CourtListener 10663210•Whiting v. Murray CA2/3
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Filed 8/29/25 Whiting v. Murray CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MARY A. WHITING, B340757
Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22CMCV00145)
v.
LOYAL J. MURRAY,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Fumiko Wasserman, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Bennett A. Rheingold and Bennett A.
Rheingold for Appellant.
Law Office of Stefon A. Jones and Stefon Jones for
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Mary Whiting appeals the trial court’s order vacating the
stipulated judgment entered in a quiet title action in which she
was a defendant and cross-complainant. Pursuant to the
judgment, Whiting was declared the sole owner of a property in
Carson, California (the property), of which she was a joint tenant
with William Polk prior to his death. After she was appointed
the administrator of the Estate of William Polk (the Estate),
respondent Loyal Murray moved to vacate the judgment on the
ground that neither she nor the Estate, of which she was the sole
beneficiary, had been served in the quiet title action. Although
the trial court found that Murray had actual knowledge of the
action, it granted the motion to vacate the judgment. We affirm.
We deny Murray’s motion for sanctions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 24, 1971, a deed was recorded that identified
“William Polk and Arline J. Polk, husband and wife,” as joint
tenants of the property.
On December 8, 2005, a grant deed transferring the
property from William Polk and Arline J. Polk to Angela Murray
was recorded. Loyal Murray signed the deed as attorney in fact
for Polk.1
On January 4, 2006, a deed was recorded in which Polk,
“an unmarried man,” quitclaimed the property to himself and
Whiting as joint tenants.
1 Because Loyal and Angela Murray share a last name, we
refer to Angela by her first name. In her opening brief, Whiting
asserts that Murray is Angela’s mother. The portion of the record
she cites does not establish this fact.
2
In a will dated April 1, 2006, Polk disinherited Whiting,
bequeathed all real and personal property to Loyal, and
nominated Loyal to act as his executrix.
On June 6, 2006, a grant deed was recorded in which Polk
“disput[ed] the validity” of the prior deed but granted the
property to himself and Whiting as equal tenants in common.
Polk died on July 9, 2006.
The quiet title action
In May 2022, Angela filed a verified complaint to quiet title
to the property. The complaint named as defendants Whiting
and “All Persons Unknown Claiming Any Legal or Equitable
Right, Title, Estate, Lien or Interest in the Property Adverse to
Plaintiff’s Title.” Angela alleged that she was the owner of the
property based on the 2005 grant deed and that the deeds
transferring the property to Polk and Whiting were fraudulent.
Angela served the complaint on Whiting in June 2022.
In August 2022, Whiting filed a cross-complaint to quiet
title to the property, naming as defendants Angela and “all
persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title,
estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the Cross-
Complaint adverse to Cross-Complainant’s title, or any cloud on
Cross-Complainant’s title.” Whiting alleged that Arline was the
name of a former girlfriend of Polk’s, whom he never married,
and no one by the name of Arline J. Polk ever existed. She
further alleged that the grant deed transferring the property to
Angela was void because Murray, not Polk, signed it, and Murray
lacked the authority to sign on Polk’s behalf. Similarly, she
claimed the deed recorded in June 2006 was fraudulent and void
because Polk did not execute it. Whiting served the cross-
3
complaint on Angela. There is no evidence in the record of
service of the complaint or cross-complaint on any other person.
On August 8, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation for entry
of judgment, which provided that Whiting was the owner in fee
simple of the property and Angela and “all persons unknown,
claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest
in the Property [(Persons Unknown)] are without any right, and
have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in the Property
adverse to Mary A. Whiting.”2 The trial court entered the
judgment on August 11, 2023, and entered an amended judgment
on September 18, 2023. At some point after entry of the amended
judgment, Whiting sold the property.
The probate actions
In November 2022, Murray filed a petition for probate
which identified the property as the sole asset of Polk’s estate.
She also filed a notice of related cases in the probate action
identifying the quiet title action. She served the notice on
counsel for Angela and Whiting.
In May 2023, Murray filed a notice of intent to abandon the
petition, which she also served on counsel for Angela and
Whiting. In June 2023, the probate court denied the petition
without prejudice.
In April 2024, Murray filed a second petition for probate.
The petition stated that Murray had provided notice to Whiting
at an address in California. Murray did not provide notice to
Whiting’s counsel. According to a declaration later filed by
2 The parties stipulated that the December 5, 2005 grant
deed purporting to transfer the property to Angela was “invalid,
void and of no force or effect.”
4
Whiting’s counsel, Whiting had not lived in California for several
years and Murray was aware of that fact.
The probate court granted the petition for probate on June
7, 2024, and appointed Murray as administrator of the Estate.
The motion to vacate judgment
In July 2024, Murray filed a motion to set aside the
judgment. She argued that the parties in the quiet title action
had failed to serve her or the Estate and the court lacked
jurisdiction to make an order affecting their rights. In opposition,
Whiting argued that Murray had actual knowledge of the quiet
title action, as demonstrated by the notice of related cases
Murray filed in the first probate action.
On July 30, 2024, the trial court granted the motion. It
found that the proof of service Angela had filed did not
demonstrate service on Persons Unknown and the court therefore
lacked jurisdiction over such Persons, including the Estate. The
court further found that Murray had actual knowledge of the
action as of November 2022, but concluded that the “Estate was
not established as an entity until July of 2024” and Murray had
filed her petition to vacate the judgment “within a reasonable
time of [the] Estate being able to act as an entity.”
Whiting timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Vacating the Quiet Title Judgment
A. Standard of review and applicable legal
principles
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b),
a party may move for relief from default “taken against him or
her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
5
excusable neglect,” where the party moves “within a reasonable
time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment,
dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”3 Under section 473,
subdivision (d), “[t]he court . . . may, on motion of either party
after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or
order.” (Ibid.) Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may
set aside a void judgment at any time. (Rodriguez v. Cho (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 742, 749.) A trial court also “generally retains
the inherent power to vacate a default judgment or order on
equitable grounds where a party establishes that the judgment or
order was void for lack of due process [citation] or resulted from
extrinsic fraud or mistake [citation].” (County of San Diego v.
Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228 (Gorham).)
A judgment entered against a person who was not properly
served is void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the
person (Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1225–1226) and
the judgment violates the person’s procedural due process rights.
(Ridec LLC v. Hinkle (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1182, 1202.)
“[W]here it is shown that there has been a complete failure of
service of process upon a defendant, he generally has no duty to
take affirmative action to preserve his right to challenge the
judgment or order even if he later obtains actual knowledge of it
because ‘[w]hat is initially void is ever void and life may not be
breathed into it by lapse of time.’ [Citation.]” (Gorham, at
p. 1229.)
We review an order on a motion to set aside a judgment for
an abuse of discretion. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th
975, 981; Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th
3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
6
1241, 1249.) However, we review the trial court’s determination
of whether the judgment was void de novo and its factual findings
for substantial evidence. (Paterra v. Hansen (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 507, 526.)
“We review the result the trial court reached, not its legal
reasoning, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, unconstrained by the route the trial court took in getting
there.” (Apex Solutions, Inc. v. Falls Lake Ins. Management Co.,
Inc. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1257.)
B. Analysis
The trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over
Persons Unknown because they were not served. Whiting does
not dispute the trial court’s finding, nor is there any indication in
the record that Whiting or Angela served Persons Unknown.4 It
follows that the judgment against such Persons, including
Murray in her capacity as beneficiary or executor of the Estate,
was void.
Whiting’s reliance on section 473, subdivision (b), is
unavailing. Because the judgment was void for lack of proper
4 Section 763.010, subdivision (b), provides that, if a plaintiff
in a quiet title action establishes to the satisfaction of the court
that he or she “has used reasonable diligence to ascertain the
identity and residence of and to serve summons on the persons
named as unknown defendants and persons joined as testate or
intestate successors of a person known or believed to be dead, the
court shall order service by publication pursuant to
Section 415.50 and the provisions of this article.” (See also
§§ 763.020–763.040; Twain Harte Homeowners Assn. v. Patterson
(1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 184, 187 [“statutory notice provisions for
quiet title actions provide for publication and posting of the
complaint and summons conspicuously on the property in
question” to provide notice to unknown adverse claimants].)
7
service, the trial court could vacate it at any time under
section 473, subdivision (d).5 Whiting also fails to establish that
the court abused its discretion in vacating the judgment because
Murray had actual knowledge of the quiet title action in
November 2022, when she filed the notice of related cases. Even
assuming Murray was also aware of the judgment when the trial
court entered it, actual knowledge is not a substitute for service.
(Gorham, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229; Renoir v. Redstar
Corp. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152 [“Knowledge by a
defendant of a plaintiff’s action does not satisfy the requirement
of adequate service of a summons and complaint.”].)
Whiting contends that Murray, as an alleged beneficiary of
the Estate, had the right to become a party to the quiet title
action without being appointed administrator, citing Landis v.
First National Bank (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 198, 207. Landis held
that a “ ‘beneficiary may prosecute claims where the personal
representative cannot or will not act, or where the personal
representative himself, by collusion with the debtor, or otherwise,
obstructs the natural course which the law establishes for the
transmission of the estate to the heirs.’ ” (Ibid.) It is unclear
that this rule would apply where the personal representative and
the sole beneficiary are the same person, as is the case here.
5 Because the judgment roll includes the summons with its
proof of service (§ 670, subd. (b)), on which the trial court relied,
the judgment appears to be void on its face. Even if it were not,
our Supreme Court recently held that there is also no time limit
to bring a motion for relief from a judgment under section 473,
subdivision (d), in the original action on the ground that the
judgment, though valid on its face, is void for lack of proper
service. (California Capital Insurance Company v. Hoehn (2024)
17 Cal.5th 207, 225.)
8
Regardless, Murray had no duty to take affirmative action to
preserve the right to challenge the judgment. (Gorham, supra,
186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229.)
Whiting further relies on Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956)
47 Cal.2d 540, 554, for the proposition that equity will ordinarily
not interfere with a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud or
mistake unless the moving party can make a prima facie case
that if the judgment were set aside and the proceedings were
reopened, a different result would probably follow. However, the
trial court had statutory authority to vacate the judgment under
section 473, subdivision (d). Even if the court had acted in
equity, Whiting does not cite any decisions supporting the
proposition that a judgment that is void for lack of service can
only be vacated where the party also pleads that he or she has a
meritorious case. Indeed, the law is to the contrary. (See Peralta
v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 86 [trial court
ruling that a “default judgment must stand absent a showing of a
meritorious defense to the action in which judgment was entered
without proper notice to appellant” was “plainly infirm” under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment]; Fidelity
Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 206
[defendant who undisputedly was never served in the action was
entitled to an order vacating a renewal of judgment without
establishing a meritorious defense].)
Finally, Whiting argues “that the trial court’s reasoning
that a ‘reasonable time’ to bring or intervene in an action
concerning title to the property does not begin until an
Administrator of the Estate is appointed is . . . illogical,” and its
statement that the Estate did not exist as an entity until
July 2024 would mean “that even if Persons Unknown had been
9
served by [Angela] or [Whiting] with a summons and complaint
by publication, that the publication would have been ineffective
to confer jurisdiction on the trial court.” We need not endorse the
trial court’s reasoning to affirm its ruling.
For the reasons described above, we conclude that the order
vacating the judgment was not an abuse of discretion.
II. We Deny the Motion for Sanctions
Murray filed a motion seeking sanctions in the form of the
attorney fees she incurred on appeal. She contends that
Whiting’s appeal lacked merit and was intended to cause delay.
She relies on Whiting’s counsel’s settlement e-mails in which he
stated that he intended to appeal the court’s order and pointed
out the cost and delay that would accompany the appeal.
We may award sanctions when an appeal is frivolous or
taken solely to cause delay. (§ 907; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.276(a).) “[A]n appeal is not frivolous simply because it has
no merit.” (Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1422.) The punishment of
sanctions “should be used most sparingly to deter only the most
egregious conduct.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d
637, 651.)
Although we have rejected Whiting’s arguments, we
conclude the appeal does not rise to the level of frivolous. Nor
does the record establish that the appeal was prosecuted solely to
harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment.
We therefore deny the request for sanctions.
10
DISPOSITION
The order vacating the judgment is affirmed. The motion
for sanctions is denied. Murray shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
11
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