CourtListener 10666323•People v. OptumRx CA2/5
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Filed 9/4/25 P. v. OptumRx CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF B343828
CALIFORNIA,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
23STCV20886)
v.
OPTUMRX INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David S. Cunningham, Judge. Affirmed.
Alston & Bird, Brian D. Boone, Matthew P. Hooker,
Alexander Akerman, Omar A. Morquecho and Andrew Hatchett
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Scott Kuhn and Andrea Ross, Deputy
County Counsel; Motley Rice, Frederick C. Baker, Brendan
Austin, Linda Singer and Elizabeth Smith for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant and appellant OptumRx, Inc., appeals from an
order denying a motion to disqualify the law firm Motley Rice
LLC, from representing plaintiff and respondent, the People of
the State of California, in this action for public nuisance arising
out of the opioid epidemic. On appeal, OptumRx contends Motley
Rice should be disqualified pursuant to California Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 1.11(c),1 because the law firm, while
representing government entities in prior matters, obtained
“confidential government information” that was not “otherwise
available to the public.” We agree with the many courts that
have considered this issue already: information that may be
obtained through routine discovery in civil litigation, even if
subject to a protective order, is “available to the public” and not
confidential government information under rule 1.11(c).
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Litigation and Government Investigations
OptumRx is a pharmacy benefit manager that administers
prescription drug benefits for health plan sponsors. In December
2017, several lawsuits with common factual questions concerning
prescription opioids were consolidated in federal multidistrict
litigation (the MDL). (In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litigation
(2017) 290 F.Supp.3d 1375, 1378.) In January 2018, the MDL
court appointed an attorney from Motley Rice as co-lead counsel
1 All undesignated references to rules are to the California
Rules of Professional Conduct.
2
for the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee. (In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig. (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 18, 2024, Case No. 1:17-md-2804)
2024 WL 3387288, at p.113) A few weeks later, OptumRx
became a defendant in the MDL. (Ibid.)
In September 2018, the City of Chicago retained Motley
Rice to investigate and litigate potential claims for unfair or
deceptive business practices by pharmacy benefit managers (the
Chicago matter). In connection with this investigation, the City
of Chicago issued a subpoena to OptumRx to produce documents,
including documents about payments that exceed the cash price.
It is undisputed that the documents OptumRx produced included
thousands of pages of information about OptumRx’s business
practices, formulary development, clinical analysis, rebate
negotiations, and financial data. A confidentiality agreement
allowed the materials to be used outside of the Chicago matter
only as required by law or court order.
In December 2020, the Office of the Attorney General for
the District of Columbia retained Motley Rice to investigate
potential violations of consumer protection and false claim laws
in the District of Columbia (the DC matter). The Office of the
Attorney General for the District of Columbia issued a subpoena
directing OptumRx to produce to its counsel, Motley Rice,
documents and information related to OptumRx’s pricing
practices. OptumRx produced information about rebates for
prescriptions filled in the District of Columbia, as well as a set of
documents that it had produced previously to the Minnesota
Attorney General (the Minnesota documents), subject to a
confidentiality agreement. OptumRx considered the majority of
the Minnesota documents to be highly confidential and
commercially sensitive.
3
In April 2021, Motley Rice was retained to represent the
Department of the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii in an
investigation of prescription drug billing practices by pharmacy
benefit managers (the Hawaii matter). The Attorney General for
the State of Hawaii issued a subpoena directing OptumRx to
deliver documents to Motley Rice related to pricing and rebates
for prescription drugs. OptumRx produced to Motley Rice a
spreadsheet with information about certain pricing practices, as
well as the Minnesota documents, subject to a confidentiality
agreement that allowed use of the materials outside the State of
Hawaii’s investigation only as required by law or court order.
B. California Complaint and Disqualification Motion in
MDL
In August 2023, in the instant case, Motley Rice and the
Office of the County Counsel for the County of Los Angeles, on
behalf of the People, filed a complaint for public nuisance against
OptumRx and other pharmacy benefit managers.
Meanwhile, in the MDL proceeding, OptumRx filed a
motion seeking to disqualify Motley Rice under Ohio Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.11(c) (Ohio Rule 1.11), which the MDL
court denied in March 2024. (In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., supra, 2024 WL 3387288, at p. 126.) OptumRx filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus in federal court to obtain review
of the order denying disqualification of Motley Rice in the MDL.
The MDL court created a discovery repository and required
defendants to produce all non-privileged documents previously
produced in civil investigations, litigations, and administrative
actions that were relevant to claims in the MDL proceeding. On
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March 26, 2024, OptumRx complied with the MDL discovery
repository order by producing documents for the depository,
including the Minnesota documents. All plaintiffs’ counsel who
sign a protective order in the MDL have access to the documents
that OptumRx’s disqualification motion is based upon. Counsel
for the People in the instant proceeding have signed the
protective order in the MDL.
In May 2024, Motley Rice and County Counsel, on behalf of
the People, filed the operative second amended complaint in the
instant case, alleging statutory and common law claims for public
nuisance against OptumRx and other pharmacy benefit
managers.
C. Disqualification Motion in the Instant Case
On June 24, 2024, OptumRx filed a motion to disqualify
Motley Rice based on rule 1.11(c), arguing that the firm was
prohibited from pursuing the People’s claims where it could use
the information that Motley Rice had obtained through
subpoenas served in prior government investigations. OptumRx
had produced thousands of documents directly to Motley Rice in
response to the government subpoenas. OptumRx argued that
the information produced in other cases was not publicly
available, and rule 1.11(c) prohibited Motley Rice’s participation
in the instant case where it could use its knowledge of that
information against OptumRx in the instant case. Specifically
with respect to application of rule 1.11(c), OptumRx argued that
information should not be considered “available to the public”
simply because it could be obtained through civil discovery.
5
OptumRx submitted the declaration of its attorney Allison
Caplis, who had responded to investigative subpoenas served on
OptumRx by the Attorneys General of Hawaii and the District of
Columbia. Caplis declared that the information produced had
consisted of sensitive commercial documents that were not
available to the public. OptumRx does not routinely produce
these types of documents and would not produce the materials
without securing a protective order or entering into a
confidentiality agreement. OptumRx submitted a similar
declaration by its attorney Michelle S. Grant as to documents
produced in response to the investigative subpoena of the City of
Chicago. OptumRx also submitted the declaration of its attorney
Matthew Hooker explaining that only 41 of the documents
produced to the Minnesota Attorney General were available as a
regular part of OptumRx’s business; the vast majority of the
documents were highly confidential, commercially sensitive
documents that were not available to the public. OptumRx also
submitted a report from two legal experts on the application of
rule 1.11(c) in the instant matter.
On August 5, 2024, the People filed an opposition to the
motion to disqualify Motley Rice. The People argued that the
documents at issue did not qualify as confidential government
information under rule 1.11(c) because the information was
available to the public through routine discovery. The People
also argued that Motley Rice’s access to the information could not
cause material disadvantage to OptumRx, and that Motley Rice
was not a public official or employee in the government
investigation.
The People submitted several declarations in support of the
opposition, including the declaration of attorney Elizabeth Smith,
6
who explained that the information discussed by OptumRx’s
experts was in publicly available documents. The People also
submitted the expert opinion of Lynn Baker, a law professor at
the University of Texas School of Law, opining that rule 1.11(c)
does not require disqualification of Motley Rice.
On August 26, 2024, OptumRx filed a reply. OptumRx
argued, among other issues, that whether information constitutes
“confidential government information” under rule 1.11(c) cannot
depend on whether the information is available through routine
discovery, or nothing would qualify as confidential government
information and rule 1.11(c) would be written out of existence.
For the first time, OptumRx also argued that Rule 1.11(c) was
not limited to documents, but encompassed other confidential
information about OptumRx. For example, it included strategic
insights and mental roadmaps that could be developed from an
investigation, such as the strengths and weaknesses of the
evidence compiled against a party. It also included internal
documents and discussions about the investigation and litigation
strategies, or materials that third parties produced in response to
subpoenas, which Motley Rice had access to during its
government service in other cases and was not available through
the MDL repository. If OptumRx subpoenaed Motley Rice to
produce other types of information, OptumRx expected the firm
would assert privileges that demonstrate Motley Rice has
confidential government information beyond the documents that
OptumRx produced.
In a footnote, OptumRx requested permission to depose the
People’s declarants about their access to confidential government
information about OptumRx other than the documents that
OptumRx produced.
7
On October 22, 2024, OptumRx’s petition for a writ of
mandate seeking to disqualify Motley Rice in the MDL court
under Ohio Rule 1.11(c) was denied. Other federal courts have
similarly denied motions by OptumRx seeking to disqualify
Motley Rice. (City of Boston v. Express Scripts, Inc. (D. Mass.
Feb. 11, 2025) 765 F.Supp.3d 31 [no disqualification under
Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11(c)]; Anne
Arundel Cnty. v. Express Scripts, Inc. (D. Md., Jan. 21, 2025, Civ
No. MJM-24-90) 2025 WL 254807 [no disqualification under
Maryland Attorneys’ Rule of Professional Conduct 1.11(c)].)
On November 14, 2024, a hearing was held in the instant
case on OptumRx’s motion to disqualify Motley Rice. The trial
court denied the motion. The court found OptumRx had not
shown Motley Rice acquired confidential government information
about OptumRx within the meaning of rule 1.11(c).
The court found OptumRx’s experts unpersuasive and
noted documents marked confidential by a party are sometimes
discoverable. OptumRx failed to differentiate between
documents the company would produce in routine discovery,
perhaps under a protective order, and any truly undiscoverable
confidential information. The court also found OptumRx’s
responses to the government subpoenas were analogous to
responses to civil litigation demands, which are subject to
compulsory discovery. In addition, the documents had already
been produced in the MDL litigation under an order allowing all
MDL plaintiffs to use the documents, which established that the
documents can be obtained through routine discovery.
With respect to information other than documents, the trial
court noted that OptumRx had not identified any particular
strategic insight or mental roadmap that was subject to rule
8
1.11(c). The court viewed OptumRx’s request to depose the
People’s declarants about whether they had any non-
documentary confidential government information as an
admission that the argument was speculative, vague, and
amorphous. Even assuming strategic insights and a mental
roadmap existed, they would likely have been derived from the
documents themselves, so depositions were not likely to reveal
different confidential government information sufficient to
change the outcome of the motion to disqualify. The court denied
OptumRx’s request to depose the People’s declarants.
The trial court also found OptumRx failed to show the
information at issue could be used to the disadvantage of
OptumRx, because the information was available to all MDL
plaintiffs, including County Counsel for the People.
OptumRx filed a timely notice of appeal from the order
denying disqualification, which is appealable under Code of Civil
Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). (Reed v. Superior
Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 448, 452–453.)
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney derives
from the power inherent in every court “[t]o control in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and
of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial
proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto.” ’
(People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change
Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145.) ‘[U]ltimately the
9
issue involves a conflict between a client’s right to counsel of his
choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional
responsibility.’ ” (Johnson v. Department of Transportation
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 917, 933.)
“Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification
motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] If the
trial court resolved disputed factual issues, the reviewing court
should not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s express or
implied findings supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]
When substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual
findings, the appellate court reviews the conclusions based on
those findings for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, the
trial court’s discretion is limited by the applicable legal
principles. [Citation.] Thus, where there are no material
disputed factual issues, the appellate court reviews the trial
court’s determination as a question of law. [Citation.]” (People ex
rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc.,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1143–1144.)
B. Disqualification
OptumRx contends the trial court abused its discretion by
denying the motion for disqualification of Motley Rice because
the information at issue constituted confidential government
information under Rule 1.11(c). We disagree.
1. General Principles and Framework
The California Rules of Professional Conduct do not provide
standards for disqualification in the courts, but courts analyzing
10
disqualification issues may obtain guidance from the rules.
(Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 602,
621.)
Rule 1.11 was enacted as part of comprehensive
amendments to California’s Rules of Professional Conduct,
effective November 2018. (Rule 1.11; Sheppard, Mullin, Richter
& Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2018) 6 Cal.5th
59, 86, fn. 7.)
Paragraph (a)(1) of rule 1.11 requires a lawyer who
formerly served as a public official or government employee to
abide by the same duties under rule 1.9(c) as a lawyer who
formerly represented a private client. As a result, rule 1.11(a)(1)
“protects information obtained while working for the government
to the same extent as information learned while representing a
private client.” (Rule 1.11, com. 4, eff. Nov. 1, 2018.)
In the absence of a prior attorney-client relationship,
however, an attorney representing a private client does not owe a
broad duty to an opposing party to maintain that party’s
confidences. (In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 572, 588.) “The imposition of such a duty would be
antithetical to our adversary system and would interfere with the
attorney’s relationship with his or her own clients. The courts
have recognized repeatedly that attorneys owe no duty of care to
adversaries in litigation or to those with whom their clients deal
at arm’s length. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335,
344; Wasmann v. Seidenberg (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 752, 755;
Schick v. Lerner (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1330–1331; St. Paul
Title Co. v. Meier (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 948, 951; Morales v.
Field, DeGoff, Huppert & MacGowan (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 307,
11
318.)” (In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d
at p. 588.)
OptumRx does not contend that Motley Rice used the
information obtained in prior investigations in violation of the
protective orders in those matters. In fact, courts have found
attorneys who obtain confidential information from an opposing
party subject to a protective order are not disqualified from
representing different clients in subsequent litigation against the
same party. (See, e.g., Hu–Friedy Mfg. Co., v. GE (N.D. Ill.
July 19, 1999, No. 99 C 0762) 1999 WL 528545, at pp. 7–8
[interpreting protective order to bar future use of confidential
information in subsequent action even though independently
relevant and discoverable would restrict attorney’s right to
practice law]; Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. Soros (S.D.N.Y.
May 12, 2009, No. 08 Civ. 5901 JFK) 2009 WL 1321695, at p. 22
[protective order prohibiting use of confidential information does
not prevent signatories from engaging in future litigation
involving overlapping discovery]; California Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 5.6 [in settlement of client controversy, lawyer may
not enter agreement that imposes restriction on right to
practice].)
2. Rule 1.11(c)
OptumRx instead relies on a narrow exception contained in
rule 1.11(c) for “confidential government information.” Under
Rule 1.11(c), a lawyer may not represent a private client when:
(1) the lawyer was a public official or employee; (2) during the
public employment, the lawyer acquired information that the
lawyer knows is confidential government information about a
12
person; (3) the lawyer is currently representing a private client
with interests adverse to that person; and (4) the current
representation is a matter in which the confidential government
information could be used to the disadvantage of that person.2
“Confidential government information” is defined as
information (1) obtained under government authority, (2) that
the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public
or has a privilege not to disclose to the public at the time the rule
is applied, and (3) is not otherwise available to the public. (Rule
1.11(c).)
Rule 1.11(c) is substantially similar to American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
1.11(c) (ABA Model Rule 1.11(c)). Unless there is a conflict with
California’s public policy, we may look to the ABA Model Rules
2 Rule 1.11(c) provides in full: “Except as law may
otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who was a public official or
employee and, during that employment, acquired information
that the lawyer knows is confidential government information
about a person, may not represent a private client whose
interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the
information could be used to the material disadvantage of that
person. As used in this rule, the term ‘confidential government
information’ means information that has been obtained under
governmental authority, that, at the time this rule is applied, the
government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public, or
has a legal privilege not to disclose, and that is not otherwise
available to the public. A firm with which that lawyer is
associated may undertake or continue representation in the
matter only if the personally prohibited lawyer is timely screened
from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part
of the fee therefrom.”
13
for guidance on proper professional conduct in California. (Doe v.
Yim (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 573, 582, fn. 3.)
The following commentary to ABA Model Rule 1.11,
although not incorporated in California’s Rule 1.11, does not
conflict with California’s public policy and further explains the
rationale underlying the rule, as follows in pertinent part: “This
Rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where
the successive clients are a government agency and another
client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion
vested in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the
other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit
to the other client might affect performance of the lawyer’s
professional functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair
advantage could accrue to the other client by reason of access to
confidential government information about the client’s adversary
obtainable only through the lawyer’s government service. On the
other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly
employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as
to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government.
The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified
lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards.” (ABA
Model Rule 1.11, com. 4.)
ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 24–509 further explains: “The
objective of the Rule is to ‘prevent the lawyer’s improper use of
his or her official position’ and to protect others from the
exploitation of confidential government information, acquired by
the lawyer while serving as a public officer or employee.” (ABA
Formal Ethics Op. 24–509, p. 6, fn. omitted.) Confidential
government information is limited to information “obtained
under government authority,” which includes “information
14
obtained pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, a search warrant, a
regulatory subpoena, or other government power.” (Id. at p. 2.)
“Whether government information is publicly available – e.g.,
whether it can be obtained through routine discovery – will be a
question of fact.” (Ibid.)
It is clear that “confidential government information”
within the meaning of rule 1.11(c) is information obtained
through the exercise of government power that a regular civil
litigant could not obtain simply through discovery. OptumRx
asserts that if the definition of confidential government
information under rule 1.11(c) excludes information that is
subject to routine discovery under a protective order, nothing
constitutes confidential government information. This is
incorrect. Confidential government information is information
that only the government can obtain, such as grand jury
testimony.
In this case, the evidence showed that the documents
produced by OptumRx in response to government subpoenas
could be obtained through routine discovery in civil litigation,
subject to a protective order. There was no evidence that Motley
Rice gathered any information that was not publicly available
through routine civil discovery requests, subject to a protective
order, and OptumRx has not challenged the trial court’s denial of
the request to conduct discovery. Motley Rice’s insights or
mental roadmap derived from publicly available documents were
not confidential government information. Preparing memoranda
for government clients based on non-confidential government
information cannot preclude Motley Rice from representing
future clients in subsequent litigation against OptumRx. If
preparing status updates for government clients based on non-
15
confidential government information was sufficient to trigger
disqualification, it would apply in every case and the distinctions
in the rule would be meaningless. We conclude no abuse of
discretion has been shown.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion for disqualification is
affirmed. Respondent, the People of the State of California, is
awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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