People v. Bowman CA4/1

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Filed 8/29/25 P. v. Bowman CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083541

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD127034)

DEAUNDRE BOWMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
Joseph Doyle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers, Amanda Lloyd and Alana C. Butler, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Deaundre Bowman appeals from an order denying his petition for

resentencing on a 1998 murder conviction under former Penal Code1 section

1170.95 (now section 1172.6).2 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
concluded Bowman was a major participant in the underlying attempted
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Accordingly, the
court found Bowman guilty of murder under a still-valid theory of liability.
Bowman argues on appeal that the record does not contain sufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding that the prosecution met its burden,
under current law, of proving him guilty of murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. He also argues that the court failed to properly consider his youth in
determining whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Having considered the relevant factors set forth in People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522
(Clark), we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding
that Bowman was a major participant in the attempted robbery and that he
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Also, because the evidentiary
hearing was held in January 2024, and there is no contrary indication in the
record, we must presume the court followed then-established case law
identifying youth as a relevant factor in the reckless indifference analysis.
Accordingly, we affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) enacted
section 1170.95, which was renumbered to section 1172.6 without substantive
change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10 [effective June 30, 2022].) We
will refer to this statutory provision as section 1172.6 for the purposes of this
opinion.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Killings
In 1997, Charles Downing sold cocaine out of his friend J.R.’s studio
apartment in San Diego. People frequently came and went from J.R.’s
apartment, and Joseph Jackson lived across the street from J.R. Jackson,
Bowman, and Kevin Sumner, who were friends, also sold drugs in the
neighborhood. Pamela F. was J.R.’s friend and lived with him and another
person in his apartment. She frequently bought cocaine from Jackson.
In the evening on January 30, 1997, Pamela saw Jackson, Bowman,
and a few others in front of a liquor store near J.R.’s apartment. Jackson or
Bowman asked her why she was not buying drugs from them anymore, and
she told them she was buying from Downing. Either Jackson or Bowman
said that they should “go over there and turn it out,” which Pamela
understood to mean “going somewhere to stop somebody from doing
something.” She thought they were “playing around” and “didn’t believe
them.” They parted ways and Pamela went back to J.R.’s apartment.
That same evening, Louis G. was leaving J.R.’s apartment when
Sumner saw Louis and asked him for five dollars that Louis owed him from
losing a bet. Jackson, Bowman, and some others were standing in front of
the apartment with Sumner. After Louis told Sumner he did not have the
money, Bowman approached Louis and asked, “You smoke dope, don’t you?”
After Louis replied that he did, Bowman asked, “Where is my friend’s
money?” Bowman then punched Louis in the jaw with a closed fist. Sumner
and someone else in the group started running toward Louis, but he was able
to get away. As he was running, Louis heard someone say, “shoot him.”
Louis was “pretty sure” Bowman said it, but could not be certain.

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Around 10:00 p.m., Pamela, J.R., Linda Lewis, Downing, and
Downing’s wife Sonja were in J.R.’s apartment. Pamela, J.R., and Lewis
were in the bathroom “getting high and getting ready to go back out to the
streets” when Jackson came into the apartment with Bowman and Sumner
following him. Jackson had a gun in his hand and announced, “This is a
robbery.” He pointed the gun at Downing and said, “you’re going to die,” or
something to that effect. He also demanded to know who was selling drugs.
Meanwhile Bowman, who also had a gun and wore a blue bandana covering
the lower half of his face, forced his way into the bathroom, “grabbed” Lewis
and J.R., and made them join the others. Then Bowman began searching the
cabinets and refrigerator while Sumner stood by the front door.
Downing admitted that he was selling drugs but said that he was “sold
out.” At some point Jackson told Downing to get on the ground, so Downing
got on one knee. A witness testified that during this time, Bowman was
holding his gun out “to let everyone see it.” Jackson asked Downing whether
he thought he was “tough” or “macho.” Sonja offered to take Jackson
somewhere else to get “money, drugs, whatever” he wanted, but Jackson told
her to “shut up” or she would “be the first one” to die.
Jackson then pointed the gun back at Downing and told him to lie down
on the ground on his stomach. According to witnesses, Bowman said
something to Jackson along the lines of “go ahead and get it over with” and
“do what you came here to do.” Jackson then started shooting. He shot
Lewis in the head, Downing in the chest, and J.R. in the chest and leg. He
shot at Pamela but missed her as she ran out the front door. Jackson shot
Sonja in the leg, and while his attention was elsewhere, Sonja dived to the
floor and pretended to be dead before he shot her once more in the other leg.
After Jackson, Bowman, and Sumner fled, Sonja was able to drive to a phone

4
booth and call 911. J.R., Sonja, and Pamela survived the shooting, but Lewis
and Downing died at the scene. Witnesses estimated that the encounter
lasted between five and 15 minutes, with some stating that “it happened so
fast” or “pretty fast.”
Soon after the killings, Jackson and Bowman fled to Oakland,
California, and Sumner went to Arkansas. Less than two weeks later, law
enforcement arrested Jackson. Police apprehended Bowman and Sumner
several months later.
B. Sumner’s Trial Testimony
Sumner testified in his own defense at trial. He said that the night of
the shootings, he, Jackson, and Bowman pooled their cash together and went
to J.R.’s apartment with the intent to buy drugs to resell. After they were let
into the apartment, Sumner stepped outside to “get a breather” from the
smell of crack smoke inside. When he went back into the apartment because
he heard arguing, he saw Jackson holding a gun, yelling and waving it
around the room. Sumner said he stood just inside by the door for about 30
seconds before Jackson fired the first shot, at which point Sumner ran out of
the apartment.
After the shooting, Jackson called Sumner that same night to ask if he
wanted to go to Oakland with him and Bowman, but Sumner declined. The
next day, Jackson and Bowman went to Sumner’s house. Jackson displayed
a gun and told Sumner that he “better not tell” and that if he did, they would
all go to prison for life or get “the death chair.” Jackson also told Sumner
that his little brother was “around here talking” and Sumner “better get [his]
brother.” While Jackson was telling Sumner this, Bowman was “standing
there,” laughing. Sumner left for Arkansas soon thereafter.

5
Sumner also testified that earlier in the evening before the shootings,
Sumner, Jackson, and Bowman were at a party about a block from J.R.’s
apartment. Jackson had a gun at the party. Sumner said that at some point
while he, Jackson, and Bowman were walking with a group leaving the party,
Jackson or someone else fired the gun into the air, causing everyone to run.
During a post-arrest interview, Sumner told a detective that he first saw
Jackson with a gun outside of Jackson’s apartment, not at a party. Sumner
also said Jackson was showing off and fired the gun in front of his apartment.
Police found a bullet casing in the courtyard of Jackson’s apartment building
that was fired from the same gun used in J.R.’s apartment.
C. Jury Verdict and Direct Appeal
In 1998, a jury found Bowman guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery
(§ 182, subd. (a)), two counts of first-degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), three
counts of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), three counts of assault
with a firearm (§ 254, subd. (b)), five counts of attempted robbery
(§§ 664/211), and one count of burglary (§ 459). As to all counts, the jury
found that Bowman personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and
was personally armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also
made true findings on special circumstances allegations. (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(3) [multiple murders]; § 190.2, subd. (a)(17) [murder committed during a
robbery and a burglary].) Bowman was sentenced to a determinate term of
20 years in state prison, two consecutive life terms without the possibility of
parole, and three consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole. We
affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. (People v. Bowman, et al. (Jan. 19,
2001, D032440) [nonpub. opn.].)

6
D. Bowman’s Petition for Resentencing
Bowman filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 in 2021,
and the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d), after finding the petition stated a prima facie case. After
reviewing the trial transcript, receiving a stipulation summarizing Pamela’s
testimony, and hearing arguments from both sides, the court found that
Bowman was guilty of murder because he was a major participant in the
attempted robbery and acted with reckless indifference to the victims’ lives.
Citing Banks and Clark, the court first found that Bowman “played a critical
role” and was present when either he or Jackson decided to “turn out” the
apartment, was present for the attempted robbery of Louis, and went to the
apartment armed with a gun. The court also noted that Bowman ransacked
the apartment looking for drugs and money.
As for reckless indifference, the court found that Bowman was armed,
he knew that Jackson was armed, and the evidence showed they went to the
apartment “to eliminate the competition.” Bowman was present in the
apartment when the shootings occurred and when “the plan was hatched.”
The court emphasized that instead of preventing the murders or intervening,
Bowman ransacked the apartment and then urged Jackson “to do what they
came there to do.” After the shootings, Bowman made no effort to “assist any
victims,” did not attempt to call the police, and then left the county.
Regarding Bowman’s knowledge that Jackson might kill, the court noted
evidence that Bowman was present when Jackson fired his gun earlier that
evening. The court reiterated that both Bowman and Jackson were armed,
Bowman watched as Jackson pointed his gun at the victims, and then
Bowman encouraged Jackson to commit the murders. The court also

7
observed that before the shootings, Bowman assaulted Louis and was present
when someone yelled “shoot him” when Louis was running away.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the People had
met their evidentiary burden and it denied Bowman’s petition.
DISCUSSION
I
Bowman first contends the record contains insufficient evidence to
sustain the court’s finding that he was a major participant in the attempted
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. We disagree.
A. Governing Law
Senate Bill 1437 was enacted “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)”
(People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.) It implemented this goal
by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which
defines the degrees of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2 & 3.)
Under the new legislation, a petitioner who files a petition and makes a
prima facie showing he could not presently be convicted of murder under the
amendments to the murder laws is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At the hearing, the prosecution bears the burden
“to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder”
under the amended laws. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “[T]he superior court acts
as an independent fact finder and determines whether the People have met
their burden in proving the defendant guilty of murder.” (People v.
Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1016 (Henley).) “If the prosecution fails
to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and

8
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)
To demonstrate that a defendant who was not the actual killer was
nonetheless a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life, the prosecution must show that the
defendant “ ‘ “knowingly engag[ed] in criminal activities known to carry a
grave risk of death.” ’ ” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801.) “The defendant
must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the
particular offense is committed, demonstrating reckless indifference to the
significant risk of death his or her actions create.” (Ibid.) But “participation
in an armed robbery, without more, does not involve ‘engaging in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Id. at p. 805.)
In Banks, our Supreme Court compiled the following list of factors to be
considered in determining whether a participant’s role should be considered
“major”: (1) the defendant’s role in planning the crime that led to one or more
deaths; (2) the defendant’s role in supplying or using lethal weapons; (3) the
defendant’s awareness of “particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants”;
(4) whether the defendant was present at the scene of the killing and in a
position to facilitate or prevent the murder; and (5) the defendant’s actions
after lethal force was used. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) No one
factor is dispositive. (Ibid.)
The next year, our high court returned to this issue in Clark, endorsed
the Banks factors, and sought to further define “reckless indifference to
human life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.) To aid in courts’ analyses
of whether a defendant exhibited reckless indifference, the court offered the
following factors: (1) the defendant’s “knowledge of weapons, and use and

9
number of weapons”; (2) the defendant’s “physical presence at the crime and
opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim”; (3) the “duration of
the felony”; (4) the “defendant’s knowledge of cohort’s likelihood of killing”;
and (5) the “defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the violence during
the felony.” (Id. at pp. 618–621, capitalization omitted.) The court explained
that the requirements of being a major participant and having reckless
indifference to human life “ ‘significantly overlap . . . , for the greater the
defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely [the
defendant] acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 614–615.)
B. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s factual findings at a section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (Henley, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1017.) We view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
decide if the prosecution introduced sufficient evidence—reasonable, credible
evidence of solid value—to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Ibid.) We will affirm unless there is no hypothesis upon which
sufficient substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s decision.
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We must “presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “An
appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might
have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30
Cal.4th 342, 396.)
C. Major Participant
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that Bowman was a major participant in the attempted robbery. As to the

10
first Banks factor regarding Bowman’s role in planning the crime, Pamela
testified that either Bowman or Jackson proposed going to J.R.’s apartment
to “turn it out” after learning that Pamela was buying drugs from Downing.
Bowman and Jackson were friends and spent time together in the hours
leading up to the killings, which supports the inference that Bowman was
involved in the planning. Bowman also sold drugs in the neighborhood and
had a financial incentive to participate. He armed himself with a gun and
wore a bandana over his face, indicating that he prepared in advance.
Although he may not have been the ringleader, Bowman instructed Jackson
to “go ahead and get it over with” and “do what you came here to do[,]” which
implies Bowman at least knew and agreed to what Jackson had planned.
The evidence thus supports the conclusion that Bowman had a significant
role in planning the underlying felony.
The second factor—Bowman’s role in supplying or using lethal
weapons—also supports finding that he was a major participant. Bowman
was not only armed, he also displayed his gun during the offense “to let
everyone see it.” Although there is no evidence that Bowman gave Jackson
the gun he used to commit the murders, the evidence shows Bowman wielded
a firearm to provide backup for Jackson. Being armed also made it easier for
Bowman to coerce Lewis and J.R. out of the bathroom and into the same
room as Jackson, exposing them to danger.
Next, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Bowman was
aware of the “particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants.” (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) As the trial court observed, Bowman himself showed a
propensity for violence when he assaulted Louis shortly before committing
the underlying felony. Bowman was also present when someone yelled “shoot

11
him” as Louis ran away. It is reasonable to infer that Bowman knew there
would be multiple people in J.R.’s apartment based on evidence Bowman also
dealt drugs in the neighborhood, and people were often seen coming and
going. Bowman’s own drug-dealing would also make him aware of the
increased dangers of robbing or confronting a rival drug dealer. Importantly,
there is evidence that Bowman was present when Jackson fired his gun
earlier in the evening, which supports an inference he knew Jackson had a
loaded weapon and was willing to use it. All this evidence, while
circumstantial, supports a finding that Bowman was aware of a heightened
risk of violence. (See People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357
[reviewing court must accept any logical inferences the trier of fact might
have drawn from the circumstantial evidence].)
As for the fourth factor, Bowman does not dispute that he was present
in the apartment immediately before and during the killings. (Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) But he was more than merely present. The three
defendants were outnumbered in the apartment, and the evidence shows
Bowman facilitated the murders with his armed presence. As noted, he
gathered two of the victims and placed them in harm’s way. There is no
evidence he took any steps to diffuse the situation, even after observing
Jackson point his gun at the victims and threaten them with death. (See e.g.,
People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 279 [finding sufficient
evidence of the fourth Banks factor where, among other things, the defendant
was at the crime scene for the entire sequence of events leading up to the
shooting and “had the ability and opportunity to help reduce the foreseeable
risk [his accomplice] would use lethal force against the victims” but “did
nothing”].) Indeed, Bowman did the opposite, approaching Jackson and
encouraging him to “get it over with.”

12
Finally, the fifth factor supports the court’s finding that Bowman was a
major participant based on his conduct after lethal force was used. (Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) It is undisputed that Bowman neither stayed to
aid any of the victims nor called 911. There are instances where this factor is
neutral because multiple inferences can be drawn from a defendant’s failure
to assist the victims. (See, e.g., In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 679
[“when different inferences may be drawn from the circumstances, the
defendant’s actions after the shooting may not be very probative of his mental
state”]; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620 [finding the ambiguous
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s hasty departure made it difficult
to infer his frame of mind concerning the victim’s death].) Here, however,
there is evidence that Bowman not only fled the scene, but he accompanied
Jackson to Sumner’s home to threaten him, laughed when Jackson did so,
and then fled with Jackson to the same city. Given that this and each of the
preceding Banks factors weighs in favor of finding that Bowman was a major
participant, we conclude the court’s determination is supported by
substantial evidence.
D. Reckless Indifference to Human Life
We turn next to the Clark factors—which significantly overlap with the
Banks factors—to consider whether substantial evidence supports that
Bowman acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706.) First, we look to Bowman’s knowledge that
weapons would be used and of the number of weapons used. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) As previously discussed, Bowman knew Jackson had a
loaded gun, and Bowman himself was armed. The mere awareness that one’s
cohorts are armed and that armed robberies carry a risk of death is not alone
sufficient to show the requisite mental state. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at

13
p. 809.) However, when Bowman’s awareness is coupled with evidence that
he knew Downing was a rival drug dealer and that Jackson had already
shown he was willing to fire his weapon earlier in the evening, this factor
weighs in favor of a reckless indifference finding. (Cf. People v. Emanuel
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885 [first Clark factor did not weigh in favor of finding
reckless indifference because no evidence demonstrated defendant’s prior
awareness that actual killer possessed a gun, would bring the gun to the
robbery, or was likely to use lethal force].)
The second factor, physical presence at the scene and the opportunities
to restrain the crime or aid the victim, is similar to the fourth and fifth Banks
factors. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 619.) As we have noted, Bowman not only failed to act as a restraining
influence, but he encouraged Jackson to carry out the crime. Bowman helped
round up the victims, stood by as Jackson threatened them with death, and
then egged him on in the final moments before the killings. As our high court
has explained, “[p]roximity to the murder and the events leading up to it may
be particularly significant where . . . the murder is a culmination or a
foreseeable result of several intermediate steps, or where the participant who
personally commits the murder exhibits behavior tending to suggest a
willingness to use lethal force.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) Where,
as here, the defendant can observe his cohorts’ actions, “ ‘it is fair to conclude
that he shared in their actions and mental state.’ ” (Ibid.) Additionally,
where the defendant has the opportunity to “ ‘act as a restraining influence’ ”
but fails to do so, “ ‘the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting
murders.’ ” (Ibid.) In this case, where Bowman not only failed to restrain
Jackson but actively encouraged him to carry out the shooting, it is eminently

14
reasonable to infer Bowman shared Jackson’s reckless indifference to human
life.
The third factor takes into account the duration of the crime and
whether there was a greater window of opportunity for violence. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.) Clark explained that “[w]here a victim is held at
gunpoint, kidnapped, or otherwise restrained in the presence of perpetrators
for prolonged periods, ‘there is a greater window of opportunity for violence’
[citation], possibly culminating in murder.” (Ibid.) Thus, in determining
whether a defendant exhibited reckless indifference to human life, “[c]ourts
have looked to whether a murder came at the end of a prolonged period of
restraint of the victims by defendant.” (Ibid.) Here, witnesses estimated that
the encounter only lasted for several minutes, which the People acknowledge
is a relatively short duration. (See In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002,
1024 [describing minutes-long encounter as “negligible” in concluding that
the duration of the felony did nothing to increase the risk of violence beyond
that inherent in the crime].) Witnesses also testified that the events unfolded
quickly. We conclude that the Clark factor concerning duration of the crime
is neutral in this case; it did nothing to heighten the risk of violence beyond
that inherent in the robbery itself.
We briefly address the fourth Clark factor, which like the third Banks
factor requires weighing Bowman’s knowledge of Jackson’s likelihood of
killing. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621.) We acknowledge that the facts
here are distinguishable from cases like Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137,
151–152, where the defendants knew their father was capable of deadly
violence because he had murdered a prison guard. But as we have explained,
the record contains sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that Bowman
knew Jackson was willing to use violence.

15
Finally, Clark instructs that if the defendant raises an argument that
he tried to minimize the risk of violence, courts should consider it as part of
their reckless indifference analysis. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 622.) The
Clark court cautioned, however, that such evidence “does not, in itself,
necessarily foreclose a finding that defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life.” (Ibid.) Bowman makes no such argument here, choosing
instead to focus only on the first four factors. We see no evidence that he
attempted to minimize the risk of violence.
When viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
denial of the resentencing petition, and “after considering those aspects of the
present felony that provide insight into both the magnitude of the objective
risk of lethal violence and [the] defendant’s subjective awareness of that risk”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 623), we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s findings that Bowman was a major participant in

the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life.3
II
Bowman contends that because he was 19 years old at the time of the
offense, the trial court erred because there is no evidence in the record that it
considered his youth and its impact on his mental state. The People argue
that even though the court did not specifically address Bowman’s youth in its
ruling, the defense raised the issue below, and we must presume that the
court followed the law. We agree with the People.
Bowman’s evidentiary hearing was held in January 2024. By that
time, cases had been published stating that courts should consider the age of

3 For the reasons discussed here and in the next section, we are not
persuaded by Bowman’s argument that his conviction violates his Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
16
young adult offenders—not just offenders under the age of 18—in
resentencing petitions involving the Banks/Clark factors or implied malice.
(See, e.g., People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400 [reversing denial of
resentencing petition and remanding for the trial court to consider youth of
defendant, who was 21 years old at the time of the offense]; People v. Jones
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076 (Jones) [reversing and remanding for the trial
court to consider youth of defendant who was 20 years old at the time of the
offense]; see also People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 [finding
defendant’s youth was relevant to his awareness of dangers under
Banks/Clark factors].) As the People point out, “we presume the trial court
followed the law in exercising its duties and duly considered the evidence
presented to it.” (Jones, at p. 1092.) That presumption applies here. (Cf.
People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 488–490 [noting it was unlikely
the trial court knew to consider the petitioner’s youth where the resentencing
hearing was held before cases addressing the issue were decided].)
Moreover, even though the court did not specifically mention Bowman’s
youth at the hearing, we cannot conclude that the court ignored it. Defense
counsel raised youth as a consideration in briefing below, asking the court to
consider Bowman’s age when analyzing whether he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Then at the evidentiary hearing, Bowman’s
counsel reiterated that Bowman was “quite young,” only “19 years old at the
time,” and the youngest of the three defendants. Absent any contrary
indication in the record, we must presume the court properly considered
Bowman’s youth and its impact on his mental state. (Jones, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 1092 [“In the usual case, the fact that a court did not
specifically mention certain evidence does not mean that the court ‘ignored’

17
that evidence.”].) Accordingly, we discern no basis for remand on those
grounds.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Bowman’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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