Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer CA2/4

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Filed 8/28/25 Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CHRISTOPHER TREJO, B324219
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. YC058023)

v.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mary Ann Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.
Niddrie Addams Fuller Singh, Rupa G. Singh, for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
O’Melveny & Myers, Amy J. Laurendeau, Charles C.
Lifland, and Carlos M. Lazatin, for Defendant and Respondent.
In 2008, Christopher Trejo commenced this action against
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. (Johnson & Johnson) for
negligence and products liability claims after taking Motrin, an
over-the-counter ibuprofen medication. The matter proceeded to
trial in 2011 and resulted in a $48 million verdict in Trejo’s favor.
Johnson & Johnson appealed. In 2017, this court reversed the
judgment and remanded the matter for a limited retrial. In July
2022, Johnson & Johnson filed a motion to dismiss the action for
Trejo’s failure to bring the matter to retrial within three years
under the mandatory dismissal statutes (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 583.320 et seq.)1 The court granted the motion.
On appeal, Trejo contends the lower court abused its
discretion by refusing to toll or exclude from its calculation of the
retrial deadline periods in which the court (1) unilaterally
continued a pretrial hearing; (2) considered three failed
statements of disqualification filed by Trejo; and (3) engaged in
other “business and vacation.” We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint, Trial, and Direct Appeal
In 2005, Trejo took Motrin, a medication manufactured and
sold by Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary, McNeil Consumer
Healthcare (McNeil). Trejo suffered a reaction from the
medication in the form of a rare skin disease called Stevens-
Johnson Syndrome (SJS) and the more severe variant called
Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (collectively SJS/TEN). (Trejo v.
Johnson & Johnson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 110, 116 (Trejo I).)

1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

2
Trejo commenced this lawsuit and the matter proceeded to
trial in 2011 on claims of strict liability and negligent failure to
warn of skin-related symptoms associated with SJS/TEN, as well
as strict liability and negligent design defect based on the failure
to sell an allegedly safer product called dexibuprofen. (Trejo I,
supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 116, 123, 142.) By special verdict,
the jury found McNeil liable for negligent failure to warn,
negligent design defect, and strict liability design defect under
the consumer expectation test. Under the same test, the jury
found Johnson & Johnson liable for strict liability design defect.
Trejo was awarded $39,401,210 in economic, noneconomic, and
punitive damages against McNeil and $8,791,670 in punitive
damages against Johnson & Johnson. (Id. at p. 123.)
In 2017, a different panel of this court issued a lengthy
decision reversing the judgment and remanding the matter for
retrial, limited to claims for strict liability and negligent failure
to warn.2 (Trejo I, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 161.) Trejo’s
petitions for rehearing and review were denied in July and
October 2017, respectively. (Ibid.; S243672.)

2 In Trejo I, the parties filed numerous new authority letters and
stipulations to extend appellate briefing. Because an evolving theory
of federal preemption (impossibility preemption) was at issue, the
court required additional briefing from the parties. (See Trejo I, supra,
at pp. 149–152 [noting development of nationwide caselaw applying
impossibility preemption to over-the-counter medications].) In a post-
remand motion filed in November 2020, Trejo’s counsel acknowledged
briefing on the preemption issue was necessitated by the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Mutual Pharmaceutical Company, Inc., v.
Bartlett (2013) 570 U.S. 472, “which was decided a few months after
briefing on the appeal was completed on February 13, 2013.”

3
B. The Initial Retrial Deadline and Proceedings on
Remand
The remittitur was filed in the trial court on October 20,
2017. From this date, Trejo had three years to bring the matter
to retrial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.320, subd. (a)(3).) Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the deadline was initially extended by six
months to April 20, 2021. (See Cal. Rules of Court, Appen. I,
Emergency Rule 10(b).)3
The parties submitted (re)trial setting briefs in April 2018.
To permit additional discovery, Johnson & Johnson requested a
retrial date in September 2018. Represented by lead counsel and
several other attorneys throughout the underlying proceedings,
Trejo estimated trial would take “at least 23–27 court days” and
include “approximately 15–20 witnesses,” making it a long-cause
trial. (See Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 2.8(e) [long-
cause trial covers “20 or more days of testimony”].)
One year later (April 2019), Trejo designated 11 non-
retained expert witnesses and 17 retained expert witnesses. The
following month, the parties stipulated to complete all fact
witness and expert depositions, pretrial motions, and long-cause
package submissions no later than August 29, 2019.
Throughout 2019 and 2020, Johnson & Johnson requested
Trejo’s portions of exhibit and witness lists and proposed
statements of the case. In November 2020, Trejo filed a motion

3 “Notwithstanding any other law, including Code of Civil
Procedure section 583.320, for all civil actions filed on or before April 6,
2020, if a new trial is granted in the action, the three years provided in
section 583.320 in which the action must again be brought to trial is
extended by six months for a total time of three years and six months.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, Appen. I, Emergency Rule 10(b).)

4
for trial preference that was denied as premature. Trejo did not
refile or otherwise renew his request for trial preference.
On May 17, 2021, the parties filed their notice of
submission for long-cause determination.4 The court rejected the
submission as deficient because (1) the joint witness list
suggested some witnesses would “possibly” be called to testify;
(2) the joint exhibit list “reserve[d] several exhibits” for later use
by Trejo; and (3) the package did not include jury instructions or
special verdicts. The court found the matter not ready for trial.
Between April 2019 and August 2021, Trejo served 18 new
or revised reports from one designated expert (Dr. Soller) and
three new reports from other experts (Drs. Alessi, Bamshad, and
Sherman). Johnson & Johnson deposed (and in some instances,
re-deposed) these experts between February 2020 and November
2021.

C. Order to Show Cause re Dismissal and the Extended
Deadline
In October 2021, the court found a resubmitted long-cause
trial package deficient and declined to refer the matter for trial
“because the action appears to be subject to mandatory dismissal”
under the limitations statutes (§§ 538.320 et seq.). The court
issued an order to show cause re dismissal and scheduled a
hearing for November 5, 2021.
Following briefing and a hearing, the court found it
impossible, impracticable, or futile to bring the case to retrial by
April 2021 due to the “unavailability of courtrooms in Los

4 In subsequent briefing, Trejo’s counsel recognized his delayed
production of exhibits and an exhibit list, as well as “various
deficiencies” in his long cause documents.

5
Angeles . . . from at least March 17, 2020[,] to December 31, 2020,
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.” The court found the parties
were diligent in bringing the case to trial during this time. The
court discharged the order to show cause, excluded time from
March to December 2020 from the limitations period, and
imposed a new retrial deadline of February 1, 2022.
At the end of November 2021, Trejo served another expert
report with new opinions on cerebral atrophy and a previously
undisclosed MRI taken of Trejo in January 2021.
Johnson & Johnson moved to strike the report or leave to re-
depose the expert.

D. Stipulations to Extend or Toll the Extended Retrial
Deadline
Despite stating “we’re ready to start now” at a readiness
hearing on January 13, 2022, Trejo’s lead counsel sought
additional tolling of the retrial deadline under section 583.3505
from February 1 to August 1, 2022. Defense counsel objected to
this request and argued section 583.350 did not apply. After
summarizing ongoing discovery issues and the “fait accompli” in
Trejo’s inability to bring the matter to trial by the extended date
(February 1, 2022), defense counsel requested the ability to file a
motion to dismiss.

5 Section 583.350 provides: “If the time within which an action
must be brought to trial pursuant to this article is tolled or otherwise
extended pursuant to statute with the result that at the end of the
period of tolling or extension less than six months remains within
which the action must be brought to trial, the action shall not be
dismissed pursuant to this article if the action is brought to trial
within six months after the end of the period of tolling or extension.”

6
In light of counsel’s argument, the court suggested
“call[ing] one juror, meet the statute, and put it over for good
cause until the pandemic recedes” to avoid missing the
impending deadline. Rather than accepting the court’s
suggestion, the parties stipulated to toll the limitations period for
time between the date of the readiness hearing and the next trial
setting conference.
At the next trial setting conference on March 22, 2022, the
parties conditionally stipulated to further toll time until May 13,
2022, to allow an additional deposition of a physician newly
identified in Trejo’s expert reports to take place.6 The parties
maintained their respective positions on the retrial deadline:
April 1, 2021, according to defense counsel; and August 1, 2022,
according to Trejo’s counsel. The court assigned the matter for
retrial to a trial judge, where rulings on motions in limine would
begin “right away.”
At pretrial hearings in May and June 2022, the parties
conditionally stipulated to extend the retrial date to June 17 and
then July 22, 2022. As before, the stipulations preserved the
parties’ “arguments they’ve made on the time to start the trial.”

E. Additional Delay Before the Assigned Trial Judge
1. First Statement of Disqualification
On March 22, 2022, Trejo filed a notice of association of a
new attorney.7 The same day, the parties elected to forgo filing
an affidavit of prejudice (§ 170.6).

6 Johnson & Johnson deposed the physician on April 29, 2022.
7 Johnson & Johnson questions this attorney’s involvement in the
case, which included an “improper ex parte communication with
another Superior Court judge regarding settlement, which defense

7
On March 28, 2022, the court ordered the parties to submit
binders containing the following documents no later than April 6,
2022: all motions in limine and responses and replies; agreed
jury instructions and disputed instructions; special verdict forms
with interrogatories; the operative complaint and answer(s); and
exhibit and witness lists.
Two days later, Trejo filed a verified statement of
disqualification, arguing the trial judge’s personal relationship
with newly associated counsel might establish “a bias toward him
in this proceeding.” (See § 170.3, subd. (c)(1).)8 On April 8, 2022,
the trial judge found “no legal grounds for disqualification” and
struck the statement (See § 170.4, subd. (b).) The newly
associated attorney filed a notice of disassociation the following
month.

2. Second Statement of Disqualification
At a trial setting hearing on April 14, 2022, Trejo filed a
second statement of disqualification, arguing the court’s prior
order and statements regarding his first statement of
disqualification demonstrated judicial bias against him and his
counsel. The court paused the proceedings, continued trial

counsel learned about from the court.” Johnson & Johnson cites a
January 2022 letter from court counsel noting the attorney’s
unauthorized communications to a court clerk “were not requested,
and do not appear to be permitted by law.”
8 Section 170.3, subdivision (c)(1) allows a party to “file with the
clerk a written verified statement objecting to the hearing or trial
before the judge and setting forth the facts constituting the grounds for
disqualification of the judge.” An order determining disqualification
under this statute “is not an appealable order and may be reviewed
only by a writ of mandate.” (§ 170.3, subd. (d).)

8
setting, and scheduled a continued hearing for approximately 50
motions in limine for May 3, 2022. On April 22, 2022, the trial
judge struck the second statement of disqualification as
unsupported and unduly repetitive. (See § 170.4, subds. (b),
(c)(3)).

3. Trial Setting Delay and Additional Pretrial Hearings
The court held 11 days of trial setting and pretrial hearings
between May 11 and June 17, 2022, to consider motions in
limine, several iterations of jury instructions and verdict forms,
objections to 15 binders of deposition testimony sought to be read
at trial, and over 1,800 trial exhibits. At many of these hearings,
Trejo’s counsel raised new, unbriefed arguments that resulted in
additional delay.

a. New Legal Arguments
On May 18, 2022, the parties argued the first motion in
limine to exclude or permit references to around 50 adverse event
reports (AERs) on reactions to Motrin submitted to the Food and
Drug Administration by Johnson & Johnson. After noting no
discovery had been taken “as to these AERs,”9 the court inquired
of the reports’ relevance. Trejo’s counsel argued the reports
would show “the number of incidents in which they [(Johnson &
Johnson)] were put on notice to do a safety signal meeting or a
brand review.” Counsel noted there was likely a regulation
requiring safety signal meetings but said, “I can’t cite it off the

9 The court further noted: “Only two exemplar AERs have been
attached [to Trejo’s briefing]. There’s no indication in the papers
filed . . . as to how many reports are at issue, the years of the reports,
the medications involved, and the specific diseases involved other than
SJS and TEN.”

9
top of my head right now.” The court replied, “I couldn’t -- that
wasn’t in your papers, and I don’t feel that I can rule on this
without that, . . .” After the court ordered additional briefing,
Trejo’s counsel urged “one further thought” for the court to “also
consider association because the reg[ulation] requires label
change consideration.” The court responded: “You need to put
this in the brief. I’m not going to take new concepts of law while
I’m reading a tentative.”
On June 8, 2022, Trejo’s counsel raised another unbriefed
causation issue and requested an “opportunity to brief this
matter” or alternatively to call an expert witness to testify. The
following day (June 9, 2022), counsel made another new request
to permit testimony about Trejo’s “dreams of doing things” to
support his claim for damages. The court noted its inability to
research the issue “because I didn’t see this coming either, . . .”
On June 15, 2022, the court again questioned Trejo’s
counsel for raising another new theory, “not articulated” in
briefing, on applying law of the case to issues of punitive
damages. In response, counsel stated, “I don’t know,” and “it’s
the law of the case and we have 40 M.I.L.’s to deal with, . . .”
The court continued trial setting and pretrial hearings at
all but one of these hearings to permit supplemental briefing.

b. New Facts and Evidence
The court continued pretrial hearings to permit
supplemental briefing on new and unbriefed facts and evidence
presented by Trejo’s counsel. On May 18, counsel argued
Johnson & Johnson was subject to punitive damages for failing to
report several cases of SJS. When asked for a foundation,
counsel relied on communications that were not submitted to the

10
court with the briefing. Later at the hearing, Trejo’s counsel
argued two “internal reports” established Johnson & Johnson’s
bad motive, which was “critical for punitive damages.” As before,
counsel acknowledged these reports were not included in his
briefing.
On June 8, Trejo’s counsel referred to deposition and trial
testimony from a dermatologist he admittedly did not include in
his trial briefs. Counsel requested an “opportunity to bring it
because I don’t have [the deposition or trial testimony] with me.”
When marking trial exhibits at a June 15 hearing, Trejo’s
counsel served a “folded up stack of documents that is almost five
inches high.” The documents contained over 1,500 line listings
from the World Health Organization (WHO) regarding Motrin
and adverse skin reactions. The following day, the court stopped
another hearing, stating, “And yet again, you are giving us
documents at 9:36 [a.m.] . . . as we are arguing it.”
On June 17, Trejo’s counsel disclosed “yet another new
exhibit” of data on SJS/TEN and Motrin. Defense counsel
objected to “probably ten inches of folded data on counsel table”
and asked Trejo’s counsel to stop belatedly introducing new
evidence.

c. Noncompliance with Court Orders and Rules
Delayed and continued hearings also resulted from
counsel’s noncompliance with rules and court orders. On June 8,
Trejo’s counsel was admonished for violating a prior
supplemental briefing order on promotional materials Trejo
contended should have appeared on Motrin labeling and offers of
proof on a life care plan expert. On June 13, the court noted the
“many times” it extended Trejo’s deadline to file jury instructions

11
and “once again set another deadline for jury instructions” to be
lodged with the court on June 20.
On June 17, the court admonished Trejo’s counsel for
missing the filing deadline for “another eight inches of
documents” he sought to mark as trial exhibits.

4. Third Statement of Disqualification
At a pretrial hearing on July 8, 2022, Trejo’s counsel filed
and served a third statement of disqualification. Before
continuing the matter, the court summarized outstanding
pretrial issues, discussing motions in limine, deposition
testimony, and jury instructions and questionnaires. The court
continued the hearing to July 19 while cautioning the parties to
“be prepared to get a call to come in earlier than ten days” to
litigate those issues. The court inquired if the parties had
“anything of a procedural nature that you’re interested in
discussing?” When Trejo’s counsel noted July 22, 2022, was a
“sensitive” date given defense counsel’s position on the retrial
deadline, the court stated, “it shouldn’t be a problem; right?
22nd. We’re going to be back on the 19th. [¶] If you folks want
to stipulate to something, send it in with an order this time, . . .”
On July 18, 2022, the court struck Trejo’s third statement
of disqualification.10 The same day, the court issued an order
continuing the final status conference and pretrial hearing
previously scheduled for July 19 to July 25, 2022. The parties
received same-day telephonic notice.

10 This court denied Trejo’s writ petition challenging the order.

12
F. The Motion to Dismiss, Hearing, and Judgment
On July 25, 2022, Johnson & Johnson filed a motion to
dismiss the action due to Trejo’s failure to meet the initial (April
20, 2021) and extended (July 22, 2022) retrial deadline.
At the rescheduled pretrial hearing on July 27, 2022, the
court placed on the record improper ex parte communications
between Trejo’s counsel and court staff the day prior. During
those communications, counsel informed staff he intended to file
a writ and request the immediate empanelment of a jury. Over
defense objection, the court granted counsel’s request and began
to “cobble together” a jury from other courtrooms. To avoid
significant prejudice resulting from this process,11 the parties
stipulated to toll an additional period between the July 27
hearing and the court’s decision on the motion to dismiss. The
court granted Trejo’s request to recess the remaining pretrial
proceedings, and with counsel’s approval, set a July 29 deadline
to oppose the motion to dismiss. The court also ordered an
additional round of pretrial briefing due to Trejo’s untimely
submissions on a life care planner.
Trejo filed his written opposition on August 1, 2022,
requesting tolling of the statutory retrial deadline while (1) his
statements of disqualification were pending, and (2) while the
trial judge was on vacation or attending to other cases.
Following a hearing on August 5, 2022, the court took the
matter under submission. By 60-page order, the court granted
the motion and dismissed the action with prejudice. Despite its
efforts to chronicle the delays caused by Trejo, the court found it
difficult “to adequately describe the volume and frequency of the

11 Johnson & Johnson’s trial team was physically isolating due to
COVID-19.

13
filings and the time necessary to read, research, prepare
tentative rulings and conduct days of hearings that were caused
by the cycle of briefing, rebriefing, late briefs, arguments, and re-
arguments in this case.” Finding the repeated delay in bringing
the matter to trial “primarily caused” by Trejo, the court declined
to extend or toll periods requested in his opposition. The court
entered judgment in favor of Johnson & Johnson. Trejo
appealed.

DISCUSSION
Trejo contends the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to toll or exclude three different periods from its
calculation. He argues that bringing the matter to trial was
impossible, impracticable, or futile during the periods in which
(1) the court “unilaterally” continued pretrial hearings; (2) the
statements of disqualification were pending; and (3) the court
was engaged in other “press of business and vacation.”

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Where the judgment in an action is reversed and remanded
for new trial, the action “shall again be brought to trial” within
three years after the filing of the remittitur. (§ 583.320, subd.
(a)(3).) As this requirement is “mandatory” and not subject to
excuse except as provided by statute, the court must dismiss an
action if it is not brought within the time prescribed. (§ 583.360,
subds. (a)–(b).)
This appeal involves one statutory exception when
“[b]ringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was
impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340, subd. (c);
hereinafter § 583.340(c).) To establish this exception, the

14
plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) a circumstance of
impracticability; (2) a causal connection between that
circumstance and the plaintiff’s failure to move the case to trial;
and (3) that the plaintiff was reasonably diligent in moving the
case to trial.” (De Santiago v. D & G Plumbing, Inc. (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 365, 372 (De Santiago).)
We review dismissal orders under the limitations statutes
for abuse of discretion. (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1100 (Gaines).) We review findings of
fact for substantial evidence, conclusions of law de novo, and
application of law to facts for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) This
review is “limited” because “trial courts are best equipped to
evaluate the complicated factual matters that could support such
a finding. [Citation.]” (Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313, 324 (Tanguilig); see Bruns v. E-
Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 731.) The
appellant bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion.
(Sagi Plumbing v. Chartered Construction Corp. (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 443, 447.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to the three periods
Trejo contends should have been tolled or excluded under section
583.340(c).

B. “Unilateral” Continuance of the July 19 Pretrial
Hearing
Trejo contends the court abused its discretion by failing to
exclude from its calculation the eight-day period when it
“unilaterally continued” the final pretrial hearing originally
scheduled for July 19 to July 27, 2022.

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1. Forfeiture
Johnson & Johnson contends Trejo forfeited this
contention, as he did not raise it below. We agree.
“It has long been the general rule and understanding that
‘an appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of
its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial
court for its consideration.’” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396,
405; see also Tanguilig, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 330
[forfeiture “specifically applies to fact-based tolling arguments”].)
Trejo recognizes he did not raise this issue when opposing
Johnson & Johnson’s motion to dismiss. He argues instead that
he preserved the issue by raising it in a post-judgment motion for
new trial. The authorities on which Trejo relies do not support
this proposition. (Cf. Wilcox v. Ford (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1170,
1178 [issue raised in opposition to motion to dismiss and
separate, pre-judgment motion for relief (Civ. Code, § 473(b)),
which no party claimed was forfeited, considered on appeal];
Cohill v. Nationwide Auto Service (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 696,
699-702 [discussing waiver of right to jury when matter assigned
to bench trial].) “New theories that could have been raised, but
were not, is not one of the causes that permits a new trial.”
(Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety
Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 922.)
Trejo has forfeited this contention.

2. Merits
Exercising our discretion to consider this period and three
new arguments Trejo raises in support, we conclude they lack
merit.

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a. Mistaken Calendaring by Trial Counsel
Trejo argues the court erred in finding him “ineligible for
tolling” because his counsel mistakenly calculated an August 1,
2022 retrial deadline by improperly relying on section 583.350.
He does so while admitting this mistake by counsel.
Trejo’s admission is well-taken. (See Lee v. Park (1996) 43
Cal.App.4th 305, 309 (Lee) [noting “obligation” of plaintiffs to
properly calculate dismissal date under section 583.310].)
His claim of error, however, is not. Trejo cites no portion of
the dismissal order in which the court deemed him “ineligible for
tolling” because his counsel mistakenly calendared the deadline.
The only order Trejo cites is the order denying his motion for a
new trial. That order provides no discussion of the issue and
instead cross-references portions of the dismissal order.12 This
“frustrates this court’s ability to evaluate which facts [he]
believes support his position, particularly when a large portion of
that citation referred to points [and other portions of the record]
that appeared to be irrelevant.” (Nazari v. Ayrapetyan (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 690, 694.)
Independently correlated and reviewed, these two orders do
not support Trejo’s argument. Portions of the dismissal order did
recognize that Trejo’s counsel “perhaps believe[ed] the three-year
rule expired on August 1, 2022, the position counsel . . . stated on
the record.” But that does not mean the court imposed, as Trejo
maintains, a “categorical bar to relief” because of this mistake.

12 The order denying Trejo’s motion for new trial provides in
relevant part: “For the same reasons stated in the [dismissal] order at
pages 40 [through] 58, [Trejo’s] post-judgment request for an
additional tolling period between July 19, 2022 and July 27, 2022 is
denied.”

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Instead, the court’s decision was based on a recurring
pattern of “noncompliance with orders, filing late briefs without
seeking or obtaining leave to file late briefs, filing briefs that do
not comply with the Court’s orders, briefs that do not address
issues raised in the moving papers[,] requiring additional briefing
and additional hearings and numerous continuances.” Its
decision was also due to Trejo’s failure to pursue “many options”
within his control. These are all proper considerations under
section 583.340(c). (See Monzon v. Schaefer Ambulance Service,
Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 16, 28 (Monzon) [section 583.340(c)
“must be determined in light of all the circumstances in the
individual case, including the acts and conduct of the parties and
the nature of the proceedings themselves”].)

b. Equitable Estoppel Against the Trial Court
Trejo next contends that under “the unique facts here,” the
trial court was compelled to toll the continuance period because it
“reassure[ed] Trejo that the [retrial] deadline would be safe
because the parties would appear” at the originally scheduled
hearing on July 19, 2022. He cites various cases applying
equitable estoppel against a party as “a useful analytical tool.”
We reject this contention for several reasons.
First, as Trejo admits, equitable estoppel is limited to
injuries caused by the conduct of a litigant, not a court. (See
Pacific Merchant Shipping Assn. v. Board of Pilot Commissioners
etc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1055; see also United States v.
Doe (9th Cir. 2016) 987 F.3d 1216, 1220, fn. 3 [estoppel “is a
doctrine that applies to the parties, not the court”].)
Second, the representations about which Trejo complains
do not give rise to equitable estoppel. “As we have explained,

18
where a party asserts estoppel, ‘the facts proved must be such
that an estoppel is clearly deducible from them . . . . [Citation.]
[¶] The representation, whether by word or act, to justify a
prudent man in acting upon it, must be plain, not doubtful or
matter of questionable inference. Certainty is essential to all
estoppels. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Steinhart v. County of Los
Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1318 (Steinhart).)
Contrary to Trejo’s suggestion, the court did not
“affirmatively reassur[e]” him his retrial deadline would be safe.
At the July 8 hearing, the court continued pretrial matters to
July 19 to consider Trejo’s third statement of disqualification. It
then inquired if Trejo had “anything of a procedural nature that
you’re interested in discussing?” Counsel responded, “There’s a
stip[ulation] that is, as you recall, until the 22nd presently” for
beginning the retrial. The court replied:
“So it shouldn’t be a problem; right? 22nd.
We’re going to be back on the 19th. [¶] If you folks
want to stipulate to something, send it in with an
order this time, . . . . [J]ust send it in because I don’t
think I can make an order right now. I’m not sure.”13

Read properly in context, these statements do not evince an
intent for Trejo to ignore monitoring the case and his

13 Trejo’s appellate briefs omit the last three sentences of this
quotation. This is but one instance in which Trejo has misconstrued
the record. (E.g., Reply Brief at p. 7 [“those facts show that [the] trial
court had assured Trejo’s counsel the deadline would be safe whether
he took further action or not”].) While counsel advocates on behalf of
their clients, they must also provide all facts needed “‘to aid the court
in avoiding error and in determining the cause in accordance with
justice and the established rules of practice.’ [Citations.]” (Perry v.
Kia Motors America, Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1095–1096.)

19
approaching deadline. (See Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1097
[doctrine applies if party to be estopped “intended that its act or
omission be acted upon, or acted in such a way that the [other
party] rightfully believed it was intended”].) On the contrary,
these statements convey that counsel could avoid the retrial
deadline by sending in another stipulation. Trejo’s argument
fails as a matter of law. (See Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 1315 [court may adjudicate equitable estoppel “as a matter of
law” on undisputed facts].)

c. Scope of Diligence
Trejo argues the court erred by finding he failed to exercise
reasonable diligence under section 583.340(c) by focusing
“shortsightedly on the three-month period between April and
June 2022” as the case approached the retrial deadline. A critical
factor in determining whether section 583.340(c) applies is the
plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in prosecuting their
case. (Tamburina v. Combined Ins. Co. of America (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 323, 336.) This duty does apply “‘at all stages of the
proceedings,’ [but] the level of diligence required increases as the
. . . deadline approaches. [Citations.] The exercise of reasonable
diligence includes a duty ‘to monitor the case in the trial court to
ascertain whether any filing, scheduling or calendaring errors
have occurred.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.; see Wilshire Bundy Corp. v.
Auerbach (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1280, 1287 (Wilshire Bundy)
[“the greatest diligence is required” as deadline approaches].)
Determining whether a plaintiff exercises reasonable
diligence depends “‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in
prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable
diligence in overcoming those obstacles. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”

20
(Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 590 (Perez), italics
added.) As such, the “finding of reasonable diligence necessarily
applies to the period of excuse, not to plaintiff[’s] actions
throughout the case.” (Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v.
Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 243, 267; accord, Gaines,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1101 [conditions must interfere with
plaintiff’s “ability to ‘mov[e] the case to trial’ during the relevant
period”].)
Here, Trejo seeks to exclude an eight-day period between
July 19 and 27, 2022. As Trejo did not address his diligence
during this period below (or here on appeal), the trial court was
not called upon to address it. (See Perez, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th
at p. 592 [“it would indeed be peculiar for us to determine here
that the court abused discretion it was never given an
opportunity to exercise”].)
In any event, the trial court did make findings on Trejo’s
conduct during this period. In its dismissal order, the court
found Trejo had failed to take steps to bring the case to trial
while “the doors of the courthouse remained open to [him],
particularly after the [c]ourt struck the third statement of
disqualification on July 18, 2022. Counsel could have requested
[a] stipulation, filed an ex parte application requesting any judge
to swear a jury or to obtain a stipulation from defendant and the
[c]ourt would have granted those requests.”
The record amply supports this finding. Trejo received
same-day notice of the continuance but did not “check with the
court at the first indication” this continuance took the matter
beyond the retrial deadline. (See Hoffman v. State of California
(1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1107 (Hoffman); Karubian v.
Security Pacific Nat. Bank (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 134, 140

21
[counsel could discover calendar issue “in ample time to remedy
the situation” by single phone call, letter, or visit to the clerk’s
office].) Trejo did not “take whatever other measures were
available” to avoid missing the retrial deadline. (See De
Santiago, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 374.) He did not offer a
stipulation to extend or toll the retrial deadline, did not seek to
impanel a jury, and did not try to advance the case before the
deadline lapsed (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1335).
We do not accept Trejo’s attempt to disclaim these avenues
as “extraordinary or futile measures” that seem reasonable in
hindsight. “Plaintiffs’ position in this regard is that there is
nothing in the record to support the conclusion that such an effort
would have been successful. Nor is there anything indicating
that it would not.” (Hoffman, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 1107.)
Trejo’s counsel was fully advised he could attempt to impanel a
jury or stipulate to further continue or toll the limitations
periods. Counsel simply “did not do so.” (Gaines, supra, 62
Cal.4th at p. 1105.)

C. Statements of Disqualification
Trejo next contends the court should have tolled or
excluded 27 days while the court considered his statements of
disqualification. He computes these days from March 30 to April
8, 2022 (first statements of disqualification); April 14 to April 22,
2022 (second statement); and July 8 to July 18, 2022 (third
statement). Trejo avers it was “impracticable, at the least, to
retry the case before the very judge that [he] believed should be
disqualified.”14

14 Trejo does not argue, as he did below, that “jurisdiction of the
court to try the action was suspended.” (§ 583.340, subd. (a).)

22
As discussed, the section 583.340(c) exception requires (1) a
circumstance of impracticability; (2) a causal connection between
the circumstance and the failure to move the case to trial; and (3)
reasonable diligence in moving the case to trial. (De Santiago,
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 372.) Trejo has not established
these factors.
Regarding the first factor, Trejo furnishes this court no
authority establishing, as a matter of law, that the filing of
statements of disqualification constitute circumstances of
impracticability under section 583.340(c). “It is well established
that ‘“‘[e]very period of time during which the plaintiff does not
have it within his power to bring the case to trial is not to be
excluded in making the computation.’ [Citation.]”’ [Citations.]
. . . To hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to litigate piecemeal
every period, no matter how short, in which it was literally
impracticable to try the case, thus rendering the statute ‘utterly
indeterminate, subjective, and unadministerable.’ [Citation.]”
(Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1101.) It is thus “illusory to ask
if it [is] impracticable for [the plaintiff] to try the case during the
period of [a] stay because the posture of the case would not have
allowed for such a result. Rather, in these types of
circumstances, courts have focused on the extent to which the
conditions interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to ‘mov[e] the
case to trial’ during the relevant period.” (Ibid., secondary italics
added.)
These principles were applied in Hartman v. Santamarina
(1982) 30 Cal.3d 762 (Hartman) and Nail v. Osterholm (1970) 13
Cal.App.3d 682 (Nail), cases on which Trejo primarily relies.
In both cases, peremptory challenges were filed on the first
days scheduled for trial—after the parties fulfilled pretrial

23
requirements and “long before” the expiration of trial deadlines.
(Nail, supra, 13 Cal.App.3d at pp. 685, 687 [completed discovery,
pretrial conferences, and jury selection]; see Hartman, supra, 30
Cal.3d at p. 764.) However, on the first days scheduled for trial,
peremptory challenges to the trial judges (§ 170.6) resulted in
dismissal of the juries and lapsed trial deadlines. (See Nail,
supra, at p. 685 [excusing jury without taking case off calendar];
Hartman, supra, at p. 764 [excusing jury and continuing trial
beyond deadline].) Among “all of the circumstances” considered
were the parties’ trial readiness and their “fundamental right . . .
to disqualify a trial judge pursuant to the provisions of section
170.6.” (Nail, supra, at pp. 686–688; see Hartman, supra, at
p. 764.)
In light of the circumstances before them, the Nail and
Hartman courts held “that if a case is timely set for trial, and if
thereafter a challenge against the trial judge to whom it is
assigned is allowed, . . . the period that the trial is held in
abeyance pending the assignment of another judge is to be
disregarded in considering a subsequent motion to dismiss.”
(Nail, supra, 13 Cal.App.3d at p. 686; see Hartman, supra, at
p. 768 [adopting holding].)
The circumstances in Nail and Hartman are not present in
this case. Trejo did not peremptorily challenge the assigned
judge (§ 170.6). He sought, unsuccessfully and repeatedly, to
disqualify the assigned judge for cause (§170.3). Challenges for
cause are “very different” from peremptory challenges; they are
not “automatic” and must be based on a good faith, factual
showing. (Magana v. Superior Court (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 840,
865, fn. 8.) Having disclosed “no legal grounds for
disqualification” (§ 170.4, subd. (b)) Trejo’s statements were

24
stricken, resulting “not only [in a] predictable, but more
importantly, invited” period of delay caused by Trejo. (Tanguilig,
supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 329.) Avoidable delays occasioned by
a party—which include “meritless” statements of
disqualification—“cannot justify tolling.” (Ibid.; Messih v. Levine
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 454, 460.)
It is also undisputed the parties were not ready for trial
during (and even after) the pendency of each statement. Pending
his first statement, Trejo missed a deadline to file his pretrial
binder. During later periods between May 18 and June 17, 2022,
Trejo’s counsel introduced new and voluminous binders of
proposed trial evidence (AERs; internal reports and
communications; WHO data; and deposition testimony), and
raised new, unbriefed legal arguments. Counsel also failed to
timely submit supplemental briefing and jury instructions.
Trejo furnishes no argument correlating any of these delays
with the circumstances for which he seeks tolling. “[I]t has never
been held or even hinted that time stands still while the parties
are going through the necessary motions of getting a case ready
for trial.” (Standard Oil Company of California v. Superior Court
(1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 852, 857.)
Thus, because “nothing prevented [Trejo] from conducting
[his] own trial preparation during this time,” the periods he seeks
to toll do not constitute causally related circumstances of
impracticability under section 583.340(c). (Gaines, supra, 62
Cal.4th at p. 1102.)

D. Press of Business and Vacation
Finally, Trejo contends the trial court should have tolled 11
days between June 27 and July 8, 2022, “when it was dark to

25
work on . . . another case and because of a pre-planned
[vacation]” of which the parties had six weeks’ notice.15 As
before, Trejo concedes this contention lacks legal support. His
admission is well-taken. “‘“Time consumed by the delay caused
by ordinary incidents of proceedings, . . . are not within the
contemplation of these exceptions.”’ [Citations.]” (Gaines, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 1101; see Tamburina, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at
p. 329 [“it is reasonable to expect that counsel will be away from
. . . due to illness, vacation and the like”].)
Notwithstanding these well-established principles, Trejo
argues the trial court’s “insistence” on resolving disputed pretrial
issues prior to selecting a jury “transformed” normal waiting into
periods of impracticability. He relies on an order providing:
“Jury selection will commence when motions in limine, objections
to depositions, the jury questionnaire and other disputed matters
have been finally resolved.”
Trejo provides this court with no reason to question this
pretrial order. Trial courts “have inherent authority to control
their own calendars and dockets” (Walker v. Superior Court
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 267; see § 128, subd. (a)(3)) and generally
must receive all trial materials (pre-marked exhibits, jury
instruction requests, witness lists, motions in limine, etc.) before
a final status conference and commencement of trial. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.713(c); Super Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules,
rules 3.25(f), 3.25(g); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1112(f)
[“timing and place of the filing and service of the motion [in
limine] are at the discretion of the trial judge”].)

15 At the first pretrial hearing on May 11, 2022, the assigned trial
judge informed counsel it would be dark June 29 to July 6.

26
Trejo’s argument also blurs the distinction between jury
selection and impaneling a pool of jurors to avoid a (re)trial
deadline. The former process is deliberative. (See Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 222.5, 226.) The latter exercise is not. To avoid an
impending trial deadline, “[t]welve prospective jurors [are] put
into the box, both sides pass[ ] for cause, the jury [is] sworn, and
[the] plaintiff move[s] for a continuance . . . .” (Hartman, supra,
30 Cal.3d at p. 764; see Lakkees v. Superior Court (1990) 222
Cal.App.3d 531, 536 [“it is sufficient that the jury be impanelled
[sic] and sworn, even if it is subsequently discharged”].) This
process, a “‘charade’” of “rites denoting the commencement of a
trial,” is a “‘trial-started fiction.’” (Hartman, supra, at pp. 765–
766; Central Mutual Ins. Co. v. Executive Motor Home Sales, Inc.
(1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 791, 795.)
Trejo’s counsel understood this exercise but did not timely
pursue it. In January 2022, the supervising judge noted this
process while warning about the impending deadline. Later in
July, counsel discussed this exercise during improper ex parte
communications with court staff. Believing, erroneously, that the
deadline was August 1, 2022, counsel did not timely invoke this
exercise. (See Taylor v. Hayes (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1410–
1411 [discussing cases in which “the inadvertent selection of a
trial date [by counsel] does not constitute the type of
impracticability, impossibility or futility”].)
As we have discussed, section 583.340(c) applies only to
circumstances outside Trejo’s control that prevented or interfered
with his ability to prepare for or begin trial. The cases on which
he relies support this proposition. (See Jordan v. Superstar
Sandcars (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1421 [trial moratoriums
not tolled because they “did not prevent or interfere with”

27
prosecuting case]; Chin v. Meier (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1473,
1478 [court-ordered continuance tolled because “both sides
announce[d] ‘ready’ and no courtroom [was] available”]; Monzon,
supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 27 [“the supervising judge trailed the
case due to court congestion, not respondents’ lack of
preparation”].) Trejo does not explain how ordinary delays in this
case prevented or interfered with his own trial preparation.

CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Trejo’s contentions fail to acknowledge periods
of delay he admits were caused by his counsel’s “late or deficient
filings and notices of errata.” The duty to calculate and track
critical dates falls on the plaintiff, not the court. (Lee, supra, 43
Cal.App.4th at p. 309; Wilshire Bundy, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1287; see also Lemaire, Faunce & Katznelson v. Cox (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 297, 302 [“a mistake by the trial court does not
release a plaintiff from the duty of keeping track of the time for
trial”]; Moore & Thomas, Cal. Civil Practice Procedure (2025),
Ch. 22, § 22:53 [“it is also no excuse that a failure to meet the
five-year [trial] deadline was due to an error of the court or court
clerk”].) Trejo does not establish a circumstance of impossibility,
impracticability, or futility, a causal connection between any
circumstance and his failure to move the case to trial, or
reasonable diligence warranting exclusion of periods under
section 583.340(c). We therefore perceive no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s rejection of Trejo’s claims of impracticability.16

16 In light of our conclusion, we do not consider Johnson &
Johnson’s alternative arguments addressing tolling beyond the initial
retrial deadline.

28
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, J.

We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

29

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