CourtListener 10662698•Prell v. The Lobster CA2/3
Full text
Filed 8/28/25 Prell v. The Lobster CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CHRIS PRELL, B339515
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV47142
THE LOBSTER LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Upinder S. Kalra, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of David R. Denis, David R. Denis and
Armando M. Galvan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kull + Hall, Robert F. Kull and Kevin P. Hall for
Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________
Chris Prell appeals from a judgment confirming an
arbitration award in favor of his former employer The Lobster
LLC. He contends the court erred in granting The Lobster’s
motion to compel arbitration. We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Lobster is a seafood restaurant in Santa Monica,
California. The Lobster hired Prell as “a server” in September
2007 or 2008. The Lobster terminated Prell’s employment
on February 8, 2021.
In December 2021, Prell sued The Lobster for wrongful
termination. His first amended complaint, filed December 29,
2021, alleged several causes of action under the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA), including
discrimination based on disability and age, as well as causes
of action for violations of the California Family Rights Act,
retaliation under the Labor Code, wrongful termination
in violation of public policy, and defamation. Among other
allegations, Prell alleged he had a medical condition for which
he required work modifications and intermittent medical leaves
of absence; The Lobster failed to accommodate his medical
condition and fired him while he was on medical leave; and
The Lobster discriminated against and terminated older workers
because of their age.
In response, on May 16, 2022, The Lobster filed a motion
to compel arbitration. Luis Garcia—The Lobster’s operations
manager—submitted a declaration in support of the motion
attaching a stand-alone arbitration agreement Prell signed on
2
April 19, 2015, and another one he signed on July 21, 2020 that
superseded the April 2015 agreement.1
Garcia declared that around April 20, 2015, he received the
arbitration agreement signed by Prell and the general manager
of The Lobster. He put a scanned copy of the agreement in Prell’s
online personnel file. Garcia declared that, as a result of the
state-ordered closure of the restaurant in March 2020 due to
the Covid-19 pandemic, Prell and all non-managerial personnel
were terminated. On July 21, 2020, Prell was re-hired, effective
August 20, 2020. When he was re-hired, Prell again was given a
copy of The Lobster’s employee handbook, its sexual harassment
policy, and its form arbitration agreement.
Garcia signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of
The Lobster. Prell signed it on July 21, 2020. Garcia’s
declaration also attached the acknowledgement of receipt of
the employee handbook Prell signed that same day. By signing
the acknowledgement, Prell confirmed he “agreed to arbitrate
certain employment-related disputes, as provided in Section 12.3
of the Handbook and in the separate Arbitration Agreement.”
The signed arbitration agreement and acknowledgement were
placed in Prell’s personnel file.
1 Garcia became operations manager in March 2019. He
has worked for The Lobster since January 2014, “in charge of
bookkeeping and personnel records.” In his reply declaration,
Garcia confirmed he is the custodian of personnel records for
The Lobster. Garcia has maintained documents prepared since
his employment “contemporaneous to” their preparation in
the ordinary course of The Lobster’s business “as part of [his]
job function.”
3
The July 2020 agreement2 states that The Lobster and
the employee—here, Prell—“agree that any claim, dispute,
or controversy arising out of or relating to the employment
or prospective employment by [The Lobster] of [e]mployee[,]
which by law may be resolved by arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act[,] shall be resolved by final and binding
arbitration” under the terms and conditions specified in the
agreement. As relevant here, under paragraph 1, the claims
subject to arbitration include “tort claims, including . . .
defamation, . . . wrongful discharge, . . .; statutory or common law
claims for unlawful employment discrimination or harassment
(including, without limitation, discrimination or harassment
based on . . . age, . . . medical condition, handicap, disability,
. . . or other unlawful basis); . . . and claims for violation of any
federal, state or other governmental law, statute, regulation,
order, ordinance, or provision, except claims expressly excluded
under paragraph 2 of this Agreement.”3
The agreement states JAMS shall administer the
arbitration, and the arbitration “shall be governed by the
JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures in effect
at the time of filing for arbitration. These Rules are available
at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration/
and a condensed copy of them as currently drafted is attached
2 From what we can tell, the terms of the 2015 and 2020
agreements are identical.
3 As relevant here, paragraph 2 states the agreement does
not hinder the employee’s right “to file an administrative claim
with[,] or to otherwise seek relief from, any government agency
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.”
4
hereto.” Paragraph 8 of the agreement provides it “shall be
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and otherwise by
the substantive law of the state of employment of [e]mployee.
Arbitration shall be held at a JAMS location closest to
[e]mployee’s place of work for [The Lobster].”
The Lobster again was shut down by government order
from December 29, 2020 through February 10, 2021. Garcia
declared that, on February 8, 2021, The Lobster emailed Prell
to tell him it no longer had a position for him because the
restaurant could open for outdoor dining only.
Prell opposed the motion, contending the 2015 arbitration
agreement was unenforceable, as the 2020 agreement superseded
it; Labor Code section 432.6—which prevents an employer from
conditioning employees’ employment on their waiver of any
“ ‘right, forum, or procedure for a violation of any provision’ ” of
FEHA—rendered the 2020 arbitration agreement unenforceable;
the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply to the agreements; and
the agreements were unenforceable because they were products
of duress, manufactured by undue influence, and unconscionable.
Prell submitted his, and another former employee’s,
declarations in support of his opposition. Prell declared he
went on a medical leave of absence in March 2020. When he
returned on July 21, 2020, a new general manager told Prell
the employee handbook had been redone and he “needed to sign
an acknowledgment that [he] received the handbook and go over
paperwork” with Garcia. Prell met with Garcia, who handed
him an arbitration agreement, “remarking[,] ‘Here’s . . . the
arbitration agreement. You have to sign it. If you don’t, we
can’t have you work here anymore.’ ” Prell declared that when
he asked what it was, Garcia responded, “ ‘[I]t’s to protect you—
5
protect your job and allow you to keep your benefits.’ ” When
Prell asked, “ ‘[W]hat if I don’t sign it,’ ” Garcia said, “ ‘Then
we can’t bring you back on. I do have some meetings to go to,
so we have to take care of this right now,’ or words to that effect.”
Prell declared Garcia and The Lobster “urged” him “to sign the
arbitration agreement quickly, right there and then,” and he
“did so under pressure.” The former employee similarly described
having to sign an arbitration agreement when he returned to
work after the 2020 closure that was not explained to him.
Prell declared he asked for a copy of the signed agreement
but never was given a copy, although Garcia said he would do so.
He also declared neither The Lobster nor its management ever
told him what JAMS was, what rules “governed any proceeding
before JAMS,” or where he could find “such rules.” Prell declared
no one gave him the rules for JAMS.4
On August 17, 2022, after hearing the parties’ arguments,
the court adopted its tentative ruling to grant the motion to
compel arbitration as its final order. The court first found the
4 As for the April 2015 arbitration agreement, Prell declared
that, at a Saturday staff meeting, he and other staff members
were told they had to sign the paper being passed out and return
it by Monday if they wanted to keep their jobs. Prell declared he
didn’t know what the arbitration document was and no one would
speak to him about it. Prell further declared that, on Monday
when he told the general manager he didn’t “ ‘feel comfortable
signing this paper,’ ” the general manager told him, “ ‘then don’t
come to work—if you don’t sign it then you just terminated
yourself.’ ” The former employee declared he also was at that
meeting and similarly described having to sign the arbitration
agreement.
6
evidence established the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute
at issue, and both Garcia and Prell had authenticated the
agreement. The court rejected Prell’s argument that Labor Code
section 432.6 rendered the agreement unenforceable, finding
section 432.6 “has no application to this motion.” The court
noted the statute provides, “ ‘Nothing in this section is intended
to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is otherwise
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.’ ” (Quoting
Lab. Code, § 432.6, subd. (f).)
The court next considered Prell’s unconscionability defense.
The court found the agreement was an “ordinary contract of
adhesion,” finding plaintiff “was not lied to, manipulated or
subject to duress,” and there was no surprise “as evidenced
by the title ‘Arbitration Agreement’ in bold letters at the top”
and Prell’s “active attempt to avoid signing the agreement.”
The court also found no surprise based on the JAMS rules:
the agreement provided a URL link to the rules and a copy was
attached to the agreement. The agreement also explained the
procedure and what was covered. Accordingly, the court found
the agreement was “minimally procedurally unconscionable”
based on its adhesive nature. The court also rejected Prell’s
claims of substantive unconscionability.
The court granted the motion and stayed the action
pending the arbitration. The matter went to arbitration under
the July 2020 arbitration agreement. The arbitrator found the
proceedings were governed by the JAMS Employment Arbitration
Rules and Procedures, effective June 1, 2021, and the merits
were to be decided under California law and the Federal
Arbitration Act. Hearings were held from August 22–25, 2023.
The parties submitted closing briefs on September 20, 2023.
7
The arbitrator issued her final award on December 6, 2023.
The arbitrator found in favor of The Lobster on all of Prell’s
claims, that no fees or costs were to be awarded to The Lobster,
and that each party was responsible for its own attorney fees.
On December 18, 2023, The Lobster filed a petition to
confirm the arbitration award. Prell opposed the petition and
filed a cross-petition to vacate the award. On April 11, 2024,
the court granted the petition to confirm the arbitration award
and denied the motion to vacate it. On April 25, 2024, the court
entered judgment in favor of The Lobster and against Prell.
Prell appealed.5
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standards of review
Both the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)
(FAA) and the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1280 et seq.) “strongly favor arbitration” (Prima Donna
Development Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 22, 35), and “establish[ ] ‘a presumption in favor
of arbitrability’ ” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125
(OTO)). The fundamental policy behind both acts is to “ ‘ensur[e]
that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to
5 Although Prell’s notice of appeal from the judgment also
covers the trial court’s orders confirming the arbitration award
and denying his motion to vacate the award, he makes no
separate argument as to how the court erred in doing so. He
thus has forfeited the issue on appeal. (See, e.g., Padilla v. Rodas
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 742, 753, fn. 2 [appellant “ ‘abandons
an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief’ ”].)
Accordingly, we consider only whether the court erred
in granting The Lobster’s motion to compel arbitration.
8
their terms.’ ” (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563
U.S. 333, 344 (Concepcion); Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999)
21 Cal.4th 815, 836, fn. 10.) “Arbitration is therefore a matter
of contract.” (Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc.
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59.) Thus, arbitration agreements
are enforceable unless invalidated under state law on
grounds that exist for any contract, such as fraud, duress,
and unconscionability. (9 U.S.C. § 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281;
Concepcion, at p. 339; Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97–98
(Armendariz).) The FAA applies to arbitration agreements
“involving”—meaning, “ ‘affecting’ ”— interstate commerce.
(9 U.S.C. § 2; Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S.
52, 56 (Alafabco).)
A party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of
proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party
opposing the petition bears the burden of establishing a defense
to the agreement’s enforcement. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical
Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) “ ‘General principles
of contract law determine whether the parties have entered
a binding agreement to arbitrate.’ ” (Pinnacle Museum Tower
Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55
Cal.4th 223, 236.) In resolving a petition to compel arbitration,
“the trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits,
declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral
testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final
determination.” (Engalla, at p. 972.)
“We review de novo the superior court’s interpretation of
an arbitration agreement, including whether federal or state law
governing arbitration applies, when the interpretation does not
9
involve conflicting extrinsic evidence.” (Nixon v. AmeriHome
Mortgage Co., LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 934, 946; accord
Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 74, 82 (Carmona) [appellate court reviews
arbitration agreement de novo to determine whether it is legally
enforceable, applying general principles of California contract
law].) To the extent the trial court’s determination of the issue
turned on its resolution of disputed facts, we review the court’s
factual determinations for substantial evidence. (Carmona, at
p. 82.) “ ‘When an issue is tried on affidavits, the rule on appeal
is that those affidavits favoring the contention of the prevailing
party establish not only the facts stated therein but also all facts
which reasonably may be inferred therefrom . . . .’ ” (American
Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383,
387.) We resolve any doubts about the validity of an arbitration
agreement in favor of arbitration. (Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital
v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.)
2. Prell signed the arbitration agreement and
the FAA applies
Prell first contends the trial court erred in finding
an arbitration agreement existed between the parties at all
“because the April 2015 arbitration agreement was superseded
and replaced by the July 2020 agreement.” Prell’s contention
is not well-taken. The Lobster relied on the July 2020 agreement
—not the April 2015 agreement—in its motion to compel. As
it explains, The Lobster included the 2015 agreement with its
moving papers to demonstrate Prell previously had signed an
essentially identical agreement and thus was “well aware of”
the agreement to arbitrate. The July 2020 agreement was
10
the operative agreement and Prell admitted he signed it.6
Accordingly, the trial court properly found The Lobster met
its burden to demonstrate an agreement to arbitrate existed
between it and Prell.
Prell also challenges the trial court’s implied finding that
the FAA governs the agreement. Prell primarily contends that,
because The Lobster provided no evidence that he performed any
of his job duties outside of California, it failed to demonstrate
their employment relationship implicated interstate commerce.
The employee need not perform work out of state for the
employee-employer “transaction” (9 U.S.C. § 2) to affect
interstate commerce, however. The FAA does not require
the transaction actually to be “ ‘within the flow of interstate
commerce.’ ” (Alafabco, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 56, quoting Allied-
Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265,
273; see also Alafabco, at pp. 56–57 [“Congress’ Commerce Clause
power ‘may be exercised in individual cases without showing any
specific effect upon interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate the
economic activity in question would represent ‘a general practice
. . . subject to federal control.’ ”].) Garcia declared The Lobster
“nearly daily has air transported in large orders [of] seafood”
to prepare and serve to guests; and “advertises via the Internet
6 Accordingly, Prell has no basis to challenge the
authenticity of the agreement. In any event, we agree with the
trial court that Garcia sufficiently authenticated the document.
He declared he was “in charge of . . . personnel records,” was the
custodian of “such records” for The Lobster, and—as part of his
job duties—kept those employment records, including Prell’s,
contemporaneous to the documents’ preparation in the ordinary
course of business.
11
and otherwise internationally, including by print ads placed
in airline magazines.” Garcia also declared that The Lobster’s
Executive Chef and Director of Operations had traveled
internationally as The Lobster’s representative, most recently
to England.7 Prell challenges Garcia’s statements “as conclusions
without any foundation.” He also argues that, if the activities
Garcia described were sufficient to trigger application of the FAA,
every business “would be subject to the FAA automatically for
using their cell phone, or having a bank account.”
Arguably, if The Lobster flew seafood in from other states8
that it then served its customers, Prell’s employment would
affect interstate commerce. (See, e.g., Herrera v. Doctors Medical
Center of Modesto, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 538, 542 [owner
and operator of medical center was engaged in interstate
commerce through purchase of “equipment, materials and
supplies from out-of-state manufacturers and suppliers”];
Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101 [concluding sales agreement for
home purchase affected interstate commerce because building
materials used in construction of home were “manufactured
and/or produced outside California”].) We need not decide
that issue, however. Although the FAA by its terms (9 U.S.C.
§ 2) applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce,
7 In his initial declaration, Garcia declared that he had
“travelled internationally to promote the brand.” Garcia
corrected that misstatement in his reply declaration.
8 Garcia declared The Lobster had seafood flown in but
did not state from where the shipments came.
12
“the presence of interstate commerce is not the only manner
under which the FAA may apply.” (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman
Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355 [parties
“voluntarily elect[ed] to have the FAA govern enforcement
of the[ir] [a]greement”].) Rather, as “arbitration is a matter of
contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.”
(Barrera v. Apple American Group LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 63,
76 [agreeing FAA applied as the parties’ agreements “provide[d]
the FAA would control”]; Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963 [same].)
Accordingly, the FAA applied to the arbitration agreement
here because the agreement expressly states it does. Not only
does the preamble to the agreement state the parties agree to
resolve employment-related claims by arbitration under the FAA,
but paragraph 8 also states the FAA governs the agreement:
“This Agreement shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act and otherwise by the substantive law of the state of
employment of Employee.” Our interpretation of the agreement
thus is governed by the FAA and California law, to the extent
it is not inconsistent with the FAA.
Prell contends that even if the FAA applies, the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable under Labor Code section 432.6
(enacted as part of Assembly Bill No. 51 (AB 51)). That statute,
effective January 1, 2020, provides: “A person shall not, as a
condition of employment, continued employment, or the receipt
of any employment-related benefit, require any applicant
for employment or any employee to waive any right, forum,
or procedure for a violation of any provision of the [FEHA]
or [the Labor] [C]ode, including the right to file and pursue
a civil action . . . with . . . any court . . . .” (Lab. Code, § 432.6,
13
subd. (a).) There is no dispute that The Lobster conditioned
Prell’s reemployment on his agreement to arbitrate employment-
related claims, including those brought under the FEHA. Prell,
however, neglects to note the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—
after granting rehearing—withdrew the opinion Prell cites and
issued a new opinion holding the FAA preempts AB 51, including
Labor Code section 432.6. (See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v.
Bonta (9th Cir. 2023) 62 F.4th 473, 478 (Bonta II).) (Prell relies
on Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2021) 13
F.4th 766, 780 [holding “regulation of pre-agreement employer
behavior in § 432.6 does not run afoul of the FAA, but the civil
and criminal sanctions attached to a violation of that section do”
and are preempted by the FAA], withdrawn and resubmitted
for rehearing by (9th Cir. 2022) 45 F.4th 1113 (Mem.).)9
9 AB 51 also added Government Code section 12953 that
makes a violation of section 432.6 “ ‘an unlawful employment
practice.’ ” (Bonta II, supra, 62 F.4th at p. 480.) Section 433 of
the Labor Code in turn makes a violation of section 432.6—part
of Article 3 of the Labor Code—a misdemeanor offense. (Bonta II,
at p. 480; Lab. Code, § 433 [“Any person violating [Article 3]
is guilty of a misdemeanor.”].) Finding “all provisions of
AB 51 work together to burden the formation of arbitration
agreements,” on rehearing—in a divided decision—the Ninth
Circuit concluded the FAA preempted “AB 51 as a whole to the
extent it applies to arbitration agreements.” (Bonta II, at p. 490.)
The court explained that, “regardless whether AB 51 includes
a civil penalty, it ‘specially impede[s] the ability of [employers]
to enter into arbitration agreements’ and ‘flout[s] the FAA’s
command to place those agreements on an equal footing with
all other contracts.’ ” (Ibid.)
14
In any event, Labor Code section 432.6 provides, “Nothing
in this section is intended to invalidate a written arbitration
agreement that is otherwise enforceable under the [FAA].”
(Lab. Code, § 432.6, subd. (f).) (See Bonta II, supra, 62 F.4th at
p. 480 [noting the California Legislature included subdivision (f)
to avoid FAA preemption, but the provision “resulted in the
oddity that an employer subject to criminal prosecution for
requiring an employee to enter into an arbitration agreement
could nevertheless enforce that agreement once it was
executed”].) Accordingly, as we conclude below that the July
2020 agreement is “otherwise enforceable,” Labor Code section
432.6 would have no effect on the agreement’s enforceability,
even if it were not preempted.
3. Prell did not present sufficient evidence to establish
the agreement was a product of duress or undue
influence
Consent to a contract must be freely given. (Civ. Code,
§ 1565.) Apparent consent is not free when obtained through
duress, menace, fraud, undue influence, or mistake. (Civ. Code,
§ 1567.) As he did below, Prell seems to argue he did not consent
to the agreement because (1) he signed it under duress—under
threat of “los[ing] his livelihood”; and (2) it was the product
of undue influence given he was “unduly susceptible to [The
Lobster’s] domination” as a long-time employee, and The Lobster
placed “ ‘excessive pressure’ ” on him to sign the agreement.
In its written ruling, the trial court did not specifically address
Prell’s duress and undue influence arguments. We can infer
the court impliedly rejected them when it found the agreement
was “minimally procedurally unconscionable.”
15
“Economic duress requires an unlawful or ‘wrongful act
which is sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonably prudent
person faced with no reasonable alternative to succumb to
the perpetrator’s pressure.’ [Citation.] ‘Examples of such
“wrongful acts” include “[t]he assertion of a claim known to be
false or a bad faith threat to breach a contract or to withhold a
payment . . . .” ’ ” (Hester v. Public Storage (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th
668, 679, relied on by Prell.) Prell has not demonstrated
The Lobster committed any wrongful act to constitute duress.
Offering the arbitration agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
may have rendered it procedurally unconscionable on some level,
but it did not constitute a wrongful act on The Lobster’s part.
Prell nonetheless argues The Lobster’s arbitration condition
was a wrongful act under Labor Code section 432.6. As the FAA
preempts that statute, its alleged violation cannot constitute
a wrongful act for purposes of determining the validity of the
arbitration agreement.10 Prell also declared he “could not afford
to be out of a job or medical benefits.” Prell may have felt he had
no alternative but to accept The Lobster’s return-to-work offer,
but the circumstances that influenced that decision did not
result from wrongful conduct by The Lobster.
10 Moreover, California officials have been permanently
enjoined from enforcing Labor Code section 432.6, subdivisions
(a)–(c) “where the alleged ‘waiver of any right, forum, or
procedure’ is the entry into an arbitration agreement that is
covered by the [FAA].” (Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Bonta
(E.D.Cal., Jan. 2, 2024, No. 2:19-cv-02456-KJM-DB) 2024 WL
3564626.)
16
Undue influence, in turn, includes “the use, by one
in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real
or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority”
to obtain an “unfair advantage”; “taking an unfair advantage
of another’s weakness of mind”; or “taking a grossly oppressive
and unfair advantage of another’s necessities or distress.” (Civ.
Code, § 1575.) “In essence undue influence involves the use of
excessive pressure to persuade one vulnerable to such pressure,
pressure applied by a dominant subject to a servient object.
In combination, the elements of undue susceptibility in the
servient person and excessive pressure by the dominating person
make the latter’s influence undue.” (Odorizzi v. Bloomfield
School Dist. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 131 (Odorizzi).)
Undue influence is a question of fact. Substantial evidence
supports the court’s implied finding that Prell’s agreement
to arbitrate was not the product of undue influence. For one,
nothing in the record supports a finding that Prell had a
diminished capacity at the time he signed the agreement,
and he was not in a confidential or fiduciary relationship
with The Lobster. Prell nonetheless argues he was “unduly
susceptible” to his employer’s “domination” because he had
worked for The Lobster for many years as a lead server and his
only choice was to sign the arbitration agreement “or be out of
a job.” Susceptibility in this context means “a lessened capacity”
“to make a free contract.” (Odorizzi, supra, 246 Cal.App.2d at
p. 131; see also Martinez-Gonzalez v. Elkhorn Packing Co. LLC
(9th Cir. 2022) 25 F.4th 613, 619, 625–626 (Martinez-Gonzalez)
[citing Odorizzi and finding arbitration agreements were not
invalid under California law under doctrine of undue influence
(and doctrine of economic duress)].) In our view, the length of
17
Prell’s employment with The Lobster does not support finding
he was “unduly susceptible” to pressure from The Lobster to sign
the arbitration agreement. (Cf. Odorizzi, at pp. 126–127, 131–
132 [teacher who sought to rescind his resignation—and reinstate
his employment—on ground of undue influence sufficiently
pleaded undue susceptibility where he signed his resignation
after having been arrested, questioned, booked, and released
on bail, and having gone without sleep for 40 hours].) There is
no evidence Prell couldn’t rationally assess whether he wanted
to sign an arbitration agreement again or go to work elsewhere.
We also cannot conclude that The Lobster’s conditioning
of Prell’s employment on his signing of the arbitration agreement
rose to the level of “taking a grossly oppressive and unfair
advantage of [Prell’s] necessities or distress,” so that Prell’s
consent was not given freely. (Odorizzi, supra, 246 Cal.App.2d
at p. 130.) “[O]verpersuasion”—i.e., “excessive pressure”—
involves several factors, including, “discussion of the transaction
at an unusual or inappropriate time” and “consummation of the
transaction in an unusual place”; “insistent demand that the
business be finished at once”; “extreme emphasis on untoward
consequences of delay”; “absence of third-party advisers”; and
“statements that there is no time to consult financial advisers
or attorneys.” (Id. at pp. 133–134.) Far from an unusual time
or place, Prell was asked to sign the agreement on his return
to work at The Lobster. True, Garcia pressed Prell to sign the
agreement quickly—Prell declared he had to sign the agreement
“right there and then, and did so under time pressure” without
“an opportunity to consider the document.” But the evidence
does not support a finding that The Lobster obtained Prell’s
agreement to arbitrate by taking an unfair advantage of a
18
vulnerable individual. In Odorizzi, on which Prell relies, the
plaintiff teacher sufficiently alleged “excessive pressure” where
the school board told him that, “if he didn’t resign at once,”
the board would dismiss him “and publicize the proceedings,”
but if he did resign the incident leading to his arrest and criminal
charges—which ultimately were dismissed—would not be
publicized and “wouldn’t jeopardize” his chances of securing
a teaching position elsewhere. (Id. at pp. 126–127, 134–135.)
There is no evidence The Lobster put similar pressure on
Prell or that Prell was susceptible to succumbing to such pressure
as was the teacher in Odorizzi. The choice Prell had—to sign
the arbitration agreement or to find work elsewhere—may
have seemed harsh, but there is no evidence Prell was “ ‘so
dominated’ ” by pressure from The Lobster’s agents as to be
unable to exercise his independent judgment. (Odorizzi, supra,
246 Cal.App.2d at p. 135; cf. id. at pp. 132–134 [giving examples
of oppressive cases: approaching pregnant woman four days
after her husband was shot to death while she was in shock and
persuading her to deed her interest in late husband’s estate to
children from his earlier marriage; asking for a release of claims
from a patient confined in a cast in a hospital who was in a
hysterical state and in so much pain she signed the release to
end the interview; and arriving unannounced at an individual’s
house at 1:00 a.m. and insisting that if she did not sign a
document right then her real estate transaction would fall apart];
Martinez-Gonzalez, supra, 25 F.4th at p. 627, fn. 9 [describing
cases discussed in Odorizzi as “illustrat[ing] the sort of extreme
pressure that California courts consider as ‘extraordinary
force’ ”].) Nor is there any evidence Prell ever asked to consult
19
with an attorney or other adviser, or that Garcia told him he
could not.
Accordingly, we conclude Prell presented insufficient
evidence to establish he did not voluntarily agree to arbitrate
his claims.
4. The agreement is not unconscionable
Prell’s final defense to the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement is that it is unconscionable. “A contract is
unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice
in deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that
are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (OTO, supra,
8 Cal.5th at p. 125.) “Under this standard, the unconscionability
doctrine ‘ “has both a procedural and a substantive element.” ’
[Citation.] ‘The procedural element addresses the circumstances
of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression
or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. [Citations.]
Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an
agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of whether they
are overly harsh or one-sided.’ ” (Ibid.) Both procedural and
substantive unconscionability must be present for a court
to be able to refuse to enforce a contract or a contract term,
including an arbitration agreement, under the doctrine of
unconscionability. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.)
“But they need not be present in the same degree.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the
less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come
to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”
(Ibid.) The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of
proving unconscionability. (OTO, at p. 126.)
20
a. The agreement contains some procedural
unconscionability
“A procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with
an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ ”
(OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 126.) “An adhesive contract is
standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by
the party with superior bargaining power ‘on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.’ ” (Ibid.) There is no question the form arbitration
agreement here—offered as a condition of Prell’s employment—
was an adhesive contract. (Ibid.) But in the words of the trial
court, “most employment contracts are.” (See Graham v. Scissor-
Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 817–818 [adhesion contracts
“are an inevitable fact of life”].) The fact the arbitration
agreement is a contract of adhesion “does not render it
automatically unenforceable as unconscionable.” (Serafin v.
Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 179
(Serafin).) Rather, “[t]he pertinent question . . . is whether
circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression
or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required.
[Citations.] ‘ “ ‘Oppression occurs where a contract involves
lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, surprise [occurs]
where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within
a prolix printed form.’ ” ’ ” (OTO, at p. 126.)
“ ‘The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression
include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party
is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount
and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed
contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length
and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education
and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party’s review
21
of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.’ ” (OTO,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 126–127.)
Here, Prell established the arbitration agreement was not
a negotiated contract, and he lacked “meaningful choice,” through
his declaration that Garcia told him he could not “ ‘work here
anymore’ ” if he didn’t sign the arbitration agreement; Garcia
“urged” him to sign the agreement “quickly, right there and
then”; and no one at The Lobster “approached” him “to negotiate
an arbitration term or provision,” nor was he “advised” that
he “could reject, negotiate, re-negotiate, bargain for, or change
any arbitration term or provision.”
“When arbitration is a condition of employment, there
is inherently economic pressure on the employee to accept
arbitration. This alone is a fairly low level of procedural
unconscionability.” (Alvarez v. Altamed Health Services Corp.
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 572, 591 (Alvarez).) In Alvarez, the
appellate court reversed a trial court’s order denying the
defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on the ground the
agreement was unconscionable. (Id. at pp. 578, 596.) There,
the plaintiff—a prospective employee—was told she had a
day to review her offer letter and accompanying arbitration
agreement—although she appeared to have taken more time—
and, because she “had a physical copy of the agreement in her
control for at least 24 hours,” she could have made a copy of it
if she wished. (Id. at p. 591.) English was not the plaintiff’s
first language, but she was comfortable speaking and reading
English and thus her preference to read difficult legal terms
in Spanish did not demonstrate she was unable to understand
the agreement. (Id. at pp. 589, 591.) The plaintiff also presented
no evidence about her education or experience or whether she
22
consulted an attorney. The court thus found the plaintiff had
“not shown any oppression apart from that inherent in the
adhesive nature of the agreement.” (Id. at p. 591.)
Prell did not have time to consider the arbitration
agreement before signing it as did the plaintiff in Alvarez.
Nevertheless, Prell already had signed a virtually identical
stand-alone agreement five years earlier. Prell also never
declared he would have consulted an attorney about the
agreement if he had not been expected to sign it “right there
and then.” Prell declared he did not receive a copy of the 2020
—or 2015—agreement, but substantial evidence shows he
had access to it through his online personnel record.11
Moreover, Prell does not contend he was lied to or tricked
into signing the agreement to support a finding that more than
a modest level of procedural unconscionability existed. (Nguyen
v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 248
(Nguyen), quoting Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th
1237, 1245 (Baltazar) [noting “ ‘[t]he adhesive nature of the
11 Garcia declared the agreement and JAMS rules were
available to Prell in his personnel folder “to which [he] was given
access.” Prell declared he did not have access to his personnel file
while he worked at The Lobster nor was he “ever informed that
it existed online” or how “to access any of [his] hiring or other
employee records online.” Garica declared The Lobster’s records
showed that, on May 20, 2015, Prell “activate[d] his online access
to his personnel records” through The Lobster’s “Paychex HR
online portal.” We can infer the trial court found Garcia’s
declaration more credible than Prell’s and implicitly found
Prell had the ability to access his personnel records, including
the agreement.
23
employment contract requires us to be “particularly attuned” to
[the plaintiff’s] claim of unconscionability [citation], but we do not
subject the contract to the same degree of scrutiny as “[c]ontracts
of adhesion that involve surprise or other sharp practices” ’ ”].)
In Baltazar, as the trial court explained, the employer presented
the plaintiff with a form arbitration agreement that she initially
refused to sign. (Baltazar, at pp. 1241, 1245.) After the plaintiff
was told, “ ‘sign it or no job,’ ” she signed the agreement. (Id.
at p. 1241.) Although the agreement was adhesive in nature,
because “there was no element of surprise,” and the plaintiff
“was not lied to, placed under duress, or otherwise manipulated
into signing the arbitration agreement,” the agreement did not
fall into the category of adhesive contracts requiring a higher
degree of scrutiny. (Id. at p. 1245.) As the trial court found here,
Prell similarly “not only knew about the arbitration agreement,
but initially sought to avoid it, ultimately deciding to accept it
because [his employer] was not willing to [rehire him] on other
terms.” (Ibid.)
Also, the physical aspects of the document here were
neither oppressive nor did they result in surprise: the two-page
agreement appears to be written in average-sized—rather than
extremely small—font and consists of a six-line preamble and
nine separately numbered paragraphs, the longest of which is
17 lines. (Compare Alvarez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 583,
592 [physical document did not give rise to surprise where
agreement was not long—two pages, consisting of six paragraphs,
the longest of which was 23 lines—and was not physically
difficult to read] with OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 128 [facts
supported finding of surprise where agreement was “a paragon
of prolixity, only slightly more than a page long but written in
24
an extremely small font,” where the “single dense paragraph
covering arbitration require[d] 51 lines,” and where the text
was “ ‘visually impenetrable’ and ‘challenge[d] the limits of
legibility’ ”].) The sentences within each paragraph are not
particularly lengthy,12 nor are the paragraphs overly dense.
(Cf. OTO, at p. 128 [substance of agreement was opaque where
sentences were lengthy and “complex, filled with statutory
references and legal jargon”].)
Moreover, although there was an inequality in bargaining
power here, there was no lack of disclosure of the arbitration
agreement and thus no surprise. The arbitration agreement
was a stand-alone, two-page document prominently titled
“ARBITRATION AGREEMENT” in bold face type. The final
paragraph above the signature block clearly stated, “The parties
understand by agreeing to binding arbitration they are waiving
and foregoing [sic] any right to a trial by jury on the claims
subject to arbitration.” The agreement to arbitrate and to give
up a right to jury trial, therefore, was not buried in a paragraph
of dense text, as in OTO. “[W]here the arbitration provisions
presented in a contract of adhesion are highlighted for
the employee, any procedural unconscionability is ‘limited.’ ”
(Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 179 [concluding
“arbitration provisions were unquestionably highlighted for
[employee] in the two-page, freestanding document, relating
12 The sentence listing the types of claims that fall within
the scope of the arbitration agreement necessarily spans several
lines, but the categories of claims are separated by semi-colons.
We do not find it particularly difficult to read given the long list
of covered claims.
25
solely to arbitration, that she received and signed”].) Prell also
had signed on July 21, 2020, an acknowledgement that he had
received The Lobster’s employee handbook and understood he
had “agreed to arbitrate certain employment-related disputes,
as provided in Section 12.3 of the Handbook and in the separate
Arbitration Agreement.” That Prell was not surprised by the
agreement also is evident—as the trial court found—by his
“active attempt to avoid signing” it.
Prell nevertheless contends the agreement was
procedurally unconscionable because he was not given
“arbitration terms or its rules.” Prell argues the agreement
did not describe how the arbitration would be conducted,
“the rules for such process, or what relief would be available.”
Prell declared he never was given a copy of the agreement, or
a copy of the JAMS rules, and was not told what JAMS was,
“what rules governed any proceeding before JAMS,” or where
he could find the JAMS rules. He argues The Lobster’s “own
documentation fails to specify which JAMS rules apply.”
We reject Prell’s contentions. First, the agreement clearly
states the arbitrator has the power to award “all sums and forms
of relief as could be awarded or granted” in a civil action based on
the same claims of relief. Second, the agreement expressly states
the arbitration “shall be administered by JAMS” and “governed
by the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures
in effect at the time of filing for arbitration.” (Italics added.)
The agreement also provides a direct URL link to those rules
and states that a condensed copy of the rules is attached. Even if
Prell did not receive a copy of the rules, as he declares, he easily
could access them through the internet from the link. (See Lane
v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676,
26
691 [failure to attach copy of AAA rules did not render agreement
procedurally unconscionable where “[t]here could be no surprise,
as the arbitration rules referenced in the agreement were easily
accessible to the parties—the AAA rules were available on the
internet”].)
Relying on Harper v. Ultimo (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1402,
Prell contends the reference to arbitration rules without
attaching them to the contract renders the agreement
procedurally unconscionable because “ ‘[t]he customer is forced
to go to another source to find out the full import of what he or
she is about to sign—and must go to that effort prior to signing.’ ”
(Quoting Harper, at p. 1406.) Harper is inapposite. There, the
referenced arbitration rules at issue “limit[ed] the damages and
remedies available to dissatisfied customers.” (Id. at p. 1405.)
The agreement thus contained both oppression and surprise:
the customer’s “inability to receive full relief” was “artfully
hidden by merely referencing” the rules, and the customer “must
inevitably receive a nasty shock when he or she discover[ed] that
no relief [was] available.” (Id. at p. 1406.) The rules’ harsh effect
on the plaintiffs’ ability to recover also rendered the agreement
substantively unconscionable. (Id. at pp. 1407–1408.) No such
surprise or oppression is present here.
Baltazar is instructive. There, the plaintiff contended
that a higher degree of procedural unconscionability was present
—“warranting closer scrutiny of the substantive fairness of
the agreement’s terms”—because the employer did not provide
her with a copy of the AAA rules that governed any arbitration
between the parties. (Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1246.)
Our high court rejected the plaintiff’s contention because her
challenge to the enforcement of the agreement had nothing
27
to do with any element of the AAA rules. (Ibid.) Similarly,
here, Prell’s unconscionability challenge does not concern the
substance of the JAMS rules themselves—he does not argue a
substantively unconscionable term of the agreement was hidden
within the rules, as in Harper, for example. Accordingly, the fact
Prell allegedly did not receive a hard copy of the then-current
JAMS rules did not cause the agreement to attain a higher
degree of procedural unconscionability. In any event, “ ‘simply
because a provision within a contract of adhesion is not read
or understood by the nondrafting party does not justify a refusal
to enforce it. The unbargained-for term may only be denied
enforcement if it is also substantively unreasonable.’ ” (Nguyen,
supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 249.)
In sum, as there was no surprise (or claim of sharp
practices), we conclude the degree of procedural unconscionability
here did not rise far above that of an “[o]rdinary contract[ ] of
adhesion.” (Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1244.)
b. The agreement is not substantively unconscionable
“ ‘Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness
of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of whether
they are overly harsh or one-sided. [Citations.] A contract term
is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side
a greater benefit; rather, the term must be “so one-sided as to
‘shock the conscience.’ ” ’ ” (Carmona, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 85.) “[T]he paramount consideration in assessing [substantive]
conscionability is mutuality.” (Abramson v. Juniper Networks,
Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 657.)
Prell contends the agreement is substantively
unconscionable because it (1) lacks mutuality, (2) precludes
28
class-wide relief, (3) provides for inadequate discovery, and
(4) limits recovery of attorney fees. His contentions fail.
Prell’s first contention is not well-taken. The agreement
is not one-sided—it requires both parties to arbitrate claims
arising from Prell’s employment by The Lobster. Nor do the
express terms of the agreement exclude the claims Prell asserts
it does: the arbitrator is empowered to award “all . . . forms
of relief” available in court, which would include injunctive
and other equitable relief; and claims of unfair competition
or unauthorized use or disclosure of trade secrets/confidential
information would fall under the agreement’s coverage of
“tort claims.”
Prell cites no authority to support his contention that
the agreement’s preclusion of representative claims renders
the agreement substantively unconscionable. The agreement
requires all claims to be brought in a party’s individual, not
representative, capacity, “[e]xcept as proscribed by law and
consistent with the [FAA].” Prell argues this provision “render[s]
PAGA13 and class representative actions impotent,” but Prell’s
complaint did not assert any representative claims against
The Lobster, much less any PAGA claims. In any event,
arbitration agreements that contain class action waivers are
not unconscionable under the FAA. (See Concepcion, supra, 563
U.S. at pp. 336, 352 [FAA preempts California’s rule conditioning
enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of
classwide arbitration procedures].) As Prell does not assert a
PAGA claim against The Lobster, we need not determine whether
13 We presume Prell is referring to the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).
29
the agreement’s exclusion of representative actions constitutes
a waiver of representative PAGA claims. (See Viking River
Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 649 [arbitration
agreement may require arbitration of individual PAGA claim];
Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1123
[employee compelled to arbitrate individual PAGA claim may
litigate non-individual claim in court].)
Prell next argues the agreement provides for an
“inadequate amount of discovery.” The agreement expressly
provides, “The parties shall be entitled to fair pre-arbitration
discovery.” Prell seems to contend that the effect of this provision
is to enable the arbitrator “to severely limit written discovery
and number of depositions in comparison to that allowed in
civil court.” He claims he identified more than 10 witnesses
whom he needed to depose. As Prell notes, employees are
“at least entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate
their statutory [FEHA] claim[s].” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th
at p. 106.) On appeal, Prell has not demonstrated how the
agreement limits his ability to obtain necessary discovery.
As the trial court noted, “ ‘adequate’ discovery does not
mean unfettered discovery and Armendariz itself recognizes
an arbitration agreement may require ‘something less than the
full panoply of discovery provided in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1283.05.’ ” (Mercuro v. Superior Court (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 167, 184 & fn. 43, quoting Armendariz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at pp. 105–106.) The Lobster argues the JAMS rules
enable adequate discovery. Although Prell does not mention it
on appeal, as The Lobster notes, JAMS Rule 17 provides each
party “may take at least one deposition of an opposing Party or
an individual under the control of the opposing Party” and the
30
arbitrator may “grant a request for additional depositions,
based upon the reasonable need for the requested information.”
(JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures, Rule 17(b),
effective June 1, 2021, <https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-
employment-arbitration/english#Rule-17> [as of Aug. 27, 2025],
archived at <https://perma.cc/3G3N-YR8Z>.) Prell’s counsel
declared he anticipated taking depositions of six former
coworkers and six managers.
The trial court found Prell and his attorney’s “self-serving
declarations . . . that there are more than 10 witnesses that need
to be deposed . . . is insufficient to demonstrate the discovery
rules are unconscionable, particularly in light of the JAMS rule
that the arbitrator can grant additional depositions based upon
a showing of ‘reasonable need.’ ” We agree. Prell’s counsel’s
declaration did not make a showing of reasonable need for 10
or more depositions, nor did Prell demonstrate the arbitrator
would deny his request for additional depositions upon a showing
of reasonable need.14 Prell has failed to meet his burden that
the agreement did not provide for adequate discovery.
Finally, Prell argues the agreement “[l]imits appellant’s
relief with Attorney’s Fees [sic].” Prell relies on Trivedi v.
Curexo Technology Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 387, which
was disapproved of on another ground in Baltazar, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 1248. There, the appellate court found an
arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable where it
allowed for recovery of attorney fees and costs by the prevailing
party because it placed the employee at greater risk than if he
14 As The Lobster notes, in the end, Prell sought only one
deposition.
31
litigated his FEHA claims in court, where a prevailing employer
only would be able to recover fees and costs if the employee’s
claims were frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or
brought in bad faith. (Trivedi, at pp. 394–395.) The provision
here is not the same. The arbitrator may award all relief as
in a civil action based on the same claims, including recovery
of attorney fees and costs. Accordingly, as a court would not
be able to award The Lobster fees and costs if it prevailed on
Prell’s FEHA claims absent the above showing, neither can
the arbitrator. And, as Prell would be entitled to attorney fees
under the FEHA if he prevailed in court, he also is entitled
to them under the agreement.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court correctly found
that the agreement lacks substantive unconscionability and
the agreement was enforceable.
Because we conclude the trial court did not err in finding
the arbitration agreement enforceable, we need not consider
The Lobster’s contention that, because the agreement included
a delegation clause, Prell waived any challenge to arbitrability
by failing to seek a determination from the arbitrator.
5. The court did not abuse its discretion by not hearing
oral testimony
As his final contention of error, Prell argues the disputed
evidence before the court required it to hold an evidentiary
hearing “as a matter of proper procedure and due process.”
We disagree. We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s
decision as to whether to hear oral testimony. (Jones v. Solgen
Construction, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1203 (Jones).)
Even where the “ ‘better course’ ” would be to conduct an
evidentiary hearing, “the fact that the ‘better course’ was not
32
pursued does not mean that the court abused its discretion.”
(Id. at pp. 1203–1204.) Rather, an abuse of discretion exists
where the trial court “ ‘ “ ‘ “exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1203.)
Prell contends there are “significant disputed factual issues
concerning what appellant signed,” but we find none. Prell did
not declare the signature on the arbitration agreements attached
to Garcia’s declaration are not his or that the arbitration
agreement he signed included different terms than the signed
agreement submitted to the court. In contrast, in Ashburn
v. AIG Financial Advisors, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 79
(Ashburn), on which Prell relies, the appellate court found that,
given the parties disputed whether the agreement at issue
contained an arbitration agreement at all, the best course was
for the trial court to hear oral testimony and give each party
an opportunity to cross-examine the other. (Id. at pp. 98–99.)
Prell also contends a hearing was necessary because
disputed factual issues existed here as to what he was told and
how he came to sign the agreement, and there was “extensive
evidence that [The Lobster] stood in a ‘significant relationship’
with [Prell] before he signed any documents.” There were some
contradictions between Prell’s and Garcia’s declarations about
what Prell was told or what he said when presented with the
2020 agreement, but we can infer the trial court presumed Prell’s
declaration of the events was true, as we have in our analysis.
There also was a discrepancy as to whether Prell could access
his online personnel file, but we find no abuse of discretion in
the court’s implied resolution of that discrepancy without the
aid of oral testimony. None of the disputed facts here was as
33
“profound and extensive” as those in Ashburn. (See Jones, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1204–1205 [describing parties’ disputes
in Ashburn: they could not agree on what the agreements
were called, what appellants signed, whether alleged meetings
took place, or what the signed documents said].) Moreover,
in Ashburn, the court did not exercise its discretion at all. (See
Ashburn, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 97.) Here, Prell asked
for an evidentiary hearing and none took place. “Although
the court did not explain its implicit denial, we presume that
the court exercised its discretion in denying the request.” (Jones,
at p. 1204.) We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision
not to hold an evidentiary hearing based on the circumstances
here.
34
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal. (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 950–951.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
GAAB, J.*
* Judge of the Fresno County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
35
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.