CourtListener 10668527•People v. Norman CA5
Full text
Filed 9/9/25 P. v. Norman CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088205
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F19905027)
v.
BRENT NORMAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. James A.
Kelley, Judge.
Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
Appellant Brent Norman appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after he
pled no contest to felony driving under the influence of alcohol with two prior “super
strike” convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)). He was sentenced to a prison
term of 25 years to life. He did not obtain or attempt to obtain a certificate of probable
cause.
Appointed appellate counsel for appellant has filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 setting forth a summary of the proceedings and facts, raising
no specific issues, and asking this court to independently review the record to determine
whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Appellant was advised of his right to
file a supplemental brief but has not done so.
After an independent review of the record, we find no arguable issues that would
result in a disposition more favorable to appellant. As such, we affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 20, 2024, appellant entered an open plea of no contest to felony
driving with a 0.08 percent or higher blood-alcohol level (Veh. Code,1 § 23152, subd. (b);
count 1), felony driving under the influence of alcohol (§ 23152, subd. (a); count 2), and
misdemeanor driving on a suspended license (§ 14601.2, subd. (a); count 3) on or about
July 26, 2019. As to counts 1 and 2, appellant admitted he had suffered two prior gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated convictions (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a))
within the meaning of section 23550.5, subdivision (b); three prior felony driving under
the influence convictions within the last 10 years within the meaning of section 23550.5,
subdivision (a); and that he had suffered four offenses within 10 years within the meaning
of section 23550. Appellant also admitted he drove a motor vehicle with a 0.15 percent
or higher blood-alcohol level (§ 23578) and that he was on bail or out on his own
1 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code except where otherwise
indicated.
2.
recognizance when he committed the offenses (Pen. Code, § 12022.1). Appellant also
admitted that the two violations of Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a) were
“super strike” convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). Finally, appellant admitted that under California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(2),2 he had suffered prior convictions that were numerous or of
increasing seriousness.3 The defense stipulated to a blood-alcohol level of 0.19 percent
and to a factual basis for the plea pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595. At the
time of accepting appellant’s plea, the trial court advised appellant that his exposure was
a prison term of 27 years to life. The court noted it “did not make any promises” but was
willing to hear a defense motion regarding striking the strike convictions.
2 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
3 Specifically, the following convictions appellant admitted to were:
• a 1994 conviction for driving on a suspended license (§ 14601.1, subd. (a));
• a 1995 conviction for driving on a suspended license (§ 14601.1, subd. (a));
• two 1999 convictions for driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent
or above (§ 23152, subd. (b));
• a 2000 conviction for receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496,
subd. (a));
• two 2002 convictions for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
(Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a));
• a 2012 conviction for driving on a license suspended for driving under the
influence (§ 14601.2);
• a 2012 conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or
above (§ 23152, subd. (b));
• a 2015 conviction for driving on a license suspended for driving under the
influence (§ 14601.2, subd. (a));
• a 2015 conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or
above (§ 23152, subd. (b));
• a 2015 conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (§ 23152,
subd. (a));
• a 2021 conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (§ 23152,
subd. (a)); and
• a 2023 conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d,
subd. (a)).
3.
The probation report set forth the underlying facts of the offenses:4 A woman
called law enforcement because appellant was refusing to leave her residence. When law
enforcement arrived, appellant had already left but was traveling back towards the
residence in a vehicle. Law enforcement was able to contact appellant, and during that
time, they received a reckless driving report regarding appellant. The witness reported
appellant drove over a lawn and “ ‘appeared to have no regard for the residents’ ”
standing on the sidewalk. Appellant admitted to having consumed alcohol prior to
driving and submitted to a breath test which resulted in a blood-alcohol level of
0.19 percent.
The prosecution filed a sentencing brief opposing any exercise of the trial court’s
discretion to strike one of the prior strike convictions under Penal Code section 1385,
contending appellant was not outside the spirit of the “Three Strikes” sentencing scheme.
The prosecution provided the following facts underlying the strike convictions: In 2000,
appellant was driving erratically and at excessive speeds. When law enforcement
attempted to conduct a stop, appellant did not stop, and a high-speed chase ensued.
Eventually, appellant sideswiped another vehicle, forcing the driver into opposing traffic,
where he collided with another vehicle. Neither victim driver survived. Appellant’s
vehicle overturned due to the impact, and he continued to evade law enforcement.
Appellant was eventually detained and taken to the hospital, where a blood draw revealed
a blood-alcohol level of 0.29 percent. He was convicted of two counts of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated, one for each victim.
In its brief, the prosecution further pointed out that appellant was sentenced to
24 years four months in prison for his manslaughter convictions in 2002 and paroled in
2011. The prosecution went on to outline appellant’s subsequent criminal history upon
release, including several subsequent driving under the influence offenses, parole and
4 Appellant waived a preliminary hearing.
4.
supervised release violations, additional prison terms, and other offenses. The
prosecution noted that appellant had been convicted of a total of 16 felony counts,
including nine lifetime driving under the influence convictions and highlighted that
appellant had little crimefree time spent out of custody.
Appellant filed a statement in mitigation and an invitation to the trial court to
strike the prior strike offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 and People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Appellant argued several mitigating
circumstances existed, including that he was fearful of the woman’s husband at the time
he committed the present offenses and suffered from alcohol addiction. He further
argued that though he had a lengthy criminal history, a life sentence was disproportionate
for a nonserious, nonviolent crime.
At sentencing on June 6, 2024, after hearing arguments from the parties, the trial
court declined to strike appellant’s prior strike convictions, noting appellant’s continued
criminal behavior, including driving under the influence offenses, since being released
from prison on his vehicular manslaughter convictions. The court sentenced appellant to
a term of 25 years to life on count 1. The court stayed punishment on the out-on-bail
enhancement and imposed and stayed punishment on count 2 pursuant to Penal Code
section 654. Count 3 was dismissed by the court on its own motion, in the interest of
justice.
The trial court awarded 1,624 custody credits, consisting of 812 actual credits and
812 conduct credits. The court imposed a restitution fine of $10,000 (Pen. Code,
§ 1202.4), a matching parole revocation fine that was suspended (Pen. Code, § 1202.45),
$40 court security fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), and a $30 criminal conviction assessment
(Gov. Code, § 70373). The court declared appellant a habitual traffic offender under
section 13350, subdivision (b) and revoked appellant’s driving privilege pursuant to
5.
section 13352, subdivision (a)(7). Finally, the court gave appellant a Watson5
advisement.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal indicating the appeal was from a judgment after
a jury or court trial. No certificate of probable cause was submitted.
On March 13, 2025, appellant’s appointed counsel filed a motion to construe the
notice of appeal to reflect that it was not a jury trial but a plea that resulted in the present
appeal. This court granted the motion on the same day and indicated it was construing
the notice of appeal “to be an appeal from the judgment entered on June 6, 2024, and
taken after a plea of guilty or no contest and based on the sentence or other matters
occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea.”
On March 24, 2025, in response to a request by appellate counsel, the trial court
prepared an amended abstract of judgment with the amount of presentence custody
credits corrected to reflect appellant had earned 1,736 total credits, made up of 868 actual
credits and 868 conduct credits at the time of sentencing.
DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the record under Wende and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th
106. Consistent with our Supreme Court’s direction in Kelly, we have provided a brief
description of the relevant facts and the procedural history of this case. We have
summarized the crimes of which appellant was convicted, and the punishment imposed.
(Kelly, at p. 110.) As stated above, appellant has not filed supplemental contentions for
us to review.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable issue
that would result in a disposition more favorable to appellant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
5 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290.
6.
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.