error was
“structural” and thus reversible per se. The People, however, argue that the
error is subject to harmless error analysis. In Lewis, we rejected the same
argument raised by defendant here. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p.
1111.) For the reasons stated in Lewis, we disagree with defendant that the
alleged error here is structural and reversible per se.
“[M]ost errors implicating a federal constitutional right . . . are
amenable to harmless error analysis and that only a ‘very limited class of
cases’ are subject to per se reversal.” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th

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342, 363.) “Most errors . . . are ‘ “trial error[s],” ’ occurring ‘during the
presentation of the case to the jury.’ [Citation.] They are amenable to
harmless error review because they can be ‘quantitatively assessed in the
context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [their]
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [citation.] ‘Structural
defects,’ on the other hand, ‘defy analysis by “harmless-error” standards’
[citation] because they are not ‘simply an error in the trial process,’ but
rather an error ‘affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds’ ”
(ibid.)—for example, “a biased judge, total absence of counsel, the failure of a
jury to reach any verdict on an essential element.” (People v. Gamache (2010)
48 Cal.4th 347, 396.) “A structural error requires per se reversal because it
cannot be fairly determined how a trial would have been resolved if the grave
error had not occurred.” (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 554.)
As we concluded in Lewis, the asserted error in the denial of an
evidentiary hearing is not structural but rather subject to harmless error
analysis. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1111–1112.) We explained:
“The trial court denied defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing at
which he could cross-examine the competency evaluator. This error is
analogous to a confrontation clause violation or the denial of a defendant’s
opportunity to impeach a witness, which errors are subject to harmless error
analysis. (People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1281,
citing Delaware v. Vans Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 684; see also People v.
Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 350 [‘If it is determined that trial
court rulings limiting cross-examination of a witness have denied the
defendant his right of confrontation, the error is subject to harmless-error
analysis’]; accord, People v. Bryant, Smith & Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335,
395.) Moreover, on the record before us, it can ‘be fairly determined’ how the

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competency proceedings would have been resolved if the error had not
occurred. (People v. Anzalone, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 554.) Therefore, we
evaluate whether the error committed in the present case was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
[(Chapman)]; People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 871–872.)” (Lewis, supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1112.)
We apply that analysis here, and conclude that any error in denying an
evidentiary hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The crux of defendant’s claims of error is that he was entitled to cross-
examine the competency evaluators and the hearsay declarants on whose
statements the evaluators relied. As to the actual substance of the
questioning he argues he should been permitted to conduct on cross-
examination, the only developed argument he offers appears in his opening
brief’s discussion of the equal protection issue and states as follows: “Section
1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B), expressly states: ‘A licensed psychologist’s
opinion shall not exceed the scope of their license.’ (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
In this case, [REDACTED]. [Defendant] did not have the right to question
her about [REDACTED].”
Putting aside that defendant did not raise these contentions below, we
conclude that defendant would not have obtained a more favorable ruling had
he been permitted to question Dr. Kokubun in the above respects. The
apparent purpose of that questioning is to undermine Dr. Kokubun’s
credibility and the reliability of her opinions. Assuming the damaging
potential of the cross-examination had been fully realized in that regard, we
nonetheless conclude that any error denying such cross-examination was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
While the trial court relied on Dr. Kokubun’s report in concluding that

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defendant was a danger to others (§ 1370(a)(2)(B)(i)(II)), it also relied on the
report of psychiatrist, Dr. Horan. Separately, in concluding that defendant
lacked the capacity to make medical decisions regarding antipsychotic
medication (§ 1370(a)(2)(B)(i)(I)), the court relied solely on Dr. Horan’s report.
Thus, the trial court had evidence independent from that of Dr. Kobukun’s
report from which it could determine whether to authorize involuntary
medication.
[REDACTED]
Defendant does not argue that Dr. Horan was unqualified to render her
opinions, that her report lacked the requisite information from which the
trial court could make a determination on whether to authorize treatment
with antipsychotic medication, or that her opinions were unsupported or
erroneous. Thus, as best we can tell, the substance of Dr. Horan’s report is
undisputed.
Because Dr. Horan’s report supplied independent, overwhelming
evidence to support the involuntary medication order, we are satisfied that
any error in denying defendant the opportunity to cross-examine Dr.
Kokubun would not have changed the outcome of the proceedings. We thus
conclude that any error in the denial of an evidentiary hearing was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The October 15, 2024 order committing defendant to the Department
and authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication
is affirmed.

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RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.

We concur.

MILLER, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

(A171772N- PUBLIC-REDACTED)

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