CourtListener 10664785•People v. Tun CA2/2
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Filed 9/2/25 P. v. Tun CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B334466
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. BA502648)
TOMAS TUN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Garcia, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
A jury found defendant and appellant Tomas Tun guilty of
two counts of driving or taking a vehicle without consent. (Veh.
Code, § 10851, subd. (a);1 counts 1 & 2.)2 In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant had been
convicted of five felonies within the meaning of Penal Code
section 666.5. The court also found true that defendant had
suffered prior convictions that are numerous and of increasing
seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)) and that he had
served a prior prison or county jail term (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(3)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
four years to be served locally in county jail, comprised of the
midterm of three years on count 1 and one year (one-third the
midterm) on count 2. The court suspended fines and fees
pursuant to People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.
In this timely appeal from the judgment, defendant
contends that (1) the trial court committed instructional errors by
failing to instruct the jury on posttheft driving and a lesser
included offense; (2) the court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of defendant’s uncharged acts; (3) there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for count 1; (4) the cumulative
effect of the alleged errors denied him a fair trial; and (5) the
court improperly denied his request for self-representation.
We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 Defendant had also been charged with second degree
burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 3), but the jury deadlocked on
that count. The trial court declared a mistrial as to count 3 and
later dismissed it pursuant to Penal Code section 1385.
2
FACTS
I. The People’s Evidence
A. The December 7, 2021, motorcycle incident (count 1)
On December 7, 2021, Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) Officer Adrian Pop saw defendant driving a motorcycle3
on the wrong side of the street. Officer Pop got behind defendant,
who then went into the correct lane. Officer Pop conducted a
traffic stop and approached the motorcycle. The motorcycle had
no rear license plate. Officer Pop also observed that the
motorcycle “had a lot of wires bulging out with electrical tape and
the ignition was punched.”
Based on his experience, Officer Pop testified that the
condition of the motorcycle was “very strong evidence that it
ha[d] been tampered with illegally since there is no legal
possession of the motorcycle and they want to get it started
without the key.” A punched ignition is used to turn on a vehicle
without the key that belongs to it. Given the appearance of the
motorcycle, Officer Pop was “99 percent” certain it had been
stolen.
Defendant told Officer Pop that the motorcycle belonged to
his friend, Ezekiel, who had let him borrow it. Defendant said
that his “girl” had told him not to drive the motorcycle because it
was “probably stolen.”
When Officer Pop accused defendant of hotwiring the
motorcycle, defendant denied it but said that he had “put . . . the
cables back together after they cut it.” Defendant stated, “I knew
3 The vehicle at issue in count 1 is referred to variously in
the record as a motorcycle, motorbike, dirt bike, and bike. For
simplicity, we only refer to it as a motorcycle.
3
it was gonna be hot. Like stolen, but I didn’t know that they
could report it.”
B. The May 3, 2022, truck incident (count 2)
Osborne Arnold (Arnold) owned a red pickup truck. On
April 30, 2022, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Osborne returned
from work and noticed that the truck was missing. Arnold, who
still had the keys to the truck, immediately went to the police
station and reported the truck stolen.
At approximately 8:40 a.m., on May 3, 2022, LAPD Officer
Henry Felix was flagged down by a person who indicated that a
red truck was blocking the flow of traffic and creating a traffic
hazard. Officer Felix and his partner found the truck and
conducted a traffic stop. Defendant was in the driver’s seat and
the sole occupant of the truck. The truck was running. Officer
Felix observed that the steering column appeared to be broken
and the fuse box was open. The broken steering column was “a
common characteristic of a stolen vehicle” to give “easy access to
start the vehicle without the key.” The key in the ignition of the
truck was not a vehicle key; rather, it appeared to Officer Felix to
be a house key. The ignition also appeared to be punched. Based
on his training and experience, Officer Felix concluded that the
truck was stolen.
Arnold did not know defendant and had not given him
permission to drive his truck to the location where it had been
found.
C. Uncharged acts
1. Attempted catalytic converter theft
At approximately 2:30 a.m., on December 6, 2022, LAPD
Officer Edwin Lozada heard a loud grinding noise and saw
defendant under a Honda Odyssey minivan. Defendant was
4
attempting to cut off the catalytic converter from the vehicle with
a Sawzall power tool.
Melinda Escalon owned the minivan. She had not given
anyone permission to damage the catalytic converter and had
never seen defendant before.
2. The Kia incident
On April 29, 2023, LAPD Officer Richard Garcia conducted
a stolen car investigation for a Kia. Officer Garcia encountered
defendant standing in front of the Kia and “actively working on
the engine bay.” The keyhole of the driver’s side door had been
punched, which was an indication that the car had been broken
into. Angle guard power tools, which are commonly used to take
off parts on stolen vehicles, were on the front seat. Several tools,
such as screwdrivers and pliers, used to steal vehicles, as well as
shaved keys, were found in defendant’s backpack.
After defendant was detained, he said that when he got out
he would “get[] high again[,]” “steal another car[,]” and “[g]et
busted for more cars.”
II. Defendant’s Evidence
Defendant did not testify or call witnesses.
DISCUSSION
I. Alleged Instructional Errors
Defendant raises two claims of instructional error, which
we review de novo. (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
A. Failure to instruct on posttheft driving
Defendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible
error by failing to instruct the jury that it was required to find
5
that defendant was engaging in posttheft driving of the vehicle,
an element of section 10851, subdivision (a).4
1. Additional background
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1820, as follows:
“The defendant is charged in Counts 1 and 2 with
unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle.
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the
People must prove that:
“1. The defendant drove someone else’s vehicle without the
owner’s consent;
“AND
“2. When the defendant drove the vehicle, he intended to
deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for
any period of time.
“A taking requires that the vehicle be moved for any
distance, no matter how small.”
2. Relevant law
Section 10851, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part:
“Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own,
without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either
to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or
her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without
intent to steal the vehicle, . . . is guilty of a public offense . . . .”
4 The People argue that defendant forfeited this claim by
failing to object to the instruction below. While failing to object
to an instruction or to request a modification generally forfeits a
claim of instructional error on appeal (see People v. Lee (2011)
51 Cal.4th 620, 638), this general rule does not preclude our
review where, as here, defendant’s substantial rights are affected
(Pen. Code, § 1259).
6
The statute “can be violated by a range of conduct, only
some of which constitutes theft.” (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th
1128, 1135 (Lara).) A theft-based violation involves an unlawful
taking, which “may be accomplished by driving the vehicle away.”
(People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 871.) This is
distinguished from a posttheft driving violation, which “‘consists
of driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent after the vehicle
has been stolen, with the intent to temporarily or permanently
deprive the owner of title or possession. Where the evidence
shows a “substantial break” between the taking and the driving,
posttheft driving may give rise to a conviction under . . .
section 10851 distinct from any liability for vehicle theft.’
[Citations.]” (Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1136.)
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on
all essential elements of a charged crime; the failure to do so is
constitutional error. (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 838
(Oyler).) “Omitted element error is generally subject to harmless
error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18 . . . (Chapman). [Citations.] [¶] Under this analysis, ‘[w]e
must determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent
the error’ in omitting a necessary element of the offense.
[Citation.]” (Oyler, supra, at p. 838.)
3. Analysis
Defendant’s jury was instructed only on the unlawful
driving theory of the section 10851, subdivision (a) offense. As
our Supreme Court found under very similar circumstances in
Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th 1128, “the instruction was incomplete:
While the instruction specified driving as the alleged illegal act,
it did not refer expressly to posttheft driving. Taking the
7
instruction on . . . section 10851 in isolation, the jury thus could
theoretically have understood guilt to be proved if defendant stole
the vehicle by driving it away from where the owner had parked
it.” (Lara, supra, at p. 1138.)
The error, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (See Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1138 [applying the
Chapman harmless error standard to “conclude that the trial
court’s failure to specify that unlawful driving must occur after
the theft of the car, and not during, did not contribute to the
jury’s verdict”].)
As in Lara, “[i]n the absence of any direct evidence tying
defendant to the theft—or indeed, any circumstantial evidence
beyond defendant’s later possession of the stolen vehicle—there
was nothing to show he also drove it while effectuating the theft,
and neither party so argued to the jury.” (Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 1138.) In his closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized
that defendant had not been “charged with actually stealing” but
rather with what is “colloquially refer[red] to as joyriding—
driving around in a stolen car . . . .” We conclude that “[i]t is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
rendered the same verdict had it received a complete instruction”
that expressly referred to posttheft driving. (Lara, supra, at
p. 1138.)
B. Failure to instruct on lesser included offense
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing
to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of
attempted driving of a vehicle without consent as to count 2.
1. Relevant law
A trial court must instruct on a lesser included offense
when there is substantial evidence that the defendant is guilty
8
only of the lesser offense. (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793,
827.) “The ‘substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by
“‘any evidence . . . no matter how weak,’” but rather by evidence
from which a jury . . . could conclude “that the lesser offense, but
not the greater, was committed.’” [Citation.]” (People v. Nelson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538.) “Speculative, minimal, or
insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an instruction on
a lesser included offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Simon (2016)
1 Cal.5th 98, 132.)
Because the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense
is nonstructural state law error, we evaluate it under the
harmlessness standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186,
195 (Gonzalez).) “That standard requires us to evaluate whether
the defendant has demonstrated that it is ‘“reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached in the absence of the error.”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
Assuming without deciding that the trial court should have
instructed the jury on attempted driving a vehicle without
consent as to count 2,5 any such error was harmless because it is
5 Although neither party has cited a case so holding, we
assume for the purpose of this appeal that attempted driving of a
vehicle without consent is a lesser included offense of the
completed crime under section 10851, subdivision (a). (See
People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 793 [“Unlawfully
driving a vehicle with the intent to temporarily or permanently
deprive the owner of possession under . . . section 10851 is a
specific intent crime”]; People v. Hubbard (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
555, 567 [“An attempt to commit a specific intent crime is
considered a lesser included offense of the completed crime”].)
9
not reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained a
more favorable result in the absence of the error. (See Gonzalez,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 195.)
In closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly claimed
that there was no evidence that defendant actually drove the
vehicle at issue in count 2 and told the jury that driving was “an
essential element” of the offense. In finding defendant guilty of
the crime, however, the jury necessarily rejected the theory that
defendant did not drive the vehicle but was, instead, merely
sitting in it. Strong circumstantial evidence supported this
conclusion. (See People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208
[“circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to
support a conviction”].)
Defendant was found sitting in the driver’s seat of Arnold’s
pickup truck three days after Arnold discovered the truck
missing. Defendant was the sole occupant of the truck, which
was running at the time defendant was seen in it and located in a
completely different location than where Arnold had last left it.
(See People v. Hanggi (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d Supp. 969, 972
[finding “ample evidence” to support former section 23102
conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol; “From
the combination of circumstances—defendant’s sitting in a
vehicle in the center of the street—behind the wheel—engine
running—lights on, it can be inferred that defendant must have
placed himself in such position, and that he accomplished this by
driving the car to the place at which he was found”].)
“When assessing prejudice under the Watson standard, we
‘focus not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a
jury is likely to have done[.]’” (People v. Wimer (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 113, 135.) Given the strength of the
10
circumstantial evidence that defendant drove the truck, the fact
that defendant’s jury was instructed only on an unlawful driving
theory of section 10851, subdivision (a), and defense counsel’s
closing argument, we detect no reasonable probability that a jury
would have only convicted defendant of attempted unlawful
driving if instructed on the lesser included offense.
II. Admission of Uncharged Acts
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted, over defense objections, evidence regarding his
uncharged acts—that is, his attempted theft of a catalytic
converter on April 29, 2023, and his tampering with a likely
stolen Kia on December 6, 2022.
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence of
uncharged acts for abuse of discretion. (People v. Reyes (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 538, 550.) We will “not disturb the . . . ruling
unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or made in a ‘“patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’
[Citation.]” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358
(Thomas).)
B. Relevant law
Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes or acts
other than those he is currently charged with is not admissible to
prove the defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion. (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (a).) However, evidence of uncharged crimes or acts
is admissible to prove other relevant facts, such as the intent
with which the perpetrator acted in the commission of the
charged crimes, knowledge, and the absence of mistake or
accident. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) “In other words, the
statute allows the admission of evidence of criminal activity other
11
than the charged offense ‘“‘when such evidence is relevant to
establish some fact other than the person’s character or
disposition.’”’ [Citation.]” (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 358.)
Before admitting uncharged act evidence, we must
“examine whether the probative value of the evidence . . . is
‘substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
[would] . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ (Evid. Code,
§ 352.)” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404.)
“‘“The prejudice that [Evidence Code] section 352 ‘“is
designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that
naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.”
[Citations.] “Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological
sense of ‘prejudging’ a person or cause on the basis of extraneous
factors. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In other words,
evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when it is of
such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating
them to use the information, not to logically evaluate the point
upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side
because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. In such a circumstance,
the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the substantial
likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.”’
[Citation.]” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 162–163
(Powell).)
C. Analysis
There was nothing arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
about the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of defendant’s
uncharged acts for the limited purpose of proving his intent,
knowledge, and the absence of mistake or accident. (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (b).) A juror could infer from the evidence
12
regarding the uncharged acts that defendant had knowledge of
the implements used to steal a vehicle or its parts, as well as the
visual signatures of a stolen vehicle. This knowledge would tend
to prove that, in the charged crimes, defendant knew the vehicles
were stolen and engaged in posttheft driving with the specific
intent to deprive the owner of possession. Furthermore,
defendant’s repeated close vicinity to stolen and/or tampered
vehicles would tend to disprove that, in the charged crimes,
defendant simply happened upon stolen vehicles by accident or
mistake.
Resisting this conclusion, defendant argues that, because
the uncharged acts related to theft, they were not sufficiently
similar to the charged crimes, which were based on a driving
theory of section 10851 liability. (See Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
pp. 1135–1136 [discussing the distinctions between theft-based
and driving-based violations of section 10851].) We disagree. As
discussed above, defendant’s knowledge of the hallmarks of
stolen vehicles as indicated by the theft-related uncharged acts
was relevant to proving his violation of section 10851 based on
posttheft driving. The charged and uncharged incidents were
sufficiently similar for this purpose. (People v. Felix (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 177, 185 [“In some cases, only a general similarity
may be required, because the knowledge at issue can be derived
from different experiences”]; People v. Hendrix (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 216, 241 [“Whether similarity is required to
prove knowledge and the degree of similarity required depends
on the specific knowledge at issue and whether the prior
experience tends to prove the knowledge defendant is said to
have had in mind at the time of the crime”].)
13
Neither do we agree with defendant that the admission of
his uncharged acts was unduly prejudicial. The uncharged acts
were not “‘“of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the
jury,’”” such that the jury would be moved to use the evidence for
illegitimate purposes. (Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 162–163.)
Nor did the testimony regarding the uncharged acts, which took
less than a day, consume an unreasonable amount of time.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant also argues that insufficient evidence supports
his conviction for driving without consent in count 1.
A. Standard of review
In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We “presume[] in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000)
23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
B. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction on
count 1. Officer Pop testified he saw defendant driving the
motorcycle, which had no rear license plate, a punched ignition,
and wires “bulging out[.]” The appearance of the motorcycle
provided Officer Pop with “very strong evidence that it ha[d] been
tampered with illegally”; he was “99 percent” certain the
motorcycle had been stolen. Defendant made numerous
incriminating statements, first claiming his friend let him borrow
14
the motorcycle and later admitting that he knew it was stolen.
He also admitted that his “girl” had warned him not to drive the
motorcycle because it was “probably stolen.” The jury could
reasonably find from this evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that defendant drove the motorcycle after it had been stolen and
without the owner’s consent, with the intent to deprive the owner
of possession for a period of time. (See § 10851, subd. (a); Lara,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 1135–1136.)
Urging reversal, defendant contends no evidence existed
that he drove the motorcycle without its owner’s permission, as
the owner was not called to testify and no associated stolen
vehicle report was entered into evidence. But such evidence was
not required. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant
lacked the owner’s consent to drive the motorcycle from Officer
Pop’s testimony, based on his training and experience, that the
motorcycle’s appearance strongly indicated it had been stolen,
and defendant’s admission that he knew the motorcycle was
stolen. “It is of no consequence that the jury, believing other
evidence or drawing other inferences, might have come to a
contrary conclusion. [Citations.]” (People v. Mendonsa (1982)
137 Cal.App.3d 888, 891.)
As for defendant’s claim that there was no evidence he
engaged in posttheft driving, we again disagree. Defendant’s
admission that his “girl” had told him not to drive the motorcycle
because it was “probably stolen” and that he knew it was “hot”—
“[l]ike stolen”—constitute substantial evidence of driving the
vehicle after it was stolen.
IV. No Cumulative Error
Defendant asserts that he was denied a fair trial in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the cumulative
15
impact of the alleged errors. “Cumulative error is present when
the combined effect of the trial court’s errors is prejudicial or
harmful to the defendant. [Citations.]” (People v. Capers (2019)
7 Cal.5th 989, 1017.)
Here, although we found error in one incomplete
instruction and assumed error in the failure to instruct on a
lesser included offense, we concluded that the errors were
harmless under the applicable standards. And, aggregating
these errors, we find no cumulative prejudice. “‘Defendant was
entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.’ [Citation.] Because
‘[t]he few errors that occurred during defendant’s trial were
harmless, whether considered individually or collectively’
[citation], we reject defendant’s contention that his constitutional
right to a fair trial was violated.” (People v. Camacho (2022)
14 Cal.5th 77, 132.)
V. Denial of Request for Self-representation
Finally, defendant contends that his convictions should be
reversed because the trial court improperly denied as untimely
his request for self-representation.
A. Additional background
Defendant’s trial began on August 4, 2023, with opening
statements given on August 9, 2023. After the close of the
People’s case, on August 11, 2023, the trial court asked defense
counsel if defendant had made a decision whether to testify.
Defendant interjected, stating: “Your Honor, I’ve had a conflict of
interest with [defense counsel] from the beginning. I want to
exercise my Faretta[6] rights.” Defendant told the court that he
did not understand what his counsel was doing because she was
6 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
16
supposed to present evidence and he had minimal contact with
her.
The trial court asked defendant if he was making a
Marsden7 motion, and defendant initially indicated that he was.
Defense counsel told the court she was not certain that defendant
understood what a Marsden motion was. Defendant responded,
“I want to exercise my Faretta rights based on information that I
gave her that she never used.”
The trial court then denied defendant’s request to represent
himself, finding it to be untimely. The court stated: “For the
record, we are in the middle of the trial. The People have rested.
At this point, your request to represent yourself is not timely. [¶]
Your attorney, . . . I will state for the record[,] has been working
very hard on your behalf, with what evidence there is in this case
and the attempts on her behalf to challenge the evidence that
was presented in this case.”
B. Standard of review
We review the denial of an untimely request for self-
representation for an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Burton
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 854.)
C. Relevant law
“A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to forgo
the constitutional guarantee of the assistance of counsel and to
represent himself at trial. [Citation.]” (People v. Kirvin (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1515.) “The right of self-representation is
absolute, but only if a request to do so is knowingly and
voluntarily made and if asserted a reasonable time before trial
begins. Otherwise, requests for self-representation are addressed
7 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
17
to the trial court’s sound discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Doolin
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453.)
In exercising its discretion to decide whether to grant an
untimely motion for self-representation, “the trial court shall
inquire sua sponte into the specific factors underlying the request
thereby ensuring a meaningful record in the event that appellate
review is later required.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d
121, 128 (Windham).) Factors to consider include, “the quality of
counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior
proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the
length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay
which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of
such a motion.” (Ibid.)
“The court in Windham, though requiring the trial court to
inquire into the reasons behind a defendant’s untimely Faretta
request, ‘decline[d] to mandate a rule that a trial court must, in
all cases, state the reasons underlying a decision to deny a
motion for self-representation which is based on
nonconstitutional grounds.’ [Citation.] Instead, a trial court’s
exercise of discretion in denying an untimely Faretta motion is
properly affirmed if substantial evidence in the record supports
the inference that the court had those factors in mind when it
ruled. [Citations.]” (People v. Bradford (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
1345, 1354–1355 (Bradford).)
D. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial
court acted well within its discretion in denying defendant’s
untimely, midtrial request for self-representation. (See People v.
Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1110 [a motion for self-
18
representation is untimely if it is “not asserted within a
reasonable time prior to trial”].)
“[W]hile the trial court may not have explicitly considered
each of the Windham factors, there were sufficient reasons on the
record to constitute an implicit consideration of these factors.
[Citations.]” (People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1206
(Scott).) The court noted the untimeliness of the request “in the
middle of the trial.” This indicates its consideration of the “stage
of the proceedings” as well as “the disruption or delay which
might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a
motion.” (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.) The court
expressly evaluated “the quality of counsel’s representation of . . .
defendant,” with an implicit consideration of “the reasons for the
request[.]” (Ibid.) On this record, substantial evidence exists
that the court properly considered the Windham factors and did
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion. (See
Bradford, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354–1355.)8
Even if the trial court had erred in denying defendant’s
motion, we would find such error harmless because there is no
reasonable probability of a more favorable result in the absence
of the error. (See People v. Rivers (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1040,
1050 (Rivers) [applying Watson harmless error standard].) “It is
candidly recognized that a defendant who represents himself
virtually never improves his situation or achieves a better result
8 People v. Rogers (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1053 and People v.
Nicholson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 584, upon which defendant
relies heavily, predate Scott, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 1197 and
Bradford, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 1345 and do not engage in the
same analysis. Accordingly, we do not find that Rogers and
Nicholson compel reversal.
19
than would trained counsel. [Citation.]” (Rivers, supra, at
p. 1051.) The record reflects that defendant’s counsel was
competent and presented a vigorous defense. Although
defendant was convicted of counts 1 and 2, the jury deadlocked on
second degree burglary in count 3, which led to the dismissal of
that count. It is extremely unlikely that defendant would have
fared better if he had been permitted to represent himself.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
20
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