CourtListener 10662708•People v. Crenshaw CA2/4
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Filed 8/28/25 P. v. Crenshaw CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B335405
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA024364)
v.
ROBERT ODELL CRENSHAW,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael V. Jesic, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Robert O. Crenshaw was tried and convicted of
the robbery and murder of Timothy Ellerson, the attempted
murder of Dwayne Haley, and the robbery and murders of Tracy
Bolton and Derrick Turner. He filed a petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied the
petition in full after an evidentiary hearing. It found that
appellant was ineligible for relief because he was the direct
perpetrator of the crimes involving Haley, Bolton, and Turner,
and was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard
for human life in connection with the robbery and murder of
Ellerson.
Appellant contends that substantial evidence does not
support the court’s findings regarding his involvement in the
crimes against Ellerson. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Convictions
A. Procedural History
Appellant and a codefendant, Richard Whitehurst, Jr.,
were jointly charged with, tried for, and convicted of the 1989
robbery (§ 211) and first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) of
Ellerson; the contemporaneous attempted murder of Haley
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664); and the 1990 robbery (§ 211) and first
degree murders (§ 187, subd. (a)) of Tracy Bolton and Derrick
Turner. The jury found robbery-murder special circumstances
allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) true as to all three murders,
and also found true a multiple murder special circumstance
1 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10). All further statutory references are to the Penal
Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The trial court sentenced
appellant to a term of life in prison without parole (LWOP) for
the Ellerson murder, a concurrent term of life imprisonment for
the Haley attempted murder, and imposed and stayed the
midterm of three years for the Ellerson robbery. It sentenced
appellant to a consecutive LWOP term for the Bolton murder, a
concurrent LWOP term for the Turner murder, and imposed and
stayed the midterm of three years for the Bolton and Turner
robbery. We affirmed appellant’s convictions on direct appeal.
(People v. Whitehurst (Nov. 16, 1994, B071419) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Factual Background
1. 1989 Crimes
Haley testified that he and Ellerson were longtime friends.
On three or four occasions in 1989, they purchased large
quantities of cocaine from Whitehurst, who was a manager at
Geraldine’s, a Los Angeles nightclub. During these transactions,
which took place at Geraldine’s, Ellerson bought the cocaine from
Whitehurst for $15,500 per kilo; Haley acted as Ellerson’s
bodyguard.
On June 21, 1989, Haley and Ellerson wanted to purchase
a kilo of cocaine from Whitehurst. In a departure from the
typical procedure, Whitehurst told them to wait a few blocks
away from Geraldine’s, where he would meet them with the
cocaine. Haley and Ellerson became uneasy waiting at the
appointed location, so they went to Geraldine’s. When they
arrived, Whitehurst said his supplier would be there soon and
invited Haley and Ellerson to wait at the club. After awhile,
Whitehurst received a phone call and went into the kitchen.
When he returned, he informed Haley and Ellerson that they
would have to leave and meet the supplier elsewhere to get the
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cocaine. Whitehurst told Ellerson that the two of them would go,
and Haley could wait at the club. Haley watched Ellerson and
Whitehurst leave in Whitehurst’s white car; Whitehurst was
driving, and Ellerson had a yellow gym bag containing $15,500 in
cash.
After waiting for a “kind of long” time, Haley paged
Ellerson a few times. He received no response. Concerned, Haley
sent Ellerson an “emergency page” using a special code. He again
received no response. About 10 to 15 minutes later, appellant
entered the club, wearing a Geraldine’s security jacket.
Appellant walked over to Haley and, using Haley’s nickname,
told Haley that Whitehurst and Ellerson had told appellant to
come get Haley and “bring you around the corner because things
took longer than they thought.” Haley had neither seen nor
spoken to appellant before, but concluded “he knew what was
going on” since he had used Haley’s nickname and referred to
Ellerson and Whitehurst. Haley left the club with appellant, and
the two of them got into Haley’s car.
Haley drove, and appellant gave Haley directions. After
they drove up and down the same street multiple times,
appellant directed Haley to park on the street behind a red truck,
about three or four houses from a cross street. Appellant got out
of the car and said he needed to make sure they were at the right
house. Haley stayed in the running car and locked the doors. As
he waited for appellant to return, he saw a white car drive past
on the cross street several times.
When appellant returned to the car, Haley reached over to
unlock the door and saw appellant draw a gun to the window.
Haley “threw” the car into gear and sped away as appellant
opened fire. Haley heard the car windows shattering and felt a
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sharp pain in his back. Haley turned onto the cross street, and
found the white car trying to block his path. He saw Whitehurst
in the driver’s seat, illuminated by his headlights.
Haley managed to get around Whitehurst and drive to his
sister’s house nearby. His sister called an ambulance. Haley was
transported to the hospital, where he was treated and released
the following morning.
Around 12:50 a.m. on June 22, 1989, Hawthorne police
received a “shots fired, man down” radio call. Officer James
Kerns responded to the intersection of 139th Street and Lemoli,
where he found Ellerson lying facedown in a pool of blood. He
had a pager clipped to his waist. No gym bag was nearby. A
medical examiner testified that Ellerson suffered two fatal
gunshot wounds to the back of the head and a potentially, but not
immediately, fatal gunshot wound to the abdomen.
Within a week or two of the shootings, Haley accompanied
police to Geraldine’s. He was unsure if he recognized anyone
there as the person who shot him, but identified Whitehurst’s
car. Whitehurst previously had been ticketed while driving a
white car matching Haley’s description; it was registered to
Whitehurst’s girlfriend.
In August 1990, approximately 14 months after the 1989
crimes, Haley again returned to Geraldine’s, this time with his
sister. As they were driving through the parking lot, Haley saw
appellant and told his sister, “‘That’s the fool that shot me.’”
Haley repeated the identification to a Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s detective, and later identified appellant as the person
who shot him in a photo array and at trial.
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2. 1990 Crimes
Melvin Lester testified to the following. In or around July
1990, Lester moved to the Los Angeles area from Oakland. He
stayed with his “good friend” Whitehurst and worked at
Geraldine’s as a security guard. Lester was friends with Bolton
and Turner, who still lived in Oakland. The three sold drugs
together, and Lester had a plan to “get a hookup” for large
quantities of cocaine in the Los Angeles area and “really take the
market” in Oakland.
A week or so before they were killed, Bolton and Turner
came to visit Lester and brought approximately $10,000 with the
hopes of purchasing a half kilo of cocaine. Lester and Whitehurst
picked them up at the airport, and “wined and dined” them at
Geraldine’s. Lester was unable to find someone willing to sell a
half kilo of cocaine, however, and he heard appellant and
Whitehurst separately mention plans to rob Bolton and Turner.
Somewhat concerned, Lester “[s]ent them back to Oakland.”
Bolton and Turner planned to come back with more money once
Lester found “a solid hookup” for a full kilo.
On August 13, 1990, Lester learned that Bolton and Turner
were on a flight to Los Angeles despite their plan to wait until
Lester found a supplier. Lester picked them up at the airport;
they had a burgundy gym bag with them. Lester took Bolton and
Turner to Geraldine’s, where Whitehurst told them he had a
supplier. The four men went into a back office, and Whitehurst
used the phone there to call appellant and arrange a sale.
After appellant arrived, the club closed for the night. Only
appellant, Whitehurst, Lester, Bolton, Turner, and another man,
Dominique Titus, remained. Titus held Bolton and Turner at
gunpoint while Whitehurst retrieved the burgundy bag from
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Lester’s car. Lester heard Bolton and Taylor being “roughed up,”
and saw appellant and Titus with bundles of money. Appellant
also had a .45 handgun that Lester had seen him with in the
past. At some point, Titus went outside and returned with wire,
which was used to bind and gag Bolton and Turner. Bolton, who
had medical conditions and took asthma medication, grunted and
struggled; Lester told the others that Bolton was having an
asthma attack. Appellant responded, “He’s going to die anyway.”
After some discussion of where they should go—as “far
away as possible from the club where it wouldn’t come back on
the club”— appellant and Titus brought Bolton and Turner
outside and put them into the trunk of appellant’s car. Appellant
got into the driver’s seat and left. Whitehurst and Lester left in
Whitehurst’s car, and Titus left in his car. All three cars stayed
together during the ensuing drive; they ultimately stopped in a
parking lot. Appellant removed Bolton and Turner from the
trunk, while complaining to Lester and Whitehurst that they had
“fucked his trunk up.” As Bolton and Turner lay on the ground,
Whitehurst handed appellant a gun and told appellant to “[h]urry
up and get it over with so we can get out of here.” Whitehurst
and Lester then left the parking lot and parked at a nearby curb.
Lester heard multiple gunshots before they left. He told
Whitehurst, “It sounded like a shot,” and Whitehurst shook his
head, smiled, and turned up the radio.
Law enforcement found Bolton and Turner lying dead in
the parking lot the following morning near two .45 caliber slugs.
A medical examiner testified that Bolton sustained a fatal
gunshot wound to the back of the head, and two additional
gunshot wounds to the shoulder and wrist. Turner was fatally
shot in the back, and was also shot in the shoulder and buttock.
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Both men had paint flecks on their bodies that matched the paint
from the scratched-up interior of appellant’s trunk. A ballistics
expert opined that the slugs were fired from the same gun that
had been used in the Haley shooting.
Several days later, appellant told Lester he had killed
Bolton and Turner. Lester noticed that appellant was wearing a
pendant and watch that looked like Turner’s.
II. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition at the prima
facie stage. Appellant appealed, and the People conceded that his
petition made a prima facie case for relief. We reversed and
remanded the matter to the trial court for issuance of an order to
show cause and evidentiary hearing. (See People v. Crenshaw
(Aug. 30, 2022, No. B312025) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the parties filed additional briefing. The
People argued that appellant was ineligible for relief for the
Bolton and Turner murders and Haley attempted murders
because he was the actual perpetrator of those crimes. They also
argued he was ineligible for relief as to the Ellerson murder, as
well as the other crimes, because he was a major participant in
the underlying robberies and acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Appellant argued that the evidence would not show
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
At the evidentiary hearing, the People reiterated their
contention that appellant directly perpetrated the murders of
Bolton and Turner and the attempted murder of Haley. With
regard to Ellerson, they conceded that “[w]e don’t know who
actually shot Mr. Ellerson.” However, they asserted that
8
appellant and Whitehurst jointly robbed Ellerson, and appellant’s
shooting of Haley was in furtherance of that robbery, namely an
attempt to eliminate Haley as a witness. They argued that it
“was clearly a planned, coordinated effort to take the money away
from these 2 men. The testimony by Mr. Haley was that he was
supposed to serve as the security, as the backup for Mr. Ellerson
who actually had the money. And so the plan was to separate
those 2 men so that it would be easier to take the money and
eliminate each of them as witnesses. And, specifically, there was
evidence that the car that was being driven by Whitehurst that
night was used to try to kill Mr. Haley. It shows that Whitehurst
and Crenshaw are working together at that stage. And so it’s
clear that they planned it together. It was all part of the same
transaction. [Appellant] is in fact a major participant acting with
reckless indifference for the murder of Mr. Ellerson, as well.”
Appellant’s counsel responded by pointing to appellant’s
trial testimony that he was not present for and did not
participate in any of the crimes. Counsel further argued that
there was nothing connecting appellant to the Ellerson murder,
which he argued “was committed by Whitehurst because
Whitehurst leaves with Ellerson . . . a good period of time before
my client is alleged to have been involved in anything. . . .
There’s nothing to indicate that my client was directly involved
either as the actual killer or participated in the actual killing of
Mr. Whitehurst [sic] because all of that takes place way in
advance of anything that happens with Mr. Haley.” With respect
to the Bolton and Turner murders, appellant’s counsel argued
that Lester’s testimony about appellant’s involvement was not
credible because he “was as much an accomplice as anyone could
be an accomplice in a situation like this. He knew Bolton. And
9
he knew Turner from before from Oakland. And he was the 1 who
helped set up everything. He had every reason – every motive
here to lay out other people like Mr. Crenshaw than himself [sic]
because he was the 1 who was so directly involved and who was
the real conspirator here who set up and had Bolton and Turner
murdered. . . . And based upon that, together with my client’s
testimony that he wasn’t present during the Bolton, Turner
murders, in combination with the clear motive and bias and
reason to lie that . . . Mr. Lester had, . . . prosecution has failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that my client could be
convicted of those murders under current law.”
The trial court denied the petition in full. First, it found
that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
was the actual shooter of Bolton and Turner. The court stated
that Lester’s testimony alone was enough to sustain the burden,
but “the corroboration that really seals it for Mr. Crenshaw” was
“that the same gun that was used on Mr. Haley…c[a]me back to
the casings as to the other case where Mr. Crenshaw is accused of
being the actual shooter.” The court further found beyond a
reasonable doubt, “based on all the testimony I’ve read,” that
appellant was the actual shooter in the attempted murder of
Haley. With respect to Ellerson, the court found “that the
evidence is overwhelming that he was a major participant and
had reckless disregard for human life as to that murder. He was
not present at that murder. I’m convinced of that. As [the People
have] pointed out nobody knows who actually committed that
murder. . . . But Mr. Crenshaw’s involvement was so intertwined
with the entire transaction from beginning to end. . . . [A]ll this
is definitely beyond a reasonable doubt that he was trying to kill
Mr. Haley to further the robbery.”
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DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6
In January 2019, the Legislature “‘amend[ed] the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448, quoting Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f) (Curiel).) As amended, section 188,
subdivision (a)(3) now provides: “[I]n order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
A person convicted of murder or attempted murder under a
now-invalid theory may petition the trial court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Upon a prima facie showing, the court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at
which the prosecution bears the burden “to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder” under current law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c),
(d)(3).) At this hearing, the trial court acts as an independent
factfinder and may consider evidence admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, or any new
or additional evidence submitted by the parties. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).) The court “must review all the relevant evidence,
evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as
to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard. . . .”
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298 (Clements).)
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II. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s findings after a section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence.
(Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; People v. Mitchell
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 591 (Mitchell).) Under this standard,
we “‘examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding
[the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Clements,
supra, at p. 298.) Substantial evidence includes both
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57), and we
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v.
Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.) We do not resolve
credibility issues or conflicts in the evidence. (People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
III. Analysis
Appellant contends the court erred by denying his petition
with respect to the Ellerson murder. He argues that the ruling
was not supported by substantial evidence, and the “minuscule
evidence presented in this case related to the Ellerson murder
belies any finding that appellant was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference.” Specifically, he contends “there
was no evidence of how and by whom [Ellerson] was actually
robbed or shot or under what circumstances,” and suggests that
“[i]t could have been that that was solely planned by Whitehurst
or not planned at all until something happened after Ellerson left
with Whitehurst from the club. That Whitehurst later called
12
appellant and directed him to take Haley and kill him could just
as easily have arisen after Ellerson had been robbed and killed,
when Whitehurst or someone else decided that something thus
needed to be done with Haley who had come with Ellerson to the
club.”
We reject these contentions to the extent they challenge the
validity of the underlying robbery conviction and the jury’s
findings related to that conviction. A section 1172.6 petition
“does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims
of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jury's findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
947.) The purpose of section 1172.6 “‘is to give defendants the
benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues
not previously determined, not to provide a do-over on factual
disputes that have already been resolved.’” (Ibid.; see also Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460 [“issue preclusion will ‘ordinarily’
apply in such proceedings”].) By finding appellant guilty of
robbing Ellerson, the only named victim in that count, the jury
necessarily found that appellant was aware of and involved in the
robbery, whether as a direct perpetrator or as an aider and
abettor. That means the jury also necessarily found that the
robbery, which was committed sometime after Whitehurst and
Ellerson left Geraldine’s with the yellow gym bag, was related to
appellant’s later interactions with Haley and was not, as
appellant now speculates, a wholly separate endeavor. We do not
revisit those findings now.
We further reject appellant’s contention that substantial
evidence does not support the trial court’s findings that he was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference. In People
v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 794 (Banks), the California
13
Supreme Court set forth several factors relevant to determining
“under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to
kill may qualify as a major participant” in a felony resulting in
death. Those factors are: “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Id. at p. 803, fn.
omitted.) “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any
one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in
determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s
participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered
‘major.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the inference that
appellant played a key role in planning the crimes. During his
very first interaction with Haley, appellant addressed him by his
nickname and demonstrated knowledge both that Haley was
connected to Ellerson and that Ellerson and Whitehurst were
together. As the People argue, this “suggests that appellant was
in communication with Whitehurst during the time period that
Ellerson went missing and then worked with Whitehurst to lure
Haley—Ellerson’s bodyguard and the sole potential witness—to
an area where he attempted to kill him.” Indeed, in an era before
cell phones enabled both easy contact and location tracking,
14
appellant directed Haley to an area where Whitehurst was
driving around, further demonstrating communication and
coordination.
Substantial evidence also showed that appellant used a
lethal firearm against Haley. Since the jury necessarily found
that the crimes against Haley and Ellerson were connected, this
second Banks factor also suggests major participation. So does
the related third Banks factor, the defendant’s awareness of
weapons used and particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime. Although neither the trial court nor the parties appear to
have considered the point, “[s]everal cases have recognized a
vehicle as a deadly weapon based on the manner it was used.”
(People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065.) Here, the evidence
suggests appellant was aware of Whitehurst’s presence near the
Haley shooting and efforts to use his car to block Haley’s egress
after appellant’s shots proved nonfatal. It also suggests that
appellant was enlisted to dispose of Haley and thereby conceal
the robbery and murder of Ellerson (fifth Banks factor), even if he
was not present at the time Ellerson was killed (fourth). In
short, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings
regarding the Banks factors, both individually and collectively.
We find no error in the court’s conclusion that appellant was a
major participant in the crimes that culminated in Ellerson’s
death.
We likewise find no error in its conclusion that appellant
acted with reckless indifference to human life. The California
Supreme Court articulated several factors relevant to
determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618-623
(Clark). Those factors include: “Did the defendant use or know
15
that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons
were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at
the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the
crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant's knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677,
citing Clark, supra, at pp. 618–623.)
The major participant and reckless indifference factors
“significantly overlap” in that “‘the greater the defendant’s
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 614-615, quoting Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S.
137, 153 (Tison).) Consequently, the trial court’s factual finding
that appellant was a major participant in the robbery leading to
Ellerson’s death is supportive of the court’s additional factual
finding that appellant acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 113; see also
Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12 [a defendant’s status as a
major participant in the underlying felony will “often provide
significant support for [ ] a [reckless indifference] finding”].)
Reckless indifference to human life is also evident in
appellant’s actions against Haley. Left alone with Haley,
appellant seized the opportunity to move forward with the
broader robbery plan rather than restrain the crime. He directed
Haley to an area where Whitehurst was waiting, opened fire at
him, and stood by while Whitehurst attempted to prevent Haley
from leaving the scene. There is no indication appellant
16
attempted to minimize the risks. Additionally, the duration of
the broader plan was lengthy, with Ellerson and Haley waiting
together for some period of time to execute the transaction before
being separated, transported, and, ultimately, robbed and shot.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implicit
findings regarding the Clark factors, both individually and
collectively. We accordingly affirm its finding that appellant
acted with reckless indifference to human life during the events
that led to Ellerson’s death.
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
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