Wang v. Jiang CA2/4

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Filed 8/27/25 Wang v. Jiang CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

GUI WANG,
B335244; B339080
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
(Los Angeles County
YUANZHAO JIANG, Super. Ct. No. 22STFL04483)

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bradley S. Phillips, Judge. Affirmed.
Yuanzhao Jiang, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

This is the second appeal in this family law case. In the
first appeal, a different panel of this court affirmed a five-year
domestic violence restraining order, issued on September 28,
2022, against appellant Yuanzhao Jiang (Jiang) and in favor of
respondent Gui Wang, and their daughter, Mingxin Jiang.
(Wang v. Jiang (Jan. 29, 2025, B324791) [nonpub. opn.].)
In this consolidated appeal1, Jiang now challenges the
judgment of dissolution and the judgment on reserved issues,
entered on October 23, 2023 and March 20, 2024 respectively. He
makes several arguments for reversal of the judgments, including
that the trial court: violated his due process rights by proceeding
in his absence; abused its discretion in denying him custody of his
daughter and visitation; miscalculated child support by relying
on only one month’s earnings; and exhibited bias against him.
None of his arguments is supported by coherent analysis and
discussion, or pertinent legal authority. Nor has Jiang provided
a reporter’s transcript of any of the relevant proceedings, and no
error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record.
Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Our summary of the factual and procedural background is
taken from the very limited record on appeal.
Wang filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on April
25, 2022. On October 13, 2023, the trial court called the matter
for trial. Wang testified on her own behalf. Jiang was initially

1 On the court’s own motion, on May 27, 2025, we
consolidated case numbers B335244 and B339080 for argument
and decision.

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present, but “[d]ue to [Jiang’s] medical issue, the court [took] a
recess.” The trial then resumed without the presence of Jiang.
The court found that “irreconcilable differences have arisen” and
granted “judgment of dissolution as to status only.” It continued
the trial, however, “on the remaining issues.” The trial court
entered judgment of dissolution on October 23, 2023, and
reserved jurisdiction over all other issues.
On February 23, 2024, the trial court held a contested
proceeding on reserved issues. Wang and Jiang appeared for the
hearing. On March 20, 2024, the trial court entered judgment on
reserved issues. Specifically, as to child custody and visitation,
the court granted Wang sole legal and physical custody of their
daughter, and ordered no visitation for Jiang. The trial court
further ordered that Jiang pay Wang a monthly amount of
$1,104.00 in child support.
Jiang separately appealed from the judgment of dissolution
and the judgment on reserved issues. As noted above, we
consolidated those appeals.

DISCUSSION
I. Fundamental Appellate Procedural Principles
It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that a trial
court’s order or judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant
bears the burden to demonstrate prejudicial error. “All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the
judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error
must be affirmatively shown.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham).) All contentions of error asserted in
appellant’s brief must include coherent analysis and discussion,
supported by pertinent authority reflecting the logical and legal
analysis by which the appellant reached the conclusions he urges

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us to adopt. (Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 989, 1007.) The appellant’s arguments must “be
tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate review,”
(Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372,
1388), and failure to do so may be considered a concession that an
assertion lacks merit. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021.)
That Jiang is self-represented does not exempt him from
these rules. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–
1247.) He is entitled to “ ‘the same, but no greater consideration
than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 1247;
Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638–639, fn. omitted
[self-represented litigant is bound by the “same restrictive rules
of procedure as an attorney [Citation.]”].)

II. Jiang Has Not Met His Burden to Show the Trial
Court Erred
We begin with Jiang’s appeal from the judgment of
dissolution. Although not entirely clear, it appears Jiang’s
primary contention is that the court violated his due process
rights by proceeding with trial despite his medical emergency.
He also contends that the court “displayed a preconceived
inclination towards issuing a ruling favorable to [Wang],
disregarding [Jiang’s] substantive claims” and that the court’s
failure to issue a detailed statement of decision violated Family
Code section 2330.
The appellate record does not include a reporter’s
transcript of the trial. The record is therefore limited to the
minute order that states: “Due to [Jiang’s] medical issue, the
court takes a recess. [¶] The trial resumes without the presence
of [Jiang].” Because we cannot tell what occurred at the trial or

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whether Jiang requested a continuance, Jiang has failed to
demonstrate prejudicial error. (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p.
564.) Jiang’s conclusory assertion that the judgment “caused
substantial prejudice to the absent party” is insufficient. As
discussed above, the court granted “judgment of dissolution as to
status only” and continued the trial on all other issues, including
custody and child support. We therefore discern no prejudice.
(See D.D. v. Pitcher (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1057 [Prejudice
is not presumed. Rather, “to obtain a reversal of the judgment,
an appellant bears the burden of demonstrating not only that the
trial court committed error but also that the error
was prejudicial”].)
There is also no basis whatsoever in the limited appellate
record for Jiang’s assertion of judicial bias. (See Electronic
Equipment Express, Inc. v. Donald H. Seiler & Co. (1981) 122
Cal.App.3d 834, 858–859, fn. 13 [“The party asserting errors at
trial has the burden to properly present his case and to designate
an adequate record”].)
Finally, Jiang fails to explain how the absence of a detailed
statement of decision purportedly violates Family Code section
2330 (which provides a list of facts that must be provided in a
petition for dissolution of marriage, such as the date of marriage
and date of separation). He has thus forfeited this argument.
(See, e.g., L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620 (L.O.)
[“ ‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness.’ . . . Consequently, ‘[w]hen an appellant . . . fails to
support [a point] with reasoned argument and citation to
authority, we treat the point as [forfeited]’ ”].)

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Accordingly, Jiang has failed to carry his burden to
demonstrate reversible error with respect to the judgment of
dissolution.
Jiang’s appeal from the judgment on reserved issues suffers
from the same fatal flaws. Jiang again argues that the trial court
violated his due process rights by proceeding in his absence. It is
unclear from Jiang’s appellate brief and the record, however,
which hearings he did not attend. Jiang merely argues, without
citation to the record, that the trial court conducted “critical
hearings without [his] presence[.]” Based on our review of the
record, on March 18, 2024, Jiang filed an ex parte application to
continue an unspecified hearing set for that same day. The trial
court denied the application. However, the judgment on reserved
issues states that Jiang was present for the contested hearing
held on February 23, 2024. Because we cannot determine the
factual basis for Jiang’s argument (i.e., which hearings he did not
attend and the reason for his absence), we reject this argument
as forfeited. (See L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620 [appellant
forfeited arguments that were legally and factually
unsupported].)
Jiang next argues the trial court abused its discretion by
denying him custody of his daughter and visitation, and that the
trial court misapplied Family Code section 40552 in calculating
child support. As discussed below, these arguments are
unsupported by reasoned analysis.
As to custody and visitation, Jiang argues the minute order
“lacks any finding of risk from [Jiang]—previously the child’s
primarily caregiver . . . .” In addition to being undeveloped,

2 Section 4055 provides the statewide uniform guideline for
determining child support.

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Jiang’s argument is also refuted by the domestic violence
restraining order issued against him and in favor of Wang and
their daughter. Jiang also cites In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)
13 Cal.4th 25 and Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57 (Troxel),
but the basis for his reliance on those cases is not apparent.
Neither case is relevant. (See In re Marriage of Burgess, supra,
13 Cal.4th at p. 29 [holding that “after a judicial custody order is
in place, a custodial parent seeking to relocate bears no burden of
establishing that it is ‘necessary’ to do so. Instead, he or she ‘has
the right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power
of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights
or welfare of the child.’ ”]; Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 72–73
[application of a state statute to allow visitation rights to the
paternal grandparents violated the mother’s right, under the
federal due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of her
children].)
Regarding child support, Jiang argues the trial court erred
by relying on an incomplete financial picture. Without citation to
the record, he contends the court relied on only one month’s
earnings and disregarded his “DVRO-induced unemployment[.]”
The “DissoMaster Report” attached to the child support order
indicates Jiang’s monthly income at the time the report was filed
in February 2024 was $2,773. Jiang points to nothing in the
record, and we have not located any evidence in the record,
demonstrating Jiang’s monthly income was inaccurate at the
time of the report. We therefore reject Jiang’s unsubstantiated
argument.3

3 Jiang again makes unfounded accusations of judicial bias
and retaliation in connection with his appeal from the judgment

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DISPOSITION

The October 23, 2023 judgment of dissolution and March
20, 2024 judgment on reserved issues are affirmed. Wang is
awarded her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

MORI, J.

on reserved issues. We deem these claims forfeited. (See L.O.,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.)

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