People v. Richardson CA2/8

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Filed 8/29/25 P. v. Richardson CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B335448

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA085418-01)
v.

ANTOINE LEON RICHARDSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Emily Cole, Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Antoine Leon Richardson of one count of
criminal threats. At trial, the victim testified that he saw
Richardson brandish a gun while making the underlying threat.
The sole issue that Richardson raises on appeal is that
insufficient evidence supports his criminal threats conviction,
arguing the victim’s testimony was inherently improbable
because the People did not present any evidence that a gun was
found when the police searched Richardson’s apartment shortly
after the underlying threat was made. We reject this argument.
The People were not required to corroborate the victim’s
testimony that Richardson brandished a gun while making the
underlying threat. Nor was the victim’s testimony inherently
improbable, as it was not unbelievable per se. We therefore
affirm Richardson’s criminal threats conviction.
BACKGROUND
In June 2023, Richardson lived in an apartment in
Lancaster. Richardson’s neighbors, Brianna and Miguel Bolden,
lived with their children near Richardson’s apartment.1
Previously, there had been no issues between the neighbors.
However, that month, Richardson had a series of interactions
with Miguel and Brianna that culminated in Richardson being
charged with making criminal threats under Penal Code2
section 422, subdivision (a).
Approximately two weeks before Richardson’s arrest,
Brianna and her father were outside their apartment when

1 Because they share the same last name, we refer to
Brianna Bolden and Miguel Bolden by their first names.
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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Richardson drove by and stopped his car in front of them.
He said to Brianna, “What the fuck are you looking at, bitch,”
prompting Brianna’s father to call Miguel outside. As Miguel
walked outside, he heard Richardson telling Brianna to “ ‘[c]all
your husband outside. I’m going to break his jaw. I’mma hurt
him.’ ” Richardson then said directly to Miguel, “ ‘I’mma . . . beat
you up. I’m going to break your jaw. I’m going to hurt you.’ ”
Richardson also threatened to kill Miguel if he called the police.
Miguel went back inside his home with his family as Richardson
stood behind them making more threats. After this interaction,
Miguel became concerned about his family’s safety. Miguel and
Brianna decided to move their family to a new home.
Approximately two weeks later, on the morning of June 26,
2023, Brianna’s daughters told her that Richardson knocked
down a wooden gate on their property. Brianna called the police.
She then called Miguel to tell him what happened.
Miguel drove home immediately. While Miguel was
approaching his home, Richardson drove out of his garage and
began to follow Miguel. Miguel, “in fear of [his] life,” drove to the
police station and parked his car. Richardson drove past, pointed
his finger at Miguel and said, “Watch your back. I’m going to get
you.”
Miguel returned home after calling his wife from the police
station. Police officers later arrived and informed Brianna and
Miguel they would search for Richardson. The officers told
Brianna and Miguel to call the police if they encountered
Richardson.
Approximately four to five hours later, Miguel, Brianna,
and Brianna’s father were loading a U-Haul and preparing to
move. Brianna’s father told her that Richardson had arrived

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home. Brianna went inside and called the police to inform them
about Richardson’s location.
That evening, Richardson backed his car into his garage.
While he was about 10 to 15 feet away from Miguel, Richardson
reached out of his window, pointed a gun at Miguel, and said that
he was “going to kill” Miguel before closing his garage door.
Miguel believed Richardson was going to shoot him because of
their interactions over the past two weeks.
Miguel entered his garage and asked Brianna to tell the
police that Richardson had pointed a gun at him and threatened
to kill him. Brianna, who was still on the phone with police,
relayed this information.
When the police arrived, an officer instructed Richardson
over the phone to exit his apartment. Richardson told the officer
that he was not home and hung up. A tactical team later arrived
and arrested Richardson. The police searched Richardson’s
apartment. An officer who testified at trial but did not search
Richardson’s apartment did not know whether the officers who
searched the apartment found a gun.
In July 2023, the People charged Richardson with one
count of criminal threats. (§ 422, subd. (a).) A jury found him
guilty as charged. The court sentenced Richardson to an eight-
month term to run consecutive to a sentence from another case
that is not related to this appeal.
Richardson filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
To convict a defendant of criminal threats, the People must
prove: (1) the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime
which would result in death or great bodily injury to another
person; (2) the defendant intended for the statement to be viewed

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as a threat, even if the defendant did not actually intend to carry
out the threat; (3) the threat, on its face and under the
circumstances in which it was made, was “ ‘so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat’ ”; (4) the threat actually caused the
person threatened “ ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety’ ”; and (5) the
threatened person’s fear was reasonable under the
circumstances. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630.)
We review a jury’s findings for substantial evidence.
(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 479.) We must determine
whether the record contains evidence that is “reasonable,
inherently credible, and of solid value.” (Id. at p. 480.) In doing
so, we “review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution . . . presum[ing] every fact the jury could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence.” (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the
evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v.
Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
“ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ”
(People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.) Therefore, before
we may set aside the judgment, it must be clear that “ ‘ “upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support it.” ’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Richardson argues insufficient evidence supports his
criminal threats conviction, claiming Miguel’s testimony that
Richardson brandished a gun while making the underlying threat

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is inherently improbable because the People did not present
evidence that the police found a gun when they searched
Richardson’s apartment after he was arrested. As we explain,
this argument lacks merit.
The testimony of a single witness generally is sufficient to
“uphold a judgment ‘even if it is contradicted by other evidence,
inconsistent or false as to other portions.’ ” (People v. White
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 305, 319, fn. 14.) “Consequently,
‘[c]onflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the
exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends.’ ” (People v. Ennis (2010)
190 Cal.App.4th 721, 729 (Ennis).)
An appellate court may reject a witness’s testimony only if
it is inherently improbable or incredible—i.e., it is unbelievable
per se, physically impossible or wholly unacceptable to
reasonable minds. (Ennis, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 729.)
A witness’s statements are inherently improbable only if there
exists “ ‘ “ ‘either a physical impossibility that they are true, or
their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or
deductions.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 124.)
The challenged statements must be improbable on their face, and
we do not compare them to other evidence, except certain
universally accepted and judicially noticeable facts. (Ennis, at
p. 729.) Although we may reverse a judgment if we conclude the
evidence supporting it “was ‘inherently improbable,’ such a
finding is so rare as to be almost nonexistent.” (Id. at p. 728.)
Miguel’s testimony that Richardson brandished a gun while
making the underlying threat was not inherently improbable.

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The testimony was not unbelievable on its face, nor did it
describe a physical impossibility. Without reference to any other
facts, it certainly is possible that Richardson brandished a gun
when he threatened Miguel. (See Ennis, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th
at p. 729 [the only issue is whether it “seem[s] possible that what
the witness claimed to have happened actually happened”].)
Such conduct is far from extraordinary, let alone impossible or
unbelievable.
That the People did not present evidence that the police
found a gun when they searched Richardson’s home after he was
arrested for making the underlying threat does not mean
Miguel’s testimony was inherently improbable. As we just
explained, the testimony of a single witness is ordinarily
sufficient to support a judgment, and the People were not
required to independently corroborate the victim’s testimony that
Richardson brandished a gun. (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th
395, 489.)
In any event, even if we were to assume, as Richardson
urges us to, that the People’s failure to prove the police found a
gun while searching his apartment compelled the jury to find
that a gun was never found, that does not mean the victim’s
testimony was inherently improbable.3 There could be any
number of reasons why the police never found a gun while
searching Richardson’s apartment, even though the victim saw
Richardson brandish one earlier that day. For instance,
Richardson could have hidden the gun somewhere outside the

3 According to statements in Richardson’s probation report,
the police did not find a gun while searching Richardson’s
apartment. The probation report was not introduced at trial, nor
did any witness testify at trial that a gun was never found.

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apartment or in a hard-to-find location inside the apartment, or
the police might not have searched every corner of the apartment.
(See People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150 [rejecting
inherent improbability argument while noting other reasonable
inferences supporting the defendant’s conviction that the jury
could have drawn from the challenged evidence].) At most,
evidence that the police did not find a gun while searching
Richardson’s apartment creates an inconsistency between
Miguel’s testimony and the evidence concerning the results of
that search. But such a discrepancy does not render a witness’s
testimony inherently improbable. (Ennis, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th
at p. 729.)
In sum, we reject Richardson’s argument that Miguel’s
testimony was inherently improbable. Because Richardson does
not otherwise contend that the People failed to prove he
committed a criminal threat, he has not shown his conviction is
not supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Sanghera
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 [when raising a substantial
evidence challenge to a conviction, it is the appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient].)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

RUBIN, J.


Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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